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Chapter One:  Introduction 
 
I. Some Photographs. 
 
In the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company archives at the University of Akron, 
Ohio, there is a series of photographs of a signing ceremony held in Jakarta, Indonesia, 
on 14 February 1967.
1
 From captions on some of the photographs we learn that the 
signing ceremony featured the execution between Goodyear and the government of 
Indonesia (the ―GOI‖) of an agreement ―for the return of the Indonesian Company by the 
Republic of Indonesia to Goodyear International Company.‖ The agenda of the ceremony 
included a speech by Mr. Sullivan Kafer, Vice President of Goodyear International 
Corporation, the formal signing of legal documentation, and much handshaking and 
mixing. The agreement itself was signed by Mr. Barli Halim, the Secretary General of the 
Ministry of Basic and Light Industry and Power, on behalf of the GOI, and by Mr. Kafer 
on behalf of Goodyear. The ceremony took place in a large room, with several rows of 
white chairs for some 30-40 guests facing a large table at which the documents were 
signed. Witnesses to the ceremony standing behind the signing table included Colonel 
Agus Sujono, identified as the Director General of Chemical Industries, and Mr. S. Alim, 
identified as the chairman of the ―Supervisional Board of Goodyear appointed by the 
Government,‖ and other identified attendees of note included Colonel Barkah Tirtadidjaja 
(Inspector General of the Ministry of Basic and Light Industry and Power), and Dr. 
Pamungkas (a high ranking official from the Ministry of Finance). Behind the signing 
table was a giant map of Indonesia with the following words in large letters emblazoned 
at the top, clearly visible for all to see: Pembangunan Semesta untuk Bidang Industri, 
                                                 
1
 GYA, Property Box 12 and Audio Visual Box 3. 
 2 
 
roughly translated as ‗National Industrial Development.‘
2
 The conspicuous positioning of 
this map with its slogan suggested that the ―return of the Indonesian Company‖ would 
somehow contribute to Indonesia‘s national economic development. Indeed, the series of 
photos conveys a positive feeling, a sense that something good has happened, with smiles 
and handshakes all around.  
What the photos do not contain is an explanation of the mysterious circumstances 
surrounding this event. What was the ―Indonesian Company‖ that was returned by the 
Indonesian government to Goodyear? Had it previously belonged to Goodyear, and, if so, 
how and why had it been taken away? What had happened to it? Why was the GOI now 
returning it to Goodyear? And what was the ―supervisional board‖ appointed by the GOI? 
As we shall see, the unidentified ―Indonesian company‖ was actually Goodyear‘s tire 
factory located in Bogor, a small town just outside Jakarta. Established in the mid-1930s, 
it was taken over by the GOI in March 1965, and was controlled by the GOI for about 
two years until its return to Goodyear in late April 1967. The ―supervisional board‖ was 
the GOI-appointed team of Indonesians established to operate the factory while under 
government control. ‗Why and how‘ Goodyear‘s factory, along with almost every other 
foreign company in Indonesia, was taken over by the GOI is the subject of this 
dissertation.   
  
II. The Big Picture: The Takeover of Foreign Companies 
and Elimination of Foreign Investment in Indonesia from 
1963-1965. 
 
In fact, the takeover of Goodyear‘s tire factory mirrored the experience of almost 
every other foreign company with operations in Indonesia. In a 28 month period from 
                                                 
2
 The phrase is actually a slogan somewhat typical of the many slogans used in Indonesia to encourage 
economic development. It is difficult to translate exactly, but the general concept is the promotion or 
encouragement of industrial development throughout the entire country (hence the map of the entire 
country below the slogan). For an excellent discussion of the history and connotations of the term 
pembangunan, or ‗development,‘ see the introduction to Ian Chalmers and Vedi  Hadiz, eds., The Politics 
of Economic Development in Indonesia: Contending Perspectives, Routledge Studies in the Growth 
Economies of Asia, no. 9; (London: Routledge, 1997).      
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September 1963 to December 1965, at least 90 foreign companies of various 
nationalities, ranging from British to American to Belgian to Malaysian, were taken over 
by the GOI. Collectively these 90 plus companies, which included oil companies, 
plantations, manufacturing plants and a handful of enterprises in other fields (see Chapter 
Three for a general description and Appendix A for a list), accounted for virtually all 
existing foreign direct investment in Indonesia. Moreover, in May 1965 further foreign 
direct investment in Indonesia was prohibited by law.  In essence, the entire foreign 
investment sector in Indonesia was seized by the GOI and the country closed itself off 
from private foreign investment in what was the pinnacle of economic nationalism in 
modern Indonesian history. As we shall see, there were a few major exceptions to this 
elimination of foreign investment, principally two large oil companies, but even these 
were put under nominal GOI supervision and were the subject of repeated threats of 
takeover. 
The principal questions this dissertation seeks to answer are what companies were 
taken over, how were these enterprises taken over, and why? Why does a country elect to 
seize virtually all foreign direct investment and then prohibit any future foreign 
investment? Moreover, what is the significance of these events, and how do they fit into 
modern Indonesian history? Answering these questions requires us to look closely at the 
last few years of the Guided Democracy era in Indonesia (1959-1966), particularly the 




To summarize briefly, I argue that the elimination of foreign investment in 
Indonesia during this period was the result of a complex confluence of Indonesian 
domestic political struggle and instability, foreign relations, and domestic economic 
policy. Moreover, the takeovers occurred in separate waves that until 1965 were not the 
result of a grand plan of the Indonesian government to eliminate all foreign investment 
but instead were targeted at specific groups and ad hoc in nature. I argue that the year 
1963, with the outbreak of Konfrontasi against Malaysia (see below), proved to be the 
key watershed in Indonesia in each of these three areas, a year which saw incipient trends 
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 As described further in Chapter Two, the Guided Democracy era was preceded by the period of 
Parliamentary Democracy (1950-59) and followed by the New Order period (1966-98). 
 4 
 
(in some cases, only just visible on the surface) develop and accelerate rapidly by 1965 to 
the point where a culmination of sorts was reached in all three areas. Indeed, I view 1965-
66 not just in terms of the familiar political struggle resulting in the collapse of Sukarno‘s 
Guided Democracy and the change to a new regime, but also as the climax to a long-term 
deterioration of the Indonesian economy and to Indonesia‘s stridently anti-imperialist 
foreign policy. Of course, these trends and culminations were interrelated and fed off one 
another. Moreover, I suggest that foreign investment was one of the few areas located at 
the intersection of these three trajectories.   
In terms of domestic politics, prior to 1963 political power was shared primarily 
by President Sukarno and the Indonesian army in an uneasy, competitive alliance. 
Beginning in early 1964 the communist party of Indonesia (the PKI) went on the political 
offensive and became a much more visible and voluble political factor, giving rise to 
what has frequently been described as a triangle of power among President Sukarno, the 
PKI and the Indonesian army. Indonesian politics after 1963 became very polarized and 
radicalized, as underlying differences rose to the surface in the wake of the PKI‘s 
dynamic offensive. Central to the PKI‘s apparent increasing influence was its focus on 
nationalism, a focus that really began to pay dividends when Konfrontasi against 
Malaysia exploded in 1963 (a good example of how domestic politics and foreign 
relations were increasingly intertwined during the last few years of Guided Democracy).  
The PKI‘s increasingly assertive stance led it to take a principal role in the takeovers of 
British companies in early 1964, forcing the GOI to intervene – in essence, these 
companies were caught up in domestic political conflict. President Sukarno, as the 
dominant individual during Guided Democracy, the core around which Guided 
Democracy was constructed, also was closely involved in the takeovers. Initially, with 
the exception of the Malaysian companies in 1963, President Sukarno appeared to oppose 
taking over foreign companies, but by late 1964 the President came to be at the forefront 
of the takeover movement. The army, the third leg of the triangle, appeared to be little 
involved in the takeovers, though army officers were certainly aware of what was going 
on and at times opposed further takeovers. It was, of course, the PKI‘s conflict with the 
Indonesian army that was the dominant political feature in 1965, resulting in the 
destruction of the PKI, the emergence of open political conflict between President 
 5 
 
Sukarno and his opponents, led by General Suharto, and the eventual downfall of 
President Sukarno and Guided Democracy. To a limited extent, the final push in late 
1965 to take over the foreign oil companies became entwined in the domestic political 
power struggle.   
A second important feature of political life in the last few years of Guided 
Democracy was the emphasis on continued revolution, ideological indoctrination, and 
mass mobilization.  This resulted in the heavy politicization of daily life and a very 
surreal atmosphere, ripe with intrigue, over the last two years of Guided Democracy. This 
trend was led by President Sukarno himself, and generally supported by the PKI, though 
the ultimate aims of the PKI did not coincide with Sukarno‘s. The push toward revolution 
and politicization was evident before 1963, but again accelerated noticeably in that year 
and thereafter. Similarly, mass mobilization – demonstrations, strikes, rallies, etc. – 
became very frequent after 1962. Both government and society were highly politicized, 
and revolutionary slogans, legitimated by Sukarno but after 1963 increasingly voiced by 
the PKI, became a common feature of political life. Revolutionary politics and mass 
mobilization certainly impacted foreign companies, as three of the five waves of 
takeovers  by the GOI were actually precipitated by physical seizures (or threats thereof) 
of those companies by mass labor organizations, frequently but not always led by the 
PKI-controlled labor federation SOBSI and also by labor groups linked to the PNI 
political party.         
With respect to international relations, it is also evident that many of the takeovers 
of foreign companies were closely linked to Indonesia‘s foreign relations. Foreign affairs 
under Guided Democracy was the domain of President Sukarno, who rejected Indonesia‘s 
‗independent and active‘ foreign policy in favor of an increasingly strong anti-imperialist 
one that emphasized the worldwide struggle between countries of the Newly Emerging 
Forces, or ‗NEFOs‘ (which included Indonesia and other underdeveloped ex-colonial 
nations), and countries from the Old Established Forces, or ‗OLDEFOs‘ (which were 
generally western European nations and the United States). This policy led to Indonesia‘s 
withdrawal from the United Nations and other international agencies in 1965, and also to 
an alliance of strange bedfellows with the Peoples Republic of China. In many cases, the 
foreign companies simply were pawns in – or hostages of - Indonesia‘s foreign relations, 
 6 
 
a means through which the GOI tried to exert pressure on foreign governments. In 
particular, the takeovers of British and Malaysian companies were clearly linked to the 
conflict known as ‗Konfrontasi‘ or ‗Confrontation‘ between Indonesia, on the one hand, 
and Great Britain and Malaysia, on the other, that arose with the creation of Malaysia in 
1963.  The takeover of Malaysian companies in 1963 was a retaliatory measure by the 
GOI to punish Malaysia for its role in Konfrontasi, and Konfrontasi also figured 
prominently in the takeover of British enterprises in 1963 and 1964. Konfrontasi, as well 
as Sukarno‘s increasing emphasis on the anti-imperialist NEFO/OLDFO conflict, also 
resulted in the deterioration of the Indonesian–United States bilateral relationship, which 
was the prime reason for the takeovers of American companies in early 1965.      
In addition to domestic politics and foreign relations, economic policy contributed 
to the virtual elimination of foreign direct investment in Indonesia by the end of 1965. 
Since independence in late 1949, Indonesia had made some attempts to build a viable, 
sustainable and independent economy. The role of foreign capital figured prominently in 
this construction of a national economy, largely because most of the ‗modern‘ sectors of 
the economy (plantations, industry, high finance, etc.) were foreign-owned. With the 
seizure and subsequent nationalization of Dutch enterprises in 1957-59, however, much 
of this modern sector fell into Indonesian hands in a process one scholar has recently 
described as ―economic decolonization.‖
4
 Under Guided Democracy, the Indonesian 
economy was deemed to be a ‗Guided Economy‘ with an increased emphasis on 
economic nationalism and a decided shift to state-led economic development, all under 
the rubric of ‗Socialism `a la Indonesia.‘ In late 1960, a highly politicized Eight Year 
Development Plan was promulgated, but by 1962 it was clear that this plan was not 
working, as economic growth had stagnated and inflation, common in Indonesia before 
the Guided Democracy era but since 1959 increasingly serious, was a major problem. In 
mid-1963, President Sukarno, with the urging and support of the United States, finally 
agreed to an economic stabilization program, but this collapsed in the wake of the 
outbreak of Konfrontasi.  This program would in fact be the last major effort under 
Guided Democracy to address economic problems. Two years later, in April 1965 
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 Thomas Lindblad, Bridges to New Business: The Economic Decolonization of Indonesia (Leiden, 
Holland: KITLV Press, 2008). 
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President Sukarno publicly wrote off the Eight Year Development Plan and launched a 
new program of economic self-reliance known as BERDIKARI, an acronym for berdiri 
di atas kaki sendiri, or ‗standing on your own feet.‘ While its outlines were vague and 
implementation almost non-existent, BERDIKARI did result in the prohibition on further 
foreign investment as well as the takeover in 1965 of remaining foreign companies in 
Indonesia. Hence, the final wave of takeovers in 1965 was driven by this official change 
in economic policy; foreign investment would no longer play a role in Indonesia‘s 
economic development and construction of a national economy. It was the pinnacle of 
economic nationalism in independent Indonesia. 
However, I do not mean to suggest that the takeovers of foreign companies were 
part of some strategic, long-term plan by the GOI to rid Indonesia of foreign investment. 
In fact, I argue that quite the opposite occurred, that the takeovers occurred in separate, 
distinct waves, with each wave having its own reasons and logic, variously rooted in the 
intersection of domestic political struggle and instability, foreign relations and economic 
policy described above. The very ad hoc nature of the takeovers, as well as their 
downright messiness and inconsistency and the large divergence between the reasons for 
the takeovers and their actual implementation, makes the whole sequence of events 
difficult to unwind and understand. Given the nature of politics under Guided 
Democracy, one is tempted to see in the complexity and confusion of events some 
greater, long-term plan and organization, but this appears not to have been the case.  It 
was only in April 1965, with the introduction of the BERDIKARI policy, that the 
takeover of existing foreign direct investment and the prohibition of future foreign 
investment became officially sanctioned. Hence, a large part of this dissertation is 
devoted to exploring these separate waves of takeovers and the varying reasons behind 
them.   
I also argue that the implementation of the takeovers was heavily influenced by 
the nature of the business concerned, most especially with respect to the precious foreign 
exchange revenues generated by the companies. Even within the separate waves of 
takeovers, individual firms were often treated quite differently. There were three 
principal sectors in which foreign investment operated in the early 1960s.  The first was 
oil; three foreign oil companies produced and refined the vast majority of oil in Indonesia 
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and generated huge foreign exchange earnings for the GOI, which resulted in the GOI 
dealing very carefully with them. This oil company exceptionalism resulted in the official 
buy-out of Shell Oil at a price of $110 million, and the takeover of the other two oil 
companies was mostly nominal. The end result was fraught with irony; oil, perhaps more 
than any other commodity, is something that a nation can claim as its very own since oil 
comes from the country‘s own soil, yet the Indonesian oil sector was the least 
nationalized of all the sectors. The second sector in which foreign investment operated 
was in plantations or estates, principally rubber and palm oil. The foreign exchange 
revenues generated by these firms were much less than the oil companies, but 
nevertheless important enough that there was significant infighting within the GOI over 
their control. The last major sector (though smaller than the first two) was the 
manufacturing sector. Virtually all these foreign companies produced for the Indonesian 
domestic market and thus did not generate any foreign exchange revenues. Consequently, 
their treatment was quite different than the other two groups. How much access to the 
revenues generated by these companies was a reason for their takeover is impossible to 
assess, but it seems fairly evident that all foreign companies, regardless of actual wealth, 
were seen by many Indonesian individuals and groups, both within and outside the GOI, 
as potential pots of gold, as the source of endless riches that could be exploited, not 
necessarily just for personal gain or enrichment but also sometimes with the idea of 
keeping the gold away from a particular person or group. On the individual level, such 
persons included GOI ministers, lower-ranking civil servants, army officials, provincial 
officials, as well as officials from the various political parties and other groups, and even 
Indonesian employees of the foreign company; on the group level it may have been GOI 
ministries or departments, provincial level governments, political parties or the army. 
Hence, after the foreign companies were taken over, control over them was contested by 
various individuals and groups. 
Another focus of this dissertation will be on describing and analyzing precisely 
how the foreign companies were taken over. To this point, I have used the rather loose 
term of ‗takeover‘ to signify that the owners lost control over their companies, thus each 
company was ‗taken over‘ by another party. In legal parlance, the terms commonly used 
are either (i) nationalization or expropriation, or (ii) confiscation, the difference being 
 9 
 
that in a nationalization or expropriation the seized companies are paid for by the 
government, but in a confiscation no compensation is paid. Having witnessed firsthand 
the potential financial ramifications from the nationalization of Dutch companies in 
1958-59, GOI officials were careful to avoid the characterization of the takeovers as 
nationalizations, expropriations or confiscations because of the compensation obligation 
such terms implied, instead claiming that the company was under government 
‗supervision‘ or ‗control‘ or ‗management,‘ all fairly ambiguous terms that gave the 
government plenty of leeway in determining what to do with them.
5
 By 1965 the GOI 
was actively attempting to separate ownership from management control, insisting that 
the loss of management control by the foreign owners did not mean loss of ownership of 
the business. I argue, however, that the takeovers clearly constituted confiscations, with 
the one exception of Shell Oil, which was a nationalization paid for by the GOI. Usually 
the GOI implemented the takeover by displacing the top level of owner-appointed 
managers, many of whom were foreigners, and appointing its own top tier level of 
management to run the company. In general, the companies were placed under the 
authority of the ministers who had jurisdiction over the relevant sector (e.g., plantations 
were given to the Ministry of Estates), and these ministers were given great discretion 
over how to execute the takeovers. Usually a ministry takeover team was installed at the 
company, and it was this team that usurped control/authority from the owner-appointed 
management, who were allowed to stay on for different lengths of time. Often Indonesian 
employees at all levels were left in place, but in the revised organizational structure were 
situated below the GOI-appointed managers. In addition, contact with the foreign 
company‘s head office and ownership was almost always severed.   
Another recurring theme the takeover story highlights is ministerial competition 
and the existence of sharp divisions within the central government. Throughout the 
takeover period, there appeared to be much division among GOI officials about how to 
handle the question of foreign businesses and their operations in Indonesia. Often the 
GOI did not speak with one, united voice on this matter, and it is sometimes extremely 
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 The Indonesian words GOI officials used to describe these various states were pengawasan (from the root 
word awas) meaning supervision, penguasaan (root word kuasa) meaning control, and pengurusan (root 
word urus) meaning management.  
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difficult to assess who spoke officially for the GOI, as different ministers pursued 
different policies and agendas. Until the implementation of the BERDIKARI policy, the 
general policy was that the rights of foreign companies were to be respected, and while it 
is clear that some officials supported this policy, others did not. Divisions within the GOI 
and ministerial competition were especially noticeable in the constant infighting among 
the ministers over control of the seized companies; this state of affairs was certainly not 
unique to the takeovers, as other commentators have noted the GOI was disunited and 
factionalized. Adding to the confusion was the general absence of enforceable law 
(whether common law or by civil codes), which often resulted in vague and sometimes 
contradictory decrees issued by President Sukarno, ministers or other authority figures 
that served as both the de facto law of the land as well as GOI policy. Hence, the story of 
the takeovers is also in part a study of ministerial bureaucracy.  
Closely related to this point was the apparent weakness of the central government 
relative to other institutions. Often during the various waves of takeovers, the central 
government seemed paralyzed, unable to take action against actors outside the 
government or to make regional governments enforce its policies. For example, in 
January 1964 there were different responses by different provincial governments to labor 
union takeovers, and at least in one case – North Sumatra - the provincial authorities 
clearly refused to execute the central GOI‘s orders. As one observer has noted, by 1964-
65 a system of ―de facto federalism‖ was in place in which ―the central government‘s 
capacity to implement its policies in the daerah [local areas] depended largely on a 
process of virtual bargaining with the local authorities.‖
6
 Similarly, the apparent strength 
of the PKI forced the GOI to take a compromise position regarding British companies in 
February 1964; it is evident that many officials within the GOI did not wish to antagonize 
labor unions and their backers, particularly the PKI. Moreover, as we shall see in the 
discussion of American plantations, some GOI officials favored the takeover of these 
estates as a pre-emptive measure to prevent the PKI and its affiliated groups from seizing 
                                                 
6
 J. A. C. Mackie, "Integrating and Centrifugal Factors in Indonesian Politics since 1945," in Indonesia: the 
Making of a Nation, ed. J. A. C. Mackie (Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National 
Univesity, 1980), p. 675.  
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them. Thus the story of the takeovers also illustrates the limits of the central 
government‘s power. 
 
III. Historiography and Sources. 
 
Surprisingly, there is almost no historiography on the takeover of foreign 
companies in Indonesia in the 1960s. This is likely due in large part to the focus of 
academic literature on Indonesia during this period 1963-65 on domestic political 
matters, especially the jockeying for political power among President Sukarno, the 
Indonesian army and the PKI. Indeed, as we shall see in Chapter Seven, the September 30 
Movement of 1965, which triggered the destruction of the PKI as well as the open 
political struggle between President Sukarno and his opponents and Sukarno‘s eventual 
downfall, remains one of the most controversial and discussed events in modern 
Indonesian history. The attention the domestic political conflict has garnered thus has 
tended to obscure other developments in Indonesia during the latter part of the Guided 
Democracy period (1959-66). As I shall reiterate in the next Section, one objective and 
benefit of this project is to explore what else was happening in Indonesia during this 
period and to shift attention away from those important but all-consuming events. 
With respect to the takeovers of foreign companies, insofar as I am aware there is 
no existing study of these events and to date they have received little attention in the 
academic literature (foreign or Indonesian). The most comprehensive account is a one 
and a half page description in an excellent recent volume on Indonesian economic 
history, but this short summary does not do justice to the full story.
7
 Other accounts 
occasionally reference these events in a paragraph or two, but with little depth or actual 
understanding of what happened, and often with factual errors. For example, in a 90 page 
chapter on Indonesia in an edited volume directly concerned with economic nationalism 
                                                 
7
 H. Dick et al., The Emergence of a National Economy: an Economic History of Indonesia, 1800-2000, 
Asian Studies Association of Australia Southeast Asia Publications Series (Honolulu: Allen & Unwin and 
University of Hawaii Press, 2002), pp. 187-9.  
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in Southeast Asia, the takeovers merited but a single short paragraph.
8
  Similarly, the 
takeovers have received little attention in what few volumes exist on individual company 
histories, with the exception of the oil industry and Unilever.
9
     
In short, the takeover of foreign companies in Indonesia in the 1960s is a largely 
unknown and untold story, and hence this study fills a large gap in the literature. 
Moreover, the gap filled here is not just the one of the confiscations, but also more 
broadly the story of what happened to foreign investment in Indonesia under Guided 
Democracy. In addition, for historians of Indonesian economic history, the takeover of 
foreign companies and virtual elimination of foreign capital in the 1960s provides an 
interesting contrast to the seizure and nationalization of Dutch enterprises in Indonesia 
from 1957-59 (discussed in Chapter Two, Part III). While there are certainly numerous 
similarities, there are also significant differences, principally the motivations behind the 
takeovers. Whereas the seizure and nationalization of Dutch companies was more a 
matter of economic and political decolonization, the events of the 1960s were more 
closely intertwined with international relations, economic policy and domestic political 
conflict and struggle. 
In piecing together a narrative to reveal this untold story, I have used a variety of 
sources. First, both the British embassy and the United States embassy in Jakarta closely 
monitored the takeovers of foreign companies, no doubt because many of the companies 
seized were British and American. In some cases, embassy officials were eyewitnesses to 
these events, and in other cases even became closely involved as representatives of the 
respective governments with access to GOI officials. Moreover, in some cases the intra-
company correspondence between company representatives in Indonesia and company 
headquarters was sent through the American or British embassy, thus leaving a fine 
record of events. Many of these records are now available in the national archives in both 
                                                 
8
 See p. 197 of Ralph Anspach, "Indonesia," in Underdevelopment and Economic Nationalism in Southeast 
Asia, ed. Golay, Anspach, Pfanner, and Ayal (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969). Similarly, in 
an article on British investment in Indonesia, the takeover (and subsequent return) of British companies 
received a scant three paragraphs; see pp. 59-60 of Richard Payne, "British Investment in Indonesia," in 
Repression and Exploitation in Indonesia, ed. John Taylor (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1974).  
9
 The takeovers in the oil sector have received by far the most attention, but there is still no comprehensive 
account or one that places the takeovers in the context of foreign investment generally. Outside the oil 
sector, the only individual company histories I am aware of that deal with the takeover of a company other 
than in passing are two volumes on Unilever. The literature on both the oil companies and Unilever will be 





 A second major source is the many decrees the GOI issued in connection 
with the takeovers.
11
 During Guided Democracy, decrees issued by President Sukarno, 
his ministers, and other officials (usually in the form of decisions or occasionally 
implementing regulations) effectively served not only as the legal basis for GOI actions 
(especially given the overall lack of legislation) and guideline for future action but also as 
functional policy statements (especially given the absence of the same). Thus, decrees are 
particularly important in trying to determine the GOI‘s intent with respect to the 
takeovers; as far as I am aware, there are no accessible records of minutes of meetings of 
GOI officials (if indeed such records exist) in which policy was debated and choices 
made, such as those frequently found in the United States or Great Britain. However, as 
we shall see, often the implementation of the decrees varied from what was stated in the 
decrees.   
Other important sources include company records, interviews with individuals 
involved in the takeovers, and various scattered records and reports found in different 
Indonesian archives.  In the case of companies, Unilever company archives and Goodyear 
company archives were especially helpful, and other companies shared some of their 
non-archival records with me.
12
 I also interviewed a number of people involved with the 
takeovers, including GOI officials and individuals (foreign and Indonesian) from the 
affected companies. These interviews enabled me to have a broader picture not only of 
what actually happened but also of the overall context, something that is often hard to 
extract from archival sources. In addition, there were a number of reports and documents 
in archives in Indonesia that were very helpful, including a number of internal GOI 
reports. In particular, there were reports from the agricultural ministries that provided 
some insight into actions the ministries took. There were also numerous governmental 
reports from the early New Order period that detailed the return of the companies and 
                                                 
10
 These include the United Kingdom National Archives located in Kew, London (hereafter abbreviated as 
UKNA), the United States National Archives located in College Park, Maryland, USA (hereafter 
USNACP), and the Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, Texas, USA (hereafter LBJL).  
11
 Insofar as I know, there is no central repository for these decrees. Rather, they are disseminated among 
numerous archives in Indonesia (such as ANRI and BKS-PPS referred to below), and some can also be 
found in the British and American national archives; some were also published in GOI (and other) 
publications.    
12
 The Unilever archives I consulted are located in Port Sunlight, England (hereafter UA), and the 
Goodyear company archives are at the University of Akron, Ohio, USA (hereafter GYA).   
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provided a wealth of information on what companies were actually taken over.
13
 Finally, 
I also occasionally use newspapers, both foreign and Indonesian, for sources, but as many 
news reports were inaccurate they must be treated with great caution.  
    
IV. Approach and Structure. 
 
While one of my aims is to understand why a country seizes and effectively 
eliminates foreign investment, I also believe that answering this question requires us to 
take a detailed look at how these companies were taken over. Thus, while the bigger 
question is what motivates a county to take the drastic step of confiscating foreign 
investment, wholesale instances of which are fairly rare, though individual expropriations 
or confiscations of foreign companies still occur in the world today, careful attention 
must be paid to how it was done. I argue that in Indonesia the process was very much an 
ad hoc one, coming in separate waves, each of which had its own distinct reasons and 
logic, and it was not until the final wave in 1965 under the guise of BERDIKARI that the 
GOI finally took a pre-meditated approach to eliminating foreign investment in whole. 
The following Chapters are structured along these lines: Chapter Two provides general 
background on Indonesia, especially in the three areas of political developments, foreign 
affairs and economic matters, while Chapter Three investigates foreign investment in 
Indonesia before the takeovers began in 1963. Chapters Four through Seven then 
examine closely the various waves of takeovers, each beginning with a short overview 
and then a section devoted to analyzing the broader picture before scrutinizing the nitty-
gritty of the takeovers.  
My approach is also conditioned by the historiography of the Guided Democracy 
era of Indonesian history. There is as yet no comprehensive study of the Guided 
Democracy period, and most accounts tend to focus on the politics of the period, 
                                                 
13
 These can generally be found in the National Archives of Indonesia in Jakarta, or Arsip Nasional 
Republik Indonesia (hereafter ANRI). Another useful archive containing materials on the foreign estates is 
the Sumatra Planters Association or Badan Kerja Sama Perusahaan Perkebunan Sumatra (hereafter BKS-
PPS) in Medan, North Sumatra, an organization previously known as AVROS that was a trade group 
representing the interests of large privately-owned estates.   
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especially for 1965. While this dissertation does not aim to correct this lack of a 
comprehensive study of the period, it does aim to take a closer look at the last three years 
of the period, certainly some of the most explosive years in the history of independent 
Indonesia. More importantly, I broaden my lens well beyond the political arena and 
examine economic affairs and foreign relations, an approach made necessary by the topic 
of foreign investment in Indonesia. In particular, I seek to demonstrate how 1965 in 
Indonesia was not just the culmination of the domestic political struggle but also the 
apogee of Indonesia‘s anti-imperialist foreign policy as well as the apogee (or nadir) of 
economic chaos, and how the climaxes in each of these areas related to the others. To 
these we could add a fourth climax with respect to foreign investment. I focus less on the 
Sukarno-PKI-army triangle and more on ministerial politics and bureaucracy below the 
Presidential level.  
As I argue that the takeover and elimination of foreign direct investment in 
Indonesia was the result of a complex confluence of Indonesian domestic political 
struggle and instability, foreign relations and domestic economic affairs, Chapter Two 
outlines the trends in these three areas prior to circa 1963. Established as an independent 
nation in late 1949 after a long period of colonial rule, Indonesia‘s first decade and a half 
of independence was a fascinating period of nation-building in which a brand new nation 
sought to establish its own identity and norms. The Chapter will not attempt to be a 
comprehensive survey of the period, but instead paint broad brushstrokes, with particular 
emphasis on matters relevant to foreign companies. As we shall see, the period generally 
can be easily broken down into the two very distinct periods of Parliamentary Democracy 
(1950-59) and Guided Democracy (1959-66), each with its own very different 
characteristics in the three areas of domestic politics, economic policy and growth, and 
foreign relations, especially with respect to the role of President Sukarno. The Chapter 
thus provides historical background in these three areas so that the trends from 1963-65 
can be set in context.  
Chapter Three analyzes the foreign investment regime of the new nation from 
1950 to early 1963 in order to set the stage for the takeovers of 1963-65. The Chapter 
provides a definition of foreign direct investment and examines the ambivalent position it 
occupied in Indonesia after independence. The first part investigates GOI policies 
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towards both new and existing foreign investment during this period, with notable 
changes under Guided Democracy. It scrutinizes the foreign investment law of 1958 and 
notes the misconception in the literature on foreign investment that this law was repealed 
in 1959; in fact, it would remain in place until 1965. The second part of Chapter Three 
surveys existing foreign investment in Indonesia at the beginning of 1963, with emphasis 
on the very different sectors of oil, estates, and manufacturing/other, particularly with 
respect to their foreign exchange generating capacity. It was this ability to generate 
precious foreign exchange, I argue, that explains the very different treatment of the 
companies in these sectors during and after the takeovers. In particular, I note the 
extremely high revenue generating capacity of the big three foreign oil companies and 
their very strong position in the Indonesian economy that resulted in their special 
treatment by the GOI, what I call the principle of oil company exceptionalism. 
Chapter Four assesses the initial waves of takeovers in 1963. In fact, there were 
two separate, distinct series of takeovers, one involving a handful (five) of British 
companies and another that eliminated all Malaysian companies. The Chapter traces the 
incipient conflict within Indonesia in 1963 between the economic stabilization program 
and the watershed event of Konfrontasi against Malaysia, with Konfrontasi winning out 
in September. The outbreak of Konfrontasi would have deep ramifications in each area of 
domestic politics, economic performance and foreign affairs. I argue that the takeovers of 
both the few British firms and all the Malaysian enterprises were directly linked to the 
outbreak of Konfrontasi with Malaysia. However, I show that with respect to the British 
companies it was a non-governmental actor, the DPS-KBKI labor federation, which 
precipitated the takeovers, and that GOI policy clearly was against the takeovers of the 
British companies. Thus, while linked to Konfrontasi, this wave of takeovers was the 
result of domestic political instability. I also explore the dichotomous events at Shell Oil 
company, whose treatment both exemplified oil company exceptionalism and showed the 
limits of this principle.  In contrast to the takeovers of British firms, I argue it was the 
GOI that took the initiative in seizing Malaysian companies, and that these seizures were 




Chapter Five investigates the creeping confiscation of British enterprises over the 
course of 1964. Here again I argue it was the actions of a non-governmental entity, this 
time the PKI, that precipitated the GOI takeover of all British enterprises in Indonesia by 
the end of 1964. The Chapter describes how, beginning in early 1964, the PKI went on 
the political offensive in an attempt to expand its influence, and one of the aspects of this 
offensive was the seizure in January 1964 of some British firms by the PKI-controlled 
labor federation SOBSI in a direct challenge to President Sukarno‘s handling of 
Konfrontasi. The GOI reaction to the seizures was to place these enterprises under GOI 
control and supervision, likely intended as a short term measure, and thus the initial wave 
was driven by domestic political conflict. However, the nebulous nature of supervision 
and control (the GOI explicitly avoided the use of terms like expropriation and 
nationalization and refused to clarify the status of the companies) and the placing of these 
enterprises under different GOI ministries led to the gradual ministerial assumption of 
control over the companies during the course of 1964. The estates, with their foreign 
exchange producing revenue stream, were the first to be taken over and were the subject 
of intense infighting between two GOI ministers. Only in late November 1964 did 
President Sukarno, the de facto highest authority in the country, while explicitly avoiding 
mention of nationalization or expropriation or confiscation, finally decree that the British 
companies were under GOI control for the long-term as well as which minister would 
control the revenue-generating estates. This decree was one of the first in a series of 
measures in which President Sukarno took an active interest in the position of foreign 
investment and also was one of several measures that heralded a new plateau of anti-
imperialism and isolation in foreign affairs. 
Chapter Six examines the phase of takeovers of American companies in early 
1965. The Chapter situates the takeovers by asserting that 1965 was a climax in 
Indonesia‘s anti-imperialist foreign policy and traces how relations with the United States 
deteriorated as a result of this policy.  In this case, there is clear evidence that President 
Sukarno himself was actively pushing for the takeover of some American enterprises, 
despite the existing GOI policy against takeovers. Hence, while the GOI takeover of 
American companies was triggered by the threat or actual seizure of the companies by 
labor unions and other groups, I argue that the seizure of American companies was 
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primarily a reflection of Indonesia‘s foreign relations. The Chapter also highlights oil 
company exceptionalism, as each of the big three foreign oil companies was placed under 
nominal government control that did not interfere significantly with owner-appointed 
management or operations. The Chapter shows how, even as the GOI was claiming it was 
not nationalizing the companies but instead was characterizing its actions as assuming 
management control - but not ownership control - over the companies, it was also 
contradictorily negotiating a buyout of the two large American rubber companies that 
generated significant foreign exchange.  
Chapter Seven explores the final wave of takeovers in 1965 that resulted from 
President Sukarno‘s promulgation of the doctrine of self-reliance known as 
BERDIKARI. I argue this doctrine of self-reliance, though hazy in its outlines and very 
limited in its implementation, was intended as a major change in economic policy, 
primarily because the Indonesian economy in 1965 reached a pinnacle (or nadir) of 
deterioration and chaos. The policy represented a climax in economic policy-making, as 
Indonesia would now only rely on itself in its search for economic independence. The 
implementation of BERDIKARI led directly to the takeover by the GOI of all remaining 
foreign companies in Indonesia as well as the prohibition on future foreign direct 
investment. The Chapter also analyzes the final GOI push to takeover the remaining 
foreign companies in the last few months of 1965. Its backdrop is the collapse of 
Sukarno‘s Guided Democracy, featuring the destruction of the PKI and the struggle for 
political power between President Sukarno and his opponents, led by General Suharto, 
that was precipitated by the September 30 Movement. This climax of domestic political 
confrontation was the third pinnacle of 1965, along with similar apogees in foreign 
relations and economic affairs.  Reflecting oil company exceptionalism, the GOI bought 
out Shell Oil for a price of $110 million, but was unable to takeover the other two foreign 
oil companies despite extreme pressure. Furthermore, reflecting both the attitude of the 
GOI Minister of Estates as well as the revenue generating capacity of the estates, the 
government agreed to pay compensation to all non-British foreign estate owners. By the 
end of 1965, with the very important exception of two foreign oil companies, there was 
no foreign investment remaining in Indonesia. 
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Finally, Chapter Eight argues that 1965 was the pinnacle of economic nationalism 
in Indonesia. It ends with a short discussion of the drastic reversal of policy by the new 
government in 1966-67 in actively promoting foreign investment in Indonesia and 




Chapter Two:  Indonesia From 1950 to the early 1960s 
 
 
This Chapter describes Indonesia from 1950 to the early 1960s, circa 1962. It 
does not purport to provide a comprehensive review of the period, but rather to provide 
an overview of the major events of the period from 1950 to 1962 with an eye toward their 
impact on foreign investment. The Chapter focuses on the period after 1949 because 1950 
was the first full year of Indonesia‘s existence as an independent nation. As I argue in this 
dissertation that the elimination of foreign investment in Indonesia from 1963-65 was the 
result of the complex interplay of domestic politics, foreign relations, and economic 
policy, the emphasis of the Chapter will be on these three aspects. By laying this 
groundwork, I hope to show in subsequent Chapters how each of these three areas 
changed rapidly from 1963-66, a period when trends just visible before 1963 were 
accelerated tremendously, and how these changes in turn resulted in great changes to the 
foreign investment regime. As Part I describes, politically the entire time span covered by 
this dissertation – from 1950 to 1966 - can be conveniently broken down into two distinct 
periods. The first is known as the period of Parliamentary Democracy, which lasted from 
1950 to 1959 (with a transitional period from 1957-59) and was characterized by the 
domination of political affairs by political parties, and the second is known as the period 
of Guided Democracy, which lasted from 1959 until 1966 and was characterized in 
political terms by an uneasy partnership between President Sukarno and the army.
1
 Part II 
analyzes Indonesia‘s foreign relations and notes how the change to Guided Democracy 
resulted in a clear shift in Indonesian foreign policy from an independent and active 
approach to a more aggressive, strongly anti-imperialist approach led by President 
Sukarno.  Part III examines Indonesia‘s economic structure and policy-making, noting in 
particular the challenges posed by the economic structure inherited from the Dutch 
                                                 
1
 The period of Guided Democracy in turn was followed by the New Order (1966-1998), in which the army 
and particularly General-turned-President Suharto played a dominant role.   
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colonial period and Indonesian attempts to change this structure and promote economic 
growth. Despite a major structural change with the takeover and subsequent 
nationalization of Dutch enterprises in 1957-59, the economy generally declined under 
Guided Democracy as politics and foreign policy were emphasized at the expense of 
sound economic policy.  
 
I. The Political Setting. 
 
A. Independence, a New Nation, and Parliamentary Democracy, 
1950-1959.  
1. Independence.  
The Netherlands ‗grant‘ of independence to her Dutch East Indies colony on 27 
December 1949 signaled the effective end of an over 300 year period during which the 
Dutch maintained some form of political presence in the archipelago now known as 
Indonesia.  This presence essentially began with the establishment in 1619 by the Dutch 
East India Company (the VOC) of an outpost in the newly conquered and renamed 
Batavia (now Jakarta, located in western Java), which soon became the capital of the 
Dutch eastern empire.  At this time, the archipelago – comprised of thousands of islands 
among the larger ones of Sumatra, Java, Borneo, and Celebes (now Sulawesi) – consisted 
politically of hundreds of larger and smaller polities. The archipelago was far from a 
unified state in the early seventeenth century; in fact, never before in the history of the 
islands had a single polity been able to exercise hegemony over it.
2
 Over the next 200 
years, while the VOC did establish outposts in various parts of the archipelago (most 
                                                 
2
 For a general history of Indonesia, see M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200, 
fourth ed. (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 2008). For shorter, excellent summaries of Indonesia 
from the pre-colonial period to the early 1960s, see Herbert Feith, "Indonesia," in Governments and Politics 
of Southeast Asia, ed. George McTurnan Kahin (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1964), 
George McTurnan Kahin, "Indonesia," in Major Governments of Asia, ed. George McTurnan Kahin 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963). Some Indonesian nationalists would argue that the classical 
era kingdom of Majapahit (at its peak in the 14
th
 century) controlled most of the area of what is now 
Indonesia, but this is incorrect.   
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notably, the Molucca islands in the east), it was principally in Java that the VOC slowly 
began to exercise a more significant political role as well as expand the area under its 
control. 
However, it was not until the end of the Java War (1825-1830) that the Dutch 
government (the VOC having gone bankrupt in 1799) was in a position of virtually 
complete control over Java and the period of Dutch colonialism began in that island. It 
was primarily in Java that the Dutch instituted the forced ‗cultivation system‘ practice 
from 1830 to 1870, under which Javanese peasants were required to produce export crops 
for the Dutch. This system, at least from the Dutch point of view, was incredibly 
successful, providing the Dutch treasury in the Netherlands with as much as 33% of its 
revenue in various years. Java thus became the centerpiece of Dutch colonialism in the 
19
th
 century. In contrast to Java, Dutch control over the ‗outer islands‘ (i.e., outside Java) 
was very limited prior to the 1820s and was only imposed gradually from the 1820s to 
about the first decade of the 20
th
 century.  It was only circa 1910 or so that the Dutch 
managed to gain more or less unimpeded control (control being exercised in various 
degrees) over all the islands that would eventually emerge in 1949 as Indonesia. 
Thus, the period of Dutch high colonialism, during which the Dutch colonial 
government was, for the most part, able to impose its will and brand of colonialism over 
all the archipelago‘s peoples in an entity known as the Dutch East Indies, began only in 
the first decade of the 20
th
 century. Put another way, it was only around 1910 that what 
would become the Indonesian nation – from Sumatra in the west to West Irian in the east 
– was united, under central political control, for the first time in its history. Not 
coincidentally, this period, which would end in 1942 with the Japanese invasion, also 
witnessed the rise of anti-colonialist sentiment as well as the beginnings of nationalism.  
Led by a tiny, newly emerging western-educated elite, the nationalist movement peaked 
in the public sphere in the late 1920s, after which the Dutch forcibly repressed it. This 
tiny elite for the first time began to conceive of an independent nation of islands known 
as Indonesia, comprised of the islands under Dutch colonial control.  However, the 
movement was fractured, united considerably more by its anti-Dutch, anti-colonial 
emphasis than any other ideology.  One of the nationalist movement‘s leaders was a 
young engineer named Sukarno (later the first president of Indonesia), who recognized 
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that the acute diversity of the indigenous people of the Dutch East Indies required some 
kind of strong unifying philosophy beyond bitter anti-Dutch, anti-colonial feelings, and 
from the late 1920s to 1966 would be at the forefront of attempts to forge national unity 
and consensus.
3
   
It was also during this period of high colonialism, from c. 1905 to 1940, that 
significant non-Dutch foreign investment began to enter the Dutch East Indies. In fact, as 
we shall see in Chapter Four, virtually all foreign companies that were taken over from 
1963-65 made their initial investments in Indonesia (at the time, the Dutch East Indies) 
during this period.  Initially, the main focus of investment was the plantation sector, 
primarily rubber and later palm oil. British, American, and Belgian firms were the 
principal sources of investment, and Java and Sumatra (especially the North Sumatra 
plantation belt, centered around the city of Medan) were by far the two main locations of 
this investment. In addition to agricultural estates, oil was also a sector of investment; the 
big three oil companies which dominated the Indonesian oil sector in the first two 
decades of independence all got started during this period. Finally, industry and 
manufacturing was a much smaller sector of investment by non-Dutch firms. Most of the 
investment here, however, did not begin until the 1930s, when the colonial government – 
for the first time – through a decided policy change began to encourage foreign 
investment in this sector as a consequence of the depression and the threat of Japanese 
competition. 
Dutch colonialism in the East Indies, which one Dutch Governor-General 
famously predicted in the late 1930s would last another 300 years, came to a swift, abrupt 
end in March 1942 with the Japanese invasion and occupation.  Dutch political control 
was irrevocably severed as the Japanese demonstrated that the white colonialists were not 
invincible after all. Most of the Dutch were interned, and the Japanese assumed control of 
the machinery of government, in the process elevating and bringing into government 
many more indigenous people. The Japanese also encouraged mass mobilization and 
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 For more on Sukarno, see the excellent bibliography by John Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography, 
third ed. (Singapore: Archipelago Press, 2003).  Sukarno‘s first major attempt to unite the three major 
ideological strands of nationalism, Marxism and Islam as the basis for a new nation state was published in 
1926; see Sukarno, Nationalism, Islam and Marxism, trans. Warouw and Weldon (Ithaca, N.Y.: Translation 
Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program Cornell University, 1969). 
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nationalism through a range of activities and forums. Sukarno, collaborating with the 
Japanese, became the voice and leader of Indonesian nationalism during this period.  
However, the Japanese occupation also brought great economic suffering and hardship 
for millions, as the economy was redirected to serve Japanese needs and unemployment 
and hunger became widespread.  In the first half of 1945, with the empire slowly 
collapsing around them, the Japanese further encouraged Indonesian nationalism, 
permitting the establishment in March of a ‗Body to Investigate Indonesian 
Independence‘ and then in August the establishment of an ‗Indonesian Independence 
Preparatory Committee.‘ During meetings of the first body on 1 June 1945 Sukarno made 
his famous declaration on the five principles of Pantja Sila, which became the basis of 
the 1945 constitution adopted in August after independence was declared.  Shortly after 
the Japanese surrender, on 17 August 1945, Sukarno and another well-known nationalist 
leader named Mohammad Hatta, in front of a small crowd at a house in Jakarta, declared 
that the new nation of Indonesia was free and independent of Dutch colonial rule. 
Sukarno‘s declaration of 17 August kicked off a bitter and tragic four year war 
(known as the Indonesian Revolution or War of Independence) between the Dutch, who 
refused to recognize the demise of their colonial empire, and the newly formed but weak 
Republic of Indonesia. This devastating war had a major effect in shaping Indonesia‘s 
post-revolutionary government and also became a defining event in Indonesian history 
and with respect to Indonesian national identity, and the bitterness it engendered would 
last for decades.
4
  Suffering was great on the Indonesian side, as economic disruption 
(leading to more hunger and starvation) and social change initiated by the Japanese 
occupation continued and accelerated for another four years, leading to great chaos.  The 
weak Republican government was often divided and factionalized, with numerous 
competitors struggling for power, and Sukarno acting mostly from the sidelines; this 
pattern would continue in the early years of independence. Although perhaps not clear at 
the time, in retrospect it was evident that the powerful uniting factor of Dutch colonialism 
and intransigence barely disguised vast differences within the Republic. Repeated 
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See also Benedict Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance 1944-1946 (Ithaca, 
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attempts by the Dutch and the Republic to negotiate a solution were unsuccessful, and the 
Republic itself was divided over how to deal with the Dutch. It was during this war that 
the Indonesian army began to coalesce and evolve as an organization (during the colonial 
period, of course, there was no Indonesian army, just a colonial army known as KNIL 
(Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger, or Royal Netherlands Indies Army), with limits 
on how far indigenous people could rise in the officer ranks), leading to its future outlook 
as the guardian of the Indonesian state.  
Resolution of the conflict was finally achieved under an agreement known as the 
Round Table Conference Agreement (the RTCA), signed in the fall of 1949 and the result 
of the Round Table Conference in Holland which lasted from August to November.
5
 
Neither side was satisfied with the final product, and in less than a decade and a half most 
of its provisions would crumble. Nevertheless, the compromise was enough to end the 
fighting. Four issues (two political and two economic) that were resolved in favor of the 
Dutch side and were basic to Dutch acceptance of Indonesia‘s independence were 
particularly galling for the Republican side and would be contentious in the years to 
come.  First, it was agreed that the new nation would be structured as a very loose federal 
system known as the United States of Indonesia, with great autonomy for its constituent 
members, of which the Republic of Indonesia was only one of many. This new nation 
would also retain a variety of ties to Holland.
6
  Second was the status of the large half-
island in the eastern part of the archipelago known as West Irian. The Indonesian side 
insisted that it become part of the new nation, but the Dutch refused, largely on the 
grounds that racially, ethnically and culturally it was different from the other islands. The 
compromise was that West Irian would remain temporarily with the Dutch, but that its 
status should be resolved by further negotiations within the next year. The third issue was 
over the amount of Dutch debt that Holland insisted the new nation should assume 
responsibility for. This debt was supposedly incurred by the Dutch colonial government, 
but it also included monies used to finance Dutch efforts during the Indonesian 
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6
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Indonesian politics.  
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Revolution (meaning that the Dutch were insisting that Indonesia pay for the costs 
incurred by Holland to fight the war!). The amount of this debt was bitterly contested, 
and finally was agreed to be 4.3 billion guilders, about US$1.13 billion, an enormous sum 
for that time. The fourth issue was the status of Dutch and other foreign investments in 
Indonesia: would they be seized by the new government or would the companies be 
allowed to continue operations as they had under the colonial period? The Republic 
finally agreed to recognize and restore the rights, concessions and licenses of these 
companies as they existed under colonial law as of the date of the transfer of sovereignty. 
Covered by this provision were the numerous foreign investments that eventually would 
be taken over from 1963-65.  
Thus, on 27 December 1949, the date sovereignty was transferred by the Dutch to 
the Republic of the United States of Indonesia under the RTCA, the archipelago 
stretching from northern Sumatra in the west to the Moluccu islands in the east was 
united and independent for the first time in history. Indeed, it had only been united once 
before, for just over 30 years under Dutch colonial role. Indonesia would be a textbook 
study of nation-building: could such a diversity of people and culture exist in one nation? 
How should this nation be constructed, and who should have political power? For many 
Indonesian nationalists, the future was open and full of possibility.  
2. Parliamentary Democracy, 1950-57. 
Upon independence in late 1949, the new nation of Indonesia faced a myriad of 
problems in the political arena. Perhaps the most basic one was that of political unity: 
could a new nation with the heterogeneity of Indonesia stay together? The diversity of 
Indonesia has been well-documented and here I shall just highlight it. First, there was the 
geographic diversity; the new nation was comprised of over 10,000 islands (including the 
big five (by population) of Sumatra, Borneo, Java, Sulawesi and Bali) stretching over 
3,000 miles. This geographic spread contributed to Indonesia‘s ethnic diversity – over 
300 different ethnic groups have been documented. Despite the spread, the island of Java 
was by far the most dominant in terms of population; out of a total population of about 85 
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million, at least 60% lived on Java.
7
 Thus, there was an immediate question as to what 
the balance of power would be between Java and the other islands, especially because at 
the time the other islands were generating far more economic revenue than Java, which 
was consuming far more revenue than it produced (see Part III on the economy below). 
There was also great religious diversity among the islands; though some 85% of 
Indonesians were Muslim, there were various and sometimes competing stands of 
practice and claims to orthodoxy as well as significant minorities of Hindus, Buddhists 
and Christians. Finally, in part reflecting these overlapping divisions, there also obvious 
political divisions within the new nation, with a multitude of outlooks reflected by a 
multitude of parties.
8
 Hence, maintaining unity in the face of this vast diversity would be 
a major concern for Indonesian leaders.
9
  
Compounding the unity question was the question of the new nation‘s 
preparedness for independence. First, of course, throughout the colonial period 
indigenous people had been denied any sort of significant political role; what experience 
Indonesians did have was gained principally during the wartime conditions of the 
revolution. In addition, as the number of Indonesians who served in the colonial service 
was extremely low, there was the problem of a general lack of administrative experience.  
For example, as of 1940 of the 3,000 or so higher ranking civil service positions, fewer 
than 10% were held by Indonesians; the number of Indonesians in the middle 
administrative ranks was much higher, but most of these positions had little decision-
making power.
10
 There was also the initial problem of a lack of trained, educated 
Indonesians. A miserable record on secondary and higher education was a direct legacy 
of Dutch colonial rule - in 1940, less than 2,000 indigenous people were enrolled in 
                                                 
7
 The figure of 85 million is an educated guess.  The Dutch colonial government in a 1930 census 
‗estimated‘ the population at 60 million; independent Indonesia‘s first census in 1961 indicated the 
population was 97 million. See Alex Hunter, "Notes on Indonesian Population," in The Economy of 
Indonesia: Selected Readings, ed. Bruce Glassburner (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971), p. 183.   
By 1963, the population was about 100 million.  
8
 For more background, see Ricklefs‘ History of Modern Indonesia, Feith‘s ―Indonesia,‖ and Kahin‘s 
―Indonesia‖.  See also Ruth  McVey, ed., Indonesia, Survey of World Cultures, 12 (New Haven: Southeast 
Asia Studies, Yale University, by arrangement with HRAF Press, 1963). 
9
 Already in 1948 the Darul Islam movement, soon to become a ‗rebellion‘ upon independence, had broken 
out in West Java.  This movement would continue to plague Indonesia until 1962. 
10
 Kahin, ―Indonesia,‖ p. 553. These numbers probably increased during the Japanese occupation, but the 
number of Indonesians holding decision-making positions was still very low. 
 28 
 
secondary education in the colony, and less than 650 were enrolled in colleges in 
Indonesia.
11
  For that matter, in 1950 there was no middle class to speak of in Indonesia 
(other than a very small Chinese one). Instead, there was a tiny educated elite sitting atop 
a vast lower class, with a wide gulf between them.   
Of immediate and paramount interest in late 1949 was what form of government 
would be adopted, and how would this new government actually ‗govern‘?
12
 Under the 
RTCA, the new nation had agreed to a fairly loose federal structure, but within nine 
months after independence this structure was rejected in favor of a ‗unitary state‘ which 
provided for a much stronger and more centralized federal government. By 17 August 
1950, all the individual republics under the old structure had merged into one 
government, and a new provisional constitution had been agreed to.
13
 This provisional 
constitution of 1950 established a western-style parliamentary system in which the role of 
the single-house legislature and the Prime Minister were paramount.  The role of the 
President (filled by Sukarno) was largely ceremonial, and his major power was to appoint 
the Prime Minister, who then formed the cabinet and government. The Prime Minister 
and cabinet ministers responsible for government policy were responsible to the 
parliament (not to the President), which was appointed according to a formula agreed to 
before the separate states formed the unitary government. Finally, the 1950 constitution 
specifically noted that the constitution itself was provisional in nature and prescribed the 
formation of a Constituent Assembly that would draft and promulgate a new constitution. 
The locus of power under the 1950 constitution and hence under Parliamentary 
Democracy in the office of the Prime Minister as well as the parliament meant that the 
political parties were extremely important, because they were the ones who contested for 
the coveted position of Prime Minister (appointed by Sukarno, as President) and also 
were the ones most heavily represented in the parliament.  The great problem was that 
there was a large number of political parties in Indonesia, and none commanded 
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anywhere close to a majority in the parliament; the appointed parliament had members 
from over 20 parties, and the 1955 parliamentary elections were contested by well over 
30 parties. There were, however, two larger parties in the early 1950s that were most 
adept at forming coalitions, the Nationalist Party of Indonesia (known as the Partai 
Nasional Indonesia or PNI) and the Masyumi Party, a modernist Islamic party, and 
power was generally shared by these two. Cabinet positions were rationed among parties 
whose support was necessary to achieve a working majority; needless to say, there were 
often deep conflicts and disagreements among the parties in a coalition. Reflecting the 
unstable nature of these coalitions, from August 1950 (when the new structure took 
effect) until March 1957 (when martial law was imposed and cabinets were thereafter 
appointed by President Sukarno), six different cabinets were formed, each led by a Prime 
Minister (appointed by President Sukarno) from either the PNI or Masyumi.    
The parliamentary elections of September 1955, the only relatively free and fair 
national elections Indonesia would have until 1999 after the fall of the New Order, 
confirmed the diversity of political opinion in Indonesia.
14
 Of the over 30 parties that 
contested the election, only four were able to garner more than 3% of the vote (voting 
was done according to party, not for individuals under single-member constituencies). 
These four were the PNI (22% of the vote), Masyumi (21% of the vote), Nahdatul Ulama 
(18% of the vote) and the Indonesian Communist Party (the PKI, with 16% of the vote).  
The PNI, large, loosely structured, and factionalized, with many members in the 
government bureaucracy, was known as a Java-based party of the Javanese bureaucratic 
elite (the priyayi).
15
  It was closely identified with President Sukarno (though it was not 
Sukarno‘s party – he remained unaffiliated with any party after independence); the main 
thrust of its ideology was nationalistic, and later it would adopt ‗Marhaenism‘ (a Sukarno 
inspired type of proletarianism) as one of its principal ideological tenets. Both Masyumi 
and Nahdatul Ulama (the NU) were Islam-based.  The Masyumi, which was organized 
by the Japanese during the occupation, had strong support outside Java and was 
                                                 
14
 On the 1955 elections, see Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Modern 
Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1957).   
15
 For a comprehensive look at the PNI, see Eliseo Rocamora, Nationalism in Search of Ideology: The 
Indonesian Nationalist Party, 1946-1965 (Quezon City, Philippines: University of the Philippines, 1975). 
See also Angus McIntyre, "Divisions and Power in the Indonesian National Party, 1965-66," Indonesia 13 
(1972), Eliseo Rocamora, "The Partai Nasional Indonesia 1963-1965," Indonesia 10 (1970).  
 30 
 
considered to be ‗modernist‘ in its outlook, much more liberal politically and 
economically than the NU.  The NU was established in 1926, forced to join Masjumi 
during the occupation and then broke away from Masyumi in 1952, and drew most of its 
support from East and Central Java. It was an alliance of Islamic clerics and was 
considered much more traditional in outlook than Masjumi. 
Of the four largest parties, the PKI was by far the most disciplined and best 
organized.
16
 Having been virtually wiped out twice before, in 1926-27 and then again 
during the Indonesian revolution in 1948 in what was called the ‗Madiun Affair‘, the 
PKI, similar to a phoenix rising from the ashes, emerged again in the 1950s. The 
principal stimulus for this rise was the ascendancy in early 1951 of a core group of four 
very young men to the leadership (the politbureau) of the PKI. This group, which would 
lead the PKI until 1965, was comprised of D.N. Aidit (the top leader of the PKI), M.H. 
Lukman, Nyoto, and Sudisman. Recognizing the unique conditions of Indonesian society 
and that the traditional communist emphasis on class conflict would be too provocative 
politically, the Aidit leadership instead adopted a united-front approach that included as 
many elements of society as possible and emphasized nationalism and the dangers of 
imperialism and colonialism. Promoting a strong sense of nationalism and democracy and 
harping against the evils of imperialism and colonialism, together with concerted efforts 
to build mass front organizations such as SOBSI (the largest labor federation in 
Indonesia) and the BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia, the largest farmer/peasant organization 
in the country), enabled the PKI to gain significant support (primarily in East and Central 
Java) such that within a few years it garnered 16% of the national vote in the 1955 
elections and an even greater percentage of the vote in some regional elections in 1957.  
This strategy also was tailor-made for political alliances; in the first half of the 1950s, the 
PKI aligned itself with the PNI against Masjumi, which viewed the PKI as a great threat, 
and starting around 1956 the PKI began an unofficial alliance with President Sukarno.   
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Several of the smaller parties were also noteworthy.  The first was the Indonesian 
Socialist Party (the PSI), a very small party that nonetheless exercised very great 
influence. The party was headed by Sutan Sjahrir, another well-known Indonesian 
nationalist, and was known for its very rational, moderate outlook, particularly with 
respect to economic affairs.  Many of its leaders were western educated, including the 
noted economist Sumitro Djojohadikusomo. In the 1950s, this party was at times aligned 
with Masjumi, and it did not have a good relationship with President Sukarno. The 
second smaller party was the Murba party, known as nationalist communists. Established 
in 1948, its leaders were followers of Tan Malacca, the communist revolutionary (also a 
member of the Comintern) who played a major role in the early period of the Indonesian 
Revolution but was killed in 1949. Many of these men were also very active and 
influential during the Revolution, serving as leaders of mass organizations, and were 
known for their strong nationalism.
17
 The party had a very small mass following, 
however.  It was also an ardent enemy of the PKI, despite its shared communist outlook.  
It was perhaps due to Murba‘s revolutionary heritage, as well as its lack of mass 
following, that a number of Murba members or supporters, including Chaerul Saleh and 
Adam Malik, were later brought into the cabinet by President Sukarno.  
Two major elements were, for the most part, relegated to the political sidelines 
during this period. The first was President Sukarno, by this time recognized as the 
‗father‘ of the nation and leader of the Indonesian Revolution. Sukarno did serve as 
President, but the office of the Presidency had a fairly weak and ambiguous role under 
the 1950 constitution. Aside from ceremonial duties, its main function was to appoint the 
formateur of the cabinet, usually the same person as the Prime Minister. The President 
also had the power to appoint the Vice President (although Mohammad Hatta in 1945 
became Vice-President and served in that position until his resignation in December 
1956), but the Vice-President had even fewer powers than the President. President 
Sukarno, of course, did not disappear entirely from the scene, but for the most part 
allowed the cabinet and the parliament to be the loci of power. The second element that 
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for the most part stayed on the sidelines was the army.
18
 The army, which had played 
such a critical role in the Indonesian Revolution, was disorganized, bloated and 
factionalized, and trying to professionalize itself by shedding extra personnel and 
reorganizing its command structure. As a result of its revolutionary war heritage, the 
army saw itself as the guardian of the Revolution and the State, but its political role was 
quite undefined. It did make a few forays into political affairs, such as the murky 
‗October 17 Affair‘ of 1952, and also causing the fall of the Ali cabinet in 1955 because 
it refused to accept the government‘s choice of army chief of staff, but in general the 
army was far more concerned with its own internal affairs.  
As we shall see, however, this political structure under Parliamentary Democracy, 
with the parties and the parliament playing a central role and President Sukarno and the 
army playing a much smaller role, would flip-flop in the next few years, and under 
Guided Democracy it would be an uneasy alliance between President Sukarno and the 
army that held power. 
3. Decline of Parliamentary  Democracy, 1957-59.  
A widespread sense that Parliamentary Democracy was not functioning properly, 
together with a series of regional rebellions that traumatized the new nation, helped 
nudge President Sukarno and the army into an unofficial partnership that jettisoned 
Parliamentary Democracy and ushered in the new period known as ‗Guided 
Democracy.‘
19
 As Lev has pointed out, Guided Democracy emerged after a variety of 
conflicts, some longstanding and fundamental to the nation, climaxed from 1957-59. The 
first was the conflict between Java and the outer islands, which resulted in the wrenching 
rebellion of 1957-58. This conflict was rooted not only in the ―opposing economic 
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interests of the over-populated importing areas of Java and the under-populated exporting 
areas of the outer islands,‖ but also political and social resentment of Javanese 
domination of the nation. The second basic conflict was between the army, which had 
grown increasingly frustrated over the divisions and lack of progress during the 
parliamentary period, and civilian/party leaders, specifically over the political role the 
army would play. Based primarily on its contribution during the Indonesian Revolution, 
the army, despite the high degree of factionalism within it, sought a much greater role in 
politics than afforded it under Parliamentary Democracy, and it was the army that played 
a key role in the collapse of the parliamentary system.  To this one might add that 
President Sukarno, the acknowledged father of the country and, together with Vice-
President Hatta, probably the two men who commanded the most national respect, was 
also on the sidelines of power.  A third basic conflict was a great lack of consensus 
among the political parties over the nature of the state, including such basic questions as 
its form and ideological basis, a conflict magnified by the pre-eminent role of the parties 
in the parliamentary system. Even before the 1955 elections, there were great political 
divisions among the parties, especially the PKI and Masjumi and NU, and a basic source 
of ideological disagreement was whether the state would be a secular or Islamic-based 
regime. These various disagreements, of course, represented deeper social, religious and 
political differences that were present in Indonesia well before independence; the 
differences went far deeper than mere political squabbling.
20
 As the 1955 election results 
emphatically testified, with four parties each getting between 22% and 16% of the vote, 
there remained great differences of opinion among the voting public.  Finally, there was 
the question of the low level of effectiveness of the central government, largely caused by 
the conflicts described above. The high expectations upon independence, perhaps 
unrealistic, simply were not being met in the eyes of many. The very visible inertia in the 
parliament, resulting from factionalism and the inability of any one party to maintain a 
coalition for long, had become commonplace.  Even the second Ali Sastroamidjojo (PNI) 
cabinet and the newly elected parliament, both of which entered office in early 1956 after 
the 1955 elections, seemed unable to bridge these differences. As one observer noted, 
                                                 
20
 Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, pp. 3-10 (quoted language from p. 3). 
 34 
 
creating effective governmental power proved very difficult, and ―effective governmental 
power was the essential and all-too lacking prerequisite.‖
21
 
In late 1956, President Sukarno became openly critical of the parliamentary 
system. In February 1957, Sukarno offered an extremely vague alternative with his 
Konsepsi speech, which proposed a ‗gotong-royong cabinet‘ (gotong royong meaning 
mutual help) comprised of all the political parties, plus a ‗national council‘ made up of 
representatives of functional groups (such as worker‘s groups, women‘s groups, etc.) that 
would advise the cabinet. Meanwhile, from September to November 1956 factionalism in 
the army stemming in part from a proposed massive reorganization resulted in numerous 
attempted coups, none of which were remotely successful.
22
 On 1 December 1956, Vice-
President Hatta vacated his office because of long-standing differences with President 
Sukarno. Later in December, in South Sumatra, Central Sumatra and North Sumatra, 
military officers took charge of the local governments in a series of peaceful coups. Over 
the next few months, the central government, led by Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo 
of the PNI, appeared unable to resolve the situation (except in the case of North 
Sumatra). Then, in early March 1957, apparently in a very negative response to 
Sukarno‘s declaration of his Konsepsi, the army territorial commander of Eastern 
Indonesia in Makassar, South Sulawesi, declared a state of martial law for the region, and 
his chief of staff issued a ‗Charter‘ which made various demands, political and economic, 
on the central government.
23
  This was clearly beyond the capacity of the Ali government 
to deal with, and at army chief of staff General Nasution‘s suggestion of compromise, on 
14 March 1957 the Ali government resigned and President Sukarno declared martial law 
over the entire country. 
 The imposition of martial law in March 1957 was a critical component of the 
army‘s rise to power in the following years.
24
 Under martial law, which would remain in 
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effect until 1 May 1963, the army‘s legal powers and authority were extensive, having 
increased greatly at the expense of civilian administration. The army was able to 
insinuate itself into civilian regional administration throughout the country, and it also 
established its own martial law administrative structure. However, as Lev noted, it did not 
―attempt to assume responsibility for running the state,‖ but rather intruded or withdrew 
as it saw fit, and in effect held the power to intervene as it deemed necessary, though 
intervention differed from region to region.
25
  It also used the power to restrict the 
activities of the various political parties, such as the outright banning of party activities 
(done in some regions in 1960 to PKI branches), limiting demonstrations and rallies, and, 
in 1957, by outlawing strikes in vital enterprises (strikes were usually organized by labor 
unions, which were linked to the parties – see Section B3 below). The army even tried to 
create its own mass organizations, such as the National Front for Liberation of West Irian 
in 1958. In addition, it was also able to gain much greater economic power by using 
martial law to take initial control over the Dutch enterprises seized in December 1957 
(See Part III, Section C below).  Thus, politically, economically and administratively, the 
army‘s role in the functioning of the nation increased dramatically under martial law.
26
      
To return to 1957, after the imposition of martial law President Sukarno in April 
appointed his own cabinet headed by Djuanda Kartawidjaja as Prime Minister, a non-
party pragmatic man with great administrative skill. In May 1957, a ‗national council‘ 
(Dewan Nasional) was appointed as per Sukarno‘s Konsepsi, but this body, which was 
chaired by Sukarno, was only another vehicle by which Sukarno could assert his power 
and authority.
27
 These moves thus represented a clear interjection into politics and power 
by the President. Hence, by the end of first half of 1957, both the army‘s and Sukarno‘s 
power and influence had greatly expanded. The political parties, of course, were not 
happy with these moves, but there appeared to be little the parties could do about it. 
Moreover, the die was far from cast insofar as the loss of the parties‘ power and influence 
was concerned.  
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The de facto expansion of power by Sukarno and the army was not enough to 
prevent the simmering regional crises from erupting in early 1958 into a full-scale 
regional rebellion and the greatest regional challenge to central authority in the history of 
independent Indonesia.
28
 In December 1957, a number of prominent Masjumi leaders, 
including Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (ex Finance Minister and Governor of Bank 
Indonesia) and Burhanuddin Harahap (the Prime Minister from August 1955 to March 
1956), left Jakarta and joined the regionalists. Then, in the midst of the economic jolt 
caused by the takeover of Dutch companies in early December 1957 (see Part III, Section 
C below), in mid-February 1958 the PRRI Revolutionary Government, headed by 
Sjafruddin, was proclaimed in West Sumatra, with groups in North Sumatra and Sulawesi 
joining in. The rebels were not looking to secede from Indonesia, but rather to change the 
power relationship between the regions and the center, and also to effect various changes 
in the leadership of the central government (including a demand that Hatta be brought 
back into government and allowed to form his own cabinet, and a demand that Sukarno 
be limited to duties prescribed to the president under the constitution). However, the 
PRRI/Permesta rebellion, as it became known, was quickly contained by the army with 
minimum casualties; by July, most of the rebel towns had been taken and the rebels had 
been reduced to a small guerilla force.    
The defeat of the rebellion had several immediate effects.  First, it enhanced the 
prestige and power of the army, which had acted swiftly and effectively in ending it. It 
also enabled the central army command to become much more unified internally, as 
dissident military officers were cleaned out and Nasution‘s position as head of the army 
was further established. Second, it ended any further thoughts of regional separatism, and 
strengthened the central government vis-à-vis the regions. Third, it discredited 
completely the two political parties principally associated with it, the Masjumi and the 
PSI, both of which were viewed with suspicion by Sukarno even before the rebellion. 
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Finally, it clearly strengthened the emerging Sukarno-army alliance, at least with respect 
to the role of the political parties.
29
   
The final blow to Parliamentary Democracy was the failure of the Constituent 
Assembly to agree on a new national constitution.
30
  The Constituent Assembly was 
elected in December 1955 (in a separate national election after the 1955 parliamentary 
elections) for the sole and express purpose of drafting a new constitution to replace the 
provisional constitution of 1950. The body began deliberations November 1957, but by 
early 1959 was unable to reach the required two-thirds majority consensus. The primary 
issue concerned the ideological foundation of the state; Masjumi and the NU were vying 
for Islam to be the basis of the state, while other parties supported the secular Pantja Sila, 
Sukarno‘s conception from 1945, as the philosophical basis of the state. Another 
important issue was over the nature of the center-region relationship, with Masjumi 
favoring more regional autonomy. In early 1959, talk began to center over returning to 
the 1945 constitution, one that was hastily drafted at the close of the Japanese occupation 
and effectively only in place for a few months. However, the Constituent Assembly, 
hopelessly deadlocked, was unable to agree on this either, as this constitution 
unequivocally prescribed Pantja Sila as its basis. With the strong encouragement and 
support of army leader Nasution, on 5 July 1959 President Sukarno, using authority he 
clearly did not have, by decree declared the abolition of the Constituent Assembly and 
the restoration of the 1945 constitution. The period of Parliamentary Democracy, 
constructed upon the foundation of the 1950 provisional constitution, was dead. 
B. Guided Democracy to Circa 1962. 
The period of Guided Democracy (1959-1966) was fundamentally different in its 
power structure and political relationships from the period of Parliamentary Democracy. 
With the exception of the PKI, the political parties were essentially emasculated. The 
parliament was no longer relevant, and there were no popular elections; instead, political 
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power was shared in an uneasy, competitive alliance between President Sukarno and the 
army.  Individually, President Sukarno was by far the single most powerful individual, 
and institutionally the army was the most powerful. Moreover, it was only in early 1964 
that the PKI became increasingly visible and voluble and really began asserting itself in 
its drive for political power. Ideology, with an emphasis on continuing the revolution, 
was heavily promoted by President Sukarno, and permeated society. In the following 
pages, I shall first describe the official organs of government under Guided Democracy, 
followed by the actual structure of political power. I then turn to the role of ideology and 
mass actions, and finish with an analysis of government bureaucracy and power, 
including a discussion of a few ministers important in the takeovers of 1963-65.  
1. Structure of Government. 
In describing the structure of the government of Indonesia, the best place to start 
is the 1945 constitution, which President Sukarno in early July 1959 decreed was back in 
force.
31
 The document is fairly basic and skeletal, providing the simplest of backbones on 
which to hang more meat and flesh. The striking feature of the 1945 constitution, in 
comparison with the provisional 1950 constitution, is the dominant role of the 
Presidency, which has much greater power and authority than under the 1950 
constitution. Indeed, it is this executive office, rather than the parliament, which becomes 
the center of decision-making. Undoubtedly it was for this reason that Nasution and 
Sukarno pushed for a return to the 1945 constitution, as power would theoretically be 
centered in the hands of President Sukarno and out of the hands of the political parties. 
The 1945 constitution provides for eight institutions of offices: (i) the Madjelis 
Permusjawaratan Rakyat (the MPR, or ‗People‘s Consultative Assembly‘), (ii) the 
Presidency, (iii) the Vice-Presidency, (iv) the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (the DPR or 
Parliament), (v) the Dewan Pertimbangan Agung (‗Supreme Advisory Council‘), (vi) 
ministers of state (the offices are not specified), (vii) a Supreme Court, and (viii) a 
financial audit board. 
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 Under the 1945 constitution, the MPR is the highest authority in the land, as it 
represents the people, in whom sovereignty resides. The MPR, which is supposed to meet 
at least once every five years, is charged with determining the broad policy lines of the 
state and electing the President and the Vice-President, and only the MPR can amend the 
constitution.  The MPR is comprised of two separate groups: the DPR, and delegates 
from regional territories and other non-specific groups. The practice under Guided 
Democracy was rather different; a provisional MPR (known as the MPRS) was appointed 
by President Sukarno, not elected, and essentially served as a rubber stamp body for 
President Sukarno‘s policies. It met three times: first in November-December 1960 
(during which among other things, it approved the Eight Year Development Plan), in 
May 1963 (during which it, among other things, appointed Sukarno President for life and 
approved DEKON, an economic doctrine – see Chapter Four), and in April 1965 (during 
which, among other things, it approved the adoption of BERDIKARI as state economic 
policy, see Chapter Seven). 
Despite the role of the MPR as the theoretical holder of the highest authority of 
the state, it is clearly the Presidency which on paper wields the most power under the 
1945 constitution.  The President, elected by the MPR for five year terms, holds 
executive authority, and can both make legislation (which must be approved by the DPR) 
and reject laws passed by the DPR. In addition, only the President can issue government 
regulations necessary to implement the laws and in emergency circumstances may issue 
regulations instead of laws (thus, there is a two tiered system of lawmaking, with laws 
approved by both the President and the DPR, and implementing regulations, which 
effectively take the place of laws, issued only by the President). As we shall see, in 
practice President Sukarno often issued decrees and regulations that were never subject to 
DPR approval (the difference among laws, regulations and decrees was very vague). The 
President appoints and dismisses ministers, who are responsible to the President alone, 
and in theory the President also holds authority over the armed forces. The President also 
holds numerous other powers, including the power to declare martial law. Of the vast 
powers granted to the President, only a few are checked by another institution. In theory, 
the President is responsible to the MPR (which meets only once every five years), and the 
DPR has the power of refusing to pass laws issued by the President, a power substantially 
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weakened by the President‘s exclusive right to issue regulations and decrees. In theory, 
DPR approval must be obtained for declarations of war and peace, for treaties with other 
countries, and for the state budget.  In practice, under Guided Democracy, President 
Sukarno exercised these wide powers of the Presidency to the fullest, with little resistance 
from the MPR or DPR, which were both appointed by him.  
The DPR‘s primary function is in the area of statute-making. As described in the 
previous paragraph, it can initiate its own legislation, which must be approved by the 
President, it can also block legislation approved by the President, and it has approval 
powers over declarations of war, treaties and budgets. Its composition, structure and 
voting procedure and the like are not prescribed by the constitution, other than the 
requirement of meeting once per year, and that it cannot be dissolved by the President. In 
fact, under Guided Democracy there were never any elections for the DPR, which was 
appointed by President Sukarno and was beholden to him, and the DPR would play a 
very limited role. 
Under the 1945 constitution, the principal role of the ministers, whose offices are 
not specified by the constitution, is to serve the President.  The President appoints and 
dismisses them, and the ministers are responsible to the President only, not the DPR. For 
the first years of Guided Democracy, President Sukarno appointed a ‗First Minister‘, who 
chaired the cabinet meetings and performed the day-to-day routine matters (Sukarno 
appointed himself as ‗Prime Minister,‘ to be in overall charge of the ministers and 
cabinet). This position of First Minister was filled by Djuanda Kartawidjaja, who had 
acted as Prime Minister in the two years before July 1959. There was a wide array of 
cabinet positions and restructurings; after the appointment of the initial cabinet in July 
1959, there were five major cabinet reshuffles through February 1966. There was also a 
body known as the Pimpinan Kabinet (cabinet leadership) and various iterations of a 
body known as ‗core ministers,‘ whose basic function appeared to be to coordinate 
policy, but this ―failed to produce close cohesion, partly because the holders of ordinary 
portfolios have often been reluctant to accept instructions from the deputy first ministers 
placed above them.‖
32
  In practice, President Sukarno provided the overall policy 
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outlines, but often left it up to his ministers to implement these general guidelines. As 
Feith observed, the principal feature of the cabinet was the ―great power which individual 
ministers may and do wield within their departments‖; there were few institutional or 
legal checks on the ministers within the departments, and ministers often stocked their 
ministries with assistants loyal to them rather than with professional administrators. 
Contributing to the dispersal of power among the ministers was the failure of the cabinet 
to meet regularly, and ―few important decisions [were] taken by the cabinet as a body.‖
33
 
In fact, as we shall see, there was constant bickering and conflict among the ministers, 
and there was great competition to be appointed as a minister, not only for the prestige 
but also for the patronage possibilities. President Sukarno, of course, could and did 
intervene in ministerial affairs, either directly or by indirect means such as reshuffling the 
cabinet, and there were often dismissals and appointments of ministers in addition to the 
reshuffling. The size of the cabinet would continue to increase under Guided Democracy 
so that by 1965 there were over 75 ministers, though not all of them had their own 
departments. The ministers‘ roles and government bureaucracy will be discussed further 
in Section 4 below. 
The roles of the other institutions in the 1945 constitution are very limited.  The 
main function of the Vice-President, also chosen by the MPR for a five year term, is to 
assist the President and to assume the Presidency should the President be unable to 
execute his duties. In fact, a Vice-President was never appointed under Guided 
Democracy – the office remained vacant after Hatta left it in December 1956. Under the 
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1945 constitution, the Supreme Advisory Council also has strictly an advisory role to the 
President, who is not required to follow its suggestions. Under Guided Democracy, this 
body was appointed by President Sukarno, and it included representatives from political 
parties and other groups, and was actually led by Sukarno himself. The powers of the 
Supreme Court are not specified by the 1945 constitution, which leaves the matter to be 
determined by statute. This Supreme Court under Guided Democracy had virtually no 
authority at all insofar as acting as a check on other governmental institutions. Finally, 
the only function of the financial audit board is to audit the budget, and for our purposes 
it played no role. 
Thus, on paper the office of the Presidency is the key position of power under the 
1945 constitution, with President Sukarno the head of state and key decision-maker. 
Immediately after decreeing the return to the 1945 constitution on 5 July 1959, President 
Sukarno, taking advantage of his newly found authority, sought to install the organs 
prescribed by the constitution. On 9 July 1959 he appointed the new ‗Work Cabinet‘ 
headed by First Minister Djuanda, and later in the month he appointed the Supreme 
Advisory Council and the National Planning Council. The National Planning Council, 
known by its acronym DEPERNAS (Dewan Perantjang Nasional), was a non-
constitutionally prescribed body which Sukarno charged with the task of drafting an 
economic development program. Comprised of 74 members, DEPERNAS was led by 
Mohammad Yamin, a strong nationalist who was not an economist by training, and will 
be discussed more in Part III below. The elected parliament of 1955 remained in office 
until early March 1960, when it rejected Sukarno‘s draft budget and as a result was 
dissolved by him. It was replaced in 1960 by the Sukarno-appointed Gotong Royong 
(mutual help) DPR (appointed in June) and the Sukarno-appointed provisional MPR 
(appointed in August, known as the MPRS), which of course were further blows to the 
political parties. Sukarno also immediately strengthened the position of the central 
government vis-à-vis the regions in the fall of 1959 by instituting measures that reversed 
the trend toward regional autonomy, principally by abolishing elections for regional 
leaders and instead having them appointed by the central government, with a concurrent 
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expansion of their powers.
34
  This also served to weaken the influence of the political 
parties. 
2.  Structure of Political Power. 
While on paper the Presidency seemed to hold the reins of power and authority, in 
the early years of Guided Democracy power was shared between President Sukarno and 
the army.  As many observers have pointed out, the most critical political relationship of 
the period was the one between President Sukarno and the army, ―a ‗stable conflict‘ 
relationship characterized by both common endeavor and continuing competition and 
tension between more or less equally matched partners.‖
35
  This cooperative but 
competitive marriage of convenience continued the arrangement begun around 1957 
when Sukarno and army chief of staff and leader General Nasution colluded, for different 
reasons, in jettisoning Parliamentary Democracy. As Feith noted, there was a rough, 
though occasionally fluid, division of power, with each side generally leaving the other to 
its own devices in its allotted sphere.  President Sukarno was in charge of ideology, 
foreign affairs, and in most ‗public politics‘, while the army was predominant in regional 
government, the nationalized Dutch companies, some areas of GOI administration, and in 
internal security. Both President Sukarno and the army accepted the arrangement 
essentially because each needed the other, at least initially, and there was little choice. 
Sukarno, a long time proponent of Indonesian independence and the acknowledged father 
of the country and leader of the Revolution, was a source of instant legitimacy.  The army 
lacked this legitimacy, and in fact there was much opposition to outright army rule. 
Sukarno, for his part, was in no position to challenge the army‘s monopoly over force. 
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Moreover, Sukarno had clearly needed army support to end Parliamentary Democracy, 
and army support was thus necessary to the continuation of Guided Democracy; the best 
Sukarno could do was to try to control the army leadership. While this would prove 
impossible, the army was still divided enough over a variety of issues (including what 
political role it should play) that Sukarno could exploit this factionalism to his benefit. In 
addition, Sukarno, while wildly popular among the masses, did not have a party of his 
own and lacked an organizational following.
36
   
The competitive nature of the Sukarno/army relationship boiled up at times, a 
reminder that below the surface of cooperation there was much maneuvering.  One of the 
areas of contention was the PKI, which was effectively allied with Sukarno against the 
army (see following paragraphs).  For example, in August 1960, after the PKI in July 
released a statement extremely critical of the cabinet and the army, regional army 
commanders in South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi and South Sumatra banned PKI 
activity. Sukarno responded by banning all party activity for three months, after which 
the PKI was allowed to resume limited activity in two of these areas (and in the third area 
in 1961). Another area of conflict was over the continuance of martial law. Sukarno 
pressed the army to end it, and as we shall see in Chapter Four Sukarno finally in 
November 1962 announced it would be lifted in May 1963.
37
  President Sukarno also 
purposefully fostered divisions among the branches of the armed forces (the army, navy 
and air force) as well as within each branch. The best example of this was the July 1962 
Sukarno appointment of General Achmad Yani to replace General Nasution as army chief 
of staff (the commander of the most powerful military force in Indonesia, the army); 
Nasution was theoretically ‗elevated‘ to the position of chief of staff of the armed forces, 
but this was an administrative position, without operational authority over any of the 
individual branches of the armed services, and the move was clearly a demotion.
38
 This 
jousting between Sukarno and the army would continue in the second half of Guided 
Democracy.  
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With the predominance of the Sukarno-army partnership, the political parties 
were essentially emasculated in the early years of Guided Democracy, and they played a 
much smaller role in comparison with the Parliamentary Democracy period.  The elected 
parliament of 1955 was replaced in 1960 by the MPRS and DPR, which were both 
appointed by Sukarno and thereafter functioned as rubber stamp bodies. Thus, the 
parliament, which prior to Guided Democracy had been a bastion of political party 
power, was no longer a locus of power and decision-making.  Likewise, beginning in 
1959 the cabinet was non-party, meaning ministers had to resign from the political 
parties. Martial law was also used by the army to restrict party activities. There were also 
more formal limitations on the parties. For example, in late 1959 President Sukarno 
issued a regulation which resulted in the ‗simplification‘ of the parties in the next year by 
(i) forcing them to accept as one of their basic principles the 1945 constitution and Pantja 
Sila,  (ii) limiting membership to Indonesian citizens only, and prohibiting acceptance of 
foreign aid,  (iii) requiring parties to have branches in at least 25% of the provinces (and 
in 25% of the regional government subdivisions below the provincial level), and (iv) 
providing the President with authority to ban a party if it participated in 
rebellions/revolts.
39
 In August 1960, in part because of the role some of their top leaders 
played in the 1957-58 rebellion but primarily because Sukarno saw them as enemies, the 
Masjumi and the PSI were banned, and in early 1962 much of their top leadership was 
arrested. By April 1961 the number of political parties legally permitted to operate was 
reduced to eight, though later increased to 10 (the big three of the PNI, NU, and the PKI, 
plus seven much smaller ones). Attempts by the parties to combat this reduction in their 
influence were short-lived; for example, in 1960 a ‗Democracy League‘ was created to 
fight these changes, but it lasted only a few months.  
However, President Sukarno did not seek to destroy entirely the influence of the 
parties, but instead to use their remaining limited influence to check the power of the 
army. This was especially important because Sukarno did not have his own party and 
organizational following. The party best suited to this tactic was the PKI, as it was the 
best organized and had the largest mass following through its various front groups.  In 
return for PKI support for his policies (ranging in form from simple positive statements 
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of support to organizing mass demonstrations), Sukarno afforded the PKI protection from 
the army, which increasingly saw the PKI as its biggest domestic rival. As we have seen, 
the PKI adopted a nationalistic united front approach in the 1950s in expanding its 
domestic base of support, and this strategy easily lent itself to a tacit alliance with 
Sukarno under Guided Democracy, especially with Sukarno‘s emphasis on nation-
building (see next section).  According to one commetator, by 1959 or so the President 
saw the PKI as ―the most energetic and consistent supporter of his militant nationalist 
creed, a useful counterweight to the army in the political system, and the most effective 
mass mobilizer behind the patriotic campaigns he held dear.‖
40
  For the PKI, such an 
alliance meant not only protection from the army but also the chance to gain a measure of 
legitimacy by publicly identifying with Sukarno, as well as the possibility of participation 
in the cabinet and government.
41
   
Nevertheless, the Sukarno/PKI alliance relationship should not be interpreted to 
mean that the PKI was anywhere close to achieving political supremacy in 1962. It 
certainly had a significant following; as we saw previously, in the 1955 elections the PKI 
had received about 16% of the national vote, and in a limited number of regional 
elections in 1957 it significantly increased its share of the vote (in Java, its vote went 
from 21% in the 1955 national elections to 29% in the 1957 regional elections). By early 
1963, its membership was over 2 million, and membership in PKI front organizations 
was estimated to be over 12 million, which would certainly have made its mass 
organization membership larger than that of any other party.
42
  Yet despite its size and its 
universally recognized effectiveness of organization, in 1962 the PKI was very much 
dependent on President Sukarno, a dependency that Sukarno recognized and exploited.  
In the words of a close observer, the PKI, along with the other political parties, had been 
―domesticated.‖
43
 By this the author meant that the PKI had been effectively blocked 
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from assuming power in Indonesia; it did not hold any important cabinet positions, it 
could not win through elections because there were no elections, and its activities had 
been gradually restricted by both Sukarno and the army. It was the price the PKI paid for 
its dependency alliance with President Sukarno.  
However, as we shall see in the following chapters, in late 1963 the PKI‘s 
relationship with Sukarno would begin to evolve. The PKI would play a much more 
visible and voluble role in Indonesian politics. Its ideological identification with Sukarno 
would in many ways become stronger, but it also increasingly would challenge the status 
quo.   
3. Ideology and Mass Action. 
Two outstanding features of political life under Guided Democracy were the 
permeation of ideology in politics and society and the use of mass action or mass 
organizations.  President Sukarno was the main source of ideology under Guided 
Democracy. One of the most important ideological themes that Sukarno promoted was 
that the Indonesian Revolution was not yet complete and must continue; as one 
commentator noted, this theme of the unfinished revolution provided the ―central 
dynamic of the Guided Democracy regime.‖
44
 Complementing the emphasis on ideology 
under Guided Democracy was prevalence of mass action, in particular demonstrations 
and political rallies. Mass actions, which seemed to increase in frequency beginning in 
1962 with the West Irian campaign, were rarely spontaneous, however; they were almost 
always led by mass organizations, of which the National Front and labor unions were 
prominent. These two features of ideological penetration and mass action often 
overlapped, with mass organizations frequently citing various aspects of ideology as the 
reason for their actions. Indeed, one of the main functions of the National Front, one of 
the most important mass organizations, was to mobilize the masses and inculcate and 
promote GOI ideology. These mass organizations were often characterized by an 
educated leadership and a mass following of mostly uneducated, working class members. 
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As we shall see in the following Chapters, mass organizations played a key role in the 
takeovers of foreign companies.   
Beginning in 1959 with the introduction of Guided Democracy, the GOI and 
especially President Sukarno really emphasized ideology (and political indoctrination) to 
the point where it and the various slogans, symbols and imagery espousing it pervaded 
society and government and became a dominant characteristic of political life.
45
  
President Sukarno was the undisputed source of most of the ideological formulation 
(though this would change somewhat from 1963-65 as many of Sukarno‘s ideas were 
indistinguishable from the PKI‘s); his speeches, especially the all-important annual 
independence day speeches on 17 August (the day in 1945 on which Sukarno declared 
independence from the Dutch), were a main point of dissemination of these slogans and 
symbols. Ideology and its slogans permeated down to almost every bureaucratic nook and 
cranny and also dominated public announcements. Even religious and cultural 
organizations were forced to support the GOI‘s ideological formulations, and public 
criticism of them was virtually impossible.
46
 Dissemination of ideology was further aided 
by the press, whose ―chief purpose…under Guided Democracy was to support and 
advance the policies of the Government, and to serve the state.‖
47
 The press was 
relatively free during Parliamentary Democracy, but under Guided Democracy gradually 
lost its independence to government restriction; it ―became saturated by the ideals, 
slogans and shibboleths of the regime‘s ideology,‖
48
 and by early 1962 each newspaper 
was ―obliged to devote a large part of its four pages to unabridged government 
declarations, most of them heavily repetitious and dealing with ideology rather than 
policy.‖
49
  Increasingly, slogans and symbols, especially those pushing Sukarno‘s 
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concept of continuing the unfinished revolution, replaced specific, considered planning,
50
 
with clearly detrimental effects. Another feature of this pervasiveness of ideology and its 
symbols and slogans was its continued evolution; as we shall see, new ideas, slogans and 
acronyms were continually popping up.
51
   
There is a dizzying array of slogans, symbols, words, and concepts that were 
promoted during Guided Democracy. I shall list only a few here by way of example; later 
in this Chapter and in the following Chapters, more that pertain to the takeovers of 
foreign companies will be discussed. In general, as Feith has described, there were at 
least five broad areas of emphasis, the first two more important than the others.
52
 Most 
important was the theme mentioned previously that the Indonesian Revolution had yet to 
be finished, and that the country should return to the spirit of the Revolution, the spirit of 
change and dynamism. The second was the emphasis on national unity and solidarity, an 
appeal that the nation should stay together in spite of its many differences (geographic, 
social, ethnic, economic, etc.).  These first two categories were broad enough to 
encompass and justify a great number of ideas and concepts. A third category stressed the 
demands of the people. Perhaps the most famous slogan of this category was AMPERA, 
an acronym for amanat penderitaan rakyat, roughly translated as ‗message of the 
people‘s suffering‘; this populist slogan emphasized how the Indonesian people had 
suffered and/or been exploited. A fourth theme was the idea that Indonesia and its people 
should have their own identity or personality, free especially from pernicious foreign 
influences. Finally, the fifth theme centered around national strength and prestige, 
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emphasizing Indonesia as a leader in the region and a nation of which Indonesians should 
be proud.  
Some of the most basic slogans under Guided democracy were 
MANIPOL/USDEK and NASAKOM.  Perhaps the most important was MANIPOL, an 
acronym for the Political Manifesto, articulated in Sukarno‘s independence day speech of 
1959 in which he publicly initiated the introduction of the 1945 constitution and the 
advent of Guided Democracy. The MANIPOL speech also touched on broad policy of the 
new regime as well as its short term and long term goals, and together with USDEK was 
subsequently endorsed in 1960 by the newly appointed MPRS as the basic outline of 
national policy. The acronym USDEK, often mentioned together with MANIPOL, 
identified five basic tenets or themes of MANIPOL: the 1945 constitution (the ‗U‘, which 
included Pantja Sila), Indonesian Socialism (the ‗S‘), Guided Democracy (the ‗D‘), 
Guided Economy (the ‗E‘), and the Indonesian personality (the ‗K‘).
53
 Another important 
acronym was NASAKOM, short for nationalism (nasionalisme, or ‗NAS‘), religion 
(agama or ‗A‘), and communism (komunisme, or ‗KOM‘). This term had its roots in 
Sukarno‘s 1926 essay formulation of the unity of nationalism, Islam and communism as 
the ideological basis for Indonesia in its struggle against colonialism. However, as Legge 
points out, its function in the 1960s was to preserve Sukarno‘s position as a balancer and 
arbiter of its different component parts,
54
 and it was also often used by the PKI to seek 
more representation in government or on councils or other official positions.
55
 Most of 
these terms were rather vague, open to interpretation and debate, often intentionally.   
Turning to mass organizations, one of the most active was the National Front.
56
   
Established in August 1960 by President Sukarno, it was originally conceived as a large, 
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single national political party that would eventually replace the independent political 
parties, somewhat similar to the Chinese Communist Party of the Peoples Republic of 
China; its function was to serve as an agent to rally and mobilize the masses behind GOI 
ideology and programs.  In his 1960 independence day speech given just after the 
establishment of the National Front, Sukarno said the front was ―to channelize the 
revolutionary unity of the people into an anti-imperialist National Front under the 
leadership of Bung Karno, to serve as a base for arousing mass action,‖ and its duty was 
to ―to build up and channel the whole of the potential of the people‖ in order to 
―complete the Revolution.‖
57
  From March 1962 until the end of Guided Democracy, 
there was a cabinet level ministerial position for the National Front.
58
 Initially only 
individuals and mass organizations were allowed to join; political parties were excluded 
(though members could join as individuals), and Sukarno was also wary of excessive 
army influence. The organization initially had little impact, but it was galvanized by the 
1962 West Irian campaign (see Part II below) and from then on was a significant force as 
an agent of mass mobilization. Perhaps not coincidentally, in January 1962 the political 
parties were allowed to join.  They quickly did, hoping to use the body as a means to 
regain some of their lost power, and apparently the political parties and the army both 
competed for power and influence within the organization. However, according to one 
observer of the PKI, the PKI very quickly became influential in the National Front‘s 
leadership and ―supplied most of the popular constituency of the Front,‖ which in turn 
provided the PKI ―with a respectable base from which to launch its mass demonstrations 
and displays of revolutionary fervor.‖
59
 By 1964, the PKI appeared to be the dominant 
organization within the National Front‘s national leadership; a CIA report of February 
1964 estimated that the PKI or its front organizations held 80% of the national executive 
council seats and dominated all other levels of the organization. While the PKI may have 
been influential on a national level in the front, the army did retain some influence at the 
provincial level, as a number of army officers, including in West Java and in East 
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Kalimantan, were the heads of the organization‘s provincial branches.  In March 1964, 
the National Front‘s position and stature were increased significantly when important 
bodies of regional government officials known the Tjatur Tunggal (these bodies were at 
three levels of regional government – provincial, regency and city), comprised of the 
provincial governor (or regent or mayor, as the case may be), local army commander, 
local police chief and local public prosecutor, were expanded from four to five members 
to include the local National Front leader and were renamed the Pantja Tunggal. Many of 
these new National Front appointees were PKI members or nominees.
60
  To summarize, 
as a political party the National Front was not successful, but as a mobilizer of masses it 
was quite effective, and although technically it was an official GOI organization, by 1964 
it was heavily influenced by the PKI and GOI control over it appeared nominal.    
Labor unions were another influential group of mass organizations.  As numerous 
commentators have shown, labor unions in Indonesia were of a highly political nature, 
frequently engaging directly in political activities, and most were associated with political 
parties.
61
  Labor groups in Indonesia were generally structured as large federations of 
individual unions, and the federations were linked to the political parties in two ways; 
first by shared ideas, principles and outlooks, and second by leaders of the federations 
becoming members of the associated parties. Leadership of the unions generally played a 
dominant role over the rank and file members,
62
 although by no means were individual 
members of the labor unions required to be members of the associated political party. 
                                                 
60
 Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, pp. 205, 216, 221-3;  Feith, ―Indonesia,‖ p. 238; Mortimer, 
Indonesian Communism under Sukarno, pp. 101-2; Rocamora, Nationalism in Search of Ideology, pp. 285-
6, 318-9;  Kahin, ―Indonesia,‖ pp. 639, 658-9, 667-8; Weatherbee, Ideology in Indonesia, pp. 47-51; 
Hindley, Communist Party of Indonesia, pp. 279, 282; Crouch, Army and Politics in Indonesia, p. 34; 
Sundhausen, Road to Power, p. 152; Mintz, Mohammed, Marx and Marhaen, pp. 196-7; the CIA report, 
dated 7 February 1964 and entitled ―The Power Position of Indonesia‘s President Sukarno,‖ can be found at 
the LBJL, National Security Files, Country File Indonesia, Indonesia Memos, Volume I (11/63-4/64, Box 
246) (p. 2).  
61
 For more on labor unions, see Sayuti Hasibuan, "Political Unionism and Economic Development in 
Indonesia: Case Study, North Sumatra" (University of California, Berkeley, 1968), E. D. Hawkins, 
"Indonesia," in Labor in Developing Countries, ed. Walter Galenson (Berkeley, CA.: University of 
California Press, 1962), E. D. Hawkins, "Labor in Transition," in Indonesia, ed. Ruth McVey (New Haven, 
CT.: Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, in arrangement with HRAF Press, 1963), John Moes, "Trade 
Unionism in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey 28, no. 2 (1959), Henry Richardson, "Industrial Labor 
Relations in their Political Setting," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 12, no. 1 (1958), Iskandar 
Tejasukmana, The Political Character of the Indonesian Trade Movement (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern 
Indonesia Project, 1958). 
62
 Hawkins, ―Indonesia,‖ p. 98. 
 53 
 
Labor groups assisted their associated political parties in various ways, such as by 
campaigning and providing manpower for demonstrations and rallies.
63
  In the late 1950s, 
it was estimated (there are no reliable figures available) that there were over 3 million 
union members. There were over 150 national unions, plus hundreds of local unions, and 
there were over 10 union federations.
64
 By the early 1960s, of these 10 plus federations 
SOBSI and KBKI, which we shall turn to next, were by far the largest and the second 
largest, respectively. 
SOBSI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia), by far the largest of the 
labor federations, was indisputedly under PKI control and the PKI‘s most important mass 
organization.
65
  Founded in 1946, by the late 1950s it was the best organized and best 
disciplined labor federation in Indonesia. A classically structured front organization, most 
of SOBSI‘s top leadership were members of the PKI, including the secretary general and 
leader of SOBSI, Njono (who was a very high ranking member of the PKI and became 
SOBSI‘s top leader in 1950). By 1960, most of SOBSI‘s officials and the officials of its 
member unions were also PKI members, though probably only a small number of the 
unions‘ rank and file membership had joined the party. Within SOBSI there were dozens 
of member national unions (plus hundreds of local unions), and by the end of 1962 
SOBSI claimed over 3.7 million total members (from its member unions), over 50% of 
the estimated total national union membership at that time.
66
  Two prominent union 
members of SOBSI were SARBUPRI, the largest estate workers union in the country, 
and PERBUM, the largest oil workers union in the country.  SOBSI was known as a 
strong defender of its workers interests, but its primary role was to support politically the 
PKI in a variety of ways.
67
 As we shall see, SOBSI would play a key role in the takeovers 
of British companies in early 1964 and in the takeovers of American companies in 1965. 
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The KBKI (Kesatuan Buruh Kerakyatan Indonesia) was by far the second largest 
labor federation in Indonesia and was affiliated with the PNI.
68
  It was initially quite 
small, but grew dramatically in the late 1950s so that by 1958 it claimed a membership of 
about 1 million, with dozens of member labor unions. It was the KBKI action which 
triggered the seizure of Dutch companies in December 1957 (see Part III, Section C 
below). Its spectacular growth was attributed in part to Ahem Erningpradja, who led the 
organization from late 1954 until 1962.
69
 Ahem was appointed by President Sukarno as 
Minister of Labor from July 1959 (the first cabinet appointed under Guided Democracy) 
until August 1964, which greatly raised the KBKI‘s prestige and also allowed Ahem to 
throw patronage opportunities to KBKI members. This also had the effect, however, of 
making the KBKI more independent from the PNI leadership, whose relations with its 
mass organizations were not nearly as close as the PKI‘s and whose relationship with 
KBKI was already strained at times.
70
 
In 1962 the KBKI split into two competing groups, the DPP-KBKI and the DPS-
KBKI, the latter of which would play a key role in the takeovers of some British 
enterprises in September 1963 (see Chapter Four).
71
 The  third national KBKI congress in 
late June 1962 had initially been unable to elect new leadership; Ahem was finally re-
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elected as the general chairman, but not until a compromise was reached. The 
compromise involved the appointment of A.M. Datuk, one of KBKI‘s leaders and best 
organizers as well as the KBKI representative to the Supreme Advisory Council, to the 
position of a Deputy Chairman of KBKI. Datuk was apparently unpopular with some of 
the leaders of the PNI, especially from the conservative wing of the party, and the entire 
Datuk appointment issue reflected a split between the conservative elements of the PNI 
and its more liberal elements, in particular the more radical leaders of the PNI-linked 
mass organizations. As part of the compromise, Datuk was not appointed to this position, 
though he remained part of the national leadership.  Datuk then appealed to President 
Sukarno, who gave Datuk his support. Under pressure from both Sukarno and Datuk, 
Ahem, without consulting conservative PNI chairman Ali Sastroamidjojo, then appointed 
Datuk to the position, which led in early October to the expulsion of Datuk from the 
KBKI by his opponents. This dispute over Datuk‘s role then led to an open split in the 
KBKI; in late October, Ahem announced the formation of a new leadership council called 
DPS-KBKI which included Datuk but excluded those leaders who had sided against 
Datuk, the so-called DPP-KBKI leadership. In November, Ahem as Minister of Labor 
publicly stated that there was only one officially recognized KBKI, the group led by the 
DPS-KBKI. There was, of course, fierce competition between these two leadership 
branches for the allegiance of the KBKI officials and member unions over the next year. 
Finally, on 13 January 1963, the DPP-KBKI leadership officially expelled Ahem, Datuk 
and the other DPS-KBKI leaders from the KBKI, and a few days later Ahem was also 
expelled from the PNI. However, by this point some of the most important KBKI leaders 
had already sided with Ahem; reflecting a general feeling among many leaders of PNI-
linked mass organizations, these leaders felt that the PNI was too conservative. Another 
major reason for their support was that President Sukarno himself initially supported 
Ahem and Datuk, though this would wane in the following months.  Thus a stalemate 
emerged between these two leadership groups which continued throughout much of 1963. 
The turning point appeared to be the 10
th
 party congress of the PNI in late August 1963, 
by which point it was clear that the Ahem group lacked support within the PNI. 
Sometime after this party congress Sukarno withdrew his support for the Ahem 
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leadership, and by the end of 1963 the DPP-KBKI leadership had won back the support 
of most KBKI officials and local union leaders.
72
 
4. Ministerial Government and Bureaucracy.  
I would like to conclude this brief examination of politics generally during the 
early years of Guided Democracy by looking at government bureaucracy, in particular its 
power and authority as well as the ministers who would play a critical role in the 
takeovers of foreign companies. Under Guided Democracy, the power and authority of 
government and bureaucracy seemed to grow tremendously, as the GOI increasingly 
intruded on everyday life with batches of new regulations and decrees.  However, as 
Feith has observed, there were clear distinctions between the scope of government power 
(―how many aspects of the people‘s activities are affected by its decisions‖), the weight 
of government power (―how intensely its decisions affect these aspects‖), and the 
concentration of government power (―how widely the making and implementing of 
decisions is shared‖). The scope of government power and authority grew tremendously 
under Guided Democracy, but the weight of government power – the actual impact of the 
apparently greatly expanded scope of authority - varied significantly. In addition, while in 
principle government power remained highly concentrated in the hands of President 
Sukarno and his supporters, it too varied a great deal.
73
 
GOI administration grew rapidly after independence, and during Guided 
Democracy was not a monolithic, unified entity but instead a highly politicized and 
divided bureaucracy, particularly among its upper ranks. The size of the government 
bureaucracy increased greatly, the number of civil servants rising from 145,000 in 1930 
(under the Dutch colonial regime) to 600,000 in 1953 to 807,000 in 1960.
74
 A major 
reason for this dramatic increase was the lack of available opportunities for well-educated 
Indonesians (as we saw previously, the number of Indonesians who finished high school 
was very low under the Dutch colonial regime), and thus the government became a major 
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employer of Indonesians who held secondary degrees. Government employment was also 
one of the major avenues to gain social status and opportunity.
75
 Moreover, government 
employment, particularly for the ministers at the higher levels, was a major source of 
patronage opportunities as well as graft and corruption, with many departments and 
agencies competing for scarce resources, especially as the size and apparent authority of 
the GOI grew. Under Guided Democracy, GOI administration was ―sprawling‖ and 
―ramshackle,‖ and because the administrative structure was not well organized with 
sharply drawn lines of responsibility between various competing departments and 
agencies, there were frequently numerous departments involved in various decisions, 
leading to great overregulation.  ―Each of these various agencies issues regulations and 
tries to force clients to come to it for licenses and approvals. In addition, a single agency 
frequently enforces several redundant sets of regulations because one set has been 
superimposed on another, often in the name of coordination and planning.‖
76
 
Compounding these divisions at all levels of bureaucracy was the competition in the 
bureaucracy between the ‗administrators‘ (those relatively few trained individuals who 
were more pragmatic and technically skilled, concerned with building up efficient 
administration and economic development) and the ‗solidarity-makers‘ (those more 
concerned with nationalism, political unity, cohesion and finishing the Indonesian 
Revolution; they had often played important roles during the Revolution).
77
 During 
Guided Democracy, the solidarity-makers in the bureaucracy, despite their deficiencies in 
technical skills, had greater influence than the administrators, reflecting generally the 
importance of politics over administration. With the decline of the political parties, the 
bureaucracy also became an arena where politics were increasingly played out.  Intra-
bureaucratic conflict increased to the point where there were few barriers between 
politics and administration, and ―policies actually implemented were most frequently the 
result of battles between politician-bureaucrats…‖
78
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The relationship between President Sukarno and his ministers often did not seem 
to enhance unity within the GOI bureaucracy. As we saw previously, under the 1945 
constitution the President appointed the working cabinet and its component ministers. 
However, as cabinet positions were much sought after because of their prestige and 
patronage opportunities, the army and the political parties and other interest groups also 
fought and competed for these positions, and President Sukarno was often forced to 
accede to their demands. Thus, there was an array of ministers with different interests, 
though generally Sukarno (and the army, depending on the issue) was the ultimate arbiter 
and authority. As one observer noted, ―politics at the center became increasingly a matter 
of rivalries and conflicts between politico-bureaucratic cliques, in which the prizes were 
prestige, influence, and the spoils of office.‖
79
 These rivalries were usually centered in 
the Presidential Palace around Sukarno‘s inner circle; ―to a large extent Guided 
Democracy was government by access to the ruler and his court, with all the palace 
intrigue which that entailed.‖
80
 
In fact, throughout Guided Democracy, many of the officials Sukarno relied on 
most were those with no independent power base and thus were not in a position to 
challenge him. These men ―formed a diverse group of intelligent and able politicians who 
were highly skilled in elite-level political maneuvering but could not provide Sukarno 
with the organized grass-roots support he needed to maintain the balance with the 
army.‖
81
  They included, among others, First Minister Djuanda, Johannes Leimena from 
the small Protestant Party (holding positions such as Deputy First Minister or Second 
Deputy Prime Minister), Chaerul Saleh (see below), Subandrio (Foreign Minister and 
also later First Deputy Prime Minister), and Muhammed Yamin (a radical nationalist who 
chaired the National Planning Council, which devised the Eight Year Development Plan). 
A number of these men were also linked to the small Murba party, the ‗national 
communist‘ party led by followers of Tan Malacca. Because they generally lacked great 
support outside the government, they often tried to cultivate power bases within the 
bureaucracy, further contributing to intra-government turf battles. Ministers Subandrio 
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and Chaerul Saleh in particular became great rivals for power after Minister Djuanda‘s 
death in late 1963.  
Conflicts, competition and divisions within the GOI bureaucracy – between 
President Sukarno and his ministers, between the different ministers and their respective 
departments, and even within the individual ministries themselves – as well as the limited 
scope of government power meant that there was often a great difference between the 
language of a rule/decree/regulation and how it was actually implemented or enforced in 
practice.
82
  As we saw earlier, while President Sukarno set the overall policy, he was 
often extremely vague as to how it should be implemented, leaving it up to the ministers, 
who wielded great power within their departments, to implement it. Given the variety of 
interests and divisions within the GOI and the at times limited scope of actual 
government power, this naturally resulted in great diversity in how such policy was 
carried out in practice.  Especially within the context of the takeovers of foreign 
companies, we must examine carefully the wording of the relevant decree or rule, which 
essentially represented official GOI policy, and see how that rule/decree was actually 
implemented. Of course, because of the variety of opinion within the GOI and the 
multitude of conflicting regulations and decrees, it is often hard to state with certainty 
what official GOI policy was. Hence, significant attention will be devoted to each of 
these in the following Chapters. 
Turning to discuss several of the ministers who played key roles in the takeovers 
of foreign companies, we start with Chaerul Saleh, a well known nationalist with large 
political aspirations.
83
  Born in 1917 in West Sumatra to a prominent family (and 
distantly related to Vice-President Mohammed Hatta), he was, by colonial standards, very 
well-educated, having attended Dutch primary and secondary schools in Sumatra, and 
then law school in Jakarta.  He was very active in student and youth organizations. 
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During the Japanese occupation he was a member of both a Japanese-controlled youth 
organization (Angkatan Muda) and an underground organization. Along with Adam 
Malik (see below), he played a leading role in the famous kidnapping of Sukarno and 
Hatta in August 1945 by a youth group determined to force the two to declare 
independence. During the Indonesian Revolution he was a member of Tan Malacca‘s 
Persatuan Perdjuangan group (many of whose leaders would later form the Murba party) 
and was arrested and jailed with Tan Malacca and other supporters in 1946 by the 
Republic. Eventually released from jail, toward the end of the Revolution he became the 
leader of the West Java People‘s Brigade (Laskar Rakyat Djawa Barat), a group of Tan 
Malacca‘s followers which opposed settlement with the Dutch; after the Revolution, this 
group (now renamed Tentara Rakyat, or ‗People‘s Army‘) continued to resist openly the 
authority of the new state.  He was captured and jailed in 1950, then in 1951 released, 
thanks to the intervention of Mohammed Yamin, but was exiled from Indonesia. From 
1952 until 1956 Saleh lived in various countries in Western Europe (Holland, 
Switzerland, and West Germany), apparently surviving off GOI scholarships and 
maintaining close contact with Indonesian students there. In 1956 Sukarno met him again 
in West Germany, where the two had some kind of rapprochement, and soon after this he 
returned to Indonesia. 
After Chaerul Saleh returned to Indonesia, President Sukarno brought him into the 
government, and Saleh quickly rose to political prominence. In April 1957, in the first 
cabinet appointed under martial law, Sukarno appointed him Minister of Veterans 
Affairs.   In the July 1959 cabinet, the first appointed under Guided Democracy, Sukarno 
appointed him to the newly created positions of Core Minister for Development, which 
was the key post for economic development within the inner cabinet, and Minister of 
Basic Industry and Mining. As Core Minister for Development, he was responsible for 
coordinating the activities of the Minister of Peoples Industry, the Minister of Basic 
Industry and Mining (Saleh himself), the Minister of Agriculture (Sadjarwo, see below), 
and the Minister of Transmigration, Cooperatives and People‘s Villages. He kept both 
these positions in the cabinet reshuffle of February 1960, but then lost the position of 
Core Minister in the March 1962 cabinet reshuffle (he would regain this position in 
November 1963 under the new term Coordinating Minister for the Development 
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Compartment), though he stayed on as Minister of Basic Industry and Mining. In 1962 
President Sukarno also appointed him as the head of the MPRS, a position he kept until 
1966. Saleh was also the designated leader of the Angkatan 45 (‗Generation of 45‘), 
comprised of individuals active in the Indonesian Revolution, though this group never 
became a significant political force. Saleh was closely linked to the Murba Party, though 
he denied being a member. Saleh had no organized political following of his own, but 
instead sought to build up political support within the bureaucracy, where he was well 
positioned to do so. In the last few years of Guided Democracy he became a close 
confidante of President Sukarno.  
Much less is known of Sadjarwo, another minister who played a key role in the 
takeovers of foreign estates.  From 1950 (if not before) until 1957 or so he was a leading 
member of the Indonesian Peasant Front (Barisan Tani Indonesia or BTI), a large PKI-
controlled peasant organization. He was the Minister of Agriculture in the first cabinet of 
independent Indonesia (from January 1950 until September 1950, before the 1950 
provisional constitution took effect), and held the same position in the first Ali cabinet 
(PNI) from late August 1953 until August 1955.  Because of opposition from Masjumi 
and the NU, he was not appointed to the second Ali cabinet (from 1956 until March 
1957).  However, he was re-appointed as Minister of Agriculture in April 1957 in the first 
cabinet appointed by Sukarno under martial law, and he remained in the cabinet 
continuously as either Minister of Agriculture or Minister of Agrarian Affairs until the 
end of Guided Democracy in 1966.  From 1959 until 1964, Sadjarwo‘s ministerial 
position was generally placed under the authority of the Core Minister for Development 
(who was usually Chaerul Saleh). By 1957 Sadjarwo had dropped out of the BTI and 
joined the PNI; as the cabinets beginning in 1959 were explicitly non-party, in 1959 he 
dropped out of the PNI also. However, he apparently remained active in the PNI, but was 
not a major party leader. In early 1959 he also became the second deputy chairman of 
Petani, a fairly small PNI-linked peasant organization. As Minister of Agrarian Affairs, 
Sadjarwo played an important role in formulating the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 (see 
Part III below). He was generally thought of as sympathetic to the PKI, though after 1963 
this changed.  Back in 1949 and 1950 Sadjarwo was highly critical of the portion of the 
RTCA providing for the return of foreign estates, though as Minister of Agriculture in 
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1950 he actually helped restore foreign estates to their owners.  As we shall see in Part 
III, Section C below, he also was quick to react in placing Dutch-owned estates under 
GOI control in 1957-58.
84
  
Dr. Azis Saleh was a high ranking army officer who was Minister of Peoples 
Industry during the takeover of foreign companies from 1963-65. In 1952, Dr. Saleh was 
deputy chief of staff of the army and was heavily involved in the failed ‗17 October 
Affair‘ as one of the individuals pushing for change.  He was also a founding member of 
the IPKI (Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia, or ‗League of Upholders of 
Indonesian Independence‘), a small army-controlled political party set up by General 
Nasution (it received less than 2% of the vote in the 1955 parliamentary elections). As the 
representative of IPKI, Colonel Saleh was appointed to the April 1957 cabinet as Minister 
of Health. He was then appointed Minister of Agriculture in both the July 1959 cabinet 
and the February 1960 cabinet.  However, beginning with the March 1962 cabinet he was 
appointed Minister of Peoples Industry, which he held until 1966. The position of 
Minister of Peoples Industry fell under the Coordinating Minister for Development (or 
Coordinating Minister for Development Compartment), and hence from November 1963 
until early 1966 Minister Azis Saleh was nominally under the authority of Minister 
Chaerul Saleh.
85
      
Lastly, we turn to Adam Malik, whose story is much better known because he 
became a major figure in the early New Order period, first as Foreign Minister and 
subsequently reaching the office of Vice-Presidency in the late 1970s.
86
 Indeed, Malik 
was one of the few ministers/politicians able to survive and prosper in both Sukarno‘s 
Guided Democracy and the subsequent New Order period. In brief, he was born in 1917 
in North Sumatra and at an early age was active in politics and nationalist movements. He 
was not well-educated, having only completed primary school (though this was in a 
                                                 
84
 Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, pp. 21-2, 149, 281-2; Hindley, Communist Party of Indonesia, pp. 
172, 255, 263; Feith, Decline of Constitutional Democracy, pp. 339, 467-8; Rocamora, Nationalism in 
Search of Ideology, pp. 245-6, 263, 337; Sutter, Indonesianisasi, pp. 664, 697; Simanjuntak, Kabinet 
Kabinet Republik Indonesia, pp. 106, 138, 185, 203, 210, 230, 241.   
85
 Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, pp. 21, 157, 281; Feith, Decline of Constitutional Democracy, pp. 
262, 264;  Simanjuntak, Kabinet Kabinet Republik Indonesia, pp. 185, 202, 209, 230, 240, 251; 
Sundhausen, Road to Power, pp. 89, 105.   
86
 See Adam Malik, In the Service of the Republic (Singapore: PT Gunung Agung, 1980).  For a shorter 
biography, see Jones, Indonesia: The Possible Dream, pp. 430-1, and also Ruth McVey, "In Memorium: 
Adam Malik," Indonesia 39 (1985).  
 63 
 
Dutch language school). In the late 1930s he co-founded the Antara news agency, where 
he worked for a number of years as editor; during the Indonesian Revolution Antara 
became the mouthpiece of the Republic and in the early 1960s the official national news 
agency of Indonesia. He was also very active during the Revolution. Along with Chaerul 
Saleh, whom he knew well, Malik played a leading role in the famous kidnapping by a 
youth group of Sukarno and Hatta in August 1945. Like Chaerul Saleh, Malik was a 
follower of Tan Malacca and member of Malacca‘s Persatuan Perdjuangan group during 
the Revolution, and was also imprisoned for a short time. He was a founding member of 
the Murba party, the bitter enemy of the PKI, and one of its leading members in the 
1950s and 1960s. He was a member of the parliament elected in 1955, and in the 1950s 
he also continued to work at Antara. From 1959 until early 1963 he was appointed by 
President Sukarno as the Indonesian ambassador to the USSR (which would provide 
Indonesia with much aid during this period), and he was also very active in the resolution 
of the West Irian issue in 1962 (see Part II below). In 1963 he returned to Indonesia, and 
in November that year was appointed by President Sukarno to the cabinet as Minister of 
Trade. Like Chaerul Saleh, he also became a close confidante of President Sukarno after 
1963, though this relationship soured in 1965.   
 
II. Foreign Relations, 1950 – c. 1962. 
 
For most of the 1950s, foreign relations did not occupy center stage in Indonesia. 
Under Parliamentary Democracy, the country followed an ‗independent and active‘ 
approach in foreign policy that was essentially one of non-alignment with the two Cold 
War power blocks. Perhaps the pinnacle of this policy was the first and only Afro-Asian 
conference of 1955, in which some 29 nations from Asia and Africa were hosted in 
Bandung, West Java, by the GOI in a conference emphasizing solidarity among the 
newly independent nations of those areas. The single biggest foreign policy issue during 
this period was the status of West Irian, which under the RTCA was to remain initially 
with the Dutch but whose ultimate status was supposed to be determined by negotiation 
within a year. However, under Guided Democracy Indonesia‘s foreign policy, formulated 
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and controlled by President Sukarno, underwent several dramatic changes. First, it went 
from a relatively low profile area to an extremely high profile area, as foreign policy 
concerns would play a dominant role during Guided Democracy. The second change, 
which was a principal reason for the first change, was that the policy itself shifted from 
an ‗independent and active‘ policy to a strongly nationalist, anti-colonialist, anti-
imperialist policy in which the world was viewed as divided between the two camps of 
‗newly emerging nations‘ and ‗old, established, imperialist nations.‘  In articulating this 
vision, President Sukarno actively pursued an aggressive policy of brinksmanship, which 
led the country to the brink of war with the Dutch over West Irian before being settled 
peacefully in 1962, and then actually into war with the British and Malaysians in 1963. 
Another feature of Sukarno‘s foreign policy was the great increase in foreign aid, which 
increased dramatically from 1956 to 1963, after which it slowed precipitously; by the end 
of 1965, Indonesia had some $2.4 billion in foreign debt alone, an incredibly high figure 
for that time.  
A. Parliamentary Democracy: Independent and Active Foreign 
Policy.  
For most of the 1950s, domestic affairs, rather than foreign affairs, were the 
primary concern of Indonesian policymakers. As Indonesia in 1950 was a brand new 
nation, the emphasis on domestic affairs – on nation-building – was quite natural. As 
sketched out in this Chapter, Indonesia simply had too many internal issues to resolve 
before it could get heavily involved in international affairs. Such a priority did not, of 
course, mean that Indonesia could shut itself off from the outside world, and the GOI had 
little desire to do this.  Instead, the GOI pursued what came to be known as an 
‗independent and active‘ foreign policy which featured non-alignment in the Cold War 
struggle. For Indonesia itself, the dominant foreign policy issue was the status of West 
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Indonesia‘s independent and active foreign policy clearly reflected its colonial 
heritage and long struggle for independence, as well as the desire not to be drawn into the 
Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.  In short, a principal goal was 
to safeguard Indonesia‘s independence and freedom. Its principles were perhaps best set 
forth in two articles published in the influential Foreign Affairs magazine in the 1950s by 
Mohammad Hatta, Indonesia‘s Vice-President until December 1956.
88
  In a 1953 article, 
Hatta described the objectives of Indonesia‘s foreign policy as (i) ―to defend the freedom 
of the people and guard the safety of the state,‖ (ii) ―to obtain from overseas those articles 
of daily necessity required for increasing the standard of living of the population…‖, (iii) 
―to obtain capital equipment to rebuild what had been destroyed or damaged…‖, (iv) to 
―strengthen principles of international law and to aid in achieving social justice on an 
international scale, in line with the UN Charter…‖,  (v) to have good relations with its 
neighbors, especially former colonial countries, and (vi) to ―seek fraternity among 
nations through the realization of the ideals enshrined in Panchasila [Pantja Sila].…‖  In 
brief, ―Indonesia will pursue a policy of peace and of friendship with all nations on a 
basis of mutual respect and non interference in each other‘s structure of government.‖ 
Moreover, ―Indonesia has not aligned itself with either the American bloc or the Russian 
bloc in the existing conflict,‖ and ―it is not prepared to participate in any third bloc 
designed to act as a counterpoise to the two giant blocs.‖ Indonesia was not neutral in the 
sense of impartiality, but rather was committed to international solidarity and peace; it 
―plays no favorites between the two opposed blocs and follows its own path through the 
various international problems.‖ Hence the policy was ‗independent,‘ but was also 
‗active‘ because of Indonesia‘s effort ―to work energetically for the preservation of peace 
and relaxation of tension generated by the two blocs.‖  In a 1958 article, Hatta, no longer 
Vice-President, in response to questions about changes in Indonesia‘s foreign policy, re-
affirmed these general principles, claiming Indonesia was still following the active and 
independent policy, pushing for peaceful coexistence, and would not set up a third block 
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to counter the two Cold War blocks.  The article also laid out Indonesia‘s claim to West 
Irian.    
In practice Indonesia did implement these general principles of the independent 
and active approach, trying to maintain an even-handed, independent approach to the two 
Cold War power blocks. If anything, Indonesia tilted slightly in favor of the United States 
for much of the 1950s, though the relationship was tense at times.
89
 The United States 
government at the time viewed the world strictly through the lens of the Cold War and its 
foreign policy was designed around containing the spread of communism, and hence it 
was not happy with Indonesia‘s stated policy of non-alignment. The US government was 
extremely worried about the perceived rise of communism and the PKI in Indonesia and 
its chief objective was to keep Indonesia from falling under communist control. Thus it 
provided Indonesia with a substantial amount of aid, mostly economic but also military.
90
 
The American focus on blindly preventing Indonesia from falling into the communist 
camp led to limited covert American support for the rebels in the 1957-58 rebellion, 
which until 1965 was certainly the low point in Indonesian-United States relations and 
something the Indonesians would not soon forget.
91
 Friction also developed over the 
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continued US support for the status quo in the West Irian conflict, a position that favored 
the Dutch side. Relations would eventually improve under the careful guidance of US 
Ambassador to Indonesia Howard Jones, who arrived in Indonesia in March 1958 but 
managed to weather the dip in relations caused by US support for the rebels.  Jones was 
considered sympathetic to President Sukarno and Indonesia, and would serve as US 
Ambassador until mid-1965, developing as close a relationship with President Sukarno as 
any foreign diplomat had.
92
   
Indonesia also tried to maintain an independent relationship with the communist 
‗block,‘ and relations were similarly tense at some times and cordial at others. Diplomatic 
relations were established with the Peoples Republic of China in 1950 but throughout the 
1950s were not particularly close.
93
 In 1956 President Sukarno visited the PRC on one of 
his world tours, an experience that profoundly impressed Sukarno because China seemed 
to demonstrate that national unity and economic progress could be achieved without 
democracy but with a strong leader, and some of the PRC‘s techniques for doing this, 
especially mass mobilization, seemed transferable to Indonesia.
94
 However, clouding 
relations between the two throughout the 1950s and 1960s was the presence and status of 
a numerically-small but economically-influential minority of foreign Chinese (citizens of 
the PRC and a smaller number who favored Taiwan) as well as Indonesians of Chinese 
descent.  The issue of the strong economic presence of Chinese in Indonesia will be 
discussed in Part III below; the PRC objected to the poor treatment that this group often 
received in Indonesia. With respect to the status of overseas-born Chinese, the PRC 
followed a policy of considering such persons as citizens of the PRC. In 1955, though, 
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the PRC dropped this policy with respect to Indonesia when it signed a dual nationality 
treaty with the GOI in which it was agreed that Indonesians of Chinese descent must 
choose between the two countries within a two year period; the treaty, however, was not 
ratified by the Indonesian side until 1960. 
In the case of the Indonesian-Soviet Union relationship,
95
 relations were cool until 
1956, when the USSR announced its policy of peaceful coexistence, which in theory 
recognized that nations were entitled to have independent foreign policies. Henceforth the 
relationship became quite cordial, especially as it was bolstered by a massive infusion of 
Soviet aid from circa 1956 to 1963.
96
 In the context of the growing Cold War, the Soviet 
Union was clearly trying to gain influence in Jakarta and, if not trying to bring Indonesia 
within the communist sphere, at least trying to keep Indonesia neutral in the  conflict.  
However, as events would later demonstrate, at least from the Indonesian point of view 
there was little ideological affinity with the Soviets; the relationship was based primarily 
on economic and military aid, which peaked during the West Irian conflict in 1961-2 and 
thereafter began to decline.  By then the communist block had split into the Soviet and 
the PRC camps, and both vied for Indonesia‘s friendship.     
The Afro-Asian Bandung Conference hosted by Indonesia in April 1955 was 
perhaps the high point of Indonesia‘s independent and active foreign policy.
97
 It was the 
first and only Afro-Asian conference, and it was the forerunner of the non-aligned 
movement, which officially kicked off in 1961 with the Conference of Non-Aligned 
Nations at Belgrade, Yugoslavia.
98
 The GOI, especially Prime Minister Ali 
Sastroamidjojo, was the prime initiator and organizer of the Bandung Conference. It was 
the first major meeting of leaders of these nations (29 nations were represented), and the 
first time many of their leaders met one another. Its primary purpose was to encourage 
solidarity among nations from Africa and Asia, especially newly independent ex-
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colonies, and ―to make ‗the voice of Asia‘ heard in world affairs at a time of dangerous 
Cold War crises in Asia.‖
99
 Hence, there was much discussion regarding nationalism, 
colonialism, and neo-colonialism. Another topic of great interest was non-alignment - of 
exploring alternative political paths in a world increasingly divided by the Cold War. 
However, the conference was unable to reach consensus on the non-alignment question, 
as there were a large group of countries present which were aligned with Western 
nations, and a smaller group led by India and Indonesia which favored non-alignment. 
The conference certainly provided an opportunity for many leaders to understand each 
other better; in particular the PRC delegation, led by Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, made 
a strong impression with its conciliatory approach. The conference ended with the 
issuance of a communiqué which contained 10 general principles that the participants 
were able to agree upon.
100
     
If the Bandung Conference was the highlight of the ‗independent and active‘ 
foreign policy, the most important and immediate foreign policy issue for Indonesia in 
the 1950s was the status of West Irian.
101
 As we have seen, under the RTCA Indonesia 
very reluctantly agreed that West Irian would remain temporarily with the Dutch, but that 
its status should be resolved within the next year. As efforts to resolve West Irian‘s status 
continually failed, the issue began to gain traction with the general public in Indonesia, 
and President Sukarno in particular was an avid proponent of incorporating West Irian 
within Indonesia. For Sukarno, who had advocated incorporation since the first year of 
independence, as well as other Indonesian leaders, West Irian was not only a continuing 
reminder of Dutch colonialism but also a strong rallying point for Indonesian nationalism 
and unity. From 1950 to 1955, representatives from Holland and Indonesia met four 
times in bilateral discussions to resolve the issue, but no agreement was reached. 
Indonesia then turned to the United Nations for resolution. Four times between December 
1954 and November 1957 Indonesia tried to get the UN involved by attempting to place 
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the issue on the UN agenda, and all four times the attempt failed to garner the two thirds 
vote required for UN consideration. In the meantime, largely due to the West Irian issue, 
relations with the Dutch had reached a low point.  In February 1956, when it was clear 
that the latest meeting between Indonesia and Holland to resolve various issues would not 
produce any agreement, Indonesia unilaterally abrogated the RTCA.
102
 In August 1956 
Indonesia repudiated the remainder of the debt owed to the Dutch under the RTCA, 
though by this point most of the debt had already been paid.
103
 After the fourth 
Indonesian attempt to get the UN to consider the West Irian issue failed in late November 
1957, labor unions in early December began seizing Dutch enterprises in Indonesia, a 
process that led to the nationalization of all Dutch companies in Indonesia and a major 
restructuring of the Indonesian economy (see Part III, Section C below). However, this 
move did not lead to resolution of West Irian‘s status, and as Guided Democracy began 
West Irian was still under the control of the Dutch.      
B. Guided Democracy: Brinksmanship and Anti-Imperialism. 
Under Guided Democracy Indonesia‘s foreign policy changed drastically from a 
fairly passive and neutral ‗independent and active‘ approach to a much more militaristic, 
aggressive, strongly nationalist approach that focused heavily on combating the evils of 
imperialism and neo-colonialism.
104
 This change was initiated and led by President 
Sukarno, who under Guided Democracy formulated, articulated and implemented foreign 
policy.
105
 Though his vision would be continually refined, by the end of 1962, if not 
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before, Sukarno publicly viewed the world as divided not along the Cold War lines of the 
Soviet-led communist block versus USA-led democracies (plus non-aligned countries), 
but instead as divided between countries newly emerging from the shackles of 
colonialism and imperialism versus the old established capitalist countries determined to 
re-impose colonialism and imperialism. Sukarno (and by extension, Indonesia) took it 
upon himself to assume the role of leading the newly emerging countries, shortened to 
‗NEFOs,‘ in the drive against the ‗OLDEFOs‘ (the ‗old established forces‘), imperialism, 
colonialism and neo-colonialism (in early 1964 the latter three terms were coined into the 
very popular acronym NEKOLIM by army chief of staff General Yani).
106
  Unlike the era 
of Parliamentary Democracy, when foreign affairs assumed a fairly low profile, under 
Guided Democracy foreign relations dominated politics, largely because President 
Sukarno‘s new aggressive policy not only led to the brink of war with the Dutch but also 
to an undeclared actual war with the British and Malaysia.  Indeed, Indonesia‘s success in 
its squabble with the Dutch over West Irian in part resulted in Sukarno‘s using the same 
brinksmanship tactics against the British and Malaysians. Moreover, foreign relations 
clearly spilled over into domestic politics, and there was a great intertwining of the two. 
As we shall see in Chapter Six, this policy would culminate in 1965 with Indonesia‘s 
withdrawal from the UN, an alliance with the PRC, and the nadir of relations with the 
United States. In addition, the extremes to which this policy was taken resulted in a sharp 
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became First Deputy Prime Minister (second in the pecking order behind Sukarno) after Djuanda‘s death. 
Like many important ministers close to President Sukarno, Subandrio had no independent base of popular 
support but was beholden to Sukarno for his position.  For two short biographies of Subandrio, see pp. 436-
7 of Jones, Indonesia: The Possible Dream, and pp. 483-4 in Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, eds., 
Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945-1965 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970).  
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NEFOs probably included the ex-colonial countries of Asia and Africa (though Malaysia was not a NEFO), 
socialist countries, Latin American countries, and ‗progressive‘ countries, while OLDEFOs included the 
United States and western European countries. See Modelski, New Emerging Forces, p. iii.  
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decline in foreign aid, which from 1956 to 1963 was a major source of funds for the GOI, 
leaving Indonesia in late 1965 with foreign debt totaling some $2.4 billion. 
President Sukarno‘s motivations in implementing this new policy have been the 
subject of much speculation, and there is no clear answer.  There is no question that he 
used a confrontational style of foreign policy featuring perpetual crises to generate unity 
and cohesion in a nation divided along numerous lines and still suffering from the trauma 
of the 1957-58 rebellion. He was also certainly quite conscious of the impact his foreign 
policy decisions would have on domestic politics.
107
 There was also an element of 
personal vanity as well.
108
 More deeply, though, the new approach certainly reflected his 
– and others - long experience with and struggle against colonialism and imperialism. As 
Bunnell noted, 
essentially these motivations consisted of the ideological–psychological 
impulses…of a fervent nationalist…the dynamic of the policy was the 
psychological need for self respect felt by a political elite long humiliated 
by colonialism. That need could best be filled by the quest for Indonesian 





There was also a strong emotional element to Sukarno‘s nationalism, which ―dictated a 
boldness in execution consistent with the spirit of his goals.  Revolutionary goals 
demanded revolutionary implementation…‖
110
 Finally, there was also a definite 
impulsive element to Sukarno‘s policies, and it seems evident that on a number of 
occasions he failed to think through the long term implications of what he was doing and 
as a result boxed himself into multiple corners. 
Whatever his motivation, by the summer of 1960, after the new MPRS and DPR 
had been appointed and the political parties generally tamed (and Masjumi and the PSI 
banned), President Sukarno‘s domestic position was finally strong enough so that he 
could attend more closely to foreign affairs and begin to assert his authority.
111
  One of 
the first public hints of the new policy came in his speech at the United Nations in 
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September 1960 (in English), in which he identified imperialism and colonialism, and not 
the Cold War, as the root of all tension and conflict in the world, and also claimed 
imperialism was the greatest evil of the world. Moreover, it was the older countries, the 
long established and stable ones, who were the greatest threat to peace. The speech also 
emphasized that ―we of Asia and Africa‖ will continue to oppose colonialism and 
imperialism.
112
 After that speech, Sukarno increasingly was preoccupied with the anti-
imperialist struggle at the expense of the non-aligned movement. The watershed public 
moment, however, was the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in September 
1961. Sukarno‘s keynote speech (again delivered in English) not only reflected the new 
course of Indonesian foreign policy but also the deep divisions at the conference and 
within the non-aligned movement, which was split between two groups, one (led by 
India) which favored focusing on defusing the Cold War as a means of maintaining world 
peace, and the other, led by Sukarno, intent on combating imperialism and colonialism as 
the means to maintaining world peace.
113
 In the speech Sukarno openly called for a new 
approach in resolving the problems of the world and identified the conflict between the 
new emergent forces and the old forces of domination as the most important struggle in 
the world. The old forces ―still try to preserve the old equilibrium based upon the 
exploitation of nation by nation,‖ while the new emergent forces ―are striving for the 
speedy establishment of a new equilibrium,‖ in which all nations ―were free to arrange 
their international relations as they see fit, based on the principles of equality, justice and 
mutual benefit.‖ Sukarno again identified imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism 
as the enemies of peaceful coexistence and called for continuing struggle against these 
evils. It was just after he returned home from this overseas trip that he coined the term 
‗newly emerging forces‘ or NEFOs and ‗old established forces‘ or OLDEFOs. 
Indonesia‘s new direction was clear, though it had yet to be applied in practice. 
                                                 
112
 A copy of this speech, entitled ‗To Build the World Anew,‘ can be found in Modelski, New Emerging 
Forces; cited parts from pp. 10-11, and 17.  See also Bunnell, Kennedy Initiatives, pp. 40-1, and Agung, 
Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy, pp. 285-6. 
113
 Bunnell, Kennedy Initiatives, pp. 43-4, Modelski, New Emerging Forces, pp. 32-3, and Agung, Twenty 
Years Indonesian Foreign Policy, pp. 315-42. Excerpts from this speech can be found in Modelski, New 
Emerging Forces, pp. 33-43; the cited parts are from pp. 35, 37, 39, 39, and 41.   
 74 
 
West Irian provided an initial testing ground for the implementation of this new 
direction in foreign policy.
114
 In August 1960 Indonesia severed diplomatic relations with 
the Dutch and thereafter continued to attempt to internationalize the issue by appealing 
unsuccessfully to the UN to get involved. As the Dutch in 1960 and 1961 continued to 
lay the political groundwork for an independent West Irian and to reinforce their military 
positions on the territory, Indonesia responded by ratcheting up the military pressure. 
This was made possible by the massive amount of aid provided by the Soviet block in 
1960-61.  In 1960, the USSR itself signed loan and trade agreements worth at least $250 
million, some of which may have been credit for military equipment, and in early 1961 
General Nasution, at the time still head of the army, went to Moscow and secured an 
additional $400 million in credits for military equipment, principally aircraft and ships.
115
  
More aid was funneled through Soviet block countries (see below for a discussion on 
foreign aid generally), and most of the military equipment had been delivered by the end 
of 1961.  It was during this period from 1960 to 1962 that Indonesian-USSR relations 
were closest.
116
 However, the Indonesian army generally preferred dealing with the 
United States (where many of the army‘s officers had received advanced training),
117
 and 
Nasution had turned to Moscow only after his requests for military assistance were 
rebuffed by the United States, which continued its policy of neutrality in the West Irian 
dispute. 
In late 1961 the West Irian conflict entered its final stage. On 19 December 1961, 
President Sukarno delivered his famous Trikora speech, which signaled that Indonesia 
was finally ready to resolve the dispute by force if necessary and greatly intensified the 
conflict. In this well-publicized speech, Sukarno issued three commands, known as the 
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‗Three Peoples‘ Commands‘ (Trikomando Rakyat, shortened to ‗Trikora‘), which were (i) 
to defeat Dutch efforts to establish a West Irian puppet state, (ii) to plant the Indonesian 
flag on West Irian, and (iii) to prepare for general mobilization. Also in December 1961, 
Sukarno established a body known as the Supreme Command for the Liberation of West 
Irian (led by him), and this group then created the Mandala Command for the Liberation 
of West Irian.
118
 The Mandala Command was charged with preparing for a military 
invasion of West Irian and it soon began to build up a large invasion force. These moves, 
and Dutch countermoves, threatened more violent action, and in mid-January 1962 there 
was indeed a naval clash off the coast of West Irian, with the loss of one Indonesian ship 
and 50 lives. 
The apparent intensification of the dispute in December 1961 and January 1962 
spurred United States and UN involvement in the conflict, which led directly to final 
resolution of the matter in August 1962. In February 1962 Robert Kennedy, the US 
Attorney General and brother of US President Kennedy, went to both the Hague and 
Jakarta in an effort to jumpstart settlement negotiations. The Kennedy administration was 
making concerted efforts to establish better relations with Indonesia after the relative 
chilly relations during the last of the Eisenhower years, but perhaps more importantly the 
United States had no desire to be drawn into a conflagration which had the potential to 
draw the Soviets in and thus quickly escalate into World War III. Robert Kennedy‘s 
efforts were successful, and in late March, under UN auspices but with the able assistance 
of US diplomat Ellsworth Bunker as mediator, the two sides commenced talks just 
outside Washington D.C., with Adam Malik representing Indonesia. The negotiations 
were not particularly smooth, as the talks broke off several times and the Indonesian 
military buildup continued, supplemented by occasional low level infiltration of small 
armed units into West Irian. Finally, however, just as the Indonesian military seemed 
poised to mount a full-scale invasion, a compromise was reached, due largely to the 
efforts of Ellsworth Bunker and last minute intervention by President Kennedy 
himself.
119
 In the final accord, signed on 15 August 1962, it was agreed that West Irian 
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would be transferred to UN authority by 1 October, and then from UN to Indonesian 
control on 1 May 1963.  In addition, by no later than 1969 the people of West Irian were 
to be allowed to choose (via an unspecified means) whether to remain under Indonesian 
jurisdiction. Indonesia‘s tactical combination of diplomatic efforts and military threat had 
successfully resolved the conflict in Indonesia‘s favor.     
Resolution of the West Irian conflict had a number of important ramifications for 
Indonesia. It was a great personal victory and affirmation for President Sukarno, who had 
spearheaded Indonesia‘s efforts over the past 12 years to bring West Irian within 
Indonesia‘s fold. Sukarno‘s domestic prestige and power zoomed to new levels, and it 
was at the peak of the West Irian conflict in June 1962 that Sukarno was able to replace 
General Nasution with General Yani as head of the army. Similarly, it was also a victory 
for the armed forces, not only because its role in pressuring the Dutch militarily had 
enhanced its status and legitimacy but also because of the new weaponry it acquired, 
though most of this went to the air force and navy. It was also extremely advantageous 
for the PKI, which was perhaps the loudest proponent of Indonesian nationalism and 
supporter of Sukarno‘s confrontational tactics, thus enhancing the PKI‘s patriotic appeal. 
It was moreover a victory for mass mobilization, as mass demonstrations, rallies, actions 
and other shows of support became commonplace. There was also a clear linkage 
between the PKI and mass mobilization; as one commentator noted, the ―National Front 
became the agitational center of the West Irian campaign,‖ and the ―PKI‘s strong position 
in the National Front by 1962 gave it a respectable official base from which to launch its 
mass demonstrations and displays of revolutionary fervor.‖
120
 Finally, it was also a very 
successful application of a type of confrontational, brinksmanship diplomacy - featuring a 
combination of diplomatic efforts, low level military action, and the threat of greater 
military action – that would also be used in Konfrontasi against Malaysia and the British. 
However, on the downside the victory came at great economic cost.  Indonesia had 
borrowed massive amounts to pay for the struggle, and attention to the conflict and the 
size of the military budget effectively crippled efforts to build areas of productive 
economic activity.  
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Before turning to economic matters, I would like to conclude the discussion of 
foreign affairs with a brief look at the importance of foreign aid in Indonesia during this 
period. This aid was both economic and military in nature and came in the form of both 
non-reimbursable grants and reimbursable loans. While there are no official figures for 
overall aid (nor is there a breakdown between military and economic aid, or between 
grants and repayable loans), there are a few baseline numbers, and the overall amount 
was staggering when compared to the size of Indonesia‘s economy.
121
 Most of the aid 
came from 1956 to 1963, declining quickly with the outbreak of Konfrontasi in 1963.
122
 
By the end of 1965, Indonesia‘s total outstanding foreign debt was approximately $2.36 
billion, broken down as follows: USSR $990 million, Yugoslavia $115 million, Poland 
$100 million, Czechoslovakia $77 million, East Germany $72 million, Hungary $19 
million, Romania $16 million, PRC $13 million, other $2 million (totaling $1.404 billion 
from communist countries), United States $179 million, West Germany $122 million, 
France $115 million, Italy $91 million, UK $42 million, Netherlands $28 million, 
Switzerland $3 million, other $7 million (totaling $587 million for the United States and 
western European countries), Japan $231 million, Pakistan $20 million, India $10 
million, UAR $4 million, and the International Monetary Fund $102 million.
123
  These 
figures do not include non-reimbursable grant aid, the total of which is unknown; for 
example, as part of the settlement for World War II, the Japanese provided some $332 
million in grant aid from 1958 to 1965, and similarly the United States provided an 
estimated $264 million in grant money from 1950 to 1965.
124
  Nor does the $2.36 billion 
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include the total figure for all loans or commitments from 1950 to 1965, as some 
commitments were not utilized and some debt was actually repaid before 1965. In fact, a 
CIA report from 1967 estimated that from 1956 to 1965, Indonesia‘s foreign aid 
commitments (presumably including loans and grants) totaled some $3.8 billion, 
including $2.4 billion in economic aid and $1.4 billion in military aid.
125
 
Unfortunately, there are no official annual breakdowns of this foreign assistance, 
but we can make educated guesses. Combining various estimates, it appears that from 
1956 to 1965 the annual inflow of foreign aid (both grant aid and loans) was roughly 
$274 million per year.
126
 To give this number some context, Indonesia‘s balance of 
payments was estimated to be a surplus of $96 million in 1960, a deficit of $168 million 
in 1961, a deficit of $168 million in 1962, a deficit of $142 million in 1963, and a deficit 
of $88 million in 1964.
127
 One commentator estimated that from 1962 until 1964 one-
third of Indonesia‘s total imports were paid with foreign aid.
128
 Moreover, $274 million 
equaled some 20% of GOI revenues in 1961, 16% in 1962, and 25% in 1964, much 
higher if the unofficial exchange rate is used.
129
  As will be discussed in Part III below, 
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regardless of the accuracy of the these numbers, the key point is that economically the 
GOI was undoubtedly living off foreign assistance, the huge sums of which allowed the 




III. The Economy, 1950 – c. 1962: Constructing a 
National Economy. 
 
From 1950 until 1965, and especially during Guided Democracy, economic policy 
and development generally took a back seat to politics in Indonesia. Nevertheless, similar 
to the myriad of political issues Indonesia faced in the construction of a nation such as 
structure of central government, political representation, and relations between the center 
and the regions, in 1950 the new country also faced a variety of issues with respect to the 
economy. The general objective and buzzword of the time was to ‗transform the colonial 
economy into a national economy,‘ but there was hardly any consensus on what the 
national economy should look like. The same political divisions and disagreements that 
rendered consensus in the political arena so difficult also plagued the country with 
respect to economic policy. Moreover, regardless of which economic vision Indonesian 
officials had for their country, in practice the nation was constrained by the economic 
structure as it existed in early 1950, a situation even more limiting than that in the 
political realm. In this Part III, I shall first describe generally the economic situation in 
1950, followed by a discussion of economic policy under Parliamentary Democracy. I 
then turn to a discussion of the takeover and nationalization of Dutch businesses in 1957-
59, a seminal event in the economic history of the new country, and conclude with a look 
at economic policy and performance in the early period of Guided Democracy.
131
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Before examining the structure of the economy at the beginning of Indonesia‘s 
independence in 1950, it may be useful to highlight five interrelated issues that from 
1950 to 1965 (and well into the New Order period) consistently framed the debate over 
the construction of the national economy. These themes were (i) constructing an 
integrated economy which addressed the economic imbalances between Java and the 
other islands, (ii) the role and position of indigenous Indonesians in the economy, (iii) the 
role of the state – the government – in the economy, (iv) raising the overall GDP and per 
capita GDP – basic economic growth and wealth distribution, and (v) how to finance the 
construction of the national economy. With respect to the first theme of integration, as we 
shall see below in 1950 the economy was quite fragmented, with Java importing the 
majority of goods and acting as the small center of manufacturing, while the other 
islands, particularly Sumatra and Kalimantan, were areas that exported directly into the 
international trade system (mostly via Singapore) and generated much foreign exchange. 
How to mesh these divergent interests would be a major obstacle to overcome.  Second, 
regarding the role of indigenous (non-Chinese) Indonesians in the economy, in 1950 
Indonesians had a very tiny role in the modern sector of Indonesian‘s dual economy, 
which was dominated by foreigners, especially the Dutch. How to ‗Indonesianize‘ the 
economy – to gain control of the foreign-dominated modern sector of the economy by 
increasing the share of Indonesians in the ownership and control of productive assets 
aside from subsistence agriculture – was a major preoccupation of officials during this 
period. The third theme of the role of the state in the economy arose from both the 
ideological identification of capitalism and free market ‗liberalism‘ with the despised 
system of colonialism and the practical circumstances of the dearth of indigenous capital 
and entrepreneurs who could play a large role in the economy. The potential for a large 
role in the economy by the state was reflected by Article 33 of the 1945 constitution (and 
the identical Article 38 of the 1950 provisional constitution) that provides  
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(1) the economy shall be organized as a common endeavor based upon the 
principle of the family system, (2) branches of production which are 
important for the State and which affect the life of most people shall be 
controlled by the State, and (3) land and water and the natural riches 





On the fourth issue of general economic development, the per capita income in 1950 was 
very low, perhaps as low as $100 per year, with widespread poverty and a literacy rate of 
around 10%.
133
  Compounding the low level of economic development was the 
destruction reaped by eight years of war and revolution, which devastated much of the 
infrastructure and the productive apparatus.
134
 Official efforts to address these 
development issues often centered around attempts to encourage industrialization in a 
country that was predominantly agricultural in nature.  Finally, the fifth issue of financing 
the construction of the national economy would prove to be unsolvable during this period 
and led to major problems such as perennial GOI budget deficits, chronic balance of 
payment deficits, chronic inflation which would become severe and paralyzing in the 
1960s, and great international indebtedness (see Part II above for details on Indonesia‘s 
international debt). In fact, as we shall see, throughout the period 1950 to 1965, of these 
five issues only the two questions of Indonesianization of the economy and the role of the 
state in the economy would be resolved to any great degree, and neither was a smooth 
journey nor one on which there was great consensus.  
A. The Economy c. 1950. 
This section explores the basic structure of the Indonesian economy in 1950 
which Indonesian policymakers had to work with. I focus on four major features or 
characteristics of the economy, all of which were inherited from the colonial era and 
informed and constrained the efforts of policymakers during Parliamentary Democracy 
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and Guided Democracy: the dual or plural economy, economic fragmentation or non-
integration between Java and the other islands, the agricultural nature of the economy, 
and finally the emphasis of the economy on exports of primary products. The section 
finishes with a discussion of a related issue touched on above, that of financing economic 
development. As we shall see, a major cause of the economic failures and problems of 
the 1950s and 1960s was the inability of the GOI to expand its revenue base to meet its 
ever increasing expenditures. This inability resulted in a substantial portion of GOI 
revenues being sourced from foreign trade, which in turn had a direct impact on much of 
the foreign investment in Indonesia.   
Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of Indonesia‘s economy in 1950 was its 
highly dualistic nature that featured a fairly sharp cleavage between the modern sector of 
the economy and the traditional rural, subsistence agricultural sector. The ‗modern 
sector‘ of the economy generally referred to industry, large scale plantations, mining, 
finance and banking, large scale international trade, and other sectors which required 
great amounts of capital investment and were comparatively highly specialized, as 
opposed to the more labor intensive sectors of the economy, principally subsistence 
agriculture and handicraft production.
135
 Capital accumulation and growth tended to 
occur primarily in the modern sector, whereas the traditional sector was generally 
stagnating, with comparatively little change in productive techniques. Virtually all 
economic production activity was contained within these two very different sectors. In 
1950, the modern sector accounted for roughly 25% of GDP,
136
 and its influence was 
certainly greater than that. The chief feature of this dichotomy was that the modern sector 
was almost entirely controlled by foreigners (particularly the Dutch), who as we saw 
maintained their economic interests under the terms of the RTCA. Such an economic 
structure was largely an inheritance from the Dutch colonial era, and indeed was often 
referred to as a ‗colonial economy.‘ In the case of Indonesia, the economy has also 
frequently been referred to as a ‗plural economy,‘ a term first coined by colonial 
administrator-turned-scholar J.S. Furnivall in his classic work Netherlands India: a Study 
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  This term refers to the divisions within the economy that are 
delineated along ethnic and social lines and reflect the great inequality of distribution of 
economic power in colonial Indonesia. It is commonly described as a pyramid structure, 
with the Dutch and other foreigners at the top of the economic and social pyramid (a tiny 
percentage of the population controlling the comparatively large modern sector of the 
economy), underneath which are ‗foreign Orientals,‘ primarily the Chinese (who 
comprised some 3% of the population but dominated intermediary trade and distribution 
and rural finance), followed by the native Indonesians (over 95% of the population, but 
most of whom did not participate in the first two sectors and hence were mostly engaged 
in subsistence or local market agriculture or handicraft production) at the wide lower 
cross section of the pyramid.   
However one characterizes this dual or plural economy, for the Indonesians in 
1950 the feature most exacerbating, humiliating and controversial was the control of the 
very important modern sector of the economy by foreigners and moreover the almost 
universal lack of participation by indigenous Indonesians (i.e., Indonesians of non-
Chinese descent) in the modern sector and the trading and retail sectors. In almost every 
sector of the ‗commanding heights‘ of the economy – agricultural estates, oil and mining 
enterprises, high finance, the tiny large scale industry sector, and importing/exporting – 
there was no significant Indonesian involvement. To the extent Indonesians did 
participate in the modern economy, it was usually in the form of labor, although there 
was a very small number of Indonesians who worked in western firms as clerks and 
administrative staff.
138
 Indonesians did own a number of small manufacturing 
establishments and were especially influential in the handicraft, textile and kretek 
cigarette (a mixture of clove and tobacco) industries. Nor were indigenous Indonesians 
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able to make much headway against Chinese control of wholesale and retail trade.
139
 
There was only a miniscule Indonesian entrepreneurial class, and capital accumulation by 
individual Indonesians – to the extent it could be measured, was seemingly 
insignificant.
140
 Given this state of affairs, it was only natural that upon independence 
Indonesian officials sought to devise ways to increase Indonesian participation in the 
modern economy.  
A general second feature of the economy in 1950 was the lack of economic 
integration between Java and the other islands.
141
 Indeed, recent literature suggests that a 
substantially integrated national economy developed very slowly and only came into 
being in the 1970s and 1980s during the New Order period.
142
 The lack of integration 
resulted from a divergence in economic interests between the lightly populated, export-
oriented ‗outer islands‘ with little manufacturing and the import-oriented Java (where 
most of the nascent manufacturing industry was located) with roughly two-thirds of the 
Indonesian population. By the 1930s, if not before, the value of exports from the outer 
islands, which already far exceeded the value of imports of the outer islands, had 
exceeded the exports of Java, which in turn was rapidly becoming a net importer; in 
1939, Java‘s share of exports was 36%, and its share of imports 66%, compared to the 
outer islands 64% share of exports and 34% share of imports.
143
  Moreover, the outer 
islands generally traded directly into the international system (primarily to Singapore), 
and trade between the outer islands and Java was minimal right up until 1940.  After 
independence internal trade grew swiftly, but the trend toward dominance of exports by 
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the outer islands and dominance of imports by Java continued; Booth calculates that 
Java‘s share of exports was 20% in 1954 and remained well below that in future years.
144
  
This disparity of interests was magnified greatly in the 1950s and 1960s because the GOI, 
unable to generate much revenue from other sources, relied heavily on international trade 
for its revenue (see discussion below). Revenue from this trade was in the form of direct 
export taxes (and import taxes) and overvalued official exchange rates for Rupiah, which 
severely cut into exporters‘ earnings and gave rise to much smuggling in the outer 
islands. Indeed, these policies that effectively penalized exporters were seen as an 
example of Javanese exploitation of the outer islands and were a principal cause of the 
1957-58 rebellion.
145
       
A third general feature of the Indonesian economy in 1950 was its agricultural 
nature and low level of industrialization. The agricultural sector was comprised primarily 
of peasant food crops, smallholder and plantation export crops, as well as livestock, 
fishery and forest products, much of which was geared toward export (see next 
paragraph).
146
 In the early 1950s, agriculture accounted for over 55% of the national 
income, with manufacturing less than 10%.
147
 This changed slightly by the end of the 
1950s; in 1958, agriculture accounted for just over 50% of national income, 
manufacturing for 13.5%, and services 32%.
148
 Exports of agricultural products also 
provided as much as two-thirds of the critical foreign exchange earned in Indonesia.
149
   
The importance of agriculture as the mainstay of economic life for the population at large 
is further underscored if we look at employment figures; according to the 1961 census, 
72% of employed Indonesians (23.5 million of 32.7 million) worked in the agricultural 
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sector, 6% (1.94 million) in mining and manufacturing, 7% (2.19 million) in trade, 
banking and insurance, and 10% (3.1 million) in services, with no other category having 
more than 2%.
150
 The lack of an industrial base was another colonial hangover; the Dutch 
were aware of the lack of industrialization and in the 1930s had finally begun to 
encourage limited industrialization, primarily as a way to combat imports of Japanese 
manufactured goods. These efforts gave rise to a small number of foreign companies 
establishing manufacturing plants in the 1930s, but did little to change the agrarian nature 
of the economy.
151
 As we shall see, in the 1950s the GOI did try to promote 
industrialization, but this effort also met with limited success.
152
 Moreover, one result of 
this limited industrial base (most of which was located in Java) was that most 
manufacturers, especially the foreign-owned ones, depended largely on imports of raw 
materials and capital goods and equipment to operate their business, which in turn 
required access to foreign currency to pay for such imports.     
Interrelated with these three features of the Indonesian economy in 1950 was a 
fourth general feature, that the economy was largely geared toward the production and 
export of a limited number of agricultural primary products as well as raw materials from 
mining, principally oil.
153
 This characteristic was also an inheritance from the colonial 
era, which witnessed an incredible boom in export driven growth from c. 1910 to 1930. 
However, the depression exposed the vulnerability of this extreme dependence on world 
markets, and it was clear that the ―export oriented economy with its high degree of 
openness and dependence on demand for primary products under the aegis of colonialism 
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could not offer a viable path for future economic development.‖
154
 Industrialization was 
one solution, but as indicated these efforts were not very successful in the first two 
decades after independence. According to Booth‘s estimates, exports as a percentage of 
GDP were 26.1% in 1951, dropping to 19.6% by 1955; from then until 1966, with the 
exception of one year (1963, 17.1%), they ranged between 18% and 20%.
155
 The two 
principal exports from 1950 until 1966 were oil and rubber (both smallholder and estate) 
(see Chapter III for more on these exports). In addition to their significance as a 
percentage of GDP, exports were the primary source of foreign exchange, and foreign 
trade in general was a major source of revenue for the GOI from 1950 to 1965. 
 Generating revenue was a major problem for the GOI, and the government‘s 
inability to raise revenue commensurate with expenditures resulted, especially under 
Guided Democracy, in serious economic problems, most notably over-reliance on trade 
taxes for revenues, perennial GOI budget deficits, chronic balance of payment deficits, 
chronic and later paralyzing inflation, and high international indebtedness. As Booth has 
noted, ―it was the failure of revenue policy which was ultimately responsible for the 
failure of fiscal policy over these years,‖ but even this phrase understates the negative 
impact of the GOI‘s inability to resolve the revenue generation problem.
156
 To compare 
with the Dutch colonial government, at the end of the colonial era, tax revenues 
accounted for 60% of government revenues, the other 40% coming from government 
monopolies and utilities; of this 60% from tax revenues, 20% came from corporate and 
personal income taxes, 20% from import/export taxes, and the remaining 20% from 
land/property and excise taxes. However, after independence trade taxes as a percentage 
of GOI revenue shot up to 58% in 1951, 23% in 1954, and 36% in 1958, before declining 
to 16% in 1961 and lower in the following years.
157
 The basic problem was a substantial 
shrinkage of the tax base; farmers (some 72% of the population in 1961) were considered 
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too poor to tax heavily, and revenues from government monopolies and utilities were way 
down (by the mid-1950s, amounting to only 2% or so of revenues) compared with the 
colonial era.
158
 Turning to foreign trade taxes as a major source of revenue was politically 
easier, since it mostly taxed businesses and foreigners – though of course there was a 
substantial group of smallholder exporters in the outer islands who were also negatively 
affected.   
In an effort to keep raising revenue from foreign trade taxes, the GOI established 
a tremendously complex multiple exchange rate system in which different rates were 
used for different transactions and that had numerous negative impacts.
159
 The basic 
problem with the system was that the official foreign exchange rates fixed by the GOI 
severely overvalued the Rupiah, and thus exporters, who were required to turn over most 
of their foreign exchange to the GOI in exchange for Rupiah at fixed rates, received far 
fewer Rupiah than their foreign exchange earnings commanded in the market. Thus, one 
impact was to skew trading incentives and effectively penalize or tax exporters in a 
variety of ways, leading to disincentives to export. This also resulted in a thriving black 
market in Rupiah and foreign exchange, vast smuggling operations (one observer 
estimated that smuggling accounted for 30% of exports by the mid-1960s), non-
declaration of earnings (or keeping the foreign exchange overseas), and disincentives to 
invest in export sectors.
160
 As noted previously, this regime particularly affected the outer 
islands and was a major source of contention in the 1957-58 rebellion. Trade, for these 
and other reasons, began to decline in the late 1950s, and the balance of payments deficits 
quickly worsened. A second major impact of the system was to make the already 
valuable foreign exchange even dearer. For the small manufacturing sector, foreign 
exchange was a necessary evil because most raw materials, capital equipment and spare 
parts were imported. In the broader context, because Indonesia‘s industrial base was so 
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small, most of its manufactured goods were imported anyway (the high demand for 
imported manufactured goods was a major component of imports, despite GOI attempts 
to limit non-essential imports), and thus access to foreign exchange was crucial to 
importing many goods. As noted, under the foreign exchange system most foreign 
exchange was turned over to the GOI in exchange for over-valued rupiah (the glaring 
exceptions were the foreign oil companies, who were allowed to keep their foreign 
exchange); the GOI then allocated foreign exchange among various applicants. This 
artificial control, especially in the face of dwindling foreign exchange earnings, offered 
much opportunity for graft and corruption. It seems a safe bet to assume that within the 
GOI control over these foreign exchange revenues was contested; it is not altogether clear 
who actually controlled these monies, though certainly the ministries responsible for the 
economic sectors which generated these revenues must have played a part.
161
 Moreover, 
as I shall argue, access to foreign exchange earnings of foreign companies played a major 
role in the takeover and treatment of those foreign companies in the 1960s. 
 Despite GOI efforts to squeeze more revenue from foreign trade, the GOI budget 
was in ever-increasing deficit from 1952 on, and this budget deficit was the principal 
                                                 
161
 One observer asserted that by the mid-1960s ―control over the allocation of official reserves …passed 
from any central policy-making authority to individual officials, including the managers of government 
agricultural estates and the governor of the central bank, each of whom utilized the foreign exchange at his 
disposal as he saw fit.‖ (Dick et al., Emergence of a National Economy, pp. 192-3, citing Rosendale) 
Palmer notes that in 1961 authority to allocate foreign exchange was transferred from Bank Indonesia to 
the Coordinating Minister for Development (a position filled by Chaerul Saleh from 1959 until March 
1962, and then again from November 1963 until early 1966); see p. 143 of Ingrid Palmer, Textiles in 
Indonesia: Problems of Import Substitution, Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and 
Development (New York: Praeger, 1972). However, Pitt suggests that under Guided Democracy allocation 
of foreign exchange among industrial firms was under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Basic Industry and 
Mining (also Chaerul Saleh from 1959 until 1965) and the Minister of Peoples Industry (Azis Saleh from 
1962 until 1966); see Pitt, ―Indonesia,‖ p. 59. In contrast,  if we can distinguish between allocation and 
control, Arndt and Panglaykim in 1966 suggest that Bank Indonesia continued to maintain control over 
some foreign exchange, and more importantly that ministries ―controlling the two most important foreign 
exchange earning industries, the Department of Estates Production and the Department of Oil and Natural 
Gas, through the political power of their respective Ministers, achieved a position where they retained 
substantial portions of the export proceeds under their control, ostensibly to finance the requirements of 
their industries for imported equipment, spare parts and materials‖; see p. 21 of J. Panglaykim and H. W.  
Arndt, The Indonesian Economy: Facing a New Era? (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1966). In 
1965-66, Frans Seda (whom we shall meet in Chapter Five) was Minister of Estates, while Chaerul Saleh 
was Minister of Oil and Natural Gas until early 1966. However, under the Contracts of Work signed in 
1963 by the three foreign oil companies (see Chapter Four), payments by the foreign oil companies were 
made directly to the state-owned enterprises who were the designated partners of the foreign companies; 
presumably these SOEs then passed the proceeds to the Minister of Basic Ministry and Mining (Chaerul 
Saleh), who oversaw the oil sector (the position of Minister of Oil and Natural Gas –also filled by Chaerul 
Saleh – was only created in late March 1965), but this is not certain given the high value of these revenues.     
 90 
 
cause of the chronic inflation which plagued Indonesia since its inception.
162
  This 
inflation was manageable until 1957 or so, but from 1957 to late 1961 jumped to around 
30% annually as defense expenditures caused by the 1957-58 rebellion and the West Irian 
military campaign increased enormously. From late 1961 until 1964, inflation doubled 
annually, and from late 1964 through 1966 a devastating hyperinflation which paralyzed 
much of the economy took hold.
163
 As we have seen, large amounts of foreign aid 
enabled Indonesia to mitigate the effects of the budget deficits for a while, but this 
assistance dried up after 1963. Moreover, revenues from trade began to decline in the late 
1950s, putting increased pressure on the deficit.    
B. Economic Policymaking under Parliamentary Democracy. 
The economic policymaking record and implementation from 1950 to circa 1957 
is generally seen as somewhat disappointing.
164
 Similar to other disappointing aspects of 
Parliamentary Democracy, a major cause of this unimpressive record was political 
divisions among GOI policymakers, divisions that cut across multiple strata. As one close 
observer noted, ―the years 1950 to 1957 in Indonesia are best understood as years of a 
hopeless losing battle on the part of a very small group of pragmatically conservative 
political leaders against an increasingly powerful political opposition of generally radical 
orientation.‖
165
 These conservative economic pragmatists, led by men such as Vice-
President Hatta, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (prominent economist and sometime Finance 
and Trade Minister), Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (Minister of Finance and first Indonesian 
Governor of Bank Indonesia) and Minister Djuanda, generally but not always favored 
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policies that worked within, or tried to accommodate, the existing structure of the 
Indonesian economy, and also generally placed more emphasis on rehabilitating and 
stabilizing the economy. Yet even within this group of pragmatists there was a wide 
diversity of opinion. At the heart of these divisions, both within the group of pragmatists 
and in the wider context of the pragmatists versus the radicals, was fundamental 
disagreement of what the new ‗national economy‘ should look like. As noted before, 
there was general agreement that Indonesia should move from a ‗colonial economy to a 
national economy‘, but there was far from a consensus on just how this national economy 
should be constructed. In particular, the two intertwining issues of foreign control of the 
economy and state involvement in the economy were greatly debated and the subject of 
much controversy. 
We have already seen that foreign interests, especially Dutch, dominated the 
modern sector of the economy and that there was minimal participation by Indonesians in 
these foreign concerns. Hence, one focus of policymakers was how best to 
‗Indonesianize‘ the economy, though the pace and extent of this process were hotly 
debated. As Sutter observed, there were nine principal forms that this process of 
―increasing the participation and elevating the role of the Indonesians‖ in their economy 
took: (i) transferring to GOI control the various state enterprises owned by the colonial 
government, (ii) establishment by the GOI of new state-owned enterprises, (iii) the 
transfer to GOI control of foreign enterprises, (iv) increased GOI control over foreign 
businesses, (v) the transfer to individual Indonesians of foreign businesses, (vi) the 
establishment by individual Indonesians of new businesses, (vii) increasing individual 
Indonesian ownership in foreign companies, (vii) increasing individual Indonesian 
participation in executive and administrative staff of foreign companies, and (ix) the 
return of landholdings of foreigners to Indonesia.
166
 The process of Indonesianization, in 
whatever form it took, was of course driven by economic nationalism. While there is 
disagreement on how exactly to define economic nationalism, one useful starting point 
may be ―the national aspiration to have nationals own and control the productive assets 
owned by foreigners, or residents considered to be aliens, and perform the important 
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economic functions hitherto performed by foreigners or resident aliens.‖
167
  In the case of 
Indonesia, economic nationalism, and the Indonesianization process in its nine forms, 
was initially directed principally against the Dutch and Chinese (including both foreign 
Chinese and Indonesians of Chinese descent - in the previous definition, ‗residents 
considered aliens‘).   
A second area of disagreement was over the role of the state in the economy. 
Because capitalism and ‗liberalism‘ were so closely associated in the minds of many GOI 
leaders with the hated colonialism and exploitation, many of these leaders nominally 
espoused socialism as their primary economic ideology, but this perhaps had more to do 
with anti-capitalism than it did with attraction toward principles of socialism.
168
 
Moreover, there were great differences over what a socialist economy should look like 
and how to construct one, especially concerning the role of the state. Nevertheless, the 
new state was seen in the minds of many as an entity which could regulate the economy 
and reduce the evils of capitalism. Indeed, as we saw, Article 33 of the 1945 constitution 
(and the identical Article 38 of the 1950 provisional constitution), which was the only 
article of the constitution dealing with economic matters, prescribed a large role for the 
state in the economy by providing that the state should control important branches of 
production as well as land, water and the natural resources therein. Naturally, however, 
there was disagreement over the definition, extent and scope of government control, and 
whether government control also meant government ownership as well.
169
 There were 
also practical considerations that pushed policymakers towards a greater role for the state 
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in the economy, most importantly the sheer lack of an indigenous (non-Chinese) business 
class and indigenous capital which could take the lead in the Indonesianization process. 
Who else could do it but the government? Certainly this dearth of indigenous 
entrepreneurs and private capital was a major factor in the slow pace of Indonesianization 
for much of the 1950s. 
Much of the focus of the several economic plans implemented during 
Parliamentary Democracy emphasized economic development with a priority given to 
increasing the role of Indonesians in the economy. The first of these plans was the 
Economic Urgency Plan, also known as the Sumitro Plan (after Minister Sumitro 
Djojohadikusumo), implemented beginning in 1951. This was a quite ambitious and 
aggressive plan whose main goal was quickly to establish and build up private indigenous 
industry, thus aiming towards not only encouraging Indonesianization of the economy but 
also promoting import substituting industrialization as a way of diversifying the economy 
and reducing dependence on foreign imports. The plan promoted the establishment of 
small, medium and large scale industrial enterprises, with small establishments operating 
through central management centers (in which capital equipment and knowhow could be 
collectively acquired, pooled and used) known as ‗induk‘. The GOI also helped finance 
these new establishments, primarily through the state-owned bank BIN (the State 
Industrial Bank). However, implementation of the plan was slow, inconsistent, and 
poorly organized, and was shelved in 1956 after only a few new enterprises had been 
established (the best known of which was the Gresik cement plant in East Java, financed 
from a $100 million US Eximbank loan signed in 1950).  The plan‘s failure contributed 
to ―the drift toward a more centralized economy.‖
170
  
One aspect of the Economic Urgency Plan which received great attention was a 
failed program referred to as the Benteng program.
171
 This program, started in 1950, 
attempted to build up an indigenous Indonesian business class in the import sector by 
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restricting certain categories of imports to Indonesian importers. In addition to promoting 
Indonesian businessmen, the program would also wrest control of part of the import 
sector away from the powerful Dutch trading companies, and keep it out of the hands of 
the Chinese. By early 1954, there were some 3,000 registered Benteng importers, about 
half of all importers, and the number continued to rise. However, the program was beset 
by three major problems and ultimately was considered a great failure and 
embarrassment. First, most of the ‗Indonesian‘ importers in the program turned out to be 
merely fronting for their Chinese backers, such that these importers were known as 
‗briefcase importers‘ (whose only asset was a briefcase and thus was acting for someone 
else) or Ali/Baba firms (‗Ali‘ referring to indigenous Indonesians, most of whom were 
Moslem, and ‗Baba‘ referring to the Chinese backer). A second major problem was the 
rent-seeking and corruption (particularly kick-backs) the program fostered, as it became a 
major source of political patronage opportunities. This was especially apparent under the 
first Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet (PNI, August 1953 - August 1955), whose Minister of 
Economic Affairs Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo was forced to resign because of corruption. A 
third major problem was that the program actually did little to reduce Dutch dominance 
of the import sector or build up Indonesian businessmen. In 1956 it was estimated that 
70% of all import trade was handled by foreign banks alone, and that the Indonesian 
importers capacity was only 6% of the foreign importers‘ total capacity. As ex Vice-
President Hatta noted, ―Indonesian traders have obtained privileges which have cost the 
country tens if not hundreds of millions of rupiahs while the suffering of the whole 
society increases.‖
172
 The program was officially abandoned in 1957, leaving a legacy of 
scandal and corruption and the ―erosion of confidence in private capital as the foundation 
of economic development in Indonesia.‖
173
  
Indonesia‘s first Five Year Plan, set to run from 1956-1960, was announced in 
early 1956.
174
  The product of several years of fairly extensive research by the National 
Planning Bureau (the effort was led by Djuanda, with the assistance of a number of 
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foreign economic experts), the plan represented Indonesia‘s ―first systematic approach to 
the problem of stimulating economic development.‖
175
 It called for a modest total 
investment of only 30 billion Rupiah (only 12.5 billion of which was to come from the 
GOI), and its main focus was on developing and establishing individual large-scale but 
essential industrial projects in the public sector.  The plan essentially ended the Benteng 
policy of promoting private indigenous Indonesian entrepreneurs, and the private sector 
was left to its own devices. The plan suffered from a number of shortcomings, including 
its modest scope and overall lack of coordination among different GOI ministries. 
Because of the 1957-58 rebellion, the takeover of Dutch companies and other factors, it 
was only partially implemented and was essentially abandoned by 1958, the same year it 
was (finally) formally approved by the Parliament.
176
     
In terms of increasing indigenous Indonesian participation in the economy, 
overall the economy underwent very modest Indonesianization during the first seven 
years of Parliamentary Democracy.
177
 For example, the Java Bank was nationalized with 
Dutch consent in late 1951 and became the nation‘s central bank, Bank Indonesia. 
Numerous utilities were also quietly nationalized with full compensation. Garuda 
Airlines, a joint venture held 51% by Dutch airline KLM and 49% by the GOI, was 
established in 1950 to service the country, and the Dutch shareholdings were fully bought 
out by the GOI in 1954. The GOI also had a small number of estates and other enterprises 
that were taken over from the colonial government and foreign businesses which did not 
wish to continue operations. In addition to nationalizing a few Dutch firms, the GOI also 
tried to grow the Indonesian presence in the modern sector by establishing state-owned 
banks such as BIN, which financed and became the major shareholder of over 30 state-
owned industrial enterprises.  In 1952 the GOI also established a shipping company 
named PELNI to compete with the Dutch shipping line KPM, which dominated the 
Indonesian inter-island shipping sector, but PELNI provided little competition. These 
efforts in general were hindered by the lack of capital and expertise necessary to compete 
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effectively with foreign companies, as well as by differences among policymakers. Thus, 
in the closing months of 1957, the modern sector of the Indonesian economy was still 
dominated by foreign interests, primarily Dutch, but this position would change very 
quickly. 
C. Takeover and Nationalization of Dutch Companies. 
 The takeover in December 1957 and subsequent nationalization of all Dutch 
enterprises in Indonesia marked perhaps the most profound structural shift in the 
Indonesian economy from 1950 until the early 1970s.
178
 These events addressed two 
basic issues that Indonesian policymakers had been wrestling with since independence: 
how to deal with foreign domination of the modern sector of the economy, and what role 
the state should play in the economy. Although the sequence of takeovers was distinct 
from the sequence of nationalizations, in a relative instant Dutch economic domination 
was eliminated and the GOI simultaneously acquired a vast stake in the modern sector of 
the Indonesian economy, and henceforth the state-owned enterprise sector would play a 
very influential role in the economy. The measures ―paved the way towards a much more 
‗Socialist‘ approach to economic problems through direct governmental intervention,‖ 
and moreover the GOI, by assuming responsibility for the companies, also was ―now 
directly implicated in the effects of [its] policies on the productive process in a way 
which [it] had never been between 1950 and 1957.‖
179
 These events also provided a 
stake-hold in the economy to the army, which was able to place a number of officers in 
management positions in the companies on a permanent basis and, according to many 
observers, continued to control a number of the companies and receive revenues even 
after formal nationalization. As Lindblad has argued, in the broader historical narrative 
the takeover and nationalization of these companies can best be viewed as part of the 
process of economic decolonization of Indonesia from the Dutch, a process separate but 
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parallel to the political decolonization process.
180
 However, while the measures had 
immediate and long term ramifications in the form of helping resolve momentarily the 
two questions of foreign economic domination and the role of the state in the economy 
and providing the major impetus for economic decolonization, it seems fairly evident that 
the GOI as a whole did not pre-plan these events, and they were very much of an ad hoc 
nature, driven much more by shorter term factors of domestic politics and foreign 
relations instead of grand economic visions of socialism or Indonesianization. 
The immediate cause and context of the takeovers was the conflict with the Dutch 
government over West Irian. As we saw in Part II above, in the early to mid-1950s 
bilateral efforts to resolve West Irian‘s status continually failed, and three times prior to 
November 1957 Indonesia attempted to get the United Nations involved in the dispute, 
but all three attempts also failed. Moreover, relations with the Dutch had deteriorated to 
the point where in February 1956 Indonesia unilaterally abrogated the RTCA.  However, 
even after this abrogation of the agreement protecting foreign economic interests, the 
Harahap cabinet and second Ali cabinet (in office until March 1957) did not express a 
desire to confiscate or nationalize Dutch companies, in part because they knew the GOI 
could not afford to pay for the nationalizations, and the Djuanda cabinet (installed in 
April 1957) also took a fairly moderate approach.
181
 In late August 1957, a group of 
friendly countries successfully managed to get the issue placed back on the UN agenda, 
with a vote scheduled in the UN for late November, and from this point the West Irian 
issue was in the Indonesian media almost daily.
182
  In October, the GOI began ratcheting 
up the pressure. On 16 October, Foreign Minister Subandrio publicly warned that if this 
UN attempt failed, Indonesia would be forced to find ―another way‖ to resolve the issue, 
which quickly led to speculation in Jakarta that the ‗other way‘ might involve some type 
of action against Dutch economic interests, even though the GOI denied any intention to 
take over Dutch companies.
183
 On 28 October there were GOI-sponsored mass 
demonstrations in Jakarta in support of the campaign to liberate West Irian, followed by a 
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four day boycott of some Dutch firms. On 18 November President Sukarno spoke at 
another GOI-sponsored mass rally in Jakarta in support of West Irian and stated that if 
the UN resolution failed, the GOI would consider a number of retaliatory measures, 
including nationalizing vital Dutch businesses. There were also various unofficial calls 
for nationalization. On Friday, 29 November, the vote failed in the UN. The next day in 
Jakarta, as word of the UN decision spread, there was a failed assassination attempt on 
Sukarno in Jakarta in which 2 were killed and 30 wounded, though Sukarno escaped 
unharmed. This attempt, though it was not linked to the West Irian issue, certainly 
contributed to the emotional climate. On Sunday 1 December the cabinet met and voted 
on reprisals, which were announced that day on the radio and were as follows: (i) a 
nationwide strike against Dutch enterprises on Monday, 2 December, (ii) the immediate 
withdrawal of KLM landing rights, and (iii) the prohibition of publication of Dutch 
language papers and magazines. The strike went off as planned on Monday 2 December, 
and on 3 December the GOI announced that no Dutch nationals could enter Indonesia.
184
 
The seizure of Dutch enterprises began on 4 December with the takeover of two 
Dutch firms in Jakarta, the KPM shipping line and the George Wehry trading house, by 
representatives of KBKI affiliated unions (for more on the KBKI, see above Part I, 
Section B3). At KPM headquarters KBKI leaders forced their way into the managers‘ 
offices and read a proclamation declaring that the workers were taking over the company, 
and they further claimed that they (the leaders) and the workers ―are the government.‖ 
When the Dutch managers refused to sign the proclamation after a ―heated discussion,‖ 
they were essentially forced to leave the premises. The KBKI leaders then gathered all 
employees in front of the building and read the proclamation again, capping off the 
ceremony by replacing the Dutch flag with the Indonesian flag, after which the 
Indonesian staff resumed their work.
185
  The seizure of these two companies by KBKI 
affiliated unions then triggered labor union led seizures of Dutch companies throughout 
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the country over the next week, and there were also strikes and boycotts; yet, despite all 
the confusion and action, none of the seizures was violent or bloody. Apparently none of 
these seizures was initiated by the PKI or SOBSI, the PKI labor federation, though both 
certainly supported the takeovers and were active in the demonstrations over West Irian 
leading up to the takeovers.
186
  On 5 December, the cabinet met and announced that all 
taken-over companies were to be placed under GOI responsibility, and ‗committees of 
authority‘ (panitia penguasa) began appearing at some of the seized enterprises. On 5 or 
6 December, the army also began taking control of the Dutch companies out of labor 
union hands; in addition, over the next few days in many provinces such as North 
Sumatra the army even began to place unaffected Dutch estates and other businesses 
under its authority, ostensibly as a means of preventing labor unions from seizing them. 
On 13 December, army commander General Nasution announced that all seized Dutch 
companies were to be placed under army control.
187
 The GOI also announced the 
expulsion of most Dutch personnel. When the dust had finally settled, over 700 Dutch 
companies were seized and put under Indonesian control, and some 33,000 Dutch citizens 
left the country in the next eight months.
188
 
The immediate question this sequence of events raises is whether the GOI was 
somehow complicit with the KBKI labor federation in initiating the seizures of the Dutch 
firms. Similar to what we shall see with respect to the takeovers of 1963-65, I think the 
answer to the question lies in part in how we define the ‗GOI‘ or, more accurately, who 
represents the GOI; it is apparent that there were some officials who approved of the 
takeovers and others who did not, and thus the entire issue really is representative of the 
divisions and lack of unity within the government. Prior to the seizures, GOI official 
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policy was clearly one of non-takeover. Post-takeover pronouncements by various GOI 
officials like ex Vice-President Hatta, Bank Indonesia governor Sjafruddin Prawiranegara 
and Prime Minister Djuanda indicated the takeovers were not premeditated by the 
cabinet, as did the apparent lack of a plan regarding what to do with the companies once 
they had been seized.
189
 However, there was also clear support for the takeovers within 
the GOI, specifically by President Sukarno.
190
  It is certainly quite possible that the 
seizures were anticipated and encouraged by Sukarno, who often set events in motion and 
then stepped aside to let events take their course. 
Over the next year, as the GOI slowly determined what to do with seized Dutch 
companies, it gradually built an administrative framework to supervise them.
191
 While 
their status was still in limbo, there was no doubt the companies were under GOI control.  
Many of the companies were grouped by sector and placed under the supervisory 
authority of newly established GOI bodies that were responsible to the related GOI 
ministries. For example, a new structure known as PPN-Baru (Pusat Perkebunan Negara 
Baru, or ‗Center for New State Plantations‘) was established to supervise the 500 plus 
estates. Similarly, a body known as BAPPIT (Badan Penjelenggara Perusahaan Industry 
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dan Tambang, or ‗Agency to Operate Industrial and Mining Companies‘) was set up to 
supervise manufacturing and mining companies, a body called BAPPHAR (Badan Pusat 
Penguasa Perusahaan2 Pharmasi Belanda, or ‗Central Agency for the Administration of 
Dutch Pharmaceutical Companies‘) was set up to supervise pharmaceutical companies, 
and BUD (Badan Urusan Dagang, or ‗Agency for Trading Companies‘) was established 
to supervise the trading companies. Overseeing the entire structure was a body known as 
Panitia Pengawasan Perusahaan2 Belanda (or ‗Committee for the Supervision of Dutch 
Companies‘). These agencies were set up gradually over the course of 1958. As one 
observer noted, the ―army took advantage of every opportunity to place officers in 
government agencies concerned with the administration of Dutch properties,‖
192
 though if 
the situation from 1963-65 takeovers is any indication, there must have been great 
infighting – among the political parties, army, GOI ministers and personnel, local 
governments, etc. – for these coveted positions of authority over presumably cash rich 
businesses. In any case, the extent of ‗supervision‘ varied greatly from company to 
company; supervision itself generally entailed overseeing and ensuring the stability of 
new Indonesian management (and ensuring the Indonesianization of management in case 
of remaining foreigners) as well as the restoration of production.
193
 Some army personnel 
went beyond mere supervisory functions; it has often been stated in the secondary 
literature that the army insinuated itself in the economy via the seized Dutch companies, 
but actual data are virtually non-existent and there has been no comprehensive published 
survey of the army/ex-Dutch company relationship. At the company level, the general 
management pattern was for the departing Dutch managers to be replaced by Indonesians 
already working at the company, while army personnel or officials from newly created 
civilian agencies acted in supervisory capacities.  The biggest problem, of course, was the 
overall lack of administrative, technical and management skills among Indonesian 
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personnel, and often the old positions of the Indonesians who were elevated to the higher 
positions (vacated by the Dutch) were not refilled.
194
  
Minister of Agriculture Sadjarwo was initially responsible for organizing and 
implementing GOI control over the Dutch estates, though the army swiftly stepped in.
195
 
On 9 December 1957 Prime Minister Djuanda issued a decree placing all Dutch estates 
under GOI control and authorizing the Minister of Agriculture to issue the necessary 
implementing decrees. Minister Sadjarwo moved quickly, issuing the next day a decree 
placing all Dutch estates under the supervision of the new PPN–Baru, whose officials 
were mostly from either the old PPN (the existing agency which supervised the 30 or so 
estates already under GOI control) or the estate services department within the Ministry 
of Agriculture. Also on 10 December, Sadjarwo held a meeting with representatives of 
the Dutch estates to explain the government‘s actions, claiming that that the 
government‘s measures were necessary in order to protect the estates and to ensure 
continued production. He further insisted that the estates had not been nationalized but 
that the PPN-Baru would only supervise them, but, after heated discussion, then indicated 
that ‗supervision‘ also meant that the PPN-Baru would be in total management control of 
the estates, and that representatives of the companies ―no longer have any voice in 
management, financing, and the like.‖
196
  On 11 December Minister Sadjarwo issued 
another decree regarding the procedure for military administration of the estates.  In 
North Sumatra, a major center for plantations, this was followed on 14 December by an 
absurdly staged transfer ceremony in which representatives from Dutch estates were 
forced to sign legal documents transferring the estates to the GOI. Soon after this, army 
officers were assigned to Dutch estate companies to supervise and control the estates; it 
was initially hoped that some of the Dutch managers would stay on and assist in the 
transition, but at least in North Sumatra they all left very quickly.  Their sudden departure 
resulted in ―near chaos on the plantations during the first months of 1958 as Indonesians 
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with some practical experience but rarely any management training stepped into the 
vacancies left by their departure.‖
197
  Not surprisingly, there were frequent clashes 
between the army officers now acting as supervisors and the estate workers. In June 1958 
General Nasution, in his position as Central War Administrator, issued instructions 
containing guidelines for cooperation between the army supervisors and PPN-Baru, and 
even directly appointed army officers to several positions within PPN-Baru. Moreover, in 
September 1958, Nasution further issued instructions outlining the role of army officers 
actually on the estates. These instructions gave army officers essentially complete control 
over personnel and appointment decisions, financing, management and sales of property 
and equipment, etc. As one observer noted, ―not a single aspect in the business life of the 
estates or other enterprises was outside the assignment of these officers.‖
198
 
For almost a year after their seizure in early December 1957, the official status of 
the seized Dutch companies was in limbo until the GOI in late 1958 finally decided to 
nationalize them. As returning the companies to Dutch ownership and control was 
politically inconceivable, there were essentially only two choices for the GOI, either 
nationalization or turning them over to the private sector to run. Turning them over to the 
private sector was in practice not really an option; as there was no strong entrepreneurial 
class of indigenous Indonesians capable of managing the companies (and the experience 
with the Benteng program had further diminished faith in native businessmen), the only 
viable option was to turn them over to Chinese entrepreneurs. This was also a political 
impossibility, given the sensitive role of the Chinese in the economy.
199
 Hence, after a 
long delay, presumably caused in part by attention to the 1957-58 rebellion, and perhaps 
in part due to political infighting over the companies, by the end of 1958 it was decided 
that the companies should be nationalized and placed permanently under the control of 
the GOI. In mid-November, control over the companies was formally transferred by the 
army to various GOI ministries, and in the last few days of 1958 a nationalization law 
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  Implementation of the nationalization law began in February 1959, 
via a series of decrees in which companies were nationalized by sector (e.g., estates, 
utilities, trading companies, etc.). An agency known as BANAS (Badan Nasionalisasi 
Perusahaan Belanda, or ‗Agency For Nationalization of Dutch Companies‘), responsible 
directly to a council of ministers, was established to coordinate and supervise the 
nationalizations. Control over the enterprises in particular sectors was given to GOI 
agencies, which were responsible to the GOI ministry having jurisdiction over that sector. 
Some of these agencies such as BUD, PPN-Baru, BAPPIT and BAPPHAR had been 
established over the course of late 1957-58 and now were reinvigorated with new 
authority and power, while others were newly established in 1959; altogether there were 
14 of these agencies.
201
 The process was mostly complete by April 1960.
202
 A small 
number of enterprises were turned over to provincial governments, and a tiny number 
was actually turned over to the private sector. The basis of a large and influential state-
owned enterprise sector was laid.  
D. Guided Economy: Socialism `a la Indonesia. 
With the switch in 1959 to Guided Democracy there was an accompanying shift 
to what was called ‗Guided Economy,‘ or as President Sukarno frequently referred to it, 
‗Socialism `a la Indonesia,‘ the goal of which was a ‗just and prosperous society.‘ 
Liberalism and capitalism were officially condemned, and Socialism `a la Indonesia was 
pushed as the elixir for the economy and society. However, in spite of the grand rhetoric, 
in practice there was simply no consensus as to what a socialist Indonesian economy 
should look like, reflecting continuing divisions within society and the government. 
‗Socialist‘ policies were not well-articulated and were vague enough to be acceptable to 
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all; often day-to-day policymaking, because of mounting economic problems, ―resorted 
to ad hoc policies…which tried to make ends meet, but bore no evident relationship to 
‗Indonesian socialism.‘‖
203
 As Mackie has observed, Guided Economy‘s three most 
espoused principal tenets, at least in its early years, were a ―preference for state enterprise 
rather than private, great emphasis on national planning, [and] commitment to an 
egalitarian rather than elitist form of society,‖ with by far the greatest success in the first, 
and little, if any, success in the second and third.
204
    In fact, as we have already seen, a 
large state role in the economy was already assured by the beginning of Guided 
Democracy with the nationalization of Dutch enterprises. To these three tenets might be 
added a fourth: a general aversion to private foreign investment, which would culminate 
in the seizure of almost all foreign companies by the end of 1965 and the prohibition of 
further foreign investment. Another principal feature of Guided Economy was the 
generally far greater attention to politics and foreign policy, with economics taking a 
distant back seat, a situation which would result in economic paralysis by 1965. One 
aspect of this feature was the reduced influence of economic pragmatists under Guided 
Democracy, a trend that started under Parliamentary Democracy but quickly accelerated 
under Guided Democracy.
205
 Except for the failed economic stabilization attempt in 1963 
(see Chapter Four), these economic pragmatists wielded little influence. Instead, 
President Sukarno dominated economic policy,
206
 even though he had a poor 
understanding of the subject and was not inclined to seek advice on pressing economic 
matters.
207
 The result was the rapid deterioration of the economy after 1960. 
Perhaps the most significant feature of Guided Economy was the expanded role of 
the government in the economy. The extent of this expanded role has been debated, and it 
might be more accurate to suggest that the government intervention in the economy 
increased under Guided Democracy. For example, Lindblad has noted that the 
nationalization of Dutch companies increased the share of GOI expenditure in GDP from 
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roughly 8% to 14%;
208
 however, Booth has argued that ―the period from 1950 to 1965 
can be viewed as one of gradual attenuation of government control of the economy.‖ In 
particular she points to a decreased ratio of government expenditures in GDP that began 
in 1962 with a dramatic collapse in government revenues; from 1962 on, government 
expenditures were no more than 10% of GDP, and actually declined somewhat.
209
 
However, if we broaden our gaze to other factors besides GDP statistics, then it becomes 
apparent that government intervention in the economy did increase substantially. This 
was done in at least two areas of state-owned enterprises as well as increased regulation. 
Because of the nationalization of Dutch companies, the GOI now controlled (at least 
nominally) a large chunk of the modern sector of the economy, an impact that cannot be 
measured by GDP figures. For example, with the takeover of the Big Five Dutch trading 
companies that controlled an enormous percentage of foreign trade, the GOI was now 
well positioned to influence this vitally important sector of an economy that was geared 
to the export of primary agricultural products and raw materials. Indeed, in 1959 control 
over some 75% of the imports of nine basic commodities was given to eight state-owned 
trading companies.
210
 Moreover, the GOI imposed a host of regulatory measures on the 
economy, such as price and distribution controls, not to mention foreign exchange 
controls, much of which only encouraged corruption and the growth of black markets.
211
 
The role of the expanded state-owned enterprises was the subject of much 
discussion in Indonesia, and paradoxically despite the official hostility the private sector 
continued to play an important role in the economy. In 1960 the now vast state-owned 
enterprise (SOE) sector was reorganized under Law No. 19/1960, and in the ensuing 
years the GOI continued to tinker with role and structure of the SOEs.
212
 Operationally, 
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the SOEs suffered from many problems, some of which stemmed from their mission 
emphasis not on profit generation but fulfilling social welfare functions such as providing 
employment opportunities and training. It also proved hard for the ministries to control 
these entities, all of which were placed under the authority of specific ministries, and 
contrastingly the entities themselves often complained about the tight controls imposed 
from above that limited their ability to operate efficiently. Management positions in many 
SOEs were highly sought after and fought over, not only because of their perks and 
benefits but also because the companies were seen as cash cows with great opportunities 
for patronage dispensing (which indeed occurred) and personal enrichment. Other 
significant problems included lack of funding, lack of trained managerial and technical 
staff, and especially the general economic conditions. However, despite the strong 
position of the SOEs and anti-capitalist rhetoric, in practice the government did not seek 
to drive out the private sector entirely, but rather to maintain a balance among the private 
sector, the public sector, and the cooperative sector (which never developed into a 
significant economic constituent). In such a mixed economy, the precise roles of each 
were never really clearly defined, though it was clear that the public sector would 
generally take the lead and exert some measure of control over the private sector.
213
  
Indeed, in spite of the over-regulation and interference, the role of the private sector was 
not significantly diminished, and especially after 1962 the GOI, perhaps in response to 
the overall disappointing performance of the SOEs, was much less hostile as it tried to 




In terms of the private sector, the role of the foreign Chinese and Indonesians of 
Chinese descent provided a major challenge for the government.
215
 Even before 1950, 
there was much resentment against the Chinese because of their role in the inherited 
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plural economy, in particular their dominance in intermediate trade, rural finance, and 
even rice milling. Issues of economic superiority were also inexorably intertwined with 
issues of citizenship and fears of foreign communist infiltration, as for the entire decade 
of the 1950s the citizenship of Chinese born in Indonesia (or Indonesians of Chinese 
descent, as opposed to foreign-born ethnic Chinese) was unresolved pending a citizenship 
treaty with the PRC (which was signed in 1955 but not ratified by Indonesia until January 
1960). However, reducing Chinese economic influence would be much more difficult 
than reducing Dutch economic influence, in part because of the much greater numbers of 
Chinese than Dutch but also because the trading and other economic activities of the 
Chinese were ―much more intertwined with the economic activities of the indigenous 
population than Dutch activities had ever been.‖
216
  As we have seen, one of the aims of 
the government in the early 1950s was to build up an indigenous class of entrepreneurs 
that could compete not only against the Dutch but also against the Chinese (for example, 
the Benteng program was geared against both Dutch and Chinese control). Nevertheless, 
as Thee has pointed out, the GOI never developed a comprehensive strategy of dealing 
with the Chinese, and most of the policies, laws and regulations were very much ad hoc 
in nature.
217
 In 1956-57, an unofficial anti-Chinese movement known as the Assaat 
movement broke out, but this did not result in any official anti-Chinese policies. After the 
nationalization of Dutch companies, the Chinese increasingly became the target of 
economic nationalist sentiment, in part because their economic power actually grew as 
they filled the void left by the Dutch and the inefficient SOEs.
218
 In 1959 the GOI issued 
Regulation 10 of 1959, which beginning 1 January 1960 banned foreign nationals (i.e., 
Chinese) from engaging in retail trade in rural areas. As a result, most Chinese were 
relocated (some forcibly) to the cities and towns, and some 120,000 actually left 
Indonesia for China. The ban caused a serious diplomatic conflict with the PRC and also 
resulted in acute economic disruption, at least initially. Though the ban was never 
rescinded, President Sukarno was later able to suspend temporarily its implementation.
219
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Regulation 10/1959 would prove to be the only explicitly anti-Chinese government 
policy from 1950 to 1965 which was actually implemented, though of course anti-
Chinese sentiment continued to bubble to the surface.  
Although economic policymaking generally took a distant back seat to politics 
and foreign policy under Guided Democracy, in 1960 two important laws, each of which 
had a potentially far-reaching economic impact, were passed. Both laws also had a 
significant impact on foreign investment, a subject that will be covered in the next 
Chapter. Both were intended to replace the various colonial laws covering their 
respective subject matters and thus were manifestations of the desire to jettison the 
colonial imprint on Indonesian society, economy, and law. The first was the Basic 
Agrarian Law of 1960, which was generally concerned with revising laws pertaining to 
land ownership and land use and was to be the centerpiece of future agrarian laws.
220
 It 
recognized several types of land ownership and land use, with land ownership rights 
available only to Indonesian citizens; foreigners could only lease land under lease rights 
known as hak guna usaha. The law also imposed minimum and maximum limits on the 
amount of land individual Indonesians could own, depending on the type of land and 
population density; the minimum was 2 hectares, which was a decidedly unrealistic  
figure given the high population densities and limited land available. The minimum and 
maximum requirements meant that a certain redistribution of land had to take place, even 
though land distribution in Indonesia was not highly imbalanced compared to other 
countries in Asia.
221
 However, the land distribution program was only minimally 
implemented in later years, and as we shall see in subsequent Chapters, this failure 
became a hot issue for the PKI. This would be the extent of efforts to ‗socialize‘ the 
agricultural sector under Guided Economy; in spite of all the socialist sloganeering, the 
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closest Indonesia came was an attempt at land redistribution plus very limited success in 
promoting cooperatives (for example, collectivization of agriculture was never tried).
222
 
The second important law was Law No. 44/1960, which was concerned with oil 
and natural gas. For years the government had been toying with new legislation regarding 
the oil industry, but only in 1960 was agreement finally reached. The law‘s prime feature 
was the reversal of colonial laws to stipulate that oil and natural gas were now owned by 
the state, and that the mining of oil and gas may only be undertaken by state-owned 
enterprises (although if SOEs were unable to undertake such operations, they may 
appoint contractors to do so).
223
 This law and its impact will be discussed in greater detail 
in the next Chapter, but in brief its significance lies in that the vitally significant oil 
industry in Indonesia was dominated by three foreign oil companies who were operating 
under a very different regime. Thus, the law portended a major shakeup in the operation 
of the oil industry.  
In terms of economic planning, the only major economic plan of Guided 
Economy was the Eight Year Development Plan, which quickly became the symbol and 
expression for Guided Economy and Socialism `a la Indonesia, at least in its first few 
years.
224
 The group responsible for formulating this plan was the National Planning 
Council (known by its acronym DEPERNAS), which as we saw earlier was appointed by 
President Sukarno in July 1959. This 74 member council was headed by Mohammad 
Yamin, a well-known nationalist historian, and its membership was chosen primarily on 
political grounds, with no trained economists as members (though a few foreign 
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economic consultants were consulted on technical matters).
225
  Not surprisingly, the plan 
was highly politicized; even the breakdown of the plan into 8 parts, 17 volumes and 1945 
paragraphs symbolically represented 17 August 1945 (the day Sukarno declared 
Indonesian independence). The plan, at Sukarno‘s request, even contained a set of 
principles for Indonesian socialism, whose main characteristics were defined as follows: 
(i) no exploitation de l’homme par l’homme (a favorite Sukarno expression meaning ‗no 
exploitation of man by man‘), (ii) ―equality of satisfaction‖ (a Javanese expression), (iii) 
―socialist emphasis on distribution should not lead to the neglect of the problem of 
production,‖ (iv) ―he who does not work does not eat,‖ (v) ―ownership of house and yard 
and guarantee to the peasants that they will own their own land,‖ and (vi) a ―service 
economy‖ based on the principles that (a) the private sector‘s right to operate is given by 
the government, and therefore the government has the right to guide economic 
development, (b) entrepreneurs must be progressive, meaning they must believe in 
MANIPOL, (c) the means of production have a social function, (d) the private sector 
should not rely on the government for support, and (e) the government will decide which 
sectors of production will be open to the private sector. From these characteristics, five 
principles of Indonesian socialism were set forth: (1) emphasis on production of 
consumer goods, (2) better distribution of daily necessities, (3) agriculture and industry 
should produce finished goods which earn foreign exchange, (4) imports should be used 
to create employment opportunities and to produce foreign exchange saving goods, and 
(5) basic industries should be developed.
226
 
  More concretely, the plan was designed around the development of two types of 
projects known as the ‗A Projects‘ and ‗B Projects.‘ The 335 A Projects were the core of 
the plan and were expected to cost Rp.240 billion, about Rp.100 billion (an estimated 
$2.2 billion) of which was to come in the form of foreign exchange.  The percent of total 
expenditure of the A Projects broken down by sector was: industry 22%, transport and 
communications 25%, military and clothing about 12% each, food 10.5%, education 7%, 
finance and tourism 5%, with none of the remaining categories (public welfare, 
government, research, health and cultural) more than 3%.  The B Projects were intended 
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to help finance the A Projects by generating gross earnings of Rp.120 billion and $2.46 
billion in foreign exchange (the net earnings figures, after taking into account 
expenditures, was not clear). Of the $2.46 billion in foreign exchange earnings, $1.9 
billion (over 75%) was to come from the oil industry (which was dominated by three 
foreign companies who produced some 90% of Indonesia‘s crude oil, see next Chapter), 
and $320 million was to come from rubber exports, with the remainder coming primarily 
from exports of other primary goods. The focus of the first three years of the plan was to 
be on achieving complete self-sufficiency in food production and a high degree of self-
sufficiency in textile production, and in the last five years the emphasis shifted to the 
development of heavy and light industry, such as steel and petrochemicals.
227
 
The plan was ambitious and quite unrealistic. Among its many deficiencies were 
underestimating the costs of the projects (including the necessary investment for the B 
Projects), the skewed priority of development of the projects, insufficient financing of the 
projects (especially failing to take into account the cost of the B projects), failure to 
match chronologically expenditures with revenues, lack of trained personnel and an 
administrative body to oversee the projects, and failure to take account of inflation.
228
  In 
fact, several observers believed that due to the lack of adequate domestic capital, much of 
the financing for the plan would have to come from foreign sources (over and above the 
foreign component in the oil sector).
229
 Notwithstanding these problems, the plan was 
approved by the MPRS (which by this time was appointed by President Sukarno) in late 
1960 and was implemented beginning January 1961. As we shall see, it was never fully 
implemented, and in any case was rendered immaterial with the outbreak of Konfrontasi 
in 1963.  
   
IV. Conclusion: Indonesia in 1962. 
 
By the second half of 1962, the GOI could look with pride on some matters but 
with consternation on others. In terms of internal security, the last remnants of the 1957-
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58 rebellions had surrendered in 1961,
230
 and in June 1962 the long-existing Darul Islam 
rebellion in West Java was finally defeated. Thus, Indonesia was essentially free from 
civil strife for the first time in its short history, a situation that eventually would result in 
the ending of martial law in 1963. Moreover, in the realm of foreign affairs, with the 
settlement of the West Irian issue in early August, Indonesia had won a major diplomatic 
achievement by essentially facing down the Dutch. The nation would shortly be fully 
‗whole‘ and unified. On the domestic political front, President Sukarno and the army had 
settled into their uneasy, competitive partnership with the political parties all but 
emasculated. President Sukarno‘s position vis-à-vis the army seemed particularly strong 
in the wake of the West Irian victory. In fact, in July, even before the West Irian conflict 
was resolved, Sukarno had scored a major victory over General Nasution by essentially 
demoting him and replacing him as army chief of staff with General Yani, who was 
thought to be more receptive to Sukarno‘s wishes. 
However, on the economic side of the ledger, the record was decidedly negative, 
as the economy, to this point under Guided Democracy a distant third fiddle to domestic 
politics and foreign affairs, was obviously in serious trouble.
231
 From 1950 until 1957 the 
economy had done reasonably well, with per capita GDP increasing around 2% per year 
and the balance of payments problem and the inflation problem still under control.
232
 
After 1957, though, the tide began to turn. Initially this may have been in large part due 
to the impact of the 1957-58 rebellion and the seizure of the Dutch enterprises, as well as 
a decline in international prices of exports. While there appeared to be a slight recovery 
in 1959, by 1960 the economy again was clearly on the downturn. Export earnings were 
declining quickly, reflecting a decline in net terms of trade (which would continue 
through 1965); as we saw previously, in both 1961 and 1962, the balance of payments 
deficit reached $168 million. Numerous attempts to achieve self-sufficiency in rice had 
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 From 1960 until 1965 the average annual growth of GDP was around 1.7%, but 
because population was growing at 2% per year, this actually amounted to a decline in 
per capita GDP.
234
 In 1962 the imbalance between government revenues and 
expenditures worsened significantly, as government revenues collapsed dramatically 
while expenditures, mostly because of the West Irian conflict, increased substantially.
235
   
This expanding GOI budget deficit fueled inflation, which jumped from around 30% 
annually from 1957-61 to a whopping 167% in 1962.
236
  Reflecting these trends and the 
growing lack of confidence they inspired in the Indonesian economy, the black market 
rate of the Rupiah to US Dollar sank from Rp.150 per one US$ in 1960 to Rp.850 in 
1962, even as the official exchange rate remained at Rp.45.
237
  
Of the three objectives proclaimed at the beginning of Guided Democracy as 
primary goals of Guided Democracy, two – internal security and the incorporation of 
West Irian into the Republic – were now achieved, while the third – sandang-pandang, or 
sufficient food and clothing – was not. President Sukarno himself recognized this 
situation publicly in his independence day speech of 17 August 1962 (entitled ‗A Year of 
Triumph‘), in which he proclaimed that two parts of the GOI‘s three point program had 
been realized and suggested that much greater attention would be given to solving 
economic problems.
238
 Such an acknowledgement gave hope to a number of GOI 
officials and citizens concerned with the economy, as well as to United States officials 
who were concerned that Indonesia may yet fall into the communist camp and sought to 
forestall that possibility by promoting economic stability and growth. As we shall see in 
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Chapter Four, the GOI would make a serious attempt to stabilize the economy in 1963, 
but this effort would be rendered impossible by the outbreak of Konfrontasi in September 
1963. What initially appeared to be a period of tranquility after the internal security 
situation and the West Irian conflict were settled was actually only the calm before the 
hurricane of Konfrontasi. Before turning to these events, however, we need to examine 








Chapter Three:  Foreign Investment, 1950 – early 1963 
 
 
As we saw in Chapter Two, the role of foreign investment in the construction of 
Indonesia‘s ‗national economy‘ was a very sensitive issue. Upon independence, the 
modern sector of the economy was dominated by foreign interests, especially Dutch, and 
one of the principal concerns of policymakers was how to ‗Indonesianize‘ the economy. 
Various schemes were adopted, but there was little change until the nationalization of all 
Dutch companies in 1958-59, which fundamentally altered Indonesia‘s economic 
structure. Hence, it will be no surprise that initially the government attitude toward new 
foreign investment was one of ambivalence; despite a variety of statements by GOI 
officials generally supportive of attracting new foreign investment, there was no legal 
framework for new foreign investment to enter the country until the passage of the 1958 
law on foreign investment. This delay reflected not so much a debate over whether 
foreign investment in general would be allowed, as many officials recognized the need 
for foreign investment given the state of Indonesia‘s economic development, but rather 
what controls and limitations should be placed upon it so as to protect Indonesian 
interests. In contrast, the government had much less discretion in dealing with ‗existing‘ 
or ‗returned‘ foreign investment, by which I mean foreign investment established prior to 
1942 which returned to independent Indonesia under the protection of the RTCA. Until 
1957-58 this protection was honored by the GOI, while it tried, as we saw in Chapter 
Two, to ‗Indonesianize‘ the economy. In what appeared to be contradictory actions, the 
government in 1958 nationalized all Dutch companies and all Taiwan-linked Chinese 
enterprises, even as it passed the new foreign investment law. Under Guided Democracy, 
the government attitude toward foreign investment became increasingly hostile, 
eventually resulting, as we shall see in subsequent Chapters, in the taking over of most 
foreign companies and the banning of new investment. Foreign investment served as an 
easy explanation for Indonesia‘s economic problems, and politically it was also an easy 
 117 
 
target, particularly in times of strong nationalist sentiment. Beginning with the takeovers 
of Dutch firms in 1957-58, foreign investment would also be increasingly used as a pawn 
in foreign relations.  
This Chapter Three is divided into two Parts. Part I examines the official policy 
toward new foreign investment as well as existing foreign investment during 
Parliamentary Democracy and the early Guided Democracy periods. The focus is 
primarily on non-oil foreign investment, as the oil sector will be discussed in detail in 
Part II. The Part starts with a short look at non-Dutch foreign investment before World 
War II, followed by a brief look at the key provisions of the RTCA concerning the 
position of existing foreign investment in newly independent Indonesia. We then turn to a 
discussion of the government‘s policy toward new foreign investment and the treatment 
of existing foreign investment under Parliamentary Democracy. Eight years of 
ambivalence finally resulted in the passage of the foreign investment law in 1958, which 
clearly permitted new foreign investment and, contrary to many accounts of Indonesian 
economic history, was not repealed until 1965. This is followed by an examination of 
policy under Guided Democracy, which became increasingly hostile to foreign 
investment and pushed for new foreign capital in the form of loans, particularly in the 
form of production sharing arrangements. I argue that while the production sharing 
arrangements had equity-like features, they clearly did not qualify as foreign investment. 
Moreover, the government increasingly asserted its authority over existing foreign 
investment, especially in the vital oil sector and the estate sector. As we shall see, there 
was very little new foreign investment in Indonesia after 1950, and most of what existed 
in 1963 was foreign investment that had been in Indonesia before World War II. 
Part II of this Chapter then examines foreign investment generally as it existed in 
Indonesia in early 1963, before the takeovers began. Part II is divided into separate 
discussions of the oil industry, the plantation sector, and the manufacturing and other 
sectors. I argue that a key distinguishing feature of these different sectors and their 
businesses, and one that as we shall see in subsequent Chapters was critical element in 
the takeover process, was the amount of foreign exchange revenues the enterprises 
generated. The oil sector was dominated by three foreign companies that collectively 
produced over 90% of the crude oil in Indonesia. I suggest that the critical importance of 
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the oil industry and the big three oil companies in the Indonesian economy, both in terms 
of the oil produced as well as the revenues generated for the government, resulted in the 
very different treatment by the GOI of these companies, a principle I call ―oil company 
exceptionalism.‖  I then turn to the foreign estate sector, another sector that generated 
foreign exchange for the government, though in amounts less than the oil companies. 
There were approximately 145 estates (totaling at least 260,000 hectares) owned by 
foreigners, the vast majority of which were rubber and palm oil and located in Java and 
North Sumatra. This is followed by an examination of some of the smaller areas of 
foreign investment in Indonesia, including the firms (some 12) in the manufacturing 
sector, whose position was significantly different because they generally produced for the 
domestic market and thus did not generate foreign exchange revenues, as well as what I 
refer to as Malaysian companies. (For a list of foreign firms in Indonesia circa mid-1963, 
see Appendix A.) Throughout both Part I and II there will be discussion of the various 
problems facing foreign investors in Indonesia.   
Before beginning, however, it would be useful to explain what I mean by foreign 
investment. I am referring to private foreign direct investment, in particular non-Dutch 
foreign direct investment. By foreign direct investment, I mean investment by a foreign 
individual or company (in the case of Indonesia, almost always a company) in a 
productive business with physical assets and ongoing operations (especially of a physical 
nature) over an extended period of time, such as a factory, an estate, or the like.  A key 
feature of this direct investment is that management is appointed by the foreign owners. 
The physical nature and ongoing operations of the investment rules out what is known 
today as portfolio investment (such as investment in stock of a company in an open 
exchange), of which there was a negligible amount in Indonesia in the 1960s. However, 
the definition is meant to include banks, trading companies with a sizable presence in 
Indonesia (not mom-and-pop importers operating out of a storefront), and insurance 
companies, and other more ‗white collar‘ businesses, even if these types of investment 
did not come in the form of large physical assets like a factory. I also use the term to refer 
to private foreign investment, not government paid-for and sponsored investment, such 
that the investment risk is borne by private companies or individuals. As we shall see in 
Part I, Section B, this definition rules out most of the production sharing arrangements, 
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which were principally loan arrangements. Moreover, my definition would generally rule 
out trade representative offices, because there were no ongoing productive operations; 
these were usually one or two person offices that simply represented the companies in the 
country (such as a sales representative). I recognize that such theoretical distinctions 
might become more blurred in practice, as some businesses overlapped, but such a 
definition picks up most of the important investments and usually is applicable for 
Indonesia during this period.
1
 
Finally, I would like to make several points regarding nationality in my definition 
of foreign investment. First, I generally use the term to refer to non-Dutch private foreign 
direct investment, largely for two reasons. In the first place, there was the special nature 
of Dutch investment in the context of the colonial relationship between the Netherlands 
and the Dutch East Indies/Indonesia; given the colonial subject-master relationship, it 
was quite different from investment by firms from other countries, both before and after 
independence. In addition, as we saw in Chapter Two, as a practical matter by the early 
1960s there was no Dutch direct investment left in Indonesia.  Second, I also exclude 
investment by Indonesians of Chinese descent. Under the terms of the RTCA, these were 
Indonesian citizens (as opposed to Dutch), but as we saw in Chapter Two, the citizenship 
question of these Chinese born in Indonesia (Indonesian or PRC) was not settled until 
1960 when the citizenship treaty with the PRC was finally ratified; under this treaty, 
residents of Chinese descent had two years to decide between PRC and Indonesian 
citizenship. However, given that most Chinese elected Indonesian citizenship, they will 
not be considered as foreigners for purposes of foreign investment. Finally, with respect 
to foreign investment by ethnic foreign Chinese, it appears that there was very little of 
this by the early 1960s. 
 
                                                 
1
 This definition of foreign direct investment can be compared to the definition provided by Lindblad, who 
cites the following definition from the United Nations in 1992: ―an investment involving a long-term 
relationship and reflecting a lasting interest of a resident entity [individual or business] in one economy 
[direct investor] in an entity resident in an economy other than that of the investor [host country].‖ See p. 1 
of  Thomas Lindblad, Foreign Investment in Southeast Asia in the Twentieth Century (London: MacMillan 
Press, 1998).   
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I. Foreign Investment Policy and Regime, 1950-1962. 
 
In this Part I, I trace the general treatment of foreign investment in Indonesia from 
1950 through 1962. Both ‗existing‘ or ‗returned‘ foreign investment and new foreign 
investment are covered, but in practice very little new foreign investment entered the 
country during this period; moreover, of the existing foreign investment, only the oil 
companies appear to have made any new significant investments (see Part II). The lack of 
new foreign investment resulted in part from the absence of any legal mechanism by 
which new foreign investment could enter the country, which reflected the ambivalent 
attitude of the GOI during the Parliamentary Democracy period. I argue that this 
ambivalence reflected much more of a debate over how new foreign investment should 
be controlled in order to protect Indonesian interests, rather than a debate over whether 
foreign investment should be allowed in Indonesia at all. This problem was solved only 
in 1958 with the promulgation of the foreign investment law, a law which remained 
operative until 1965. However, the increasingly hostile attitude of the government toward 
new foreign investment during Guided Democracy, plus a whole array of other issues 
affecting existing foreign investment, resulted in almost no new foreign investment 
entering the country. These same issues not only discouraged new foreign investment 
from entering the country but also discouraged existing foreign investment from making 
further investments. 
Before examining these developments, it may be helpful to discuss broadly the 
nature of foreign investment as it existed at the time of Indonesia‘s independence. As we 
saw in Chapter Two, foreign investment in the early 1950s was almost exclusively in the 
‗modern‘ sector of the economy - oil and mining, plantations/estates, industry, large scale 
finance and banking, and large scale international trade.
2
  Most of the non-Dutch foreign 
investment entered the Dutch East Indies after the turn of century, especially between 
1905 and 1930. These investments were largely linked to export production and thus 
were concentrated in the estate agriculture sector (about 56% of the total foreign 
                                                 
2
 For a nice summary of pre-war foreign investment, see Thomas Lindblad, "Foreign Investment in Late 
Colonial and Post Colonial Indonesia," Economic and Social History in the Netherlands 33 (1991). See 
also chapter two of Peter Creutzberg, ed., Changing Economy in Indonesia, Volume Three: Expenditure on 
Fixed Assets (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977).  
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investment, including Dutch), with major investments also in oil (about 19% of the total, 
including Dutch).
3
 Most of the foreign investment was located in either Java or Sumatra, 
and most of the plantations in Sumatra were in the Medan area of North Sumatra. Of the 
estates, much of the non-Dutch foreign investment was in rubber, followed by palm oil, 
tea and other products. These estates were sometimes managed directly by the owners, 
especially where there were large holdings, and sometimes by estate management firms 
(see Part II, Section B). Accurate statistical data regarding overall pre-world War II 
foreign investment are hard to obtain; Lindblad estimates that total foreign investment, 
including Dutch investment, reached 1.7 billion guilders ($675 million) by 1914 and 4 
billion guilders ($1.6 billion) by 1930, before tapering off to 3 billion guilders in the 
1930s. Moreover, some 70% of the total foreign investment was Dutch, with much of the 
remainder British, American and Japanese.
4
  Earlier estimates made in the 1940s 
indicated that total foreign investment in 1937 in the Dutch East Indies was about $1.4 
billion; of this total, some 75% was Dutch, followed by British investment at 14%, 
followed by American investment of about 7%.
5
    
Until the 1930s, foreign investment in the manufacturing sector was fairly limited. 
The depression, however, forced the colonial government, which prior to this time had 
done little to encourage the growth of industry, to rethink its policy. The immediate 
impetus for this change was the flood of cheap Japanese manufactured consumer goods 
after 1931 (spurred especially by a huge devaluation of the yen in late 1931), which led to 
regulations in 1933 and 1934 both to limit imports and to promote import substituting 
manufacturing.  These changes led to a significant surge of industrialization, though as 
we saw in Chapter Two the percentage of manufacturing/industry in GDP remained very 
                                                 
3
 Lindblad, Bridges to Business, p. 21. 
4
 Lindblad, Bridges to Business, pp. 21-2, and Dick et al., Emergence of a National Economy, p. 116.  See 
also Creutzberg, Changing Economy of Indonesia, Volume Three, p. 25. In discussing foreign investment in 
the colonial era, Lindblad has identified four categories of foreign investment; non-indigenous Indonesians 
such as those of Chinese descent, Dutch-owned companies rooted in the Dutch East Indies, Dutch-owned 
companies managed from the Netherlands, and a fourth category of investment from other countries such 
as the United States and Great Britain. (Bridges to Business, p. 22)   
5
 The estimates come from Helmut Callis‘ 1942 work titled Foreign Capital in Southeast Asia, and for 
years were the only estimates available (cited in Meek, Government and Economic Development in 
Indonesia, pp. 205-6). Creutzberg‘s percentage estimates by nationality for 1940 are comparable: 72% 




low, perhaps in part because the outbreak of World War II limited the possibility of 
further industrial growth.
6
  Foreign firms also responded to this initiative, and a number 
of large non-Dutch foreign owned manufacturing plants (among others, a Goodyear Tire 
factory, a Bata Shoe plant, and a Union Carbide battery plant) began operations in the 
second half of the decade. Virtually all the non-Dutch foreign investment in 
manufacturing was in Java, especially West Java.  
With the Japanese occupation and the subsequent Indonesian Revolution, most of 
the 1940s was a lost decade for foreign investment. During the Japanese occupation, most 
of the foreign companies operating in Indonesia were seized by the Japanese and put 
under some type of supervision. Some ceased to operate altogether. The oil fields, of 
course, were a prime target of Japanese control and a primary reason for the 
invasion/occupation. The fledgling Republican government took over and operated many 
foreign companies beginning in late 1945 as the Indonesian Revolution broke out, though 
a number of companies whose assets were primarily located in Dutch controlled areas did 
return during the Revolution.
7
 However, by 1949, most of the foreign companies, 
including Dutch companies, had not returned, and as we saw in Chapter Two the status of 
these firms was a major issue in the Round Table Conference in 1949. 
Non-Dutch foreign firms fell under the umbrella of protection extended by the 
RTCA to Dutch firms. No less than twelve articles in the Financial and Economic 
Agreement section of the RTCA (known as ‗FINEC‘) related to operation of foreign 
business enterprises (including Dutch companies). The key article was Article One, in 
which Indonesia agreed to ―adhere to the basic principle of recognizing‖ the ―rights, 
concessions and licenses properly granted under the law of the Netherlands Indies 
(Indonesia) and still valid on the date of transfer of sovereignty….‖  Indonesia further 
recognized that ―the rightful claimants be restored to the actual exercise of their rights,‖ 
with certain provisos, such as taking into account situations on estates which were 
occupied by squatters during the occupation and Revolution, the possibility of 
nationalization of public utilities, etc. Moreover, in Article Four Indonesia agreed that for 
                                                 
6
 Dick et al., Emergence of a National Economy, pp. 158-162; Booth, Indonesian Economy, pp. 41-5. 
7
 Sutter, Indonesianisasi, chapter 16.  
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existing and new enterprises and estates, the possibility will be made 
available for an extension, a renewal or the granting of rights, concessions 
and licenses required for their operation…at such conditions, and for a 
period and at a time so as to enable the enterprises remaining or being 
operated on a sound business basis and the lawful owners being 
guaranteed a continuity making possible the investments required for 
normal long term business operations… 
 
In addition, Indonesia agreed in Article Six to ―make the provisions required to safeguard 
the lawful owners exercising their rights, concessions and licenses referred to in Article 
1…to promote resumption and lastingness of economic activity.‖ Indonesia further 
agreed to extend the term of all rights, concessions, and licenses that ―could not be 
exercised as a result of the war, occupation and abnormal conditions‖ by a corresponding 
period (Article Seven). Finally, Indonesia pledged (Article Eight) that the 
burdens imposed on business as a consequence of fiscal measures and 
social and other measures customary in a modern country will be kept 
within such reasonable limits that under normal circumstances business 
can be carried on, permitting normal replacements, depreciations and 
reserves and permitting a reasonable profit for the capital invested in the 
enterprises. 
 
The Indonesian side was able to impose a few limits to these broad concessions. For 
example, Article Three specifically provided for the possibility of expropriation or 
nationalization of some companies in accordance with procedures to be prescribed by 
law, but only if such measures were for the public benefit. Article Five required the 
returning businesses to ―cooperate with and enable participation of Indonesian capital, 
subject to this being justified from a business point of view.‖ 
In sum, the rights and interests of existing foreign investment seemed well 
protected by the provisions of the RTCA. Indeed, it was largely under the aegis of the 
RTCA that foreign companies returned to what was now Indonesia. As discussed below, 
however, the climate for foreign investment was not altogether hospitable. 
A. Foreign Investment during Parliamentary Democracy. 
The discussion in Chapter Two of the Indonesian economy in the 1950s made 
plain that one of the most controversial issues relating to the economy was the role of 
foreigners. Much of the debate over the construction of the national economy revolved 
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around the extent to which the economy should be ‗Indonesianized,‘ and as we saw the 
GOI undertook various measures to achieve this objective. Hence, the government 
wanted to ensure that foreign investment was controlled and limited, an attitude that was 
frequently described as one of ambivalence. As one observer noted in 1956, 
On the one hand, top level official policy statements have stressed the 
country‘s need for foreign capital and invited investors to establish new 
businesses in Indonesia. On the other, ministerial policy pronouncements 
and the actions of administrators not infrequently have jeopardized 




The government‘s ambivalence was most evident with respect to new foreign investment, 
as despite a variety of statements by GOI officials generally supportive of foreign 
investment, it was not until September 1958, ironically right around the time that the GOI 
decided to nationalize the Dutch businesses and seize the Taiwan-linked companies, that 
the new foreign investment law was finally passed by the elected Parliament of 1955. 
Prior to this, there was no legal basis upon which new foreign investment could enter the 
country, and as a result hardly any did. Hence, virtually all the foreign investment in 
Indonesia from 1950 to 1966 was in the form of ‗returned‘ or ‗existing‘ foreign 
investment which came back under the protection of the RTCA. As there were distinct 
differences with respect to new foreign investment and existing/returned foreign 
investment, this section first summarizes GOI policy toward new foreign investment, and 
then traces the treatment of the existing/returned foreign investment.  
1. New Foreign Investment. 
The characterization of the GOI‘s attitude toward new foreign investment during 
most of the Parliamentary Democracy period as ‗ambivalent‘ derives from the contrast 
between the frequent supportive statements made by GOI officials toward new foreign 
investment and the various official policy statements issued by different cabinets, and the 
delay in actually passing a foreign investment law until 1958. Thus, despite various 
statements generally encouraging new foreign investment, there was no legal structure in 
                                                 
8
 Meek, Government and Economic Development in Indonesia, pp. 205-6. For short discussions of foreign 
investment in Indonesia in the 1950s, see Meek, Government and Economic Development in Indonesia, pp. 
185-215, Sutter, Indonesianisasi, chapters 25 and 26, Lindblad, ―Foreign Investment in Late Colonial and 
Post Colonial Indonesia,‖ and Thee, "Economic Policies in Indonesia during the Period 1950-1965, in 
particular with respect to Foreign Investment." 
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place to accommodate any new investment until 1958. This certainly reflected foreign 
investment‘s association with capitalism and colonialism and the domination of the 
modern sector of the Indonesian economy by primarily Dutch business concerns; the 
various cabinets obviously were afraid of negative backlash if the door for foreign 
investment were too wide. It also undoubtedly was partly a reflection of the short lifespan 
of most of the cabinets of the period, as they did not have enough time to develop policies 
for foreign investment, especially when there were more important matters to be dealt 
with. Perhaps most importantly, however, the question often was not so much whether 
foreign investment would be welcomed, but rather what conditions would be imposed 
upon its entrance. Indeed, many officials recognized the general need for new foreign 
investment given the state of Indonesia‘s economic development, and much of the debate 
seemed to revolve around how to limit and control this new foreign investment so as 
protect Indonesian interests. This dilemma was nicely captured by one observer writing 
in 1956, who noted that since the ―early days there has been a continuing effort within the 
Indonesian government to formulate the principles of a basic policy which would both 
attract new capital and insure that its operation would benefit the economy.‖
9
 Devising an 
acceptable formula was painstaking slow and contentious, however, as evidenced by the 
eight years it took to promulgate a foreign investment law.  
Various statements by GOI officials in the early 1950s clearly indicated there was 
support for new foreign investment.
10
 For example, in September 1950 Prime Minister 
Natsir (Masyumi) declared in a well-publicized statement that rejecting foreign capital 
altogether would be harmful to the economy, and in order to improve the economy it was 
necessary to attract foreign capital into several areas. He indicated that the government 
would conduct a study of which fields would be open, and what conditions would be 
imposed, including the form of the enterprise, limits on transfers, and participation by 
Indonesians.
11
 President Sukarno also recognized the need for foreign investment in these 
early years; in a speech in February 1950 he indicated that security was necessary so that 
                                                 
9
 Meek, Government and Economic Development in Indonesia, p. 187.  
10
 For a detailed description of the political debate over foreign investment in the first half of the 1950s, see 
chapters 25 and 26 of Sutter‘s Indonesianisasi; for a very short summary, see Meek, Government and 
Economic Development in Indonesia, pp. 185-92.   
11
 Sutter, Indonesianisasi, p. 1128; Booth, Indonesian Economy, p. 54.  
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both citizens and foreigners would invest in Indonesia, and that Indonesia still needed 
―assistance‖ from foreign capital, and in another speech in September 1951 he defended 
the Sukiman cabinet‘s policy of encouraging foreign investment.
12
 One of the biggest 
proponents of foreign investment was the influential Sjafruddin Prawiranegara. In March 
1951 while Minister of Finance he wrote that if Indonesia‘s standard of living was to rise, 
foreign capital had to be tolerated and increased in size, as Indonesians were too poor 
even to maintain the current standard of living by themselves. As Governor of Bank 
Indonesia, in 1952 he wrote in the bank‘s annual report that the origin of capital should 
not matter, and the only criterion for distinguishing between foreign capital and national 
capital should be whether funds were transferred abroad; in the bank‘s 1953 report, 
Governor Sjarfruddin also emphasized the need for foreign investment, albeit with some 
controls.
13
 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, another influential economist, also was supportive 
of foreign investment, provided it met certain conditions, such as minimum Indonesian 
participation in ownership and management, required training for Indonesians, 




Similarly, in a late August 1952 interview, Prime Minister Wilopo (PNI) stated 
that Indonesia both welcomed and needed foreign investment.
15
 In fact, in that same 
interview, Prime Minister Wilopo indicated that that within several months his 
government would issue an unofficial policy statement on foreign investment. Over the 
course of the next nine months the Wilopo cabinet undertook a detailed study of foreign 
investment, began drafting policy statements on foreign investment, and even began 
drafting a foreign investment law.
16
 However, none of the above was finished when the 
Wilopo cabinet fell in June 1953, ironically by an issue linked to returned foreign 
investment (see subsection 2 below).  
                                                 
12
 Sutter, Indonesianisasi, p. 1108; Feith, Decline of Constitutional Democracy, p. 216. 
13
 Sutter, Indonesianisasi, pp. 1144-5, 1184-6, 1210-1.  
14
 Thee, ―Economic Policies in Indonesia during 1950-65, particularly with respect to Foreign Investment,‖ 
p. 326. 
15
 Sutter, Indonesianisasi, p. 1207.  
16
 Sutter, Indonesianisasi, pp. 1203-4; Meek, Government and Economic Development in Indonesia, pp. 
187-8; Feith, Decline of Constitutional Democracy, p. 476 (footnote 20); and Thee, ―Economic Policies in 
Indonesia during 1950-65, particularly with respect to Foreign Investment,‖ p. 328. 
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The first official policy statement on foreign investment was made in February 
1954 under the first Ali Sastroamidjojo (PNI) cabinet by Minister of Finance Ong Eng 
Die.
17
 Consisting of 18 paragraphs, the policy statement declared that ―in order to enlarge 
national production, improve the people‘s standard of living, and to develop sound 
economic conditions, Indonesia, with an ever increasing population, requires foreign 
capital investment,‖ which may be invested in accordance with various principles. Three 
types of investment were specifically sanctioned: foreigners could invest on their own 
(presumably meaning complete foreign ownership), or in cooperation with Indonesian 
citizens, or in cooperation with the GOI. Another prominent principle was that 
―enterprises in Indonesia should be primarily places for Indonesian citizens to work,‖ and 
thus only foreigners whose skills were not available in Indonesia would be permitted to 
work in the country. Foreign enterprises were allowed to remit abroad after-tax profits, 
and foreigners working in the enterprises were allowed to transfer part of their income 
abroad. Moreover, the statement declared that ―in general, all capital will be permitted to 
return to the country of origin after it has been utilized a number of years in Indonesia.‖ 
The statement did enunciate certain limitations on the operations of foreign investment. 
These included reserving unspecified fields for the GOI to operate in, either alone or in 
cooperation with private investors, and a preference for industrial firms rather than trade, 
transport and banking enterprises. The statement further indicated that regulations 
relating to privately-owned enterprises would be established, as would government 
agencies.  In sum, the policy statement clearly indicated that foreign investment was 
welcome and desired, subject to some rather vague limitations that had yet to be spelled 
out. However, the policy statement was not followed by the promulgation of any laws, as 
more urgent matters occupied the government‘s attention.
18
 
In December 1955, the second official government policy statement was issued, 
this time by the Burhanuddin Harahap (Masyumi) cabinet.
19
  Like the 1954 statement, it 
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 An English translation of the policy statement is attached as Appendix T to Sutter‘s Indonesianisasi. 
Quotations from the policy statement are taken from this version. 
18
 Sutter, Indonesianisasi, p. 1224. 
19
 For a nice summary of the 1955 Harahap policy statement, see pp. 2-3 of "Investment in Indonesia: Basic 
Information for United States Businessmen,"  (United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign 
Commerce, 1956). The following summary is taken from this source.  See also Meek, Government and 
Economic Development in Indonesia, pp. 188-92.  
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was fairly broad in scope, recognizing the need for foreign capital, both in the form of 
loans and investment, but with certain limitations. Excluded sectors included the fields of 
social enterprises and public utilities, such as railroads, interisland navigation, domestic 
air service, electricity, and water supply, which were to be owned by the government, as 
well as traditional small scale industries operated by Indonesians. In addition, foreign 
control over basic industries should be limited to no more than 49% of the enterprise. 
Aside from these three areas, however, foreign investment was wide open. There would 
be no nationalization of foreign firms outside these three areas except by agreement with 
the GOI. The statement indicated that forthcoming regulations would allow foreign 
companies to use land for up to 40 years, with extensions possible, and that international 
agreements would be signed to avoid double taxation. Profits and certain expenses were 
allowed to be repatriated, as was capital after an unspecified period. Foreigners were 
allowed to enter the country and work, though in order to further the employment of 
Indonesians some restrictions might be established, and there would also be requirements 
for training Indonesian personnel. Finally, the statement indicated that a new foreign 
investment law was forthcoming, as were regulations designed to allow existing foreign 
investment to be subject to these same rules. However, as the Harahap government was 
clearly an interim government in place only until the new government determined by the 
1955 elections could enter office, it did not actually issue any laws or regulations.  
Despite these efforts, a foreign investment law was not promulgated until 1958. 
The first draft of a foreign investment bill was actually submitted to Parliament in June 
1956 by the second Ali Sastroamidjojo (PNI) cabinet, but this bill went nowhere.
20
  
Somewhat ironically, it was the Sukarno-appointed Djuanda cabinet which really pushed 
for the promulgation of the new foreign investment law, Law No. 78/1958, which in its 
final form was a slightly modified version of the 1956 draft.
21
 By this time, President 
Sukarno had come out against foreign investment, favoring instead foreign loans or 
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grants. Prime Minister Djuanda, however, was determined to encourage it, and with his 
determined support the modified bill was passed by the elected Parliament in September 
1958 and promulgated into law in late October 1958. The PKI was the only major party 
to vote against the law.
22
 This 1958 law would remain on the books until 1965, when it 
was revoked by President Sukarno as part of his BERDIKARI initiative (see Chapter 
Seven). It should be noted in this connection that much secondary literature on 
Indonesian economic history incorrectly states that the law was repealed by President 
Sukarno in 1959.
23
 Instead, the door remained open throughout the Guided Democracy 
period, though it was hardly used.   
The timing of the passage of this new law was very curious, because it came just 
as the GOI decided to nationalize the Dutch companies that had been seized in late 1957 
and was in the process of taking over companies owned by Taiwan-linked Chinese (see 
section B below). It thus appeared as though the government was sending very mixed 
signals regarding the position of foreign investment in Indonesia. The timing is such that 
the promulgation of the new law in 1958 may have been an acknowledgement that once 
the strong position of Dutch companies was finally determined (they would be controlled 
by Indonesia), Indonesia was perhaps more secure in welcoming new foreign investment. 
Similarly, the timing might suggest a desire to reassure foreign companies that in spite of 
what was happening to the Dutch and Taiwan-associated companies, new foreign 
investment would be welcome. In addition, the general desire to have a framework in 
place for foreign investment may have been supplemented by a sense of urgency 
resulting from the loss of protection granted to ‗returned‘ investment from the abrogation 
of the RTCA in February 1956.  Certainly these events suggested that GOI officials 
viewed Dutch investment very differently from other foreign investment, a clear 
dichotomy which probably reflected not only the colonizer/colonized relationship but 
also the hitherto dominant position of Dutch enterprises in the modern economy.    
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 Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, pp. 180-1; Lindblad, Bridges to Business, pp. 193-4.  
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The 1958 foreign investment law contained many of the elements of the previous 
policy statements and reflected the desire to encourage new foreign investment under 
carefully monitored and controlled conditions that would protect Indonesian interests. 
The law itself was quite short and left much open, to be determined at a future date by a 
body known as the Council for Foreign Investment (CFI). The preamble noted that in 
light of the absence of domestic capital, foreign investment was needed to accelerate 
economic growth and raise the standard of living in Indonesia. Foreign investment was 
specifically excluded from the areas of railways, telecommunications, shipping and 
aviation, power generation, water supply, arms and munitions, and the mining of vital 
materials (all of which were presumably left to the government, which could employ 
foreign capital under special conditions), as well as in enterprises usually undertaken by 
Indonesian nationals (Articles 2-4). All other sectors were open to foreign investment. A 
preference was expressed for enterprises that featured cooperative arrangements between 
foreigners and Indonesian partners (Article 4). Undertakings operated wholly or primarily 
in Indonesia had to be incorporated under Indonesian law and domiciled in Indonesia 
(Article 5). Land use rights for industrial firms were to be for 20 years, which were 
extendable; for large agricultural firms, the period was 30 to 40 years, also extendable 
(Articles 6 and 7). The law specifically undertook to avoid double taxation and further 
indicated that various types of tax relief may be granted on the Indonesian side (Articles 
11 and 12). The law further declared that industrial enterprises would not be nationalized 
for at least a 20 year period, 30 years in the case of agricultural enterprises (Article 13). 
All after-tax profits were transferrable abroad in the case of wholly-owned foreign 
enterprises (Article 16). Repatriation of capital, a key issue for foreign concerns, was 
allowed in cases where the enterprise had been in operation for an unspecified length of 
time, subject however to future decisions of the CFI (Article 17). A statement in the 
official explanation to the law indicated that the law applied to foreign investment made 
after 1 January 1956, and that foreign investment made before then was to be 
‗synchronized‘ with the law. Presumably this meant that pre-1956 investment would be 
subject to the provisions of the 1958 law.    
The apparent open nature of these provisions, however, was tempered by the 
enormous discretionary power held by the CFI, whose general function was to 
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―determine the conditions and exercise the supervision necessary to make this Act 
effective‖ (Article 19). The official explanation indicated that the CFI would be the 
agency reviewing all foreign investment applications. The CFI was to be comprised of 
the Minister of Industry as chairman, the Minister of Finance as vice-chairman, and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Trade, Minister of Labor, Governor of the central 
bank, and the Director-General of the State Planning Bureau (Article 18). The CFI was 
responsible to an unspecified council of ministers, from which it would receive direction. 
The CFI had broad discretionary powers which were to be exercised on a case-by-case 
basis, a situation sure to cause some discomfort for many prospective foreign investors. 
These broad powers included (i) approving the location of new foreign investment, (ii) 
determining which enterprises were usually undertaken by Indonesian nationals and thus 
closed to foreign investment, (iii) whether an enterprise was operating wholly or 
primarily in Indonesia and thus had to be incorporated under Indonesian law, (iv) 
determining the available tax relief, and (v) how much capital could be repatriated.  
Furthermore, the CFI determined the number of foreign personnel allowed to work in 
each enterprise, and also specified requirements for educating and employing Indonesian 
nationals (the accompanying explanation indicating that foreign workers would be 
permitted only if there were no available Indonesian workers, but that at least one foreign 
individual may be present to represent the interests of the foreign investors). Despite 
these potential shortcomings, however, Indonesia at last had thrown the door open to new 
foreign investment, though as we shall see in the next section almost no new foreign 
investment would enter the country in subsequent years.  
2. Returned Foreign Investment. 
The apparent ambivalence of the GOI toward new foreign investment throughout 
most of the 1950s contrasted somewhat with the treatment of the ‗returned‘ or ‗existing‘ 
foreign investment, defined as foreign investment existing before 1942 that returned to 
independent Indonesia under the protection of the RTCA. While the decision to allow 
existing foreign investment – especially Dutch - to return was not popular, some GOI 
officials recognized the need for it as well as the potentially dramatic consequences of a 
failure of such investment to return. After 1949, this ‗returned‘ foreign investment – 
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especially Dutch - was an easy target for many groups, and sometimes became 
intertwined with domestic politics, as demonstrated by the Tanjung Morawa case 
described below. As one observer has noted, the continuing presence of the returned 
companies presented the GOI with a dilemma: ―while the Indonesian government, bound 
by international treaty commitments, was committed to protecting the legal rights of 
foreign enterprise, strong political pressure, including that from grassroots level, forced 
the government to take some steps to assuage the strident nationalist demands of several 
pressure groups.‖
24
 Of all the returned foreign investment, it was the role of returned 
foreign estates and foreign oil companies in the new economy that was certainly the most 
sensitive in terms of public sentiment, and it was the foreign estates that in particular bore 
the brunt of this sentiment as expressed by non-governmental actors. The situation in the 
province of North Sumatra, where there was a huge concentration of foreign owned 
estates around an area of Medan known as ‗East Sumatra‘ (sometimes also known as 
Sumatra‘s East Coast), was especially delicate.
25
 By the late 1950s existing foreign 
investment spilled over from the domestic politics and economics into foreign relations, 
as the nationalization of Dutch enterprises in 1958-59 and especially the takeovers of 
Taiwan-linked Chinese companies discussed below demonstrate.  
It is unclear exactly how many foreign companies (including Dutch) returned to 
Indonesia under the protections of the RTCA, but it appears that most did. As noted 
above, some had even begun to return in the late 1940s, and most had apparently returned 
by 1952 or 1953 to reclaim their assets. In the case of estates, the GOI in 1950 set up in 
each of the main estate areas ‗Committees to Return Foreign Estates‘ (Panitia 
Pengembalian Perusahaan Perkebunan Milik Asing) to organize the returns.
26
 Minister 
of Agriculture Sadjarwo was heavily involved in this process until he was replaced in the 
September 1950 cabinet. By 1952, some 98% of rubber estates, 88% of the palm oil 
estates and 80% of the hard fiber estates in the Medan region of North Sumatra had been 
returned to their owners. Similarly, most estates in West Java had also been returned by 
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the end of 1952, though only about 60% of the estates in East Java were returned. In total, 
by the end of 1952, about 70% of the foreign estates in both Java and Sumatra had been 
returned; in absolute numbers, the number was 1140 estates totaling two million hectares, 
with some 466 estates totaling 480,000 hectares (about 20% of the total by acreage) still 
not returned (though some may have been returned after 1952). It appears that numerous 
smaller estates may not have been returned, in part because the owners no longer wanted 
them and in part because local conditions were simply too difficult. In addition, as we 
shall see below a number of companies agreed to turn over some of their estate lands to 
the government, though the actual amounts are unknown. The return of estates was 
complicated by the existence of squatters who had settled and grown crops on numerous 
estates during the chaos of the 1940s. The big three foreign oil companies also returned 
(see Part II), as did most of the foreign companies in the manufacturing sector. However, 
the environment they all returned to was quite different from that of the colonial era.  
The best known example of how returned foreign investment became embroiled 
in domestic politics and was exploited by various groups for political purposes was the 
Tanjung Morawa incident of March 1953, which led to the downfall of the Wilopo 
cabinet (PNI) a few months later.
27
 The details of the incident were widely misunderstood 
and resulted in many Indonesians believing that the incident occurred between squatters 
and foreign estate owners, when in fact the land in question had already been turned over 
to the GOI a year and a half previously.
28
  Such misconceptions even led one observer to 
describe the incident as ―dramatiz[ing] the tensions caused by the use of government 
force to return property to ‗colonial‘ business enterprises and as such became 
immediately an important political issue.‖
29
  In fact, the dispute was between the GOI and 
Chinese squatters, and it was quite ironic that the plight of these Chinese, who were 
frequently viewed with suspicion and mistrust by indigenous Indonesians, was able to 
generate so much attention and sympathy.  More broadly, the incident involved land 
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The land in question in the Tanjung Morawa incident (about six hectares) was 
previously owned by a Dutch tobacco estate company, but had been surrendered to the 
GOI in September 1951 as part of a deal struck between the government and some 
foreign tobacco companies in which the companies were allowed to retain 125,000 
hectares of estates but in return gave up 130,000 hectares to the government (which 
would presumably then turn over some of the land to peasants for cultivation).
31
 The 
government decided in April 1952 to use the six hectares to develop an experimental 
farm and fishery. However, there were some 10 families of Chinese descent who had 
been occupying the land since the late 1940s and growing crops on it. The presence of 
these squatters not only reflected the chaos of the 1940s but also the growing problem of 
an increasing population with limited available land. The government planned to relocate 
these squatters to nearby districts, with each family receiving about half a hectare, but the 
squatters refused and continued to plant new crops. Tensions rose in early 1953 as the 
government tried to clear the land and peasant unions got involved and organized local 
demonstrations and shows of support. On 16 March 1953, as a government bulldozer 
escorted by local police was about to begin clearing the area, a crowd of some 1500 
demonstrators surged forward; in the melee, members of the crowd apparently tried to 
grab one of the policemen‘s automatic weapon, which fired and killed five demonstrators 
(four Chinese, one Indonesian) and injured 18 others. Thereafter, there were no more 
incidents, and the 10 families were resettled and the area cleared. However, the incident 
quickly became a national-level lightning rod for criticism from a variety of parties for 
their own agendas, including attacking agrarian policy. The PKI was especially active in 
criticizing the land redistribution and resettlement program, pressing for change. There 
was even criticism over the type of land given up by the foreign estate companies, as 
some of it was unsuitable for peasant agriculture. The Wilopo government, a coalition 
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between the PNI and Masyumi, was unable to survive the controversy, though certainly 
this was only one of many divisive issues, and fell in early June 1953.     
Outbursts of negative public sentiment were perhaps easier for the returning 
foreign companies to deal with than some of the new measures introduced beginning in 
1953 by the first Ali Sastroamidjojo (PNI) cabinet. For example, until that year up to 
100% of the after-tax-profits of foreign companies were transferable out of the country, 
though in practice 50% were subject to government review. In July 1953, new rules 
limited such overseas transfers to only 40% of after-tax-profits (profits were taxed at 
40%) and depreciation transfers were halted. In March 1954, this scheme was replaced by 
the imposition of a 66% levy on all overseas transfers (with some exceptions, such as 
monies for pensions). In addition, in May 1954 new severe restrictions were placed on 
imports, and the corporate tax rate rose to as high as 52%.
32
  Moreover, after 1954 capital 
repatriation was suspended from time to time.
33
 Finally, in 1954 the first Ali government 
also issued regulations prohibiting foreign manufacturing firms from distributing their 
own goods within Indonesia; instead, they had to use distribution firms owned by 
Indonesians. This was complemented by a measure requiring foreign firms that gave 
exclusive rights to other firms to import the required goods to give such sole agency 
rights to Indonesian firms.
34
   These measures also exacerbated the impact of the 
restrictions on the usage of foreign exchange, which quickly became a major problem for 
many foreign companies (see discussion in Section B below).   
In addition to the above, ‗returned‘ foreign companies were hampered by other 
general economic and political conditions. A publication from the United States 
Department of Commerce in 1956 nicely describes the various factors affecting foreign 
investors. On the economic side, deterrents included  
(1) the fundamental economic instability resulting from heavy dependence 
on the export of a relatively few products, notably rubber, petroleum, and 
tin; (2) the low level of domestic savings and deficient local capital 
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markets; (3) inadequate development in the fields of transportation, 
communications, and power, the necessary base upon which industrial 
development can be built, (4) a limited supply of skilled labor and low 
labor productivity; and (5) low per capita income, with a resultant small 




As the report recognized, these problems were typical of underdeveloped countries. Other 
economic issues included the slow rate of economic development, the shortage of capital, 
and the small number of competent Indonesian entrepreneurs. After citing the restrictions 
on profit and capital repatriation described above, the report turned to political conditions 
which hampered foreign investors. First discussed was the labor situation, featuring the 
seemingly unreasonable demands of labor unions (many of which were communist 
dominated) in spite of the relatively low productivity of the workers. Lack of trained and 
competent technical and administrative staff was cited as another serious problem, 
especially as foreign companies were under pressure to Indonesianize their staffs. 
Second, the report cited the unstable nature of Indonesian politics, with its many cabinets 
and provisional constitution, as a deterrent to investment. Finally, the report cited the 
trend toward nationalization and efforts to indigenize the economy as deterrents, even 
though to date there had been no nationalizations without compensation.
36
 
With the unilateral abrogation of the RTCA by Indonesia in early 1956, the 
returned foreign companies technically lost the protection of that agreement. As we saw 
in Chapter Two, the abrogation came in the context of Dutch/Indonesian relations. Such a 
legal void may have been a factor pushing the government to pass new legislation 
covering foreign investment, which was finally done in 1958. In any case, the 
government‘s actions after the abrogation of the RTCA initially seemed to reflect a desire 
to maintain the status quo. On the one hand, in September 1957 the government decreed 
that all companies operating in industry and trade were subject to a 1934 colonial law 
(the company regulation ordinance or bedrijfsreglenerigs ordonnantje) that required the 
companies to have licenses to continue their operations; the decree explained that existing 
foreign companies could temporarily continue operations pending new regulations, but 
no permission would be granted for expanding or moving the location of these 
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 This decree seemed aimed principally at Dutch companies. On the other 
hand, it appears that the potential power of the government under this decree was never 
exercised (perhaps because the Dutch companies were seized a few months later). 
Moreover, the government actually took several steps to reassure foreign companies, 
including ordering the return of a Dutch company seized in Makassar.
38
  
As we saw in Chapter Two, the seizure and nationalization of Dutch companies in 
1957-59 was arguably part of the process of economic decolonization from Dutch 
colonialism and clearly was not something directed against all foreign investment. The 
seizure of Dutch companies was directly related to the Dutch-Indonesian conflict over 
West Irian and appeared to catch the GOI off guard. The subsequent nationalization of 
these companies allowed Indonesia to gain control over a large majority portion of the 
modern sector of the economy, thus going a long way to achieving one of the major 
economic goals of Indonesian policymakers. Nevertheless, the seizures of the Dutch 
companies in December 1957, albeit by what appeared to be non-governmental actors, 
hinted that there was the possibility of some kind of linkage between foreign investment 
and foreign policy concerns, if one considers the matter of West Irian to have been not 
just a colonial matter but also a foreign policy matter as well. I emphasize ‗hint‘ because 
of the complexity of factors behind the takeovers of the Dutch companies; while the 
economic decolonization argument provides a solid long-term analytical framework from 
which to view the takeovers of Dutch companies, we cannot ignore that the immediate 
impetus for the takeovers was the West Irian question (which arguably was just as much 
a foreign policy issue as it was a colonial issue).  
The seizure by the GOI of Taiwan-linked Chinese enterprises in 1958 was a more 
forceful indication that the GOI would link the position of foreign investment to foreign 
relations, in effect use foreign companies as pawns in foreign affairs.  Unlike the seizure 
of Dutch companies, which was initiated by non-governmental actors, the takeover of 
Taiwan-associated enterprises was initiated and entirely undertaken by the GOI and was 
part of an overall effort by the government against Taiwan-linked groups in Indonesia in 
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1958 in retaliation for Taiwanese support for the 1957-58 regional rebellions.
39
 In April 
1958, the government began prohibiting the publication of Chinese language newspapers 
and magazines, later amending that to require a license to publish. In September the 
government banned over 50 Chinese organizations in the Jakarta area believed linked to 
Taiwan, such as sports groups, women‘s organizations, cinemas, schools and other 
groups. Finally, in October 1958 further decrees were issued placing all schools and 
business enterprises (banks, estates, industrial companies, etc.) that were associated with 
Taiwan under GOI control. It is unclear, however, exactly what and how many businesses 
were taken over, and what happened to them. It appears, though, that the number and size 
of these businesses was quite small compared with other foreign investors, and thus the 
significance of this measure is hard to judge. Nevertheless, the seizure of these 
companies by the GOI was first clear-cut case of the GOI using foreign enterprises as a 
tool of foreign policy, a tactic that would be taken to much greater extremes in 1963-65.     
As noted, the seizure and nationalization of existing Dutch and Taiwan-linked 
enterprises in 1957-58 occurred just as the GOI had finally shed some of its ambivalence 
regarding new foreign investment and promulgated its first law on foreign investment.  
This juxtaposition, whatever the motivations, certainly made both new and existing 
foreign investment wary; it seems highly unlikely that many foreign investors were able 
or willing to risk resources in exploring these apparent contradictions. In any case, the 
welcome mat of the 1958 law was rarely, if ever, tested in future years as the climate for 
new foreign investment worsened significantly under Guided Democracy.   
B. Foreign Investment under Guided Democracy to c. 1962. 
Under Guided Democracy, the conditions under which new foreign investment 
and existing foreign investment could operate were increasingly stringent, both because 
of government policy and actions and because of the deteriorating economy, and thus the 
overall climate for foreign investment became increasingly hostile. From the beginning of 
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Guided Democracy, President Sukarno expressed a preference for new foreign capital in 
the form of loans, not investments, a concept that by 1962 had translated into an official 
preference for production sharing contracts. Hence the official attitude toward new 
foreign investment had hardened considerably in a few short years, despite the passage of 
the 1958 law on foreign investment that on the surface welcomed new foreign investment 
in specified fields. The policy toward existing foreign investment also reflected toleration 
for such investment as long as it fit into Indonesia‘s conditions and requirements. A good 
example of this was the promulgation in 1960 of two laws regarding land ownership and 
oil/natural gas that replaced existing colonial laws, measures that significantly impacted 
foreign oil companies and foreign estates but by no means eliminated them. While these 
measures did chip away at the position of foreign investment, there were clear indications 
that the government continued to support existing foreign investment, such as the 
prominent position of foreign investment, primarily oil, in the Eight Year Development 
Plan, and the government‘s preventing the seizure of some Belgian companies in 1960-
61. 
1. New Foreign Investment. 
President Sukarno, with his new power and influence under Guided Democracy, 
set the tone toward foreign investment immediately in his independence day address of 
17 August 1959, his first major address of the Guided Democracy period: 
Though we take our stand on the principle that for construction and 
development we give priority to our own capital, and that, if nevertheless 
foreign capital is needed, we would prefer credit rather than foreign 
investment – and I emphasize this principle again here – despite this, we 
are nevertheless tolerant enough of non-Dutch foreign capital which is 
already here and which will possibly come here. But the conditio sine qua 
non for permission to foreign capital to operate here is that it has to obey 
all the requirements fixed by the Republic. If it does not obey those rules, 
if it plays negative roles, for instance if it silently carries out economic 
sabotage or illegally gives support to contra-revolution, then, do not be 
surprised if one day the Republic of Indonesia treat[s] it similarly to the 
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Over the next several years, President Sukarno in other speeches would also emphasize 
the preference for foreign loans rather than investment.
41
 Such statements undoubtedly 
were discouraging for any new foreign investment hoping to enter the country under the 
auspices of the 1958 foreign investment law, and in fact none appears to have come in.
42
 
In 1962, the preference for foreign loans instead of foreign investment culminated 
in the promotion of production sharing contracts as the official preferred form in which 
new foreign capital could enter Indonesia.
43
 On 3 August 1962, President Sukarno made 
a brief statement regarding this new structure that proclaimed ―foreign investment of the 
classical type is unacceptable to the Government.‖
44
 One reason cited was that  ―foreign 
investment recalls the bitter experiences of the newly independent countries as a result of 
the consequences which such investment has had for the state as a whole…foreign 
investment is always related to the colonial era and is equated with the methods used to 
extract wealth from a colonial country.‖ Another reason given was because it was 
―difficult to justify the unrestricted transfer for profits which the traditional form of 
foreign investment involves. A country that accepts foreign investment is obliged, even 
after the entire invested capital has been repaid, to continue to permit the transfer of 
profits and there is basically no way to put this to a stop.‖ Nevertheless, the statement in 
essence recognized the necessity of foreign capital generally, and to avoid these pitfalls 
outlined two basic conditions for further ―cooperation‖ with foreign parties: first, the new 
enterprise in question should be owned and managed from the beginning by Indonesians, 
and second, continued transfer of profits was unacceptable. However, the statement also 
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acknowledged that even these conditions, which amounted to a credit or loan supplied by 
the foreign party, would not prevent a strain on the balance of payments and tying up of 
foreign exchange as the loans were repaid. In fact, this issue seems to have been the real 
reason behind this new form; writing a decade later, prominent Indonesian economist 
Mohammad Sadli claimed that the production sharing structure was ―motivated mainly 
by the prevailing scarcity of, and restrictions on, foreign exchange.‖
45
   To avoid this 
problem, the statement added a third condition to the first two of (i) ownership and 
management of the enterprise by the Indonesian side and (ii) no transfer of profits: (iii) 
the reimbursement of the credit/loan in kind in the form of the production or output from 
the enterprise. An appendix to the statement further described these and other principles 
of production sharing contracts, including the feature that the GOI would guarantee each 
production sharing agreement. 
Over the next several years the GOI issued a number of statements and 
regulations regarding production sharing contracts. A regulation issued in late September 
1962 announced the establishment of a credit committee for production sharing contracts, 
which was essentially responsible for overseeing and controlling all production sharing 
contracts; it determined the parameters of the production sharing contract system by 
issuing regulations, organizing the government approval process (all such contracts had 
to be approved by the government), and monitoring the contracts. In November 1962 the 
members of the committee were appointed, and in December a decree was issued 
outlining the entire government approval process.
46
 The GOI also issued a number of 
official statements in 1963-64 answering questions and outlining the various conditions 
and principles of production sharing agreements.
47
 The Ministry of Peoples Industry even 
issued a sample sixteen page production sharing contract in English.
48
 
In form and practice, production sharing contracts were very similar to loans and 
were by no means equity investments, which were the almost universal form of foreign 
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 The general arrangement was for the foreign party to provide foreign 
exchange to the venture that would be used to purchase the necessary equipment from 
foreign suppliers, often the same foreign party providing the credit.
50
 The Indonesian side 
provided all the Rupiah-based financing and also owned, managed and operated the 
venture. However, the foreign party often entered into a technical assistance agreement 
with the Indonesian side, under which the foreign party would provide personnel and 
training for the equipment. There was some limited scope for participation in 
management by foreigners, though in principle the venture was to be run by 
Indonesians.
51
 The foreign party was also usually in charge of selling the 
output/production of the venture in overseas markets. The loan/credit was repaid 
according to a fixed, agreed to schedule of interest and principal, and there was also 
usually a third component of repayment, usually in return for the technical services 
provided. All repayments – interest, principal, and the third component – were made in 
kind in the output/production of the venture; the amount repaid was calculated according 
to prevailing world prices for the product received by the foreign party. Thus, repayment 
of interest and principal, while fixed in terms of amount of foreign exchange, depended 
entirely on the production of the venture (if the amount was short for one payment period, 
it was added to the next payment period). These features are virtually identical to classic 
loans or extensions of credit, except that repayment is made in kind from production. In 
practice, it appeared that virtually all the production sharing agreements entered into were 
guaranteed by the GOI (or the government of the foreign party); this also indicates that 
the arrangement was one of the classic loan type, as the risk normally borne by equity 
investors was guaranteed by a third party. As is evident, the production sharing 
arrangement was only suitable for projects whose output could be sold overseas and thus 
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generate the foreign currency necessary to repay the loan. This generally meant 
production sharing projects were in natural resource development, such as oil, mining of 
minerals, timber, etc.   
The production sharing arrangement was unsuccessful in attracting foreign 
interest. By early 1966, only 19 production sharing contracts had been signed, and the 
total commitment by foreign parties under these contracts amounted to only $72 million; 
moreover, of this total commitment of $72 million, only $12 million had actually been 
extended. In addition, $44 million of the $72 million, or 60%, was from Japanese 
concerns, with about $12 million of commitments coming from communist countries and 
the remaining $16 million coming from western European nations and Australia. $70 
million of the $72 million in commitments was guaranteed by Indonesian banks.
52
  
Furthermore, most of these Japanese commitments involved either substantial financing 
or a guarantee from the Japanese government, a practice that clearly suggested a loan 
structure rather than equity investment as the risk was mostly born by the Japanese 
government.
53
  In sum, the results of the production sharing initiative undertaken by the 
GOI were not encouraging, indicating that private investors were simply not comfortable 
with the arrangement. In early 1965 the government actually amended the regulations 
greatly in favor of the foreign side in an effort to attract more interest, but these changes 
did not have the hoped-for result.
54
  It should also be noted that in spite of this emphasis 
on production sharing and apparent unwillingness to allow ‗classic‘ foreign investment to 
enter the country, the 1958 foreign investment law was not withdrawn until 1965. 
2. Existing Foreign Investment. 
In the early years of Guided Democracy, the government appeared to be 
implementing President Sukarno‘s directive in his 1959 independence day address that 
Indonesia would tolerate existing investment as long as it obeyed all requirements fixed 
by the government. In particular, in 1960 the GOI began changing those requirements for 
the oil sector and the estate sector, the two biggest areas of foreign investment in 
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Indonesia. Such changes resulted from the passage of two laws in 1960, both of which (i) 
were designed to replace the various colonial laws covering their respective subject 
matters with new jurisprudence that would reflect the values and desires of the new 
independent nation, (ii) significantly impacted foreign companies operating in these 
sectors, and (iii) made the operating climate for foreign firms in these areas more hostile. 
The first law was the Oil and Gas Law (Law No. 44/1960), specifically targeted at the oil 
and natural gas industry that was dominated by the big three foreign oil companies. It will 
be discussed in greater detail in Part II, Section A; for now, it will suffice to note that the 
principal feature of the law was the stipulation that oil and natural gas were now owned 
by the state, and that the mining of oil and gas could only be undertaken by the state or 
SOEs or their contractors. This feature reversed the position of the oil companies under 
colonial laws and forced the oil companies to renegotiate entirely their position in the 
country, an arduous process that would not be resolved until three years later. 
The second law was the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960, which was generally 
concerned with land ownership and land use (see Chapter Two, Part III, Section D for a 
brief description). Under this new law, foreigners could only lease land under lease rights 
known as hak guna usaha, which were generally valid for 25 year terms. All existing 
foreign estates, whose concessions and other land use grants were issued under colonial 
laws, had to apply to convert their holdings to this structure. Foreign estates were 
generally given until late September 1961 to do so, and the new term in fact was 
supposed to be equivalent to the remaining period of the original concession and in no 
event greater than 20 years.
55
 Moreover, concessions which originally were set to expire 
before September 1965 were not to be converted but instead given to the GOI.
56
 The 
overall impact of the law was that foreign estate companies were forced to renegotiate 
and restructure their estate holdings to fit within this new structure, and most importantly 
existing estates were forced to give up one-third of their holdings under an informal rule 
known as the ‗one-third rule.‘ This unofficial rule stemmed from the potential disruption 
caused by forcing companies to give up holdings whose concessions expired before 
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September 1965; the holdings were all intermingled, such that the result would have been 
the government operating a small estate within the middle of a foreign estate. In response, 
Minister of Agrarian Affairs Sadjarwo floated the idea of the companies giving up one-
third of their holdings (approximately divided equally between planted areas and 
unplanted areas) in exchange for (i) not breaking up the estates, and (ii) granting new 
rights under the hak guna usaha framework for terms roughly equal to the average 
number of years remaining on the companies‘ old concessions. The foreign estate 
companies had little choice but to comply, even ones whose original concessions did not 
expire prior to September 1965.
57
 Hence, most companies entered into arduous and 
lengthy individual negotiations with the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs to determine what 
holdings would be ceded to the government and what would be kept by the company. The 
end result was a massive infusion of estate lands into the government‘s hands from 1961-
62.
58
 Apparently the rights to at least a portion of these lands were then sold to private 
Indonesian entrepreneurs pursuant to a somewhat selective application process.
59
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Despite the general tightening of the conditions under which the oil companies 
and estates could operate in Indonesia described above, the government nevertheless also 
seemed to signal that existing foreign investment was necessary and would be protected 
in Indonesia. Perhaps the strongest example of this was the position accorded to foreign 
investment under the 1960 Eight Year Development Plan, which as we saw in Chapter 
Two was the early centerpiece for economic planning under Guided Democracy.  This 
plan anticipated that that the oil industry alone, which meant the big three foreign oil 
companies, would supply some 75% of the foreign exchange earnings called for by the 
plan. Thus, the plan in essence recognized the continuing importance of foreign 
investment, or more specifically earnings from the big three oil companies, in the 
Indonesian economy.  Perhaps more than anything, this was a reflection of oil company 
exceptionalism, a concept described in Part II. Yet, as pointed out in Chapter Two, 
several observers concluded that due to the lack of sufficient domestic capital, the Eight 
Development Year Plan, without saying so directly, was implicitly relying on foreign 
sources, both loans and investments, for much of its financing, even after taking into 
account the financing from the oil companies. 
A second example of GOI support for existing foreign investment was the 
government‘s prevention of attempted takeovers of various Belgian companies by 
SOBSI-affiliated unions in early 1961.  In late 1960 SOBSI initiated a campaign against 
Belgian business interests in Indonesia in response to Belgian ―imperialist‖ and 
―colonialist‖ actions in the Congo, Africa. In March 1961, workers led by SARBUPRI 
(the SOBSI-affiliated estate workers union) attempted to take over eight Belgian-owned 
estates in North Sumatra, but they were prevented from doing so by the Indonesian 
army.
60
 The general takeover procedure was for a group of leaders of the workers to 
gather at the head office of the plantation and present estate management with a statement 
of takeover, which declared that the estate was being taken over by the workers and 
appointed an interim management board consisting largely of workers.
61
 As we shall see 
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in later Chapters, this same procedure would be followed in subsequent years. However, 
the army quickly stepped in and halted such attempts, even arresting a number of SOBSI 
cadres. The army also temporarily stationed two to three personnel on various Belgian 
estates; while styled as ‗supervision,‘ presumably to appear as though the army was 
sympathetic to PKI/SOBSI demands, in fact these army personnel on no way controlled 
or affected company management or operations, instead acting more as security to 
prevent any future occurrences of the same.
62
  Similarly, in July 1961, workers at the 
Belgian-owned Faroka cigarette factory in Malang, East Java, tried to take over that 
factory, but were also prevented from doing so by the Indonesian army.
63
 While the 
army‘s motivations in both cases certainly were based primarily on containing PKI 
activities instead of defending foreign business interests, the army‘s actions nevertheless 
were a clear statement that the government would defend foreign companies against any 
‗illegal‘ takeovers. 
3. Operational Problems Facing Foreign Investment in the Early 1960s.  
Before turning to the more detailed description of foreign investment in Indonesia 
in 1963 in Part II, it would be useful at this juncture to summarize generally the various 
operational problems facing existing foreign investment in the early 1960s. In particular, 
the following discussion will focus primarily on the non-oil sectors of existing foreign 
investment, as an analysis of the foreign oil companies is reserved for Part II; in addition, 
as the previous discussion has centered around the vagaries of official GOI policy and 
general political atmosphere for foreign investment, I would like to focus on conditions 
outside this. Perhaps the biggest challenge to the growth and efficiency of operations of 
foreign companies was the deteriorating economic environment. These conditions were 
described in the 1956 US government report on investment in Indonesia discussed in 
Section A above: general economic instability, low level of domestic savings, deficient 
local capital markets, inadequate development in the fields of transportation, 
communications, and power, limited supply of skilled labor and low labor productivity, 
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low per capita income, slow rate of economic development, shortage of capital, and small 
number of competent Indonesian entrepreneurs. As we saw at the end of Chapter Two, 
general economic conditions deteriorated significantly in the early 1960s, making the 
above factors even more acute.  Put simply, these overall conditions, plus the rapidly 
rising inflation rate, created an extremely difficult operating environment. Contributing to 
these general factors was the increased regulation under Guided Democracy as the 
government intervened more and more in the economic life of the nation by imposing 
price, distribution and other controls.
64
  These controls were especially onerous for the 
foreign-owned manufacturing companies because most of their output was sold on the 
domestic Indonesian market.  
Insofar as specific factors are concerned, one of the biggest single factors 
inhibiting the operations of foreign companies was the scarcity of, and restrictions on, 
foreign exchange.  As noted in Chapter Two, Part III, the GOI from the very early 1950s 
introduced a number of foreign exchange schemes that not only disincentivized exporters 
(including foreign estate companies) but also resulted in the effective loss of control by 
foreign companies over their foreign exchange, most of which was turned over to the 
government in exchange for overvalued Rupiah. Companies had to apply to the GOI to 
receive foreign exchange, which was controlled and allocated by the government. The 
result was that it was very difficult to obtain foreign exchange, which was necessary for 
the import of raw materials, spare parts and capital goods. This obviously hurt the foreign 
manufacturing companies (such as Unilever, Union Carbide, etc.) because they imported 
most of these goods (such goods were unavailable in Indonesia), but it also adversely 
affected the foreign estate companies as well because they needed to import capital 
equipment for processing estate produce. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Rupiah 
was way overvalued, further exacerbating these problems. The Dutch-owned Philips 
radio plant in Surabaya was forced to shut down in 1954 because of a lack of such goods, 
and the inability to obtain foreign exchange apparently was one of several reasons for 
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General Motors sale of its assembly plant to the GOI in 1954-55.
65
 Complementing these 
problems were increasing restrictions on imports generally.  Another significant inhibitor 
of operations was the inability of most foreign companies to repatriate any profit or 
capital after the late 1950s. Such restrictions on repatriation naturally resulted in a 
corresponding unwillingness to invest new capital for rehabilitation and growth: why 
inject more money if it cannot be taken out?  Finally, high corporate taxes also deterred 
further investment.  
Personnel difficulties were also frequently cited as operational problems for many 
foreign companies. One area of concern was labor agitation, particularly on estates. This 
was a major concern of the 1956 US government report, which as we saw above noted 
the seemingly unreasonable demands of labor unions (many of which were communist 
dominated) in spite of the relative low productivity of the workers. In the late 1950s and 
early 1960s labor agitation and labor union activity seemingly increased, though strikes 
in vital industries – which included most foreign companies - were banned by law. In 
fact, one observer noted that it was in the areas where foreign capital was most active – 
oil fields, estates and industrial enterprises - that increasingly large and militant trade 
unions were enrolling most of their members,
66
 and many of these unions were affiliated 
with SOBSI, the PKI labor federation (see Chapter Two, Part I, Section B3 for more on 
labor unions and mass action). For example, at the Union Carbide battery plant in Jakarta, 
labor leaders in the early 1960s often instigated work slowdowns and occasional 
sabotage; as the operation was very labor intensive, labor actions had a major impact, and 
the senior Indonesian staff did little to control the workers.
67
 Similarly, after 1956 labor 
unions at Unilever‘s factories, principally the communist-led SERBUNI (Serikat Buruh 
Unilever, or Unilever Workers Association), were increasingly assertive and active, even 
demanding shares of profit.
68
 Labor unrest was particularly evident on foreign estates and 
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was frequently cited as a major operational problem.
69
 While the number of strikes 
decreased significantly after 1958, labor unions, especially the SOBSI-affiliated 
SARBUPRI (estate workers union), continued to agitate in the form of demonstrations, 
slowdowns, support for squatters, demands on management, etc.
70
 In the case of foreign 
estates, squatting and illegal occupation were also major problems.
71
 The second major 
area of concern in personnel matters was the lack of trained and competent Indonesian 
managers, technical staff and administrative staff, especially as foreign companies were 
under pressure to Indonesianize their staff and restrictions were increasingly placed on 
the usage of foreign managers. Most foreign firms successfully implemented 
Indonesianization (see below), but there were clearly hiccups in the process. 
We might also consider at this point how existing non-oil foreign investment 
reacted to the various challenges posed by operating in Indonesia in the 1950s and early 
1960s. In general, the response fell into three categories: (i) disinvest from Indonesia, 
either by actually winding up operations or selling out, or transferring earnings out of 
Indonesia, (ii) not reinvesting new capital in existing operations, and (iii) Indonesianizing 
the staff and management as much as possible. Unfortunately, for the first two responses 
we are limited by a lack of data and must rely on anecdotal evidence, but for the third 
option there is hard data available. With respect to the first response of divestment, there 
are a few examples, most notably the sale by General Motors of its Jakarta assembly 
plant to the GOI in 1954-55.  A number of individual estates were also turned over by 
foreign estate companies to the government in the 1950s, though again there are no 
available statistics. A later example was the sale in late 1963 by Proctor and Gamble, an 
American firm, of its cooking oil facility in Surabaya to a Swiss company that was 
actually owned by Indonesians.
72
 Another variant of this response was for foreign 
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companies to repatriate as many profits and capital as possible. Lindblad has detailed 
some of this repatriation with respect to Dutch enterprises, but not with respect to other 
foreign investment.
73
 Presumably non-Dutch foreign investment also tried this approach 
to some degree, but by 1956-57 the GOI had severely restricted this option so that it was 
very difficult to do so. Anecdotal evidence from my research indicates that this 
alternative was in fact non-existent by the late 1950s, if not sooner.
74
  
The second response was simply not to make new capital investments in existing 
operations, and anecdotal evidence again suggests that many, if not all foreign businesses 
followed this course, especially after the mid-1950s. That is, foreign companies may have 
reinvested profits, particularly since retained earnings could not be repatriated, but there 
was little new investment coming in from overseas corporate parents. Hence, many 
foreign manufacturing companies, but also estates, had to make do with old, outdated 
equipment. For example, there was little post-war investment in Union Carbide‘s battery 
plant in Jakarta: using ancient equipment, relying on imports but having very little 
foreign exchange to do so, unable to remit profits, and facing labor problems, by the late 
1950s/early 1960s the ―whole operation there was essentially a holding one waiting for 
better times…we could barely hold our head above water.‖
75
 Unilever appears to have 
been the exception, as it made significant investments in rehabilitation in the early part of 
the 1950s, but even it ceased doing so after 1955.
76
 A similar attitude was apparent with 
respect to many foreign estates. As one manager of a Belgian estate noted, from the late 
1950s the company had little money to invest in Indonesia owing to the foreign exchange 
regulations, worthlessness of the Rupiah, difficulty of importing goods from abroad, and 
generally horrible economic conditions.
77
 Many observers similarly noted the ageing of 
trees and the slow rate of replanting on foreign estates, much of which dated back to the 
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 as trees were the major investment of estates, this slow replanting rate 
indicated a lack of investment. 
With respect to the third response of Indonesianization of staff and management, 
non-Dutch foreign companies generally were very successful in implementing this 
change. Here, I can add numerical support from my own research to Lindblad‘s 
suggestion that non-Dutch foreign companies achieved greater success than Dutch 
companies in Indonesianization; perhaps more accurately, while I do not have figures 
from the early 1950s, I do have data from the early to mid-1960s, most of which indicate 
that the numbers of foreign managers were extremely low. Most of these foreign 
managers were at the top level of management. By far the highest concentration in 
absolute numbers of foreign managers was in the big three foreign oil companies, but 
even in these companies the absolute number was fairly low compared with total amount 
of employees. For example, in 1965 Shell employed 114 foreigners plus 13,000 
Indonesians, Stanvac employed 118 foreigners out of a total of 6,800 employees, and 
Caltex employed 124 foreigners (total employees unknown) (see Part II, Section A). Each 
of Shell, Stanvac and Caltex had implemented extensive Indonesianization programs 
beginning in the early 1950s, including training programs.
79
 
In non-oil foreign enterprises, by the early 1960s the number of foreign personnel 
in absolute numbers was very low, and as a percentage of the workforce rarely exceeded 
one percent. For example, Unilever shrunk its foreign staff from 68 in the early 1950s to 
six by early 1964 (out of a total of 3,800 staff and workforce), replacing them with 
Indonesians.
80
 At Union Carbide‘s battery plant, in the early 1960s there were three 
expatriate managers out of a total workforce of 300;
81
 at Goodyear‘s tire factory outside 
Jakarta in early 1965 there were 11 expatriates out of a total workforce of 1,200 (see Part 
II); the ex-Heineken brewery in Surabaya had 3 foreign managers (total workforce 
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 the Singer Sewing head office and factory combined had only one expatriate 
out of a workforce of about 30 (see Chapter Seven).
83
  The numbers for foreign estates 
were even lower. In terms of the larger estate companies that managed their own estates, 
P&T Lands, one of the largest foreign estate holders, had 20 foreign managers and a 
workforce of over 30,000 (see Part II); London Sumatra/Harrisons & Crosfield had 
anywhere from 12 to 17 foreign managers, with a workforce of at least 13,000 (see Part 
II); Goodyear estates had about 15 foreign staff out of a workforce of 10,000 (see Part II); 
US Rubber had a foreign staff of 13 out of a total workforce of 7,300 (see Part II); and 
the Belgian estate giant SOCFIN reduced its expatriate workforce from 33 in 1958 to 
around 6 by 1965, out of a total workforce of  about 19,000 (see Part II).
84
 The number of 
foreign managers in the estate management firms was correspondingly low, and many of 
the individual estates managed by these firms appear to have few or no foreign managers 
at all. In sum, by the early 1960s, the number of foreign managers, both in absolute 
numbers and by percentage, appeared extremely small. 
 
II. Description of Foreign Investment c. Early 1963. 
 
This Part II describes generally foreign investment in Indonesia at the beginning 
of 1963, just prior to the first wave of takeovers, with a focus on the individual foreign 
companies themselves. A complete list of these companies is found in Appendix A. The 
breakdown of foreign investment into the three broad categories of oil, estates, and 
manufacturing/other is driven not only by sectoral reasons but also by the general 
treatment that each grouping received as foreign companies were being taken over (even 
within the separate waves of takeovers, individual firms were often treated quite 
differently). I argue that this different treatment derived primarily from the revenues or 
potential revenues generated by each sector, with the oil sector generating by far the 
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most, followed distantly by the foreign estate sector, and the manufacturing/other sector 
generating very little, if any.     
A. The Foreign Oil Sector: Oil Company Exceptionalism. 
In brief, the factors that made the position of the big three foreign oil companies – 
Caltex, Shell and Stanvac – so unique in Indonesia were (i) their generation of enormous 
sums of foreign exchange revenues for the GOI, (ii) that they produced and refined about 
90% of the oil in Indonesia and supplied a roughly equivalent amount to the Indonesian 
domestic market, and (iii) the inability of the Indonesian government (or private 
entrepreneurs) to operate such large and technologically complex businesses on its own, 
whether with respect to the capital required, expertise of management and technical 
ability, or marketing the oil outside  Indonesia. This position resulted in the GOI dealing 
very carefully with the oil companies, and the oil companies were in fact treated quite 
differently than other foreign investors. Two good examples of this different treatment 
were allowing the oil companies to remit profits and exempting the oil companies from 
foreign exchange controls so that the oil companies retained control over their earnings. I 
use the term ―oil company exceptionalism‖ to describe both the unique position of the big 
three oil foreign companies and the different treatment they were accorded by the GOI.  
 While Shell, Stanvac, and Caltex are often lumped together like some sort of 
monolithic entity, it is important to note that each company had quite different histories 
which by the 1960s resulted in each company having its own different interests.
85
 Shell 
was by far the oldest; it began operations in 1890 as a 100% Dutch-owned company 
named ‗Royal Dutch‘; in 1907, it merged globally with British-owned Shell Oil to 
become Royal Dutch Shell, with its Dutch East Indies arm known as BPM (short for 
Bataafse Petroleum Maatschapij). It was the dominant oil producer in the Dutch East 
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Indies until World War II. Its main oil fields were in south Sumatra, where it had an oil 
refinery in Pladju, near Palembang, and it had smaller concessions and fields in Aceh, 
north Sumatra, central and east Java, east and south Borneo, and even in the Molucca 
islands. In addition to the main refinery at Pladju, it had five smaller refineries: one near 
Balikpapan (eastern Borneo), one in Tarakan (northeast Borneo), one in Pangkalan 
Brandan (north Sumatra), one in Cepu (east/central Java), and one in Wonokromo (east 
Java). In 1938, Royal Dutch Shell accounted for 72% of the crude oil production in the 
Dutch East Indies.
86
  It also had a 50-50 joint venture with the colonial government 
named NIAM, which was set up in the early 1920s to develop a concession in Jambi, 
Sumatra.
87
  Shell‘s pre-war dominance in the oil industry, of course, reflected the policies 
of Dutch colonial government, which was reluctant to grant oil concessions to non-Dutch 
companies. 
The only other significant oil company during the colonial period was Stanvac. 
The forerunner company known as NKPM was established in 1912 as a Dutch 
incorporated subsidiary of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. Initially it was only 
allowed to purchase unexpired mining concessions, which proved non-lucrative; 
however, in late 1921 it discovered a large field in south Sumatra that it quickly began to 
develop. The field, known as Talang Akar, was so large that it led the company to build a 
refinery some 80 miles away at Sungei Gerong (just outside Palembang (south Sumatra) 
and about a mile downriver from Shell‘s Pladju refinery), which began operations in late 
1926.
88
 In the ensuing years, the company began developing several other fields in the 
same area, in particular the Pendopo field (which was actually an extension of the Talang 
Akar field), and the capacity of the Sungei Gerong refinery was expanded by the late 
1930s to 40,000 barrels per day, the largest in Southeast Asia.
89
  The company also began 
developing concessions in Aceh, central Sumatra, and central Java, so that by the late 
1930s it accounted for 28% of the total production in the Dutch East Indies;
90
 however, 
the company‘s main fields were those in south Sumatra. In 1933, the parent company 
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Standard Oil of New Jersey merged NKPM‘s assets with some of the distribution assets 
in Asia of two other Standard Oil companies, Standard Oil of New York (Socony) and 
Vacuum Oil Company, to create Standard Vacuum Oil Company, or Stanvac for short.
91
 
The Sungei Gerong refinery and several of the oil fields were destroyed by the Dutch as 
they retreated from the Japanese invasion, though the Japanese were later able to partially 
restore them.
92
   
Caltex did not produce any oil in the Dutch East Indies prior to World War II.  
Standard Oil of California began exploring for oil in the colony in 1924, but initially 
found nothing. In 1930 it established a Dutch subsidiary known as NPPM and applied to 
the colonial government for a concession. However, it was not awarded one until 1936, 
when it received a concession for an area in central Sumatra (as well as a small joint 
concession in West Irian), not too far from Pekanbaru. In that same year Standard Oil of 
California and Texaco created a joint venture for their production and marketing 
operations in the eastern hemisphere known as Caltex, which became the parent company 
of NPPM. In late 1941 Caltex identified a possible major site near Duri, central Sumatra, 
but before it could begin drilling operations World War II broke out.
93
   
Several other features of the colonial era oil industry should be noted. First, as 
implied above, 100% of the crude oil production in the colonial era was done by either 
Shell or Stanvac; initially Shell was by far the dominant producer, but by the late 1930s it 
was producing 72% of total production, while Stanvac was producing the other 28%. 
They were also the only two companies with refining operations. Second, virtually all 
crude oil produced in the Dutch East Indies was also refined there, so that there were 
almost no exports of crude oil. Instead, only products from the refining process were 
exported.
94
 Third, under the colonial concession system, all the crude oil and refined 
products produced from the concessions was the property of the entity holding the 
concession (which usually lasted for 40 years); the government claimed no rights over 
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this, and the concessionaire could do what it wanted with it.
95
 Fourth, concessionaires 
did, however, pay four types of taxes to the colonial government: a royalty tax, profit tax, 
company tax and export tax. One observer estimated that the net effect of the tax 
structure was that the colonial government‘s ―share of income from the ‗5A‘ concessions 
in the 1920s and 1930s averaged a few percentage points less than 50 percent.‖
96
    
The 1950s were a curious decade for the oil industry, as the GOI sought to 
determine ways to gain control over the oil companies and oil revenues, even as it 
encouraged the companies to stay and invest in the country. The government‘s efforts 
paid off; in a decade when most foreign companies adopted a ‗wait and see attitude‘ and 
were wary of committing further resources to Indonesia, the big three foreign oil 
companies made substantial new investments in Indonesia, investing some $350 million 
in rehabilitation and expansion.
97
 The conundrum the GOI faced, of course, was that 
neither it nor any Indonesian entrepreneur was in a position to rehabilitate and expand the 
industry. Moreover, over the course of the decade, the importance of oil as an export 
product and earner of foreign exchange increased dramatically; it rose from 18% of 
Indonesia‘s total export value in 1950 to 31% of total export value in 1960, second only 
to rubber in export value during this period, and actually surpassed rubber by 1963.
98
 The 
primary reason for this was the dramatic jump in exports of crude oil, from virtually none 
in the prewar period to 15 million metric tons by 1964, which was largely the result of a 
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concurrent increase in the production of crude oil.
99
 This jump in crude oil production 
was in turn driven largely by Caltex, which finally began producing oil. Its Minas field, 
which turned out to be one of the largest in the world, began commercial production in 
1952 and its Duri field began commercial production in 1958.
100
 The incredible growth of 
Caltex, which had no refineries and exported most of its crude oil, fundamentally 
changed the nature of the oil industry and the relationship among the big three foreign oil 
companies, for Caltex produced much more crude oil than the other two, and unlike 
Stanvac and Shell was not constrained by obligations to supply the Indonesian domestic 
market with refined products.   
Insofar as determining the role that the foreign oil companies would play in post-
Revolution Indonesia, relations were initially conditioned by the Dutch colonial 
government‘s eagerness for the companies to return after 1945 so that oil revenues could 
contribute to the rehabilitation of the economy.
101
 Most of the companies‘ concessions 
and facilities were repossessed piecemeal from 1945 to 1949, though not without some 
resistance from the Indonesian side; only Shell‘s concessions and facilities in Aceh, north 
Sumatra and Cepu (Central/East Java) were not returned.
102
 To encourage the companies 
to return, in 1948 the Dutch issued Stanvac and Shell ‗let alone‘ permits, which exempted 
these companies from foreign exchange controls for a number of years (so that the 
companies could freely dispose of their foreign exchange) and allowed the companies to 
import without restriction capital goods and equipment. In return, the companies made no 
demands on the government‘s foreign exchange reserves or otherwise with respect to 
rebuilding their facilities, but were entirely self-funded. These were complemented 
separately by a reduction of the company tax rate, an extension of all pre-war concessions 
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by three years, and the granting of a few new concessions. Both companies responded by 
rehabilitating their facilities in south Sumatra, and oil production increased almost 
immediately.
103
 In early 1949, the Dutch granted a similar ‗let alone‘ permit to Caltex 
that expired in 1954, as well as similar tax reductions and a three year extension on 
existing concessions; this was supplemented in August 1949 by the grant of a new 
concession.
104
 These existing rights and concessions of the oil companies were protected 
by the provisions of the RTCA upon Indonesia‘s independence.  
While the GOI did honor the let alone agreements and existing permits and 
concessions, it also immediately sought to gain a greater share of revenue and impose 
some limits on the oil companies. In 1951, a government commission was appointed to 
draft a mining law, but for the next nine years was unable to devise one.
105
 However, in 
1951 the parliament did ban the granting of further concessions to the big three oil 
companies, which particularly impacted Stanvac and Shell as the oil reserves in their 
existing concessions seemed to be drying up.
106
 Moreover, in 1951 Stanvac began to 
negotiate with the government over the extension of its ‗let alone‘ agreement with the 
Dutch, which was due to expire at the end of 1951.
107
 As it turned out, the GOI also 
wanted to enter into a new profit sharing arrangement featuring a 65-35 split of gross 
profits in favor of the government, and it also increased the company‘s taxes from 40% to 
51% of gross income and imposed new duties on exports; it appeared that the government 
in effect wanted to restructure the entire arrangement. After a series of temporary 
compromises (including one covering the expired let alone agreement), a new four year 
agreement was signed in 1954, which featured a reduction of the tax rate (such that the 
                                                 
103
 Aden, Oil and Politics in Indonesia, pp. 88-9; Hunter, ―Indonesian Oil Industry,‖ p. 64.  
104
 Aden, Oil and Politics in Indonesia, pp. 100-1.  
105
 Fabrikant, Oil Discovery and Technical Change, pp. 7-8.  
106
 Stanvac in Indonesia, pp. 39-40.  
107
 Aden, Oil and Politics in Indonesia, pp. 119-20.  Stanvac points out that these ill-named ‗let alone‘ 
agreements actually benefitted the GOI as well because the government did not have to provide the huge 
amounts of foreign exchange necessary to rehabilitate and expand the oil facilities. Such amounts were 
necessary because virtually all the capital goods and equipment used at the time in the oil industry were 
imported. In addition, Rupiah earnings were insufficient to cover Rupiah expenditures, so foreign exchange 
had to be brought in to make up the difference. Absent a large degree of freedom with respect to their 
foreign exchange, it was simply uneconomic for the oil companies to invest. See Stanvac in Indonesia, pp. 
43-4.  This problem was faced by other foreign manufacturers and estate companies, but not nearly to the 
same extent because of the comparatively large sums involved. It is, of course, an example of oil company 
exceptionalism.    
 160 
 
combined taxes and duties were about 50% of net profits), continued exemption from 
foreign exchange controls (as well as the ability to transfer abroad current earnings), and 
a 10 year exemption from import duties on capital goods and raw materials. Stanvac in 
return agreed to invest $80 million to develop its Lirik field in central Sumatra, which 
was discovered just before World War II.
108
  In 1954, Caltex, whose let alone agreement 
had expired at the end of 1953, signed a new one for five years similar to Stanvac‘s. In 
return, Caltex agreed to invest $50 million in development of a port and to pay the GOI 
$60 million over a five year period. Some observers suggested that this $60 million 
payment was made in exchange for the government not requiring Caltex to build a 
refinery in Indonesia, but instead allowing the company to refine its crude oil abroad. In 
1956 this agreement was renegotiated and extended until the end of 1963; in return, 
Caltex agreed to invest at least $192 million in its Duri field.
109
 Finally, in 1956 Shell, 
whose let alone agreement had expired at the end of 1955, renegotiated its arrangement 
along similar lines.
110
 All these arrangements ultimately appeared to be quite similar to 
the ones negotiated in the late 1940s with the Dutch in terms of the exemption from 
foreign exchange controls, freedom of remittances, and the roughly 50/50 profit split, but 
in exchange the companies had to agree to invest large sums in Indonesia. As one 
observer noted, ―so long as the rehabilitation of the industry continued and so long as 
exports could continue to earn substantial foreign exchange for Indonesia, the large 
petroleum companies retained this strong position vis-à-vis the government.‖
111
     
In late 1960, however, the promulgation of the Oil and Gas Law signaled the 
beginning of a new era in the oil industry.
112
 As we saw above, a government 
commission had been appointed in 1951 to draft a new law, but no law was forthcoming. 
The impetus for the passage of the new law came from Chaerul Saleh, who as we saw in 
Chapter Two was appointed to the newly created positions of Core Minister of 
Development and Minister of Basic Industry and Mining (the Ministry of Basic Industry 
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and Mining having succeeded the old Ministry of Basic Industry) in the July 1959 cabinet 
reshuffle. Minister Saleh immediately set out, among other things, to draft a new law 
covering the oil industry.
113
 After almost a year of discussion and negotiation, the draft 
bill was promulgated into law by President Sukarno in late October 1960.
114
 The law‘s 
prime feature was the reversal of colonial laws to stipulate that oil and natural gas were 
now owned by the state (Article 1), and that the mining of oil and gas may only be 
undertaken by state-owned enterprises (Article 2). However, if SOEs were unable to 
undertake such operations, they may appoint contractors to do so by entering into 
contracts of work (Article 6); other than the requirement that in entering into such 
contracts the SOE must follow the directives of the Minister who had jurisdiction over oil 
and gas, there was no mention of the content of the contracts. Finally, the law provided 
that all rights of companies which were not state-owned – which meant in practice the big 
three foreign oil companies – would only continue to be exercised for a short period to be 
determined by a separate regulation, although these companies would be given priority 
under the new scheme (Article 22). In other words, the concessions of the big three oil 
companies issued under colonial law would soon be expiring at a date to be announced. 
Thus, in only two key provisions, one vesting ownership and mining rights to oil and gas 
in the state, and the other announcing that old concession rights would soon expire, the 
position of the oil companies was almost completely undercut. In fact, as it was 
undoubtedly designed to do so, the law led to the complete reworking of the 
arrangements under which the big three and other oil companies could operate in 
Indonesia, which henceforth were to be embodied in Contracts of Work (CoWs) entered 
into between state-owned enterprises and private contractors. 
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Negotiations between the big three oil companies and the GOI over the 
companies‘ new arrangements commenced almost immediately. They were initially 
complicated by the demands of First Minister Djuanda, who injected himself into the 
discussion in an apparent intra-bureaucratic attempt to assert jurisdiction over the oil 
companies. After a few months, Minister Chaerul Saleh managed to regain control of the 
negotiations.
115
 Reaching agreement with the oil companies proved elusive, however, and 
by early 1963, almost two years later, there was still no meeting of the minds. Not 
surprisingly, the biggest single issue appeared to be over division of revenue; the GOI 
wanted to impose a profit sharing structure of 60:40 in favor of the GOI, which was a 
significant bump up from what many observers believed to be the roughly 50:50 split 
under the existing arrangements. Crucial to this new arrangement was how ‗profit‘ would 
be defined, with both sides arguing for different definitions. Other major issues included 
the extent to which the GOI could have a say in determining the export price of oil 
(which had a direct impact on profits), the duration of the contract (the companies 
pushing for a longer period than the GOI wanted), and new areas for the companies for 
exploration and development (no new areas were granted after 1949, and Shell and 
Stanvac were particularly affected). Finally, there were two interrelated questions 
concerning the pricing for the marketing and refining facilities which were to be 
transferred to the GOI (and whether the companies would continue to finance these 
facilities after transfer) and the amounts of oil the companies had to supply the 
Indonesian domestic market.  Shell and Stanvac, which had refineries, supplied the 
Indonesian domestic market with refined products and were increasingly constrained by 
the price controls and distribution requirements imposed by the government, were happy 
to comply with the GOI‘s desire to purchase the companies‘ refining and 
marketing/distribution facilities, subject to agreement on a satisfactory price (the position 
of Caltex was quite different than Shell and Stanvac, for it had no refinery and only 
supplied a small percentage of refined products via the other two, mostly Stanvac, to the 
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Indonesian market). Similarly, there was much discussion over the amount of crude oil 
the companies would be required to supply to the Indonesian market (at fixed prices, well 
below market value). 
Complicating these negotiations was the signing of the first CoW under the new 
law in 1962 between Pertamin (an Indonesian SOE, see below) and Pan American 
International, a subsidiary of Standard Oil of Indiana, a new entrant into the market. 
Among other provisions, the CoW provided Pan American with exploration and 
development rights for 30 years in a large area next to Caltex in central Sumatra, and it 
provided for a 60:40 profit split in favor of Pertamin (with a defined meaning of ‗profits,‘ 
the calculation of which was a major issue in the negotiations with the big three oil 
companies), with a $5 million up front payment and the possibility of another $5 million 
payment.
116
 As the first CoW signed under the new law, the Pan American contract did 
have some precedential influence. Despite the give and take of the negotiations with the 
big three, however, it was clear that Minister Chaerul Saleh and other Indonesian 
government officials recognized in general terms the significance of the big three foreign 
oil companies to Indonesia. 
 That significance, which was at the heart of oil company exceptionalism, could 
be measured in a variety of ways by the early 1960s. In the first place, the oil companies 
provided a major source of scarce foreign exchange to the GOI. Though estimates vary, 
one expert suggested that the net foreign exchange revenues accruing to the GOI from the 
companies (after accounting for the oil companies imports and remittances) was $158 
million in 1958, $48 million in 1959, $70 million in 1960, $99 million in 1961, and $88 
million in 1962; as percent of all export earnings (before deducting for company 
remittances), net oil exports averaged around 20% for these years.
117
 The US government  
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estimated that the GOI‘s net gain from the oil companies was about $125 million per year 
by 1964, though the US embassy in Jakarta thought the GOI‘s 1964 take was slightly 
lower at about $100 million.
118
 The second way the big three foreign oil companies were 
important was their significance to the Indonesian economy, in particular their 
domination of the domestic oil industry. For example, in 1963 (in figures roughly 
comparable to other years), the big three produced 91% of the crude oil in Indonesia 
(Caltex at 52%, Shell at 24% and Stanvac at 15%); insofar as refined products supplied to 
the domestic market, they provided 87% of the total of 4.2 million metric tons (Shell at 
45%, Stanvac at 30%, and Caltex (refined by the other two) at 12%).
119
  These figures 
clearly demonstrate that the Indonesian economy was almost completely reliant on the 
big three for its supply of refined oil products, in particular the important products 
kerosene (used widely in the household for lighting, cooking, etc.), gasoline for cars, 
diesel oil, fuel oil, and aviation oils. Moreover, in addition to refining, the companies also 
provided an integral portion of the distribution facilities and network.
120
  
The third factor contributing to oil company exceptionalism was the sheer 
difficulty for Indonesia in replacing the services provided by the big three foreign oil 
companies, primarily technical ability and overseas marketing. Oil exploration, 
production and refining required a high degree of technical competence (both in 
personnel and in equipment) and financing that at the time could not be supplied by 
Indonesia or the three small Indonesian state-owned oil companies (see below). 
Moreover, with respect to the overseas marketing of crude oil, the source of the all-
important foreign exchange, Indonesia‘s capabilities were limited in several ways, as 
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explained by one high ranking Caltex official to the US embassy in 1965. First, the oil 
from Caltex‘ Minas field, which was a large source of crude oil exports, had a high wax 
and sulphur content which could only be refined by a very few refineries in the world, 
and it was prohibitively expensive to build a new refinery. Furthermore, in the case of an 
illegal seizure of the big three‘s facilities, the seven major oil companies of the world, 
five of whom operated in Indonesia through Caltex, Stanvac and Shell, would certainly 
band together and refuse to refine Indonesian oil, leaving only a few independent 
refineries (plus the PRC and possibly countries in eastern Europe) which could take the 
oil.
121
 Hence, without the cooperation of the big three foreign oil companies and their 
parents, it would be very difficult for Indonesia by itself both to produce the oil and 
refine and export it, thus affecting the domestic economy as well as the generation of 
foreign exchange revenues.   
It may be useful at this point to describe briefly the operations and position of 
each of Shell, Stanvac, and Caltex in early 1963.  Shell and Stanvac were similarly 
positioned, and their interests were not the same as Caltex‘s.
122
 Shell had significant 
operations in both South Sumatra and East Kalimantan. Its refinery at Pladju, South 
Sumatra (near Palembang), had a capacity of about 107,000 barrels per day (or 40% of 
the total refining capacity in Indonesia of 265,000 barrels per day) and refined crude oil 
from fields in South Sumatra. It also had major operations in East Kalimantan, with a 
refinery in Balikpapan having a capacity of roughly 73,000 barrels per day (or 28% of 
total capacity in Indonesia) which refined crude oil from fields in East Kalimantan; these 
operations really only began producing significant amounts in 1962. Shell also had a very 
small refinery in East Java in the Wonokromo area (3,100 barrels per day) which did not 
figure prominently in its output. Headquartered in Jakarta with scattered offices around 
the country, it employed around 13,000 Indonesians plus about 114 foreigners.
123
 
Stanvac, the joint venture subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony Mobil 
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Oil Company, had a single refinery (capacity of about 73,000 barrels per day, or 28% of 
the total capacity in Indonesia) in Sungei Gerong (South Sumatra), also near Palembang 
and very close to Shell‘s Pladju refinery. The oil refined at Sungei Gerong came mostly 
from Stanvac‘s Pendopo oil field (also in South Sumatra).  In addition, Stanvac had 
several fields in Riau (central coast of Sumatra) (the most important of which was the 
Lirik field, which began commercial production in 1958), which primarily exported their 
oil in crude form; in 1962, about 55% of Stanvac‘s crude production came from the fields 
in south Sumatra, with the remaining 45% from the fields in Riau.
124
 Stanvac‘s 




In contrast to Shell and Stanvac, Caltex, the joint venture between Standard Oil of 
California and Texaco, did not have a refinery but rather exported most of its crude oil 
production, which came from two fields named Duri and Minas, both in Riau (central 
Sumatra). The Minas field was one of the largest in Southeast Asia, and as we saw above 
both fields only began commercial production in the 1950s. Caltex was by far the largest 
crude oil producer of the big three, accounting for over 50% of the total crude oil 
produced in Indonesia in 1963, and averaging as much as 280,000 barrels per day in 
1964.
126
  With headquarters in Jakarta, Caltex employed 124 foreigners.
127
  Caltex was by 
far the most profitable of the big three oil companies, for two main reasons. First was the 
size of its fields, the estimated reserves for which were enormous and had only recently 
begun to be exploited. In contrast, Stanvac‘s and Shell‘s fields were smaller and had been 
exploited over a much larger period of time (except for Shell‘s operations in Kalimantan, 
which were fairly recent). The second reason was because Caltex had no refining 
operations in Indonesia and exported most of its production in crude form. In contrast, 
Shell and Stanvac were much more closely tied to, and limited by, the highly regulated 
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 See Enclosure I of US Embassy telegram (van Swearingen) dated 11 April 1963 (USNACP, RG 59 
Central Files 1964-66, PET 2 Indon, Box 3620).   
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 Employment figures from 1965; see Hunter, ―1963 Agreements and After,‖ p. 25.   
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 Wall Street Journal 22 March 1965. 
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the oil fields - see US Embassy telegram (Green) dated 6 October 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 




Indonesian domestic market. They were required to provide a large portion of their 
refined output to the Indonesian market; as we saw above, in 1963 it was estimated that 
Shell and Stanvac supplied some 75% of the refined oil products of the Indonesian 
domestic market (with Caltex supplying another 12% that was refined by the other two). 
However, domestic sales prices were kept extremely low by the GOI so that the average 
Indonesian could afford such products. (Naturally, such artificially low prices, combined 
with high inflation, created a huge black market in oil products in the early and mid-
1960s.) Consequently, these domestic sales were hardly, if at all, profitable for Shell and 
Stanvac, and in fact they both reported that these operations were increasingly losing 
money, with Shell in particular apparently the worst affected.
128
  As we shall see Chapter 
Seven, these domestic sales arrangements and their impact on profitability played a key 
role in the GOI‘s push to take over the big three oil companies in the last four months of 
1965. 
As to the Indonesian state-owned enterprises in the oil sector, in the early 1960s 
there were three, each of which would be appointed to act as representatives of the 
government for purposes of the CoWs under the new 1960 law. The first was a company 
named PT Permina, which was controlled by an army colonel named Ibnu Sutowo.
129
 Its 
primary assets consisted of Shell‘s fields and facilities in north Sumatra, which for a 
variety of reasons were never returned to Shell after World War II; in 1957, the army 
took them over and General Nasution appointed Sutowo to operate them.
130
 Sutowo 
aspired to develop Permina into a major player in the oil industry and found the necessary 
financial support from the Japanese government, which, after private Japanese interests 
                                                 
128
 For a nice discussion of this domestic pricing problem, see pp. 5-10 of part nine of William Hanna, 
Bung Karno's Indonesia, revised ed. (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1961). See also 
Hunter, ―Indonesian Oil Industry,‖ pp. 74, 89-95; and pp. 14 and 16 of the confidential March 1963 British 
government report, ―The Indonesian Oil Industry‖ (UKNA, FO 371/169944). This problem was often 
highlighted in many British and American reports on the companies and their operations in Indonesia, and 
Shell and Stanvac frequently complained of problems arising from their domestic distribution requirements.   
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 Born in central Java in 1914, Sutowo was trained as a medical doctor in Indonesia in the 1930s and had 
his first posting under the Dutch medical service to south Sumatra in 1940. During the Revolution, he 
joined the south Sumatra regional command of the army as a medical officer and remained in south 
Sumatra until 1955, actually serving as chief of staff for the south Sumatran command from 1948-1951, 
then as medical officer until 1955. During this period, he became involved in businesses involving, among 
others, oil trading. He returned to Java in 1955, and in 1956 was appointed Nasution‘s Deputy Chief of 
Staff in charge of operations. (Aden, Oil and Politics in Indonesia, pp. 82-3, 108, 159-61.)  
130
 For details on the ex Shell facilities in north Sumatra and their takeover by Sutowo, see Aden, Oil and 
Politics in Indonesia, pp. 74-7, 83-4, 142-9, 153-8, 161-5, 170-2.  
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failed to come up with the necessary financing, in 1960 backed what became the first 
production sharing arrangement in Indonesia by providing a $53 million credit for 
equipment in exchange for oil.
131
 By the early 1960s, Sutowo himself was a major figure 
in the Indonesian oil industry, rivaling Chaerul Saleh, and as we shall see in Chapter 
Seven played a major role in the takeovers of the oil companies in 1965. Permina‘s single 
refinery had a capacity of 3,700 barrels per day, about 1.5% of total Indonesian 
capacity.
132
 The second state-owned company was PT Pertamin, newly formed in early 
1961 to take over the assets of the 50-50 joint venture company between Shell and the 
Dutch colonial government (whose ownership interests were assumed by the GOI in the 
early 1950s) originally known as NIAM. At the time, NIAM was the fourth largest 
producer of oil in Indonesia, accounting for some 8%, with facilities scattered across 
Indonesia; the venture‘s concessions were set to expire in late 1960, and despite Shell‘s 
desire to continue the venture, Minister Chaerul Saleh did not do so. Instead, Minister 
Saleh, seeking to build a company to rival Sutowo‘s Permina (which in practice was out 
of Saleh‘s control, despite operating in the oil industry) as well as one that could act as a 
state-owned company able to enter into CoWs under the new law, formed Pertamin to 
take over NIAM‘s assets.
133
 Minister Saleh remained influential in this company. The 
third state-owned oil company was Permigan, formed by Minister Saleh in 1961 to take 
over oil fields near Cepu, in Central/East Java, some of which were ex Shell facilities. 
These facilities were quite small, but were boosted in 1962 when Shell sold the remainder 
of its Cepu facilities to Permigan.
134
 Its total refining capacity in 1963 was about 5,000 
barrels per day, or about 2.2% of Indonesia‘s total capacity.
135
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180-92.   
132
 See p. 11 of the confidential March 1963 British government report, ―The Indonesian Oil Industry‖ 
(UKNA, FO 371/169944). 
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 Aden, Oil and Politics in Indonesia, pp. 210-14.  
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―cultivate his reputation as a radical revolutionary, and lessen his vulnerability to the PKI‘s accusations 
that, by negotiating with the foreign oil companies, he had made himself a tool of western capitalist oil 
interests.‖ 
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 See p. 11 of the confidential March 1963 British government report, ―The Indonesian Oil Industry‖ 
(UKNA, FO 371/169944). 
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B. The Foreign Estate Sector. 
The foreign estate sector in Indonesia circa early 1963 was not nearly as 
concentrated as the foreign oil sector, and nor did the foreign estates dominate the 
Indonesian estate sector as the foreign oil companies dominated the Indonesian oil sector.  
The actual number and hectarage of the foreign estates is extremely hard to calculate. By 
my own estimates, there were some 145 foreign estates with a total hectarage of at least 
260,000; these estates were owned by approximately 51 different foreign companies or 
groups (see Appendices A and B).
136
 The majority of these were British-owned, though 
there were also significant Belgian and US interests. Most of these estates were in either 
Java or Sumatra, and within Sumatra were primarily in North Sumatra in the plantation 
area centered around the city of Medan. By one GOI estimate, foreign estates accounted 
for about 25% of the total estate hectarage in Indonesia, the other 75% of estate hectarage 
divided between government owned estates (51%; most of these were ex-Dutch estates) 
and privately held estates (24%).
137
 Rubber was by far the most important product of the 
foreign estate holdings, both in terms of acreage and value. Palm oil was a very distant 
second to rubber, and there were also foreign-owned tea and coffee estates. These foreign 
estate companies employed huge numbers of Indonesians, though the total number is 
impossible to pinpoint because of lack of data; the five large estate companies described 
below by themselves employed a total of around 80,000 workers.  
Most of the foreign-owned estates exported their produce and thus were 
significant generators of valuable foreign exchange, though insofar as I am aware there is 
no hard data available with respect to these amounts. According to one estimate, total 
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 The 260,000 hectare figure is a minimum number; I do not have hectarage information for some 50 
estates, about one-third of the total foreign estates.  GOI figures are conflicting and likely inaccurate. One 
GOI table, prepared from information in early 1964, indicated that there were 213 foreign estates totaling 
440,500 hectares (Djumlah Kebun Di Indonesia, ANRI, RA-15, No. 80). Another GOI table, apparently 
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estate exports of both rubber and palm oil, the two primary estate products, were $154 
million in 1960 (or about 22% of all exports, including the net amount from oil), $143 
million in 1961 (or about 23% of all exports, including the net amount from oil), $119 
million in 1962 (or about 22% of all exports, including the net amount from oil), $114 
million in 1963, and $126 million in 1964.
138
 However, these figures are from all estates 
in Indonesia, not just the foreign-owned ones, and there is no way to calculate what 
portion of these amounts is from the foreign-owned sector. While it is probably safe to 
assume that the revenues generated by the foreign estate companies were significantly 
less than those accruing to the GOI from the big three foreign oil companies, it is also 
important to note that unlike in the oil sector all the foreign exchange revenues earned by 
the foreign estates were turned over to the government; the foreign estate companies were 
not allowed to retain and control their own export earnings. Another contrast with the oil 
sector was that these foreign exchange earnings were diffused and spread over many 
different companies, not concentrated in three. 
Virtually all the foreign estate companies still in Indonesia in the early 1960s 
initially made their investment in the period from c. 1910 to 1930, when Indonesia was 
still a Dutch colony.
139
 These investments were both large and small, ranging from single 
smaller estates (many of which were British-owned) to extremely large single estates 
(such as Goodyear) to multiple estates held by a single corporate group (such as SOCFIN 
or Harrisons & Crosfield). Most of the larger estates, whether single or in groups, were 
managed by the owner, but many of the single small or medium-sized estates were 
managed by professional estate managers or agents, some of whom also managed estates 
in Malaya and other countries, and some of whom took a small ownership interest in the 
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 Thomas and Panglaykim, ―Indonesian Exports, Part I,‖ pp. 74, 77 and 91.  Similarly, another more 
recent work estimates that estates accounted for 25% of Indonesia‘s total export value in 1960, 25% in 
1961, and 24% in 1962. See p. 83 of Hiroyoshi Kano, Indonesian Exports, Peasant Agriculture and the 
World Economy 1850-2000: Economic Structures in a Southeast Asian State (Athens, Ohio: Ohio 
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 For an excellent look at the development of the estate industry in north Sumatra, see Kian Wie Thee, 
Plantation Agriculture and Export Growth: an Economic History of East Sumatra, 1863-1942 (Jakarta: 
National Institute of Economic and Social Research, 1977). Kano‘s Indonesian Exports, Peasant 
Agriculture and the World Economy, especially chapter six, also contains useful information on the foreign 
estates before World War II.  For a look at foreign companies in Indonesia in the early 1950s, see G. C. 
Allen and Audrey Donnithorne, Western Enterprise in Indonesia and Malaya: A Study in Economic 
Development (London: Allen & Unwin, 1957).   
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estate. Sorting through these diverse ownership interests is extremely difficult. As we saw 
in Part I, it appears that few of these companies made significant investments in 
expansion post 1949, though some certainly invested in rehabilitating their estates. By 
1963, most of the larger firms were still reeling from being forced to give up one third of 
their holdings under the one-third rule (see Part I, Section B) and naturally were still 
reluctant to make new investments. Moreover, as we saw earlier, overall conditions for 
investment were hardly encouraging, and operational problems such as squatting and 
illegal land occupation, labor disputes, lack of trained and competent local managers, 
high taxes, lack of foreign exchange and hence inability to import necessary capital 
equipment, inability to remit profits, aging of trees and low replanting rate, etc., plagued 
most of the companies.  
As there was a large number of estate companies, I shall limit descriptions of the 
individual companies to the five largest. One of the largest and oldest foreign estate 
companies was P&T Lands, which in the 1960s was owned by Anglo Indonesian 
Plantations, a British company based in London. The history of the P&T Lands can be 
traced back all the way to 1813, when the British Raffles administration, temporarily 
occupying Java from the Dutch,  granted freehold title to two enormous plots of land 
located in the northern part of West Java, between Bandung and the north Java 
coastline.
140
 Over the next 75 or so years ownership of the estates changed hands 
numerous times; the two freeholds were at some point carved up into numerous 
individual estates and then placed into a company named P&T Lands, which was 
incorporated in 1887.
141
  In 1910 the P&T Lands was purchased by a British company 
which eventually took the name of Anglo Indonesian Plantations (AIP). By 1963, P&T 
Lands was comprised of 21 individual estates, primarily rubber and tea, but also cocoa, 
kapuk, cincoma and other crops, with a total acreage of approximately 29,400 hectares. 
There were 15 ‗inner‘ estates which were the primary producers and 6 less important 
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 These two freehold estates were known as the Pamanoekan freehold and the Tjasem freehold, so named 
because they were located near two villages of the same names and were actually separated by the river 
Tjasem. The eventual name ‗P&T‘ derives from these freeholds. The history of P&T Lands up until World 
War Two can be found in  Wilfred H. Daukes, The "P&T Lands", an Agricultural Romance of Anglo Dutch 
Enterprise (Anglo Dutch Plantations of Java, 1943). As the title suggests, it is a rather romantic view of the 
history of the estates; it was written by a former chairman of Anglo Dutch Plantations.  Nevertheless, it 
contains useful basic information regarding the growth of the estates and the various owners. 
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 AIP 1970 Annual Report (UKNA, FCO 24/1124); Daukes pp. 50-51. 
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‗outer‘ estates, all located in the Subang area of West Java, and the company itself was 
headquartered in the town of Subang.
142
 The company employed about 30,500 people, 
including around 20 expatriates, and AIP estimated that in 1963 it generated about £2.4 
million (about $6.7 million) in exports for the GOI.
143
  
The other large British-owned estate company was Harrisons & Crosfield/London 
Sumatra, an international estate management company whose early interests were 
scattered across Asia. In Indonesia, Harrisons & Crosfield began operations in 1906 and 
during the colonial period managed numerous estates in which it usually took partial 
ownership interests (the estates were owned by separately established companies).
144
 
H&C also engaged in shipping, trade, insurance and engineering services, mostly related 
to marketing the produce of the estates. Prior to 1960, the group structure was a 
complicated maze of cross ownership holdings involving dozens of separate companies. 
In 1960, the London Sumatra Plantations company was established in London as a 
holding company for the various estate holdings in Indonesia (the main Indonesian 
holding company was established in late 1962), presumably as a means of forcing some 
kind of organizational structure over the group‘s scattered holdings, though it may also 
have been related to the forced restructuring of estates pursuant to the one-third rule.
145
 
Over the next few years, many of H&C‘s estate holdings were brought into this new 
company, though H&C was also forced to give up at least 12 estates to the GOI under the 
one-third rule.
146
 By 1963, London Sumatra owned about 17 estates in North Sumatra, 
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 Physical assets on the estates also included offices, housing, tea and rubber factories, hospitals and 
clinics, and much more.  AIP estimated the value of P&T Lands in 1964 as, conservatively, £6.0 million 
(about $16.8 million). See 22 October 1964 AIP Chairman Statement to Shareholders (UKNA, FCO 
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 Indoconsult Associates Report on P&T Lands, 22 April 1968 (henceforth the ―Indoconsult Report‖), 
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 For a general history of Harrisons & Crosfield, see P. Pugh and G. Nickalls, Great Enterprise: a History 
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145
 See London Sumatra Plantations Limited, Directors Report and Statement of Accounts for the Year 
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GOI under the one-third rule can be found in BKS-PPS under 1962 Tanah2 Konsensi Perkebunan Besar, 
IV, including one chart listing the names of the estates and dates of transfer (see Keterangan Mengenai 
Perkebunan2 Jang Telah Diserahkan).  
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mostly rubber, whose total hectarage was approximately 52,000.
147
 It also owned four 
estates in Java and three in Sulawesi (hectarage uncertain). The total workforce on the 
estates in Sumatra is unclear, perhaps around 13,000.
148
 These estates generated 
significant amounts of valuable foreign exchange; in February 1964, the manager of 
H&C‘s Medan office estimated that the estates in Sumatra managed by it earned $10 
million annually.
149
  Harrisons & Crosfield‘s primary office in Medan, North Sumatra, 
acted as estate managers for London Sumatra‘s estates in Sumatra (as well as at least 
three smaller non London Sumatra estates), in addition to its other businesses of shipping, 
trade, insurance, etc. The Medan office was managed by a British national, and altogether 
there were around five expatriates in the office; of the estates it managed, some five to 
ten were managed by foreigners and the rest by Indonesians. H&C also had a separate 
office in Jakarta, with two foreigners, whose primary responsibility was to manage 
London Sumatra‘s four estates in Java and three estates in Sulawesi (Celebes).   
SOCFIN (Societe Financiere des Caoutchoucs) was a large, Belgian-based 
international plantation group with operations and estates in Southeast Asia and in Africa. 
In Indonesia, SOCFIN began operations in 1911, initially focusing on palm oil estates 
and palm oil production, but also delving into rubber estates. By the early 1960s, it 
consisted of a jumbled mix of 15 different subsidiary or related companies, 10 of which 
owned plantations. Its collective holdings included approximately 18 rubber and palm oil 
estates, all in North Sumatra or Aceh, and together these estates totaled about 51,700 
hectares, making it, along with London Sumatra, one of the two largest foreign estate 
holders in Indonesia.
150
 In 1963, its total staff and workforce numbered about 17,750, 
including 14 foreigners; by 1965, its total workforce was around 18,960, including six 
foreigners.
151
 It managed all the groups‘ estates itself.  
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There were also two very large American estate companies, Goodyear Plantations 
and United States Rubber Corporation. Goodyear operated two rubber estates, the Dolok 
Merangir estate (established 1916) and the world famous Wingfoot estate (established 
1927), both in North Sumatra.
152
 Wingfoot was about 16,000 hectares in size and Dolok 
Merangir was about 6,000 hectares; together, the estates employed about 10,000 workers, 
plus around 50 Indonesian staff employees and about 15 foreign staff.
153
  However, as 
described further in Chapter Six, Wingfoot in mid-1964 was set to be exchanged for two 
GOI estates adjacent to Dolok Merangir as a settlement under the one-third rule. United 
States Rubber, which had established operations in Indonesia in 1911, operated an estate 
of about 17,500 hectares named Kisaran (also in North Sumatra), which was actually a 
compilation of different adjacent concessions. It employed about 7,200 workers, with an 
Indonesian staff of 85 and foreign staff of 13.
154
  Neither company had been able to remit 
profits out of Indonesia since 1960 or so.
155
  
There were also a number of estate management firms operating in Indonesia. 
Generally these firms did not take an ownership interest in the estates they managed, 
most of which were fairly small; precisely because of the small size of the individual 
estates, it did not make business sense for the owners to manage them, but instead to 
entrust management and operations to professional managers. Among the numerous 
estate management firms, there were two larger ones of note. The largest was JA Wattie, 
which opened an office in Surabaya (East Java) around 1910 and prior to World War II 
managed as many as 37-38 estates.
156
 In 1951 the company relocated its head office in 
Indonesia from Surabaya to Jakarta. By the early 1960s, it managed approximately 25 
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 Kano, Indonesian Exports, Peasant Agriculture and the World Economy, pp. 202-06; 2006 PT JA 
Wattie Company Profile (published by the company). 
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different estates on Java, mostly British-owned.
157
  Its Jakarta office was headed by two 
British managers; it is unknown how many foreigners were on the estates. The second 
large estate management company was Anglo Sumatra Estate Agency, which was based 
in Medan, North Sumatra.
158
 This company was a 50/50 joint venture between SIPEF, a 
Belgian estate company, and the Rubber Estates Agency, a British estate firm. Anglo 
Sumatra managed about a dozen estates in north Sumatra, about half of which were 
rubber estates owned by various British companies and the other half of which were palm 
oil estates owned by different Belgian companies. Anglo Sumatra‘s main office in Medan 
was managed by a Swiss national, and there were two other European expatriates in the 
office. Apparently all the estate managers were Indonesian. 
C. Manufacturing and Other Enterprises. 
The remaining foreign investment in Indonesia in the early 1960s was much 
smaller in comparison with the oil sector and the estate sector, both in size and overall 
importance (see Appendix A for a list). The key difference between most of these firms, 
especially those in the manufacturing sector, and the foreign-owned firms in the estate 
and oil sectors was that they generated few, if any, foreign exchange revenues.  
Of the remaining foreign investment in Indonesia in the early 1960s, the largest 
concentration was in the manufacturing sector. This sector was very small compared with 
the estate sector and comprised only about 12 enterprises. All these companies were 
located in Java, primarily around either the Jakarta area or Surabaya in East Java. Most of 
them made their initial investment in the period 1925-1940, and much of this came in the 
second half of the 1930s when the Dutch colonial government for the first time tried to 
encourage development of local manufacturing (see Part I above). There was very little 
brand new investment in this area after 1950; the only example I know of was the small 
Prodenta toothpaste factory in Surabaya.
159
  In fact, as we saw in Part I, there appeared to 
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 This small company was established in Surabaya in 1952 by a Dutchman. In 1955-56, it was sold to a 
West German company named Fuchs, and after 1958 there were no resident foreigners at the plant; the 
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be little new investment by returned companies after 1950, and there was actually some 
disinvestment, as demonstrated by the sale of the General Motors assembly plant in 1954-
55 to the GOI and the sale in late 1963 by Proctor and Gamble of its cooking oil facility 
in Surabaya. Perhaps the most important feature of the foreign-owned manufacturing 
sector was that virtually all these companies produced goods for sale in the domestic 
Indonesian market and thus did not generate valuable foreign exchange like the foreign 
oil companies and foreign estate companies. Instead, they were consumers of foreign 
exchange, because most of them imported raw materials, machinery, capital equipment 
and capital goods for use in their operations. Of course, as we saw earlier, the inability to 
import these goods because of a tightly controlled foreign exchange regime was perhaps 
the principal operational problem facing these companies in the early 1960s. 
Many of these foreign manufacturers were widely known in Indonesia and 
internationally, and several of them were the dominant domestic producers of their 
products. For example, Goodyear of the United States operated a tire factory in Bogor, 
just outside Jakarta, which was established in 1935 and in 1964 employed about 1,200 
people, including 11 American expatriate managers.
160
 The operations of the tire factory 
were entirely separate from Goodyear‘s rubber plantations in Sumatra, both separately 
incorporated and separately operated. The factory, which produced both automobile and 
bicycle tires (including automobile tires for Dunlop Tire), was one of two automobile tire 
manufacturers in Indonesia (though there were a number of bicycle tire manufacturers), 
and by far the larger producer of the two.
161
 The white cigarette sector was another sector 
dominated by foreign interests, specifically British American Tobacco (BAT), the largest 
producer in Indonesia, and the Belgian-owned Faroka factory, the second largest 
                                                                                                                                                 
entire staff was Indonesian. (Interviews with Mr. F.R. van Blommestein, 12 and 19 June 2006; Mr. von 
Blommestein was a commissioner of Prodenta in the 1970s.)  
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producer. It was estimated that these two firms, plus a Dutch firm nationalized in 1958-
59, accounted for 65% of white cigarette production in the 1950s.
162
 BAT began 
operations in the Dutch East Indies in the mid-1920s and by the early 1960s had three 
cigarette factories (in Surabaya (East Java), Cirebon (West Java), and Semarang (Central 
Java)), along with a head office in Jakarta, and employed an estimated 4,500 people.
163
 
The Faroka factory began operations in the late 1920s and was located in Malang, East 
Java.  
Another major foreign manufacturer was British-owned Unilever, which 
employed some 3,800 people in operating three factories in Jakarta and one in Surabaya 
producing laundry and washing soaps, shampoos, margarine, coconut oil, other edible 
oils, toothpaste, and other ‗toilet preparations.‘
164
 Unilever‘s products were widely used 
in Indonesia, though unfortunately few statistics are available regarding its market share. 
Similarly, the Australian-owned NASPRO operated a pharmaceutical factory in Jakarta, 
and its brand of aspirin was well known throughout Indonesia. Likewise, Singapore-
based Fraser & Neave (known in Indonesia as F&N) operated soft drink/bottling plants in 
both Jakarta and Surabaya and before World War II was the largest soft drink 
manufacturer in the Dutch East Indies.
165
 Bata Shoe also operated a large shoe factory 
(established in the late 1930s) in Jakarta. Finally, the Belgian-owned Intebra owned a 
brewery in Surabaya which previously had been managed by the Heineken beer 
company, but beginning in 1960 operated under the name of Bir Bintang. 
Another smaller category of foreign-owned companies in 1963 were the 
Malaysian companies. By Malaysian firms I mean businesses from Singapore, Malaya, 
and the two Borneo territories of Sabah and Sarawak; as we shall see in the next Chapter, 
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 See pp. 20-1 of Lance Castles, Religion, Politics and Economic Behavior in Java: the Kudus Cigarette 
Industry, Cultural Report Series (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 
1967). White cigarettes were so named because they contained no cloves, in contrast to the popular kretek 
cigarettes found in Indonesia.  
163
 The 4,500 number comes from an internal BAT memorandum dated 17 March 1965 (S.D. McCormick) 
found in the BAT Online Document Archive, http:/bat.library.ucsf.edu.   
 
164
 See H. W. Wamsteker, 60 Years of Unilever in Indonesia, 1933-1993 (Jakarta: Unilever Indonesia, 
1993).  See also chapter five of Fieldhouse‘s Unilever Overseas.  Unfortunately, few statistics are available 
regarding Unilever‘s market share, but its products were widely used in Indonesia. The parent company of 
Unilever was a publicly held corporation, based in Britain; to avoid nationalization, in the late 1950‘s the 
shareholdings of Unilever Indonesia were transferred internally from a Dutch subsidiary to a British 
subsidiary (Wamsteker, 60 Years of Unilever, p. 61). 
165
 Sutter, Indonesianisasi, p. 38. 
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it was these four territorial blocks that were cobbled together as ‗Malaysia‘ in September 
1963 (until Singapore was expelled in 1965). In general, it seems that the Malaysian 
business presence was very small in Indonesia at that time. With the exception of the 
Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation, most Malaysian businesses appeared to be in the 
rubber remilling or rubber smokehouse business and located in either Sumatra or 
Kalimantan.
166
 These companies actually did generate foreign exchange because they 
exported most of their blanket and sheet rubber, but unfortunately there is no data 
available regarding their earnings (though certainly the amounts were far less than those 
generated by the foreign estates). Some of these firms seemed to have a strong position in 
that industry; for example, it was reported that the five Malaysian firms which had 
remilling factories in Palembang (a major rubber remilling center in South Sumatra) 
accounted for 53% of Palembang‘s total rubber remilling production in 1963.
167
  In 
addition, all the Malaysian remilling companies that were taken over in 1963 (see next 
Chapter) appear to have been owned by residents/citizens of Malaysia who were 
ethnically Chinese. Of course, there were probably many small, unregistered Malaysian 
owned businesses such as shopkeepers.  There also seems to have been many individual 
estate holders, but these appear to be virtually all smallholders, though again information 
is scant.   
Finally, there were a small number of ‗white collar‘ foreign owned businesses in 
the country, principally banks, insurance companies and trading firms. In the banking 
sector, in the early 1960s there were four foreign banks operating in Indonesia. These 
were the Singapore-based Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation, the British-owned 
                                                 
166
 In the rubber remilling process, rubber slabs were torn apart by machines, cleansed with water, and 
reformed into blankets, which were then dried for two to three weeks, after which they were ready to be 
shipped into the international market. The point of the process was to get rid of impurities and reduce the 
water content of the slabs.  The slabs were made by pouring freshly collected rubber latex (directly from 
the tree) into wooden boxes; this was frequently done by smallholders or villagers. The congealed results 
were known as slabs, which were then shipped to the remillers, who transformed them into blankets. The 
remilling process and its output were different from the sheet rubber process, in which latex is sieved, 
allowed to coagulate, then kneaded to allow it to pass through hand mangles, which squeeze out water and 
reform the rubber. The result is sheet rubber, which is then dried in a specially designed smokehouse for 4-
5 days. The sheet rubber is much smaller than the blankets produced from the remilling process (1.4 meters 
compared to 4 to 5 meters). See p. 142 and accompany footnotes of K. Thomas and J. Panglaykim, "The 
Chinese in the South Sumatran Rubber Industry: A Case Study in Economic Nationalism," in The Chinese 
in Indonesia, ed. JAC Mackie (Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press in association with the 
Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1976).  
167
 Thomas and Panglaykim, ―The Chinese in the South Sumatran Rubber Industry,‖ p. 179. 
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Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, the British-owned Chartered Bank, and 
the PRC-owned Bank of China. However, the operating license of the Hong Kong and 
Shanghai Bank was withdrawn in early 1963 for unknown reasons, resulting in the 
closure of its operations.
168
  In addition, in November 1964 the Bank of China was 
handed over voluntarily by the PRC to the GOI in circumstances not disclosed at the 
time.
169
 There were also a handful of foreign insurance companies operating in the 
country, but these had few physical assets. There were also several trading companies, 
the largest and best known of which was British-owned Maclaine Watson. 
   
III. Conclusion. 
 
By early 1963, it would be easy to characterize the position of foreign investment 
in Indonesia as precarious. Oil company exceptionalism was being put to the test, as the 
GOI and the big three oil companies were trying to find common ground over how the 
companies would operate in Indonesia under the new 1960 Oil and Gas Law. The major 
obstacle here was how to allocate profits between the two sides. Likewise, the foreign 
estate companies were certainly still reeling from the forced divestment of one-third of 
their estate holdings under the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law. Moreover, operationally all the 
foreign companies (with the exception of Caltex) were suffering not only from the 
general deterioration of economic conditions but also from GOI policy-induced 
operational difficulties, such as the lack of foreign exchange and hence the inability to 
import necessary capital equipment and raw materials, the inability to remit profits, and 
the strict regulation of the business environment such as the imposition of price controls, 
as well as from other problems such as aging equipment and capital resources, labor 
unrest, and lack of trained and competent local managers.  The forecast appeared gloomy.  
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 See pp. 55 and 268 of Report for the Years 1960-1965,  (Bank Indonesia, 1968). 
169
 See Mozingo, Chinese Policy Toward Indonesia, pp. 209-10, and Hauswedell, The Anti-Imperialist 
International United Front, p. 224.  The Bank of China was not privately owned but was instead owned by 
the Chinese government and was widely viewed by non-communist Indonesians as the PRC‘s ―main source 
of leverage on the Chinese business community in Indonesia and as the ever ready provider of funds for the 
PKI.‖ (Mozingo, p. 209) The PRC volunteered to transfer the company in March 1964, though the transfer 
did not occur until November. This measure reflected the budding PRC-Indonesia relationship; see Chapter 
Six, Part I, Section A.   
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From one perspective, it may be argued that such circumstances were a natural 
progression from 1950.  From independence the GOI had been somewhat ambivalent 
toward new foreign investment, and a legal framework for such new foreign investment 
was not even put into place until 1958. Burdened by colonialism, fears of economic 
exploitation, and Dutch control over the modern sector of the economy, the debate was 
less over whether foreign investment would be allowed as over how to control it so that 
Indonesian interests could be protected as fully as possible. Indeed, many GOI officials 
recognized the need for foreign investment because it could provide financial capital, 
manpower and training, and goods and technology that were unavailable in Indonesia. 
With respect to foreign investment in Indonesia prior to 1949, Indonesia was obliged by 
the RTCA to allow this investment to return and resume its previous position. Indonesia 
gradually chipped away at the position of this returned capital, but it was not until the 
swift and sudden seizure and subsequent nationalization of Dutch companies in 1957-59 
that significant measures were taken against it. While the seizure of Dutch foreign 
investment may be viewed as part of the process of economic decolonization, the seizure 
of Taiwan-linked Chinese foreign investment in 1958 certainly indicated that the GOI 
would consider the possibility of linking the position of foreign investment of other 
nationalities to Indonesia‘s foreign relations. Ironically, the seizures of Dutch and 
Taiwan-linked companies came just when the foreign investment law of 1958, which was 
designed to attract new foreign investment, was promulgated. Given the unstable political 
and economic climate, both before and after the promulgation of the 1958 law, as well as 
the measures taken against the Dutch companies, there was naturally little, if any new 
foreign investment entering Indonesia. Under Guided Democracy, the conditions under 
which new foreign investment and existing foreign investment could operate were 
increasingly stringent, and thus the overall climate for foreign investment became 
increasingly hostile. The passage of both the oil and gas law and the Basic Agrarian Law 
in 1960 were clear signals that the positions of foreign companies in the oil and estate 
sectors, the two largest sectors of foreign investment, were to be renegotiated. Moreover, 
under Guided Democracy the officially preferred form which foreign capital could enter 




Yet, the situation in early 1963 was arguably not as bad as it seemed on the 
surface. Oil company exceptionalism suggested that the three foreign oil companies and 
the GOI would eventually find common ground; the position of the oil companies was 
simply too unique and important for the GOI not to reach some accommodation. After 
all, revenue from the oil companies was an integral part of the 1960 Eight Year 
Development Plan. Similarly, the foreign estate companies could certainly take some 
assurance in the fact that they had successfully weathered the fallout from the 
restructuring of their estate holdings under the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law. That is to say, 
by 1963 they had already reached an accommodation with the GOI under this new law, 
and presumably the 1960 law was all that was forthcoming – the worst had already 
passed. Moreover, did not the GOI act against unauthorized attempts to seize Belgian 
companies in 1961 by PKI-affiliated groups? Finally, as we shall see in the next Chapter, 
foreign investors could also take comfort from what appeared to be a determined attempt 
by the GOI at major economic reform and stabilization in the middle of 1963. This 
attempt at economic reform had great international support and if successful would help 
right the foundering Indonesian economic ship. While these factors were not strong 
enough to induce foreign companies to risk pouring additional investment in Indonesia, 
they did perhaps make it more difficult to foresee that in just three short years virtually all 









In 1963 there were two waves of confiscations of foreign companies that were 
both directly linked to Konfrontasi with Malaysia. In the first wave, on 17 September, in 
the midst of the outbreak of Konfrontasi, a handful of British companies were seized by 
the DPS-KBKI labor federation in an action that seemed to catch the GOI off-guard. 
After several days of confusion, the GOI responded by prohibiting further takeovers and 
taking the seized companies out of the hands of DPS-KBKI. These companies were not 
officially returned to their owners but instead placed under GOI supervision, a term that 
as we shall see in practice meant different things for each of the companies. Moreover, 
the GOI went to great lengths to emphasize that it was not nationalizing or expropriating 
the companies.  The exception, an example of the extraordinary position of the foreign oil 
companies in Indonesia, was Shell Oil, whose Pladju refinery near Palembang, South 
Sumatra, was quickly returned to the company. However, the triumph of oil company 
exceptionalism was complicated by the simultaneous takeover of Shell‘s Balikpapan 
facilities in East Kalimantan by the military commander of East Kalimantan, who did not 
return them to Shell‘s control until late December 1963. Hence, I argue that this first 
wave of takeovers was primarily the result of domestic political instability. In the second 
wave of takeovers, in late October 1963 President Sukarno, in a series of rather 
uncoordinated moves, initiated the confiscation of all Malaysian enterprises in the 
country. How many Malaysian companies were actually taken over remains unclear, but 
at least 10 remilling firms in Sumatra and Kalimantan were seized. In contrast to the 
takeover of British firms in September, the takeovers of Malaysian companies were not 
spurred by any labor union activity nor prohibited by the government but rather were 
clearly intended to be an active weapon in the GOI‘s foreign policy arsenal in the 
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Konfrontasi conflict. Thus, while both waves of takeovers were closely linked to 
Konfrontasi, the reasons behind them and their implementation were quite different. 
 The outbreak of Konfrontasi was a watershed event in Guided Democracy, 
marking 1963 as a critical year in the history of the new country. It deeply affected each 
of the three areas (discussed in Chapter Two) of domestic politics, foreign relations, and 
the economy, changes that would culminate in 1965 and that together led directly to the 
takeovers of most foreign companies from 1963-65 and the prohibition of further foreign 
investment in 1965. In terms of domestic politics, Konfrontasi directly impacted the 
balance of politics in that it provided the opportunity for the PKI to become a much more 
visible, voluble, and aggressive political force. As we saw in Chapter Two, prior to 
Konfrontasi the political power structure was one of an uneasy, competitive partnership 
between President Sukarno and the army. However, as will be discussed in Chapter Five, 
the outbreak of Konfrontasi enabled the PKI to become more of a dynamic political force 
that emerged from Sukarno‘s shadow and thereafter began to take major initiatives on its 
own.
1
 As one observer famously described, what emerged was an uneven triangle of 
power among President Sukarno, the army and the PKI.
2
 At the same time, ideologically 
President Sukarno after 1963 increasingly seemed to identify publicly with the PKI‘s 
position on various issues.
3
 The overall effect was a much intensified polarization of 
domestic politics. Related to this point, there was similarly an intensification of 
ideological indoctrination and predominance in political life, as new slogans relating to 
Konfrontasi and various old slogans such as ‗completing the Revolution‘ dominated 
political discourse and affected daily life, reflecting the interplay between foreign affairs 
and domestic politics.  
The rise of the PKI came primarily at the expense of the army, which was 
continuing to jockey for position with President Sukarno. One major contributing factor 
to the decline of the army‘s position was the lifting of martial law by President Sukarno 
on 1 May 1963. The lifting of the ban was announced in November 1962 by Sukarno and 
                                                 
1
 Crouch, Army and Politics in Indonesia, p. 51; Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno, p. 204.   
2
 Herbert Feith, "President Sukarno, the Army and the Communists: the Triangle takes Shape," Asian 
Survey 4, no. 2 (1964). 
3
 See, e.g., Hauswedell, ―Sukarno: Radical or Conservative,‖ and Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under 
Sukarno, pp. 237-8.   
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was done ostensibly because over the course of 1962 internal security had been achieved 
and the West Irian situation resolved. This resulted in the dismantling of the martial law 
war authority (known as Peperda) and the regional branches of administrative units 
(known as Peperti) that the army used to exert its influence over the provinces. Such 
dismantling reduced significantly the powers of the army and restored somewhat the 
power of civilian authorities, especially in the area of internal security.
4
 Moreover, the 
lifting of martial law resulted in a significant increase in activity by the PKI and the PNI, 
as restrictions on their activities were curtailed significantly. In particular, there was a 
noticeable increase over the next few years in mass actions (demonstrations, rallies, etc.), 
as mobilization of mass support was the principal way the parties, whose political 
influence was still limited, were able to express themselves. The increase in party-
sponsored mass actions also resulted in increased tension and competition among the 
parties, who tried to take advantage of this suddenly expanded freedom. Clearly, 
however, the PKI, because of its organizational strengths and large mass organizations, 
was the best suited to do so.
5
 As we shall see, mass actions organized by both the PKI 
and the PNI-linked group DPS-KBKI (later the KBM) played a significant role in the 
takeovers of foreign companies.    
                                                 
4
 Mackie, Konfrontasi, pp. 133-4; Crouch, Army and Politics in Indonesia, p. 54; Sundhausen, Road to 
Power, pp. 166-7.  Martial law would be partially restored in September 1964 because of Konfrontasi; this 
was accompanied by the creation of regional bodies known as Pepelrada, ‗Regional Authorities to 
Implement Dwikora,‘ which were headed by army officers and had various powers (Crouch, Army and 
Politics in Indonesia, p. 76; Sundhausen, Road to Power, p. 186). As Crouch notes, other important strikes 
by Sukarno against the army were (a) the July 1962 demotion of General Nasution and promotion of 
General Yani (done to promote divisions within the army), and (b) the reorganization of KOTI in July 
1963. KOTI was the acronym for the Supreme Command for the Liberation of West Irian, formed in 
December 1961 by Sukarno to coordinate the West Irian invasion.  The reorganization in July 1963 was a 
move to reduce General Nasution‘s influence in KOTI and further exacerbate army divisions (Crouch, 
Army and Politics in Indonesia, pp. 54-5). The revamped KOTI‘s role in the GOI‘s decision making is not 
all that clear, but it was thought to be one of the most important advisory bodies to President Sukarno and 
was often seen as a more important policy-making body than the cabinet. It had five divisions, with General 
Yani as its chief of staff and the intelligence division headed by Foreign Minister Subandrio, and army 
officers occupied most of the staff positions. See Crouch, Army and Politics in Indonesia, pp. 47-8, 54-5; 
Sundhausen, Road to Power, p.163; Bunnell, Kennedy Initiatives, pp. 59, 654.   
5
 Rocamora, Nationalism in Search of Ideology, pp. 8-9, 317-9; Justus van der Kroef, "Indonesian 
Communism and the Changing Balance of Power," Pacific Affairs 37, no. 4 (1964-5), p. 379. Restrictions 
on activities of other political parties were also lifted, but as Rocamora points out none of these other 
parties had the wherewithal to compete at the national level with the PKI or PNI. NU was the only other 
remaining major party (the Masjumi was banned in 1960), but its base was limited to East Java.    
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In terms of foreign affairs, as we shall examine more closely in Chapter Six 
Konfrontasi dramatically accelerated the anti-imperialist, anti-colonial thrust of President 
Sukarno‘s foreign policy. It was one thing to discuss these ideas in speeches (1960-61) 
and then apply them to what was essentially a conflict with its old colonial master (West 
Irian 1961-62), but quite another to implement them in other areas. In public President 
Sukarno consistently described Konfrontasi as an attempt by a NEFO (Indonesia) to 
combat the meddling of an OLDEFO (Great Britain) that was attempting to extend its 
influence in Southeast Asia by the creation, he claimed, of the puppet state of Malaysia; 
the entire episode was a perfect example of neo-imperialism and its evils. With 
Konfrontasi the dominant feature of foreign affairs from September 1963 until at least the 
end of 1964, the struggle against anti-imperialism (featuring NEFOs against OLDEFOs) 
was firmly established as the cornerstone of Indonesia‘s foreign policy. This undeclared 
war with the British was the major reason for the decline in Indonesian relations with the 
United States as well as other European countries. Sukarno‘s policy would lead to 
international isolation, as Indonesia withdrew from the United Nations and other 
international bodies in 1965, though it did result in a brief alliance with the PRC. The 
emphasis on anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism also led to splits in the non-aligned 
movement and Afro-Asian movement and Indonesia‘s isolation from these movements. 
Perhaps the most immediate impact of the outbreak of Konfrontasi in September 
1963 was the failure of a major attempt at economic reform, which in turn resulted in 
further swift deterioration of the economy. As we saw at the end of Chapter Two, with 
internal security finally achieved and the West Irian conflict settled, Indonesia beginning 
in August 1962 was finally positioned to undertake real economic reform that was 
desperately needed in light of the deteriorating economy. This attempt at economic 
stabilization, which had the support of the United States and the IMF, would be 
Indonesia‘s only major attempt at economic reform during Guided Democracy. The 
stabilization program featured a number of economic reforms whose sting would be 
partially ameliorated by the critical injection of a large dose of foreign aid. However, 
with the outbreak of Konfrontasi and in particular the severing of trade relations with 
Malaysia, through which much of Indonesia‘s trade flowed (via Singapore) and which 
served as a pillar of the economy, international financial support for the program was 
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impossible and was quickly dropped. The economy would deteriorate severely in the next 
three years, and inflation would become paralyzing. This window of opportunity for 
much needed economic adjustment was shut down by Konfrontasi. 
This Chapter is structured as follows. Part I traces the parallel but eventually 
intersecting paths of Konfrontasi and economic stabilization. Part II then discusses the 
takeovers of a handful of British firms, which were seized just as Konfrontasi broke out 
in September 1963. Part III discusses the takeovers of Malaysian companies later in the 
year, also a result of Konfrontasi but very different from the takeovers of the British 
firms. Part IV adds some final observations.   
 
I. The Intersecting Paths of Economic Stabilization and 
Konfrontasi. 
 
In the first nine months of 1963 in Indonesia two mutually incompatible trends 
vied for predominance. The first was an attempt at economic reform and stabilization, 
which was actually implemented successfully from late May to September. The second, 
in foreign affairs, was known as Confrontation or Konfrontasi, and was directed against 
the formation of the new state of Malaysia. The nascent conflict between these two was 
finally resolved in mid-September when Konfrontasi broke out in full fury. Prior to that, 
Konfrontasi and economic stabilization developed in separate, parallel paths that only 
sometimes intersected, but not to the forceful degree they would in September. It might 
not have been clear to all GOI officials that these were contradictory and could not 
simultaneously coexist, but since the economic stabilization program depended on large 
amounts of foreign assistance, it was fairly obvious that any foreign policy measures 
which threatened either economic growth or the providers of the foreign assistance would 
result in a loss of support for this critical aid. For many foreign observers, this period was 
seen as one in which Indonesia was at a crossroads of a sort, where it could choose 
between a peaceful path of economic stabilization and development or a path of reckless 
foreign adventure. While such a view perhaps oversimplifies the situation, particularly in 
the domestic political context, as described above the outbreak of Konfrontasi did have 
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multiple long term impacts. Moreover, for foreign investment Konfrontasi would have 
both immediate and longer term implications. 
A. Konfrontasi: Background and Developments to August 1963. 
Konfrontasi was a perplexing affair whose origins, motives, and dynamics from 
the Indonesian side remain opaque even today.
6
 As one observer has pointed out, the 
entire affair from 1963 to 1966 was less than a war but much greater than a simple 
diplomatic dispute, for despite its relative military insignificance (in total, only around 
625 people were killed in the conflict) it had a great impact on developments in Southeast 
Asia which have often been obscured by the Vietnam War.
7
 Within Indonesia, 
Konfrontasi was the dominant foreign policy issue, and the conflict greatly influenced 
domestic politics and economic policy. President Sukarno was certainly the driving force 
behind it, and there were probably a variety of motives driving him. The army generally 
supported the conflict (for different reasons than Sukarno), but clearly wanted to keep the 
military aspect of it at a very low level and did not want to engage in a full scale war. The 
PKI had its own reasons for supporting the conflict; among others, it provided an 
opportunity to demonstrate the PKI‘s patriotism and to flex its political muscle. 
Importantly, the motivations for these principal actors changed over time as each party 
tried to use the conflict for its own benefit.
8
 More than anything else, however, it appears 
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 There has been a substantial amount of literature on Konfrontasi. Mackie‘s Konfrontasi remains the most 
comprehensive account, especially from the Indonesian side.  Bunnell‘s Kennedy Inititatives beautifully 
describes the interplay between economic stabilization and Konfrontasi and is especially useful for 1963. 
Konfrontasi is touched upon in almost every work covering Indonesia politics or foreign relations in the 
early 1960s; other useful works which focus primarily on Konfrontasi include Mohammad Hatta, "One 
Indonesian View of the Malaysian Issue," Asian Survey 5, no. 3 (1965), Donald Hindley, "Indonesia's 
Confrontation with Malaysia: a Search for Motives," Asian Survey 4, no. 6 (1964), George McTurnan 
Kahin, "Malaysia and Indonesia," Pacific Affairs 37, no. 3 (1964).  More recently, three volumes have been 
published on the subject, the most comprehensive of which is Mathew Jones‘; see David Easter, Britain 
and the Confrontation with Malaysia, 1960-1966 (London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2004), 
Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961-1965: Britain, the United States and 
the Creation of Malaysia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), John Subritzky, Confronting 
Sukarno: British, American, Australian and New Zealand Diplomacy in the Malaysian-Indonesian 
Confrontation, 1961-5 (New York: Macmillan Press, St. Martin's Press 2000). 
7
 Mackie, Konfrontasi, p. 1. The figure of 625 deaths comes from Mackie, Konfrontasi, p. 237, footnote 26. 
8
 None of these motives are all that clearcut, and it should be emphasized that they undoubtedly changed 
over time. Sukarno‘s motives included, among others, viewing Malaysia in the context of the anti-
imperialist, anti-colonialist NEFO/OLDEFO ideology, a desire for Indonesia to play a role in regional 
affairs, personal vanity, and a host of considerations relating to domestic politics, such as forging national 
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that Konfrontasi took on a life of its own, akin to an uncontrollable, petulant child who 
will not heed his parents or siblings. The course of the conflict was uneven, hesitant at 
times but then aggressively threatening, with seemingly no apparent rhyme or reason, 
probably reflective of its unplanned and ad hoc nature.  What started as a fairly small 
matter grew into something far greater than what was probably anticipated at the time, 
and like Pandora‘s Box was difficult to close once opened, developing its own, 
independent momentum with its own twists and turns.  
The genesis of the conflict lay in the decision to create a new nation called 
Malaysia, which would be formed by combining the country of Malaya with Singapore, 
Brunei, Sarawak and Sabah.
9
  The idea for some type of merger had been around since 
the mid-1950s, with the British particularly interested in it as they were trying to 
decolonize their holdings in Southeast Asia.
10
  The idea was very unformed, though, and 
as the newly independent Malayans were not altogether pleased with the concept, the 
British did not push it. However, by 1961 the situation had changed; politics in Chinese-
dominated Singapore had taken an increasingly leftist bent, and the Malayans were 
increasingly fearful of Singapore developing into a radical Chinese state on their southern 
border allied with the communist PRC, a situation similar to United States and Cuba. 
Hence, so the Malayan reasoning went, Singapore should be brought into Malaya‘s 
                                                                                                                                                 
unity and deflecting concerns over economic decline.  For the army, it was a way to prevent budgetary cuts 
and the prospect of demobilization and the loss of power (because of the ending of martial law), and 
naturally a means of increasing prestige; improbably, some army officers and others also thought the new 
Malaysia might be dominated by Chinese and thus become a means by which the communist PRC might 
encircle Indonesia (see Hatta, ―One Indonesian View‖). Moreover, some army officers were determined not 
to let the PKI gain the upper hand like in the West Irian conflict as the greatest proponent of patriotism and 
nationalism. For the PKI, in addition to the reasons cited, a conflict with Great Britain would also end the 
drift to the US camp represented by the economic stabilization policy, and moreover in contrast to the army 
the PKI indeed might have seen Malaysia as an attempt to contain the PRC and communism, as many 
Malayan officials claimed it to be. However, the PKI also was concerned that if the conflict escalated the 
army might reimpose martial law and extend its influence. See generally Hindley, ―Search for Motives,‖ 
Kahin, ―Malaysia and Indonesia,‖ Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno, chapter five,  
Sundhausen, Road to Power, pp.173-4, 187-8,  Crouch, Army and Politics in Indonesia, pp. 58-60. 
9
 Malaya, on the Malayan peninsula, had become independent from Great Britain in 1957; Singapore, 
Sabah (technically known as North Borneo) and Sarawak (in western Borneo) were separately administered 
British crown colonies; Brunei, also in Borneo, was a British protectorate that had a British resident who 
advised the Sultan.  When combined, the new nation would be named ‗Malaysia.‘     
10
 For excellent discussions of the background behind the decision to form Malaysia, see Jones, Conflict 
and Confrontation, introduction and chapters two and three, and Mackie, Konfrontasi, chapters two through 
four.  For a shorter summary, see T.Y. Tan, "The 'Grand Design': British Policy, Local Politics, and the 
Making of Malaysia, 1955-1961," in The Transformation of Southeast Asia: Perspectives on 
Decolonization, ed. Marc Frey, Ronald Pruessen, and T.Y. Tan (Armonk, N.Y.: ME Sharpe, 2003).  
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political orbit, which would allow Malaya to control the situation better. Because Malay 
officials thought the addition of people of Chinese descent in Singapore would upset the 
sensitive racial balance in Malaya, they thought it would be necessary to balance the new 
numbers of Chinese with people of ‗Malay‘ descent, and hence Sarawak, Brunei, and 
Sabah should also join.
11
 The prospect of a radical Singapore that might threaten regional 
stability was pushed by Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, who had long 
advocated merger with Malaya and whose PAP party was under political siege in 1961. 
In late May 1961, Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman announced publicly at 
a foreign correspondents association lunch in Singapore that Malaya was considering the 
possibility of a merger with Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei.  
    The Tunku‘s announcement set the merger wheel in motion. The British were 
initially very cautious, in spite of the neat dovetailing of the idea with overall British 
interests, and were content to let the Malayans take the initiative on most matters. Formal 
talks between Malaya and Great Britain on the matter did not begin until late November 
1961, when the British indicated they needed to assess the opinion of the peoples in 
Sarawak and Sabah (it was left to the Sultan of Brunei to speak for his subjects on the 
matter). The terms of the merger needed to be worked out, as did the nature of the 
defense arrangement and status of the large British military/naval base in Singapore. The 
British followed up on the first issue by establishing the Cobbold Commission, a five 
member team whose function was to ascertain the wishes of the populations of Sarawak 
and Sabah with respect to the merger. The commission performed this tricky task over 
the first half of 1962 and in June presented its report. The report concluded that in the 
opinion of the commission‘s members a federation was the best option, and that indeed 
there was general support among the people for a federation of some type, with one-third 
of the people supportive of a federation, one-third supportive but with conditions, and the 
remaining one-third not supportive. Privately, British members of the commission 
expressed reservations over Malayan unwillingness to make concessions to non-Muslim 
                                                 
11
 The Malayans were also considering the possibility of a merger without Singapore. In June 1960, 
Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman had quietly suggested to British officials the possibility of a 
merger with Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei only, and in October even held a conference with high officials of 
Brunei, Sabah and Sarawak which recommended that a merger proceed. However, in early 1961, a severe 
political crisis in Singapore resulted in the Tunku‘s changing his mind to include Singapore in the merger 
for the reasons noted above. Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, pp. 61-66. 
 190 
 
peoples and over other issues, particularly in Sarawak. Nevertheless, in early August 
1962 the British announced that a target date for the formation of the new nation had 
been set for 31 August 1963, just over a year away, and work proceeded over the next 
year to iron out the many unresolved details of the federation.
12
  
 The formation of the new Malaysian federation hit a minor snag when a small 
revolt broke out in Brunei on 8 December 1962.
13
 The revolt was led by A.M. Azahari, 
who was the leader of the dominant political party in Brunei (Partai Rakyat, which in fact 
wielded little actual power, virtually all of which – including the decision to join the new 
federation - was held by the Sultan) and had long advocated some kind of merger with 
Sabah and Sarawak, but not with Malaya and Singapore. Azahari had lived in Indonesia 
for much of the 1940s during the Indonesian Revolution and apparently had connections 
to influential people.  The militant wing of the Partai Rakyat, known as the North Borneo 
National Army or TNKU, had begun training in June/July of 1962 and in the months 
leading up to the revolt had received training and supplies in East Kalimantan, Indonesia 
(which adjoined Sabah and Sarawak but not Brunei, which overland could only be 
reached from East Kalimantan by crossing through either Sabah or Sarawak). It is 
inconceivable that these activities went on without the knowledge and support of the East 
Kalimantan military commander Colonel Soehardjo (whom we shall see more of in Part 
II below); the real question is the extent to which Colonel Soehardjo‘s support for the 
TNKU was backed by the army and GOI officials in Jakarta.
14
 The goals of the revolt 
were ambiguous, though it apparently was aimed in part against the formation of 
Malaysia and British domination and instead sought a merger of the three Borneo 
territories.
15
 Militarily, the revolt was insignificant, as it involved only some 3,000 
TNKU members (Azahari himself was conveniently in Manila) and was crushed by 
British troops in about one week. 
While the revolt did not directly derail formation of Malaysia, it did serve as a 
spark-point for official Indonesian opposition to Malaysia, which prior to this point was 
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 Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, pp. 85-95. 
13
 On the Brunei revolt generally, see Mackie, Konfrontasi, pp. 112-22; see also Bunnell, Kennedy 
Initiatives, pp. 234-30.   
14
 Mackie, Konfrontasi, pp. 116, 120-1; Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, p. 109; Bunnell, Kennedy 
Initiatives, pp. 230, 249.   
15
 Mackie, Konfrontasi, pp. 116, 121-2; Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, p. 112. 
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non-existent. In fact, the formation of Malaysia before this hardly seemed to interest the 
Indonesian government at all.  In a meeting with a high British official in August 1961, 
Foreign Minister Subandrio raised no issue with the prospect of a new Malaysia; indeed, 
in November 1961 Subandrio declared in a speech at the United Nations that Indonesia 
had no objection to the formation of Malaysia, and even wrote the same thing in a letter 
published in the New York Times that month.
16
 The GOI may have been waiting for 
resolution of the West Irian matter before plunging into opposition to Malaysia, but even 
throughout 1962 seemed uninterested. However, within a few weeks the Brunei revolt 
ignited Indonesian opposition. Initially the Indonesian response was fairly mild, but soon 
after a war of words broke out, aided by the Indonesian press‘ mischaracterization of 
comments made by Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman.  President Sukarno 
and Foreign Minister Subandrio both made some ambiguous but inflammatory comments 
about the situation, and on 23 December 1962 the first anti-Malaysia mass rally broke out 
in Jakarta, led by the newly established National Committee for North Kalimantan, which 
was organized by Minister Chaerul Saleh. Both sides continued to trade remarks, and 
then on 20 January 1963 Subandrio in a speech declared that Indonesia was adopting a 
policy of confrontation (Konfrontasi) against Malaysia, which was acting as an 
―accomplice of the neo-colonialists and neo-imperialists,‖ though it was unclear exactly 
what form this confrontation would take. This statement predictably aroused much 
support in the Indonesian press, and as Mackie notes it gave President Sukarno time to 
gauge general support for the idea without formally committing Indonesia to it.  As the 
war of words continued to escalate, on 13 February 1963 President Sukarno, citing a 
number of reasons, finally affirmed publicly the policy of Konfrontasi, again without 
shedding light on exactly what this meant.
17
 It was thus clear by this point that Indonesia 
and Malaysia were likely headed for some sort of showdown, but whether the showdown 
would be a full scale conflict (which seemed improbable at this point) or instead a meek 
war of words (or something in between) was left open. However, the proverbial cat was 
out of the bag, and the GOI would be forced to deal with the issue in some manner; it 
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 Mackie, Konfrontasi, pp. 104-5.  The PKI, however, did register its objection in December 1961.   
17
 Mackie, Konfrontasi, pp. 121-7; Bunnell, Kennedy Initiatives, pp. 230-8, 273-300. Jones (Conflict and 
Confrontation, pp. 130-1) and Mackie both emphasize that such ambiguity over what exactly Konfrontasi 
was gave great flexibility to Sukarno.     
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could not just ignore it and sweep it under the rug. Moreover, as we shall see in the next 
section, this policy of Konfrontasi was developing just as the GOI was on the verge of 
implementing an economic stabilization program.  
From March to late May 1963 there were conflicting signals from the Indonesian 
side over what was to come. March witnessed the beginning of low level diplomatic 
discussions among Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines, with the idea of eventually 
having a summit meeting of the three leaders.
18
 Negotiations were sporadic and 
inconclusive over the next month several months, in part because the parties could not 
agree on the subject matter of the talks, as the Malayans were still puzzled by what 
exactly Indonesia wanted and the Indonesians kept their objectives close to their chest.
19
 
On 12 April Indonesia ratcheted up the pressure in the form of the first major border 
incursions from the Indonesian side (West Kalimantan) into Sarawak, which was 
followed by other incursions. Most of these incursions were carried out by the TNKU, 
which was being openly supported and trained by the Indonesian army.
20
  Over the next 
six weeks there was little progress on the diplomatic front until late May, when President 
Sukarno invited the Tunku to meet him in Tokyo on May 31 for talks.
21
 This unexpected 
gesture indeed apparently represented a shift in the Indonesian position, as the meeting 
was friendly and paved the way for discussions among the three foreign ministers in 
Manila from 7-11 June.
22
 
The successful meeting of foreign ministers in turn paved the way for a summit 
meeting among the three heads of state, but the road was very bumpy.
23
 The foreign 
ministers agreement, known as the Manila Accord, had several principal features. Most 
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 The Philippines was involved because it claimed that part of Sabah actually belonged to the Philippines.  
19
 Mackie, Konfrontasi, pp. 129-30. 
20
 Mackie, Konfrontasi, p. 211; see also "Indonesian Involvement in Eastern Malaysia,"  (Department of 
Information, Government of Malaysia, 1964).  
21
 In late May Indonesia‘s economic stabilization efforts were also gearing up. Policy reforms were finally 
implemented, and while President Sukarno was in Tokyo the big three oil companies were also there 
meeting with Indonesian officials to discuss the oil companies‘ position in Indonesia. These meetings 
resulted in a basic agreement.  See next Section.  
22
 Mackie notes, however, that Sukarno‘s version of the unofficial agreement reached at the Tokyo meeting 
was very different from the Tunku‘s version.  The Tunku claimed that he insisted that the date of 
Malaysia‘s formation was fixed irrevocably for 31 August, while Sukarno insisted that the Tunku had 
agreed to investigate the desires of the people of the Borneo territories.  Mackie, Konfrontasi, p. 149.  
23
 See generally Mackie, Konfrontasi, pp. 127-32, 148-157; much of this paragraph summarizes Mackie‘s 
detailed description. See also Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, chapter six. 
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importantly, the Philippines and Indonesia ―stated that they would welcome the formation 
of Malaysia provided the support of the people of the Borneo Territories is ascertained by 
an independent and impartial authority, the Secretary General of the United Nations or 
his representative,‖  while Malaya in turn ―undertook to consult the British Government 
and the Governments of the Borneo Territories with a view to inviting the Secretary 
General of the United Nations or his representative to take the necessary steps in order to 
ascertain the wishes of the people of those Territories.‖
24
  These two key provisions were 
intentionally and obviously ambiguous; for example, how much support had to be shown 
by the people of Borneo, and how exactly was the UN representative supposed to 
ascertain it? Moreover, Malaya technically had not agreed to anything other than to 
consult with the British and territorial governments. Nevertheless, the provisions were 
enough for all sides to save face and assert that the accord had met their objectives and 
the matter could be forwarded to the respective heads of state for final resolution in a 
summit meeting.  However, the summit meeting scheduled for late July in Manila almost 
did not happen, because on 9 July representatives of United Kingdom, Malaya, 
Singapore, Sarawak and North Borneo (Sabah) signed the London Agreement. This was 
the final agreement concerning the terms of the new Malaysian federation, which would 
include Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah but not Brunei, and further provided that 
Malaysia would be established on 31 August 1963.
25
 Predictably enough, the formal 
fixing of the date for establishment of the federation enraged President Sukarno, who in a 
speech the next day claimed that Malaya had reneged on its promise in the Manila 
Accords to ascertain and heed the wishes of the people of the Borneo territories prior to 
establishing Malaysia, though as we have seen the Malayans had not agreed to this at all. 
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 From Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Manila Accord, the full text of which can be found in Mackie, 
Konfrontasi, pp. 336-8.  Other areas of agreement were (i) that the three countries shared responsibility for 
maintaining stability and security of the area, free from subversion, (ii) general support for the idea of 
Maphilindo, a Philippino-proposed idea of establishing some type of federation among the three countries 
as representatives of the Malay peoples, and (iii) Malaya agreed that the incorporation of Sabah into 
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 The terms of the London Agreement had been fiercely negotiated over the past year, especially in the 
closing stages and in particular over financial and economic terms. In a wonderfully ironic twist, at the last 
moment the Sultan of Brunei, where the December 1962 revolt broke out, decided not to join the new 
federation, largely out of concern over sharing oil revenues and his place in the succession of Malay rulers 
who were to rotate as the principal Malay ruler. For a summary of the negotiations and final agreement, see 
Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, pp. 159-66.  
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Sukarno‘s attendance at the summit meeting was thrown into question, though he 
ultimately did participate after announcing it at the very last minute. 
 The Manila conference from 30 July to 4 August among Indonesian President 
Sukarno, Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman and Philippine President 
Macapagal resulted in the issuance of a joint statement so ambiguously worded on the 
key issue of the form of the the UN ―ascertainment‖ that it was clear that in fact there was 
no meeting of the minds at all on this central question.
26
 The matter was left entirely in 
the hands of the UN General Secretary or his representative, who was charged with 
―ascertaining‖ the wishes of the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak prior to the establishment 
of Malaysia by the use of a ―fresh approach, which in the opinion of the Secretary 
General is necessary to ensure complete compliance with the principle of self-
determination within the requirements of embodied in Principle 9 [referring to a UN 
general assembly resolution], taking into consideration‖ the recent elections in Sabah and 
Sarawak (but with further investigation into whether Malaysia was a major issue in the 
elections, whether electoral registers were properly compiled, whether the elections were 
free, without coercion, and whether votes were properly polled and counted) and the 
rights of those who were unable to vote in the recent elections because of imprisonment. 
It was thus left up to the UN general secretary to devise this ―fresh approach,‖ an obvious 
indication that the parties themselves could not agree on what to do. There was no 
indication in the joint statement as to what the ―fresh approach‖ should be, other than it 
should be in the secretary general‘s opinion in compliance with UN principles of self-
determination; interestingly, UN secretary general U Thant was consulted during the 
conference and sent no less than three cables, presumably all relating to the form of the 
―ascertainment‖ and the ―fresh approach,‖ suggesting that there was indeed some 
discussion over the matter.
27
 Moreover, nothing in the joint statement actually committed 
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 For the text of the Manila Declaration and accompanying Joint Statement, see Mackie, Konfrontasi, pp. 
338-40. The joint statement also addressed a number of other issues, principally the Philippine claim to part 
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any of Indonesia, Malaya or the Philippines to honoring the results of the ascertainment 
(though the June Manila Accord issued by the foreign ministers implied that Indonesia 
and the Philippines would do so); this was certainly an intentional omission so that none 
of the parties would be bound. In essence, because the parties could not agree on what to 
do, they left it entirely in the hands of the UN general secretary.
28
 As we shall see, the 
question of ascertainment was never resolved to Indonesia‘s satisfaction, at least 
officially. Before turning to these events, however, we first examine the GOI‘s attempt at 
economic stabilization in 1963.  
B. The Attempt at Economic Stabilization. 
As we saw at the end of Chapter Two, by 1962 the Indonesian economy was in a 
perilous state. Increasingly large GOI budget deficits, triggered in part by a shrinkage of 
revenues and a large increase in expenditures because of the West Irian conflict, had 
fueled inflation that reached 167% by the end of the year. Moreover, the overall 
economic picture was one of stagnation and even decline. Even President Sukarno, 
normally not attuned to economic affairs, recognized the severity of the situation, 
suggesting in his annual 17 August independence day speech that the government would 
now focus its attention on economic matters. But how could the GOI go about ‗fixing‘ 
the economy? Clearly, major economic reform would require an infusion of foreign aid to 
tide Indonesia through the initial rough stages that any significant economic reform 
would likely result in. Moreover, budget cuts, which would also surely be part of any 
reform package, would also obviously result in much political infighting. 
The United States and the IMF were both major supporters of some type of 
economic stabilization program, and their support proved decisive in establishing the 
program. The United States in particular was also willing to commit large sums of aid to 
ensure the success of the program. The Kennedy administration was eager to improve 
relations with Indonesia and ensure that Indonesia did not fall into the communist block 
side of the Cold War, and a stable Indonesian economy supported by US assistance 
                                                                                                                                                 
a summary of the summit. For a closer examination of Indonesian views on the Manila Agreement, see also 
chapter seven of George Kahin, Southeast Asia: A Testament (New York and London: Routledge/Curzon, 
2003).  
28
 This is also Mackie‘s interpretation; see Konfrontasi, pp. 163-4.   
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would hopefully contribute to this objective.
29
 In April 1961 during President Sukarno‘s 
visit to the United States President Kennedy had offered to send an economic team to 
Indonesia to make recommendations, and this team went to Indonesia in August 1961 for 
a number of weeks and submitted its initial report to President Kennedy in February 
1962.
30
 US Ambassador Howard Jones then presented President Sukarno with the United 
States‘ formal report on 1 August 1962. In addition to assessing the overall state of the 
Indonesian economy and the viability of the Eight Year Development Plan, the report 
also recommended new aid programs for Indonesia in an amount ranging from $325 
million to $390 million over five years, with the United States providing $200 million to 
$235 million and the remaining $125 million to $155 million coming from other 
international sources.
31
 Meanwhile, in May 1962 an IMF team had gone to Indonesia and 
recommended numerous reforms to attack basic economic problems, such as fiscal 
discipline and tight monetary policy, devaluation of the Rupiah and an end to the multiple 
exchange rate system, the cessation of certain state subsidies, etc., most of which would 
be in the final stabilization plan.  As the United States and the IMF over the fall of 1962 
continued to encourage efforts at economic reform, two basic questions emerged: first, 
how much overall foreign assistance would be provided, and second, what reform 
measures would the GOI have to institute as conditions to receiving the aid. 
Within the GOI, serious efforts to devise a stabilization program began in the fall 
of 1962.
32
 First Minister Djuanda headed these efforts and was aided in particular by 
Sutikno Slamet, a former Indonesian representative to the IMF. In late September Slamet 
and Bank Indonesia Governor Sumarno invited the IMF to help draft a stabilization 
program that would be acceptable to foreign aid providers. The IMF sent out US 
economist Bernard Bell, who was already familiar with Indonesia‘s situation, having 
advised on the Eight Year Development Plan and also consulted with the US economic 
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 In November 1962 a high level GOI committee, chaired by Djuanda, was 
established to discuss stabilization measures.
34
 With US help, efforts were also begun to 
secure new aid from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization 
of Economic Development, which together with the US and IMF would provide most of 
the required assistance.
35
 In mid-January 1963, just before Foreign Minister Subandrio‘s 
20 January speech declaring Konfrontasi, a $40 million foreign exchange allocation 
program for the import of raw materials and spare parts (which was to be funded partially 
by an unannounced $17 million loan from the US) was announced by the GOI. This was 
viewed as a very positive development in the stabilization effort as Indonesia continued 
to work out a plan.
36
  In mid-February, just as President Sukarno announced his support 
for Konfrontasi, Indonesia sent a team headed by Slamet to Washington to negotiate with 
the IMF; the goal was to ―convince the IMF of Indonesia‘s willingness and capability to 
launch a stabilization program, while at the same time seeking to temper the IMF‘s 
customary stringent requirements for stabilization loans,‖ which included budgetary 
discipline, decontrol of prices, currency devaluation, and debt rescheduling, all of which 
would create major political problems.
37
 
Given the pain and the controversy that would undoubtedly accompany economic 
reform, President Sukarno, perhaps still uncertain of which course to take, moved very 
cautiously. The general strategy was to come up with set of principles that not only would 
form the basis of future economic policy, including the possibility of reform that would 
accommodate the developing stabilization plan, but also was politically acceptable to all 
important interests.  After a six week process that saw the formation of three different 
high level advisory committees consisting of members across the political spectrum,
38
 on 
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28 March President Sukarno announced the new policy of DEKON (Deklarasi Economi, 
or ‗Economic Declaration‘), which immediately took its place in the pantheon of 
Indonesian ideological lexicon as the economic equivalent to MANIPOL. DEKON itself 
contained very mixed messages, certainly a reflection of President Sukarno‘s intent that 
the interests of all political groups be accommodated; as one observer noted, as a 
―statement of economic principles which would serve as guidelines for future policy,  it 
was so eclectic as to mean all things to all men.‖
39
 The first two dozen paragraphs of 
DEKON contained primarily revolutionary slogans, with some attention to the condition 
and nature of the Indonesian ―socialist‖ economy. One notable emphasis was on the two-
stage nature of the Indonesian economy. In the first ―national and democratic‖ stage, 
which was the prerequisite to the second stage of a truly socialist economy (with no 
exploitation of man by man, and with adequate food, clothing and work for everyone), 
the vestiges of imperialism and feudalism had to be wiped away. Towards the end of 
DEKON, there was recognition of the need for some change, such as ―deconcentrating‖ 
the centralization of economic management in Jakarta by allowing the regions more 
authority, providing better incentives for production and distribution of goods, and 
altering the tax scheme. In its final section, under the heading ―Short Term Policy,‖ 
DEKON did contain a very broad description of possible new directions of economic 
policy, including a priority on food, clothing and imports of raw materials and spare 
parts, increasing exports and decreasing imports of non-essential goods, incentivizing and 
streamlining SOEs, raising efficiency and increasing production, mobilizing domestic 
capital, etc. It also stated that foreign aid would be used to finance economic policy if 
                                                                                                                                                 
the basis of the eventual set of principles), a third committee known as the Committee of Seven was then 
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domestic capital was insufficient.
40
 Because so many political interests were involved in 
its formation and because it was so general and could be broadly interpreted, DEKON 
was for the most part accepted, however reluctantly. It was endorsed by the MPRS in 
May 1963 as official economic policy, and much like MANIPOL was often cited as the 
sacred creed in the economic field. It also fulfilled its primary function by paving the way 
for the eventual implementation of the stabilization package.  
Continuing his cautious approach, President Sukarno waited a full two months 
after the announcement of DEKON (and after it was approved by the MPRS as official 
policy) before approving in late May a package of reforms devised by First Minister 
Djuanda‘s team. Issued on 26 May 1963, the economic stabilization package was 
comprised of 14 regulations and generally consistent with IMF suggestions. It was 
primarily aimed at (a) combating the rapidly increasing inflation by increasing 
government revenues, especially via export earnings, and partially by reducing 
government expenditures, such as subsidies for utilities (which were frequently well 
below cost), and (b) stimulating efficient production (by both SOEs and private 
companies), in part by reducing government over-regulation, especially in the area of 
price controls, and also by importing a greater amount of raw materials and spare parts 
which would allow for increased production. As Mackie has described, there were five 
main  elements of the program: (i) the dismantling of most price controls and the 
subsequent swift rise of public utility costs such as transport and electricity (hitherto 
provided very cheaply), (ii) the doubling of salaries and allowances to civil service 
workers, (iii) a new set of foreign exchange regulations which effectively devalued the 
Rupiah (although not to the level of the open market), which had the effect of increasing 
the return to both exporters and the GOI, (iv) the immediate release (initially of $40 
million) of foreign exchange to be used for imports, especially of raw materials and spare 
parts, and (v)  new austerity in GOI expenditures combined with increases in revenues so 
that the 1964 GOI budget could be balanced.
41
 Foreign aid was the crucial component of 
(iv) and (v), without which neither element would work; it was expected that as much as 
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The stabilization program was not popular and elicited widespread opposition. 
The most vociferous objections came from the PKI, which believed that the program 
reflected the increasing influence of the moderates in the GOI and thus portended a de-
emphasis on nationalism and ‗completing the Revolution,‘ both of which favored the 
PKI. Similarly, the PKI thought that the program, with its heavy foreign aid component, 
would result in closer relations between Indonesia and the western countries providing 
the necessary foreign assistance. Both these possibilities decreased the likelihood of 
success of the PKI push for cabinet positions under the guise of nasakomization; certainly 
the United States had made clear that its aid was conditioned on no PKI representation in 
the cabinet. The army, the key political partner/competitor of President Sukarno, only 
passively supported the program; its equivocal support was largely because of the vast 
decrease in military expenditures a balanced budget envisioned.  There was also 
opposition from the business community, especially importers and speculators, as well as 
some GOI officials. Moreover, the discontinuance of GOI subsidies for utilities, and the 
immediate large increases (as much as 600%) in transport and electricity prices, also 
released a storm of public discontent. Finally, the GOI made almost no effort to mobilize 
popular support for the program. Perhaps most notable for his lack of public  support was 
President Sukarno, who was in Tokyo when the new scheme was announced on 26 May 
and did not even publicly acknowledge the program‘s existence until his 17 August 
independence day speech.
43
   
 Despite its unpopularity, the stabilization program was quite effective, although 
initial foreign support in the form of assistance was lukewarm. The scheme did result in a 
dramatic slowdown in inflation from June through early September, as well as a large 
increase in exports. Moreover, the government was able to implement some degree of 
budget control. Indeed, the value of the Rupiah actually appreciated against the dollar. On 
the negative side, the principal problem was a liquidity crunch caused by tight monetary 
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policy. In addition, the intended increase in production did not materialize as quickly as 
hoped, in part because the anticipated increase of imports of raw materials and spare parts 
also did not materialize. This was primarily due to the tight credit policy and the slow 
arrival of foreign aid.
44
 In terms of the critical component of foreign aid, efforts to secure 
this received a major boost when the USSR agreed in June to restructure Indonesia‘s 
outstanding debt to it.
45
 Then on 24 July, the IMF, together with the United States the 
primary international supporters of the program, approved (only days after the IMF report 
was completed, the GOI having delayed in formally inviting the IMF to review the 
stabilization program) a standby loan facility of $50 million, subject to certain conditions 
precedent. However, on 26 July, the DAC, a consortium of countries under the OECD, 
failed to approve the expected pledge of some $250 million. The United States, which 
was to provide some $140 million of the DAC pledge, was unable to convince the other 
DAC members to make commitments, despite months of preparation. Certainly the haste 
at which the DAC meeting was arranged, urged by the United States and coming so 
closely after the IMF loan was approved, was a factor in the failure to secure a pledge, as 
was the uncertainty over whether Sukarno was planning to attend the Manila summit in 
the effort to resolve the dispute over Malaysia.
46
 However, the DAC meeting did not 
outright reject Indonesia‘s request, but rather decided to reconsider it in late September. 
Together with the economic stabilization package, another development that for 
many observers signaled that President Sukarno and Indonesia were ready to turn from an 
adventurous foreign policy to a focus on economic stability was the tentative agreement 
reached by the GOI and the big three foreign oil companies in early June 1963.
47
 This 
agreement was signed in Tokyo on 1 June, just on the heels of the announcement of the 
stabilization program and as President Sukarno and the Tunku had their amicable meeting 
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that paved the way for the meeting of the foreign ministers to resolve Konfrontasi. As we 
saw in Chapter Three, by early 1963 Caltex, Stanvac and Shell had reached an impasse 
with the GOI over how the big  three were to operate in Indonesia in the wake of changes 
mandated by the Oil and Gas Law of 1960 (Law 44/1960, see Chapter Three, Part II, 
Section A). In late April, in an obvious attempt to ratchet up the pressure on the oil 
companies, Minister of Basic Industry and Mining Chaerul Saleh had issued a regulation 
(known as Regulation 18) which fixed 15 June as the end of the transition period under 
Law 44/1960. This in effect prescribed a deadline of 15 June for reaching agreement, the 
absence of which would result in either the winding up of the oil companies‘ businesses 
or their operation under unfavorable regulations which had yet to be promulgated. Given 
the gravity of the situation, Caltex and Stanvac solicited the help of the United States 
government, which, recognizing the political, economic and strategic interests at stake, 
agreed to intervene. In particular, the US government was concerned about the severe 
deterioration of economic conditions that would surely result if agreement were not 
reached; in a likely chain reaction, oil production would slow down, resulting in the loss 
of a key commodity in the Indonesian economy as well as loss of precious foreign 
exchange and would certainly kill the foreign aid component of the stabilization package 
and in any case make implementation of the program much more difficult, if not 
impossible. This scenario would then push Indonesia toward the communist camp, both 
domestically and internationally.
48
 Meeting with President Sukarno on 22 May, just a few 
hours before Sukarno left for Tokyo after approving the economic stabilization package, 
US Ambassador Howard Jones expressed the US government‘s concern over the oil 
situation and suggested that President Kennedy would like to send a special emissary to 
discuss the situation with him if Sukarno were amenable. Sukarno, who up to this point 
had not been involved in the oil negotiations, agreed, and Tokyo was set as the location.
49
 
For several days beginning 29 May, there was a parallel series of meetings in Tokyo 
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among President Sukarno, US special emissary Wilson Wyatt and his team, and US 
Ambassador Jones, and a second series of meetings between Minister Chareul Saleh and 
other GOI officials, representatives of Caltex and Stanvac (Shell sent a representative, but 
he did not participate in the meetings), and representatives of the US government (who 
were observing and pushing both sides for agreement).  It certainly appeared that US 
government representatives‘ discussions with President Sukarno in the first series of 
meetings over the possible negative consequences of failure to resolve the oil companies‘ 
situation were a significant factor in the success of the second series of meetings between 
the oil companies and GOI officials.    
On 1 June 1963, a single very short preliminary agreement known as the Heads of 
Agreement was signed between Minister Chaerul Saleh on behalf of the GOI and 
representatives from each of Caltex, Stanvac and Shell Oil. The Heads of Agreement, 
which was approved by President Sukarno, was acceptable to all sides.
50
 The oil 
companies recognized that pursuant to the provisions of the Oil and Gas Law 44/1960, 
their concessions were now owned by the GOI and they were acting as contractors to the 
government. However, they were granted 20 year licenses to continue exploration and 
development on the old concession areas and were also allowed to apply for new 
exploration and production areas (for 30 year periods), subject to the payment of certain 
fees.
51
 Profit sharing was split 60% for the GOI, 40% for the companies, with all taxes 
owed by the companies to the GOI coming from the 60% share. Moreover, the GOI 
would receive a minimum payment of 20% of the gross value of crude oil produced in 
each year.
52
 The companies also agreed to sell to the GOI their refineries within 10-15 
years and their marketing and distribution facilities within 5 years based on agreed 
formulae, and further agreed to sell a share of their production domestically at discounted 
prices. As we have seen, given low profitability on sales in Indonesia because of price 
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controls on petroleum products, Shell and Stanvac were certainly happy with this result. 
In addition, the companies agreed to pay foreign exchange which was ‗owed‘ from 1961-
62.  The GOI dropped its demand that the companies provide financing and technical 
support for the domestic distribution facilities after they were taken over by the 
government. Finally, each of the big three was paired with an Indonesian oil SOE; 
Caltex, the most profitable and with the best prospects, was paired with Pertamin, the 
company closest to Chaerul Saleh, while Stanvac was partnered with Permina, the 
company controlled by Ibnu Sutowo, and Shell was paired with Permigan. As it was not 
anticipated that the oil SOEs would be involved in management or operations, the prime 
function of the pairing was for the SOEs to be the recipient of payments made by the 
foreign companies.
53
 While the Heads of Agreement was a major breakthrough, it should 
be noted that virtually all the details had yet to be worked out, and it was anticipated that 
the Heads of Agreement would be embodied in separate Contracts of Work (CoWs) 
signed between each foreign oil company and its SOE partner. As we shall see below, 
this process would take another four months and oddly would culminate in late 
September in the signing of long and detailed CoWs just after Konfrontasi broke out.    
C. September 1963: the Outbreak of Konfrontasi, Collapse of 
Economic Stabilization. 
In early August 1963, it appeared on the surface as though the conflict over the 
formation of Malaysia was under control and that Indonesia might indeed concentrate on 
economic reform. The economic stabilization program was in full swing, and while it was 
unpopular it was obviously having a positive impact. A crisis over the status of the big 
three oil companies had been averted, reinforcing the trend toward putting the economic 
house in order. Perhaps most importantly, the Manila summit among President Sukarno, 
Philippine President Macapagal, and Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman had 
concluded successfully. However, the joint statement of the Manila summit was vague 
and non-committal in places and moreover reflected Indonesia and Malaya‘s inability to 
agree over what type of ―ascertainment‖ to conduct among the people of Sabah and 
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Sarawak, instead punting the issue to the UN general secretary, who was charged with 
finding a ―fresh approach‖ to the matter. Given the parties‘ obvious disagreement over 
the question, it is not surprising that issues soon arose as the ascertainment process 
unfolded. Initially, the biggest concern was over the status of the Indonesian observer 
team, but Indonesia would ultimately challenge the ascertainment process itself. Events 
would culminate in an incredibly tumultuous 10 day period beginning September 15 in 
which Konfrontasi broke out in full fury and led to the developments described in the 
introduction to this Chapter.
54
 
The first public issue after the Manila conference that was so petty it probably 
reflected the deep mistrust of the parties was the status of the Indonesian observer team. 
The UN ascertainment team, led by an American named Lawrence Michaelmore, actually 
arrived on 16 August in Sarawak, ready to begin work. However, the team delayed for 10 
days while awaiting the arrival of the Indonesian observer team, whose proposed 
numbers and members were contested by the British as being too many and as consisting 
of intelligence/military officers who intended to stir up trouble and not observe. Deciding 
not to wait for the Indonesian team, the UN team began work on 26 August. A number of 
other issues then arose with respect to the Indonesian team, which finally arrived on 1 
September, nearly a week after the UN team started.  
Perhaps the biggest irritant to the Indonesian side was the declaration by Malayan 
Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman on 29 August that the formation of Malaysia 
would occur on 16 September. As the UN team was not close to finishing its work, the 
obvious implication was that Malaysia would be formed regardless of the findings of the 
UN team, and indeed the official explanation accompanying the announcement argued 
that the fixing of the date did not conflict with the Manila joint statement (which, as we 
saw earlier, was true). The 29 August announcement reflected the great pressure the 
Tunku was under from officials from Great Britain, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak who 
for their own reasons wanted to see Malaysia Day come sooner rather than later. Duncan 
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Sandys, the British Secretary for the Commonwealth and Secretary for the Colonies, in 
particular seems to have really pushed the Tunku on this matter. The Malayans tried to 
cushion this blow by sending a high official to inform Indonesian Foreign Minister 
Subandrio of the decision a few hours before it was publicly announced. Subandrio 
himself seemed to accept the decision, and initially the announcement did not draw much 
of an Indonesian reaction.  However, President Sukarno was furious, telling US 
Ambassador Howard Jones on 29 August that he had been ―duped and humiliated by the 
British‖ and would ―not take it.‖
55
 On Monday 2 September Indonesia issued an angry 
protest note at Malaya‘s ―betrayal.‖  From this point on, ―it became increasingly evident 




The UN ascertainment report was made public on Saturday 14 September and 
unequivocally affirmed the support of the majority of the peoples of Sarawak and Sabah 
for the formation of Malaysia.  While UN Secretary General U Thant did criticize sharply 
Malaya for its premature announcement of August 29 and sided with Indonesia in the 
dispute over the Indonesian observers, he made clear that neither circumstance 
significantly impacted the findings of the team. In defending the adequacy and objectivity 
of the ascertainment, he also justified the methodology of the process, noting that it 
clearly fell within the broad confines of the ―fresh approach‖ and that under the Manila 
joint statement he alone determined what the fresh approach would be.
57
 From the 
perspective of the UN, there was little doubt that the majority of the people supported 
becoming a member of the new Malaysia. The only remaining question was how 
Indonesia would react to the findings. 
 The release of the UN findings triggered a tumultuous 10 day period in Indonesia 
that resulted in the clear outbreak of Konfrontasi against Malaysia and the British.
58
 The 
course of events raises two related but separate questions, both of which have been 
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debated but neither of which will probably ever be known. First, what was the extent of 
GOI involvement in the events that unfolded early in the week; that is, to what extent was 
the GOI ‗masterminding‘ events? Second, to what extent did pressure from non-
government sources, such as the mob actions and strong displays of public sentiment, 
influence the government‘s decision to pursue the course of Konfrontasi? In retrospect it 
seems that public nationalist tension, which had already built to a frenzy, outran GOI 
intentions, certainly forced the government into some positions it did not want to be in 
(such as apologizing for the sacking of the British embassy), even though the course of 
events was clearly precipitated by President Sukarno‘s attitude toward Malaysia. That is, 
if the GOI and President Sukarno indeed lost control of events, then they were backed 
into a corner of their own making. Of course, President Sukarno‘s intentions once 
Malaysia was established were not at all clear (he may not have been sure himself) and in 
any case there were certainly divisions within the GOI over what course of action to take. 
Indeed, while the general outline of the major events is clear, the reasons for them and the 
nature of the GOI decision-making process, if any, remain opaque. The situation was 
very fluid, similar to other occasions where Sukarno had created or allowed conditions to 
develop and then essentially let events take their course. The PKI certainly played a role 
in stoking the fire, but, like the GOI, it seems unlikely that the PKI was controlling 
events. As one commentator observed, ―the dynamics of the Indonesian government‘s 
unique system for mobilizing political support greatly increased the pressures for extreme 
action.‖
59
 After the public outburst of mob action seemed to have peaked and the 
government began to regain control of events on 19 September, the GOI – obviously led 
by President Sukarno as the supreme decision maker - over the next week made a number 
of crucial decisions which ensured that Konfrontasi with Malaysia was the course taken. 
The extent to which the GOI and Sukarno were in essence forced into these decisions by 
public opinion is unclear, but certainly the GOI and Sukarno could always point out that 
public sentiment supported their actions. 
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On Sunday 15 September, after meeting with US Ambassador Jones in which 
Jones tried to convince him to accept the UN findings but Sukarno reiterated his inability 
to accept the results, President Sukarno convened a KOTI meeting, at which it was 
agreed that Indonesia would request a new ascertainment.
60
 This position was then 
announced – very gently – in a press conference by Foreign Minister Subandrio, who 
phrased Indonesia‘s displeasure by saying ―corrections‖ to the ascertainment were 
necessary and that Indonesia would withhold recognition of the new state. In spite of the 
mild official GOI reaction, the same day there was a large GOI-sanctioned mass meeting 
organized by the Youth Front (the youth wing of the National Front) at which the 
representative of the PKI youth organization called for the severance of diplomatic 
relations with Malaya and Great Britain, the seizure of British enterprises, and the return 
to duty of the volunteers of the West Irian campaign.
61
 
   On Monday 16 September Malaysia was officially established. In protest, the 
National Front organized a demonstration, again apparently sanctioned by the GOI, at 
which petitions were delivered to the Malaysian and British embassies in Jakarta.  The 
crowd was  estimated to be some 3,000 around the Malaysian embassy but as large as 
10,000 by the time it reached the British embassy, where it became unruly, throwing 
rocks, breaking windows, tearing down the protective fence, and burning a car (while a 
British embassy officer, obviously trying to provoke the crowd, marched around playing 
the bagpipes).  A small delegation was allowed inside the building to see British 
Ambassador Gilchrist, whose childish actions did not contribute to peaceful 
reconciliation.
62
 More viciously, the British and Malaysia consulates in Medan, North 
Sumatra, were completely sacked by rioters. Later that evening Foreign Minister 
Subandrio issued a statement deploring the damage. These events apparently triggered a 
demonstration against the Indonesian embassy in Kuala Lumpur on Tuesday 17 
September, in which a much smaller crowd (estimates vary from several hundred to 
1,000) burned pictures of Sukarno, torched an outer building of the compound, and raised 
the Malaysian flag over the embassy. Malaysia also broke diplomatic relations with 
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Indonesia on Tuesday, though it was unclear if official relations had actually been 
established as Indonesia was withholding recognition.
63
 Also on Tuesday, some British 
enterprises were seized in a series of actions that contributed greatly to the confusion and 
tension (see Part II below).  
The smoldering atmosphere ignited into a fireball on Wednesday 18 September 
when the British embassy in Jakarta was completely sacked and most of the homes of 
British citizens in the capital city were also destroyed. In the early afternoon around 2:00 
pm, a ―few truckloads‖ of unidentified youths arrived at the embassy and set it afire, after 
which an enormous crowd gathered and began looting and taunting the embassy staff. It 
is unclear where the mob came from and who its members were, though members of the 
National Front were clearly involved to some extent. The authorities were unable to stop 
these events until army units arrived around 6:00 pm (though police were able to 
evacuate the British personnel). Then, around the same time and into the night, most of 
the homes of British citizens in Jakarta were also destroyed by smaller groups, and 
British owned cars were torched (homes and cars of other foreigners were not harmed).
64
 
The delay in responding effectively to the destruction of the embassy and residences led 
many to suggest GOI (and Sukarno‘s) complicity. Though no lives were lost, this event 
shocked and galvanized the British and United States governments into action and was a 
clear indication that things had gotten out of control. President Sukarno also appeared to 
believe the sacking of the British embassy had gone too far; in a meeting early the next 
morning with US Ambassador Howard Jones, he appeared – at least to Jones - regretful 
and after hearing Jones‘ formal protest promptly agreed to Jones‘ requests regarding 
government protection and evacuation of British personnel.
65
 The sacking of the British 
embassy would be the peak of popular mob pressure, as the GOI struggled to regain some 
control over events and the situation appeared to calm down. The next day, 19 
September, the government released a statement regretting the incidents of September 18 
and imploring the people to refrain from further wild actions, though this soft 
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condemnation was further tempered by the statement‘s declaration that the GOI could 
understand the outburst of popular anger, which had been ‗inflamed‘ by the actions in 
Kuala Lumpur on September 17.
66
 In addition, as we shall see in Part II, late in the day 
the GOI began to take measures to deal with the seized British companies and prohibited 
any further takeovers.  
However, hopes that the GOI might continue to attempt to defuse the situation 
were dashed on Saturday 21 September when the government announced it was breaking 
economic relations with Malaysia. It is unclear how long the GOI had contemplated some 
form of economic confrontation, but certainly the actual formation of Malaysia and the 
events of the week of 16 September played a key role in its implementation.
67
 On 17 
September, President Sukarno held a meeting of KOTOE
68
 at which a special committee 
of KOTOE was appointed to formulate, by Saturday 21 September, proposals regarding 
Konfrontasi, and it was this special committee which recommended the severance of 
economic relations.
69
 On 21 September, after a six hour joint KOTI/KOTOE meeting led 
by Sukarno, the GOI announced that economic relations with Malaysia would be severed. 
Three justifications were offered: first, that the political nature of Konfrontasi required 
economic Konfrontasi as well; second, that economic relations with Malaya and 
Singapore were detrimental anyway to the Indonesian economy; and third, that Malaysia 
had severed diplomatic and trade relations with Indonesia.
70
 This decision clearly 
established that the GOI was intent on escalating Konfrontasi after a period of a few days 
when the GOI apparently had been trying to defuse the situation politically and 
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diplomatically. Moreover, because the implications for the stabilization program were so 
obvious, it was somewhat puzzling in that the GOI had reacted strongly against the 
seizure of British companies and had prohibited further takeovers and in addition was 
trying to conclude negotiations with the big three foreign oil companies on their 
Contracts of Work (a point discussed further in Part II below).   
The decision to sever economic relations with Malaysia had momentous 
consequences in that it effectively sounded the death bell for the economic stabilization 
program, after which the Indonesian economy would steadily deteriorate. While exact 
statistics are not available, a large portion of Indonesia‘s trade – by some estimates close 
to 50% of exports - went through Malaya and especially Singapore, both now part of the 
new Malaysia.
71
 Severing economic relations would thus likely result in a significant loss 
of trade and negatively impact the Indonesian economy, a result which did in fact happen. 
In particular, foreign exchange revenues, which were a critical source of revenue for the 
GOI, would be disrupted by the break, making it that much harder for the GOI to balance 
its budget. The significance of this action was not lost on the foreign countries who 
supported the economic stabilization program and whose assistance was crucial to its 
success. On 24 September, the United States, the biggest international supporter of the 
stabilization program, announced that it believed that the stabilization program could not 
succeed and that it had informed other DAC members that it saw no point in convening 
the DAC meeting, already scheduled for late September, to finalize pledges of economic 
aid to Indonesia. As a result, the meeting never took place and no assistance was 
forthcoming. Shortly thereafter, the IMF suspended further disbursements of the 
remaining $30 million under its $50 million loan package.
72
 The economic stabilization 
program was effectively dead in the water, although it would remain on the books 
officially until April 1964. Economic conditions almost immediately deteriorated, with 
inflation jumping up once again, tight credit relaxed, depreciation of the Rupiah, a 
significant decline in exports, and the return of heavy GOI deficit spending – very much a 
return of the same ill economic conditions existing prior to the stabilization attempt.
73
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Within a few short days after the 21 September decision to break economic 
relations with Malaysia, Konfrontasi escalated both politically and militarily. On 25 
September, President Sukarno in a widely publicized speech declared that Malaysia was a 
neo-colonialist plot and Indonesia would fight and destroy it. Sukarno declared a policy 
of Ganyang Malaysia, which would henceforth be the principal slogan of Konfrontasi.
74
 
In addition, for several weeks the army significantly stepped up its military activity in 
Borneo, which had to this point been fairly quiet.  The number, size and depth of 
incursions into Sarawak rose dramatically in the last week of September, and more 
Indonesian troops were dispatched to the area.
75
 For the first time there were incursions 
into Sabah, the northern state in Borneo.
76
  Though the military side of Konfrontasi 
would never escalate into an all-out conflict, this initial escalation appeared to be a sign 
of the dangerous times to come. Konfrontasi had now broken out in earnest, and as 
argued at the beginning of this Chapter, its implications would be far reaching. 
In a curious twist to the story that demonstrates the ambiguities and 
inconsistencies of the conflict, the break-out of Konfrontasi in the second half of 
September did not derail the signing of the Contracts of Work between the big three 
foreign oil companies and their SOE counterparts on 25 September. As we saw above, in 
early June a preliminary Heads of Agreement was executed among the big three and the 
GOI that contained the basic principles of the new arrangements under which the 
companies would be operating. The Heads of Agreement was very brief, however, and 
anticipated that the details – which were much harder to work out than basic principles – 
would be set forth in lengthy individual Contracts of Work between each oil company 
and its SOE counterpart.  These negotiations had proceeded since June and in mid-
September were reaching their final stage. Despite both the outbreak of Konfrontasi and 
its economic implications and the potential ramifications of the takeovers of certain 
British companies (see Part II), the big three and the GOI continued to push to finalize 
the CoWs. Shell appeared initially reluctant to proceed, as it was clearly the most affected 
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 Ganyang is a very evocative word literally meaning to chew and swallow, or to devour. Hence the slogan 
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 213 
 
by the takeovers; on 19 September its Pladju facility had been taken over for one day 
before being returned, and Shell was still not in control of its Balikpapan facility, which 
was taken over on 17 September. In addition, at some point Shell was told by some 
Indonesian officials in Jakarta that it would not be allowed to sign its CoW (presumably 
because of the outbreak of Konfrontasi).
77
  However, First Minister Djuanda and Minister 
Chaerul Saleh were aware of the potential impact of the takeovers on Shell and assured 
US Ambassador Jones that they wanted Shell to finalize its CoW and had no intention of 
nationalizing it.
78
 The situation was resolved, and on 25 September a ―relaxed‖ and 
―friendly‖ signing ceremony was held in the offices of the Ministry of Basic Industry and 
Mining in which over 100 attendees witnessed the signing of the three CoWs.
79
 In an 
affirmation of oil company exceptionalism, the outbreak of Konfrontasi had not 
prevented any of Caltex, Stanvac, Shell or the GOI from committing to the new 
arrangement. 
 
II. The September 1963 Takeovers of Certain British 
Firms and Aftermath. 
 
The establishment of Malaysia on 16 September inspired the seizure of five 
British companies in Indonesia beginning on Tuesday 17 September. As one of these 
companies, JA Wattie, managed some 25 estates in Java, the impact may have been 
greater. Except for the takeover of Shell Oil‘s Balikpapan facilities, these takeovers were 
led by the DPS-KBKI, which as we saw in Chapter Two was one wing of the KBKI labor 
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 Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, pp. 207-8. 
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 US Embassy telegram (Jones) dated 18 September 1963 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1963, Inco 10 
Indonesia Box 3501); US Embassy telegram (Jones) dated 20 September 1963 (USNACP, RG 59 Central 
Files 1963, PET 6 Indon, Box 3620).  According to Aden, after Shell made its reservations clear to 
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at the time of signing of the CoWs.   
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 US Embassy telegram (Jones) dated 26 September 1963 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1963, PET 2 
Indon, Box 3620). Shell‘s ambiguous position (whether due to its own reluctance stemming from the partial 
takeovers or due to the assertions by some GOI officials that it would not be allowed to sign the CoW) 
caused a small rift between the British government and the United States government, as apparently US 
Ambassador Jones had advised American-owned Caltex and Stanvac to proceed regardless of what British-
owned Shell did. See Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, pp. 207-8. 
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federation that split in 1962. Naturally there was some speculation as to whether whoever 
was behind the seizures was in fact serving as a proxy for the government. This does not 
appear to have been the case, as the GOI after several days of confusion prohibited 
further takeovers and also took the seized companies out of the hands of the DPS-KBKI. 
However, with the exception of Shell‘s Pladju refinery, these companies were not 
formally returned to their owners but remained under GOI supervision, though the nature 
of this supervision varied greatly. While the quick return of Shell‘s Pladju facility was a 
clear affirmation of oil company exceptionalism, events at Shell‘s Balikpapan facility 
also demonstrated that there were limits to this general principle. 
Taking place during a week filled with great chaos and uncertainty, the nature of 
the takeovers and the government response was highly confusing at the time and in turn 
has generated a great deal of confusion about what actually happened. Most of the 
misunderstanding stems from what was taken over (some accounts suggested that all 
British enterprises were seized), who initiated it (most accounts attributed the seizures to 
the PKI), and what the government did about it (there were divergent accounts of the 
government‘s reaction, and no correct account). Confusion was apparent not only at the 
time on the part of the companies, the British and United States governments, the press, 
and even within the GOI, but also in subsequent published literature. For example, the 
two principal works covering the outbreak of Konfrontasi both attribute the seizures of 
the companies to the PKI, and both imply that the vast majority of British companies 
were seized.
80
 Both these authors have thus attributed to the PKI a larger overall role in 
the events of the week of 16 September than appears to have been the case. 
Misunderstanding of these events continues today in more recent works.
81
 Hence, this 
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Part II will attempt to set the record straight with respect to the takeovers of British firms 
in 1963. 
A. The Takeovers and Government Response. 
1. Initial Seizures.  
On the afternoon of 17 September the head offices of four British companies in 
Jakarta were taken over by different branches of the DPS-KBKI labor federation.
82
  
These takeovers occurred amidst other action against British firms such as boycotts, and 
over the next several days there were rumors and even reports of other takeovers, but 
when the dust settled only these four (plus Shell, as described below) were actually 
seized by labor unions. The four firms taken over were the Jakarta office of Harrisons and 
Crosfield (which, in addition to engaging in trading and export/import, served as 
managers for London Sumatra‘s four estates in Java and three estates in Sulawesi, but not 
for London Sumatra‘s numerous estates in Sumatra), JA Wattie (an estate management 
firm that managed around 25 foreign-owned estates in Java), Dunlop Rubber (Dunlop 
had no manufacturing operations in Indonesia; the primary function of its head office was 
to oversee the contract with Goodyear under which Goodyear‘s tire factory in Bogor, 
West Java, manufactured tires for Dunlop), and Commercial Union Assurance Company 
(an insurance company, represented by its affiliate Ocean Accident insurance). In each 
case it appeared that DPS-KBKI federation representatives within each firm led the 
takeovers.
83
  The takeovers were non-violent. Typically, a ‗takeover‘ involved the 
presentation of a takeover document to management, or a declaration, that the DPS-KBKI 
representatives were taking over the company. This action was immediately followed by 
the expulsion of foreign managers from the office, and henceforth the foreign managers 
could no longer enter. In at least one case (Watties, described below) the DPS-KBKI 
representatives appointed a supervisory team to manage the business, which consisted of 
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 For a general summary of these events, see British Ambassador Gilchrist‘s letter to Indonesia Foreign 
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headed by Labor Minister Ahem Erningpradja.  
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a mixture of DPS-KBKI representatives and Indonesian staff already employed at the 
firm. Apparently most of the work of the offices came to a standstill, as the situation was 
very confusing, and to the extent work did continue, it was done by the Indonesian staff 
employees.  
The takeover of the JA Wattie office in Jakarta is illustrative.
84
 On the afternoon 
of 17 September two officials from the Ministry of Labor, who were also members of the 
DPS-KBKI labor federation, appeared in the Watties office.  These two officials, 
claiming that they were not acting in their official GOI positions but instead in their 
capacity as members of DPS-KBKI, and after further prodding stating they had no 
official authority for their actions and they knew their actions were illegal, told the two 
British managers (Stanley Pull, who was the director of the company, and Mr. Buchanan, 
the finance director) that they were taking over the office.  They were joined by the 
Watties head of the DPS-KBKI (many labor federations formed branches at individual 
companies), an Indonesian named Ohim, and together the three announced to the staff 
that the office was being taken over, even though they recognized that they had no 
authority to do so. They were then joined shortly thereafter in the office by A.M. Datuk, 
who as we saw in Chapter Two was one of the national leaders of the DPS-KBKI 
federation. Datuk claimed that DPS-KBKI had earlier taken over both Ocean Accident 
insurance and Harrisons and Crosfield and was about to take over Dunlop Rubber and 
British American Tobacco. He also stated that he had no official authority for the 
takeovers and knew the action was illegal. Apparently no reason for the takeover was 
given by any of these DPS-KBKI officials. They then appointed a three member 
supervisory committee which included Ohim (the DPS-KBKI leader at Watties) plus two 
Indonesian staff members (one of whom was the head of the staff department). The two 
British directors were told to go home, which, unable to contact any authorities, they did. 
There was no violence and, other than some scribbling on the walls of the office and the 
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The other company involved in takeover activity was Shell Oil.  As we saw in 
Chapter Three, Shell, whose head office was in Jakarta, had two major refineries in 
Indonesia: the bigger one was at Pladju, near Palembang, South Sumatra, which refined 
oil from Shell‘s main fields in South Sumatra, and the other was in Balikpapan, East 
Kalimantan (Borneo), which refined oil from Shell‘s fields in East Kalimantan. Takeover 
actions took place at both the Pladju refinery and the Balikpapan refinery in separate 
actions which occurred on different days and were clearly separately engineered.  
Moreover, as we saw in Part I above, these seizures came at a very delicate time for both 
Shell and the GOI, which were intensely engaged in final negotiations to complete and 
sign Shell‘s new Contract of Work. On 16 September, ―mass actions took place in the 
Balikpapan area by the workers within the framework of the Malaysia confrontation 
policy,‖ and Shell expatriates in Balikpapan (there were about 66, and included all of the 
top management) were ordered to stay home. The next day, the military commander of 
East Kalimantan, Colonel Soehardjo, who also doubled as chairman of the East 
Kalimantan National Front regional committee, in his capacity as the local National Front 
leader issued a statement that indicated Shell‘s Balikpapan refinery was being taken over, 
                                                 
85
 After a persistent effort, the supervisory committee finally secured two of the three cars used by the two 
British directors of Watties. The persistent effort is perhaps some indication of the perceived spoils foreign 
companies had to offer and the lengths taken to secure these assets.  On the afternoon of 17 September, 
after the British directors were asked to leave the office, unidentified members of the DPS-KBKI federation 
showed up at Stanley Pull‗s residence and tried to seize his car, but Pull refused to hand it over. Pull then 
went back to the office to talk to the supervisory committee members about the car, explaining that he was 
going to keep it. Later that evening, Ohim, the DPS-KBKI member of the supervisory committee, showed 
up at Pull‘s house and demanded the car, but again Pull refused. The next day, 18 September (the day the 
British embassy was sacked), the two British directors came back to the office to meet the supervisory 
committee. Having waited two hours, they gave up and left. Later that evening, Boechari, the head of the 
staff and now supervisory committee member, visited Pull‘s house and demanded that the three cars used 
by the directors be surrendered to the supervisory committee, which Pull again refused. Later in the 
evening Pull‘s house ―narrowly escaped attack‖ by rioters, and he and his family were forced to evacuate 
(as we saw in Part I, on 18 September not only was the British embassy gutted but also most of the houses 
of British citizens were sacked). The next morning, 19 September, Boechari went to finance director 
Buchanan‘s house (Buchanan had also been forced to evacuate the house during the night, but had returned 
the next day) and demanded that he surrender his car, which Buchanan did; thereafter Boechari went back 




and Shell expatriates in Balikpapan were barred from going to work.
86
 Thus, in 
Balikpapan, there was no formal takeover by labor unions, but the regional army 
commander/local National Front leader seized control of the refinery. Then, a few days 
later on the morning of 19 September, workers apparently led by the DPS-KBKI took 
over Shell‘s Pladju refinery in South Sumatra.
87
 Details of the takeover are sketchy, but at 
least for one day on 19 September Shell‘s management was not in control of the Pladju 
refinery.  
2. Government Reaction. 
There is very limited information about what kind of activity the takeovers 
triggered within the GOI. However, on the morning of 18 September, American 
Ambassador Howard Jones was assured separately by both Foreign Minister Subandrio 
and Minister of Basic Industry and Mining Chaerul Saleh that the GOI was taking 
immediate action to return the British companies and there would be no repeat of the 
Dutch takeovers of 1957-58.
88
 Further, Chaerul Saleh also told Jones that the GOI had no 
intention of nationalizing Shell. In addition, Subandrio told Jones that an inner cabinet 
meeting was held on 17 September to discuss the takeovers and President Sukarno 
explicitly told Labor Minister Ahem – who although Minister of Labor also headed the 
DPS-KBKI labor federation – to stop any further union activity and to return all 
companies already taken over.
89
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Indonesia, Box 3501). On the surface, it may be curious as to why GOI officials were discussing the 
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Surprisingly, the first public governmental response came from West Java 
Governor Mashudi, who was clearly reacting to the takeover of the four firms in Jakarta 
(which, although geographically located within West Java, as the capital city had its own 
governor and held the same status as a province).
90
 On 19 September Governor Mashudi 
issued no less than three decrees involving British and other foreign firms.
91
 Most 
significantly, Decree No. 376 placed virtually every British company in West Java under 
the ―supervision‖ of the West Java provincial government. Noting that the policy of 
confrontation against Malaysia ―requires the mobilization of all national potential as well 
as vigilance in all fields‖ and that statements recently issued by the GOI regarding the 
Malaysia problem ―might give rise to undesirable events, such as violence by 
irresponsible elements against productive units owned by British or Malayan citizens 
which constitute a source of foreign exchange for the Government,‖ but that because 
―there has as yet been no decision from the Government concerning the status of such 
firms, it is necessary to take immediate steps to safeguard such firms so that continuity of 
production can be guaranteed,‖ Governor Mashudi placed a specified list of British firms 
under the supervision of the province of West Java.  These firms included P&T Lands (21 
estates), JA Wattie managed estates (eight listed), Harrisons & Crosfield estates (two 
listed), Ross Taylor estates (this was an estate management company associated with 
Watties, two estates listed), as well as Dunlop Tire linked enterprises (Dunlop‘s office at 
the Goodyear Tire factory in Bogor plus two tire outlet stores), three BAT facilities (the 
factory at Cirebon, the Grand Hotel at Cirebon, and a small facility at Garut), Shell Oil‘s 
offices in Bandung and Cirebon, plus two stores (whose ownership I have been unable to 
                                                                                                                                                 
takeovers with US Ambassador Jones rather than British Ambassador Andrew Gilchrist, as the affected 
companies were all British.  As discussed in Chapter Two, by 1963 Jones was the dean of all ambassadors 
in Jakarta and had a unique relationship with Sukarno and other GOI figures. 
90
 Born in 1920 in West Java, Mashudi in his youth was active in youth groups. In 1946 he joined the newly 
established Siliwangi division of the army, which after independence was based in West Java, and rose to 
the position of major general in the Siliwangi division. He served as Governor of West Java from 1960 to 
1970, and was one of the first army officials to be appointed to provincial governorships in 1960.  He also 
served as chairman of the MPRS for a few years during the New Order. 
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 These were Decrees of the Governor of West Java Nos. 376, 377 and 378, all dated 19 September 1963.  
For English translations (I have been unable to locate the original Indonesian versions), see US Embassy 
telegram (Ellis) dated 12 November 1963 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1964-66, Inco 15-2 Indon, 
Boxes 1072-3). Decree 377 involved P&T Lands specifically (see next section), and Decree 378 instructed 
government apparatuses to take unspecified measures to safeguard foreigners and their property in West 
Java.      
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determine). Of this long list of companies and operations, none had actually been taken 
over by labor unions or even subjected to some form of takeover activity (though as we 
saw above, the Jakarta administrative offices of H&C and Watties had been seized). Thus 
the Governor appeared to be acting preemptively, to prevent a takeover by unions or 
other ―irresponsible elements.‖ 
The key question Decree 376 raised was the nature and extent of the 
―supervision‖ of the companies. The decree appointed a provincial official from each of 
the provincial estate inspection office, provincial industrial office and provincial trade 
inspectorate to act as supervisor for the companies under their respective areas, and these 
three supervisors were to be coordinated by one Major Akil Mansur. The decree also 
appointed the existing managers of the companies as officials responsible to the 
supervisors, and these managers were to continue to exercise their responsibilities.  This 
seemed to suggest that the companies were to be operated as usual. Finally, the decree 
ordered that the managers were to establish immediately enterprise councils in 
accordance with a law promulgated in 1960. The actual role of the supervisors was not 
explained in the decree (what authority did they have? what did ‗supervising‘ mean in 
practice?), and the instruction that current management was to remain in place seemed to 
suggest that business was to continue as usual. Like many instructions that would be 
issued by various GOI officials in the next two years, the measure was ambiguous 
enough to please no one yet satisfy most. From the perspective of the companies, the 
measure was not pleasing because the province of West Java was now ―supervising‖ their 
companies, though it seemed there was a chance that business would continue as usual; 
from the perspective of those who favored seizing the companies, the government had 
intervened to some degree, although not to the desired level.  
On the night of 19 September, after the West Java Governor issued his decrees, 
the central government finally reacted, with President Sukarno, in practice the highest 
executive authority in the land, issuing three decrees that were unequivocally against the 
seizures of the British companies. It is hard to know, but the timing may suggest that it 
was the seizure of Shell‘s Pladju refinery early on 19 September that spurred the GOI to 
action. On the other hand, the GOI clearly had many more pressing matters to deal with 
as a result of the formation of Malaysia, not the least of which was the fallout from the 
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sacking of the British embassy. Moreover, in reality only a very short period of time had 
elapsed since the first takeovers on 17 September. In any case, the GOI clearly was 
taking a stand against the takeovers. 
The first and most important was Presidential Decree 194.
92
 The decree explained 
that it was necessary to take security measures both in order to guarantee the smooth 
functioning of non-oil firms that had been taken over by workers and in the interests of 
the safety and security of the owners/managers. The decree contained two key provisions. 
First, it provided that all non-oil firms which had been taken over by workers in the 
framework of Konfrontasi would be transferred to the relevant GOI minister according to 
their respective fields, and that the ministers involved should make further arrangements 
so that the firms operated smoothly. Secondly, the decree explicitly forbade anyone from 
carrying out any further takeover actions toward British firms unless so ordered by the 
President himself.  Thus, the decree did not return the seized firms to the British owners, 
but it did officially take the firms out of the hands of the DPS-KBKI and into the hands of 
GOI ministers. The official silence over the ultimate fate of the companies most likely 
was maintained in order to appease those who favored taking over the companies. Similar 
to Governor Mashudi‘s decree of the same day, the undeclared fate of the taken-over 
companies would please no one, yet satisfy everyone. The taken-over firms were not 
happy because they were now under the GOI ministries, though it was unclear what the 
ministries would actually do with the companies, thus leaving a ray of hope. Those who 
favored takeovers were perhaps not pleased that the GOI had taken over from them, but 
at least the foreign owners were presumably no longer in control. However, President 
Sukarno clearly appeared to have drawn a line in the sand regarding further takeovers, 
ordering that there be no more. 
 The other two decrees issued by President Sukarno on 19 September each 
involved Shell Oil, and, in distinct contrast to the ambiguity of the Presidential Decree 
194 over the fate of the other taken-over companies, were clear in their rejection of any 
takeover of Shell, demonstrating the importance of this company and the principle of oil 
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 The first of these, Presidential Order No 41/KOTI, was 
targeted at Shell‘s Pladju operations (i.e., the refinery). Citing the necessity of 
maintaining uniformity of action between the people and the government in the 
framework of Konfrontasi, and noting that petroleum and natural gas had special 
significance for Indonesia‘s national defense and development, it stated that it was 
necessary to take measures to ensure the normal production and distribution thereof. The 
order then instructed the Governor of South Sumatra to take over immediately Shell‘s 
operations in Pladju and transfer the management of the company back to the Shell 
managers. All workers who took over Shell‘s Pladju operations were instructed to 
transfer immediately to the Governor of South Sumatra all parts of Shell that had been 
taken over, and to continue to perform their jobs as usual. The order also instructed the 
Chief of Police and the South Sumatra regional army commander to take security 
measures against any activities that could interfere with the smooth operations of the 
business. Finally, the order instructed the Minister of Basic Industry and Mining (Chaerul 
Saleh) to ensure the order was implemented by appointing an official to supervise its 
implementation. President Sukarno‘s second order, Presidential Order No 42/KOTI, was 
directed at Shell‘s operations other than Pladju. Citing the necessity of maintaining 
smooth operations in the framework of Konfrontasi, especially in the field of petroleum, 
the order instructed the Governors, regional military commanders and chiefs of police in 
East Kalimantan, Jakarta, Central Java and East Java – every place where a Shell facility 
was located – to prevent the taking over of Shell enterprises, including oil fields and 
refineries. It further instructed these officials to implement protective measures in order 
to preserve the production of the facilities. The message of Presidential Orders 41 and 42 
was eminently clear: Shell Oil was not to be touched. 
 The different tones and implications of the various decrees were reflected in the 
diplomatic arena and in conversations with leading GOI officials. Initially, the British 
government was naturally more preoccupied with the sacking and destruction of its 
embassy on 18 September, but after a few days it attempted to ascertain the status of the 
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Pladju Dibawah Pengawasan Pemerintah and Surat Perintah Presiden/Panglima Tertinggi (Sukarno) No. 
42/KOTI/1963 Tentang Larangan Pengambil-Alihan PT Shell Indonesia, each dated 19 September 1963. 
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seized companies. On 20 September the Indonesian embassy in London delivered a note 
to the British Foreign Office that stated the GOI had no intention of nationalizing the 
companies and the GOI had placed the companies under its protective supervision ―to 
ensure the continuation of production, which might be interrupted by strikes and 
lockouts, and other interferences [sic].‖ The note further said that British staff would be 
allowed to continue their work, except in cases where the British staff and management 
had left, the situation for which was still being studied. Finally, the note indicated that the 
GOI ―has taken measures to guarantee that British enterprises, in particular the oil 
industries, will continue production without interruption.‖
94
 In a meeting with British 
Foreign Office officials at which he delivered the note, the Indonesian ambassador 
claimed that the government supervision was only meant to be temporary.
95
 However, the 
note itself said nothing about when the companies would be returned to their owners or 
what ―supervision‖ meant in practice, points that were raised in the British government‘s 
formal response to the note on the same day.
96
  The GOI‘s response to the British note 
came a few days later in the form of a note dated 23 September: the note referred to 
Decree 194 and KOTI Orders 41 and 42 as the protective measures it had taken, and 
stated that the GOI ―does not intend to place certain limits on the capability of the British 
management of the various concerns to conduct their affairs.‖ The note emphasized that 
the GOI was acting to ensure continuity of production and that in cases where British 
management had left they could return when ―satisfactory conditions‖ had been 
established.
97
 The vague language over the future of the companies suggested that 
perhaps the GOI itself did not know what was going to happen, and the ambiguity did 
little to placate British fears that the companies were permanently lost. 
Meanwhile, back in Jakarta, discussions with GOI officials also reflected the 
dichotomy between the GOI‘s sharp response to the takeover of Shell versus the 
ambiguity over the future of the other taken-over companies. GOI officials initially 
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avoided meeting with British officials in Jakarta regarding the takeovers (as far as I have 
been able to determine, until October the meeting with Deputy First Minister Leimena 
described below was the only one with a GOI official at the minister level), so most of 
the discussion was via US Ambassador Jones. First Minister Djuanda assured 
Ambassador Jones that the GOI had no intention of taking over Shell‘s facilities in Pladju 
and Balikpapan and that the GOI wanted Shell‘s operations to proceed on a normal 
basis.
98
 Djuanda and other GOI officials – including Chaerul Saleh – were clearly also 
worried that the actions against Shell might jeopardize the final Contract of Work 
negotiations with Shell and the two other oil companies. However, with respect to the 
other British companies, Djuanda assured Jones that the Sukarno had issued instructions 
to halt further takeovers, but was unable to say if the GOI planned to return the seized 
companies to their owners; when pressed, Djuanda indicated their return would depend 
on events over the next week or two.
99
  On 23 September British Ambassador Gilchrist 
was finally able to meet with Deputy First Minister Leimena. Reflecting the obvious 
confusion within the GOI over the status of the seized companies, Leimena was unable to 
distinguish between the ‗observers‘ then at Shell and the ‗supervisors‘ then at P&T 
Lands, though he did indicate that the takeovers were supposed to be temporary only and 





The GOI response to the seizures of the British firms was clearly anti-takeover. 
The West Java provincial government had acted even before the central government and 
placed numerous firms, none of which were even affected by labor actions, under its 
―supervision,‖ which seemed to be aimed at safeguarding continued production of the 
companies by means of preventing labor/worker seizures. It appears that the West Java 
government was also acting on its own, without direction from the central government. 
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When the central GOI finally reacted, the clearest signal of all was that Shell Oil was not 
to be touched and should be returned immediately. Similarly, Presidential Decree 194 
unambiguously stated that there should be no more takeovers of other British companies.  
However, the status of the seized companies (other than Shell) was left vague. They were 
to be surrendered by the DPS-KBKI to various GOI ministries, but beyond this initial 
step the GOI seemed to be reluctant to take any public measures. It was unclear what the 
resulting GOI supervision meant in practice, or even in theory for that matter. Some GOI 
officials assured British and American officials that supervision was only meant to be 
temporary, while others would not speculate.  In any case, no firm timetable for the return 
of the companies, nor any description of the conditions necessary to allow for their 
return, was established.  
Several lines of inquiry regarding the seizures and the GOI response merit further 
discussion. The first concerns the role of the DPS-KBKI in the seizures of each of the 
companies other than Shell‘s Balikpapan facilities. Given that Ahem Erningpradja served 
as both GOI Labor Minister and as the leader of the DPS-KBKI, and that both Ahem and 
A.M. Datuk (who was obviously heavily involved in the seizures as his actions at Watties 
indicated) had initially been supported by President Sukarno when the split in the KBKI 
first developed (see Chapter Two, Part I, Section B3), did the seizures by the DPS-KBKI 
somehow represent GOI or Sukarno‘s intentions, perhaps as a means of ratcheting up 
pressure of Konfrontasi? The unequivocal GOI response to the seizures suggests that 
there was no such thing. The actions of President Sukarno, who as we saw in Chapter 
Three was highly critical of foreign investment, in taking such a hard line against the 
takeovers – forbidding any further actions, ordering the return of Shell – obviously 
signifies that even he was against them. The apparent initial confusion within the GOI 
over the seizures also indicates that the government was caught off guard and was unsure 
what to do. Finally, we are presented with the problem of lack of specific evidence 
regarding whether Sukarno instructed Ahem/Datuk to act and thus must draw conclusions 
based on general circumstances, which overwhelmingly suggest that DPS-KBKI was not 
acting on the government‘s behalf. 
However, it must be emphasized that while the general GOI policy clearly came 
out against the takeovers, such a position would not have prevented individual GOI 
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officials from encouraging them. Labor Minister Ahem‘s leadership of the very 
organization which organized and led most of the seizures clearly implicates him, at least 
on the surface. As we have seen in previous Chapters and will continue to see in 
subsequent Chapters, the GOI, even under Guided Democracy, was hardly a monolithic 
entity speaking with a united voice, and there was certainly much division among GOI 
officials about how to handle the question of foreign businesses and their operations in 
Indonesia. Clearly, some officials favored the GOI takeovers, while others did not. 
Hence, it was quite possible that Minister Ahem was following his own predilections. It 
might also be possible that Ahem himself was unaware of what was going on; as we saw 
earlier, it was A.M. Datuk who appeared to be publicly directing the seizures in Jakarta. 
It is conceivable, though perhaps unlikely, that Datuk may have been acting on his own, 
without Ahem‘s consent.   
If the DPS-KBKI was not acting for the GOI, what were its motivations in seizing 
the companies?  It should be recalled from Chapter Two that by this point the DPS-KBKI 
did not represent the PNI, whose support of the group had waned. It may be possible that 
the DPS-KBKI was somehow acting in cahoots with the PKI, but there is no evidence for 
this that I have found. Absent any specific evidence, I think two lines of conjecture are 
reasonable. First, it may have been a display of patriotic, nationalistic support for the 
government in the midst of all the tension created by the formation of Malaysia. Along 
these lines, it should be recalled that it was the KBKI federation that initiated the seizures 
of Dutch companies back in December 1957 that triggered the takeover of all Dutch 
companies and their subsequent nationalization. The DPS-KBKI may have been trying to 
trigger a similar wave with respect to all British companies. Here, patriotic zeal may have 
combined with genuine dislike of foreign capital, though the limited nature of the DPS-
KBKI actions (except regarding Shell, all were Jakarta-based and directed against British 
firms only, and only four companies at that) may suggest otherwise. Secondly, it may 
have been a genuine attempt by leaders of the DPS-KBKI to push the government into 
taking stronger action against Malaysia. In any case, it seems improbable that the DPS-
KBKI thought it would be allowed to maintain control over the companies, though as we 
saw in the Watties takeover it was clearly hoping to keep some of the spoils of the 
seizures (in the form of cars).  
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The second line of inquiry concerns the relationship among the strong GOI 
reaction against the takeovers (and resisting calls generally for nationalization of British 
companies), the signing of the CoWs, and the severing of economic relations with 
Malaysia. As we saw in Part I above, it was really the decision on 21 September to break 
economic relations with Malaysia which cast the die toward full Konfrontasi. In other 
words, before then there was still the possibility that Indonesia might pursue the path of 
economic stabilization, and there were of course many GOI officials, led by Minister 
Djuanda, who supported this path.  The decision to sever economic relations seems 
somewhat contradictory to the earlier decision to halt further takeovers (on 19 
September) and the decision to proceed with the signing of the CoWs with the oil 
companies (25 September) after economic relations were cut. Moreover, there were 
widespread demands to nationalize all British firms, particular from the PKI, which had 
been pushing such an outcome all week.
101
 This apparent contradiction has been 
discussed to some extent by commentators, one of whom essentially frames the decision 
as nationalization versus trade break. In this scenario, President Sukarno was under great 
pressure to take some type of forceful action, and choice boiled down to these two 
options.
102
 To nationalize the companies, however, might play into the hands of the PKI 
by allowing it to exploit and seize the mantle of nationalist sentiment (since it was the 
PKI which had been calling the loudest for nationalization), and thus the course of 
severing economic relations was taken.
103
 However, I do not think the choice was nearly 
as stark as this. 
While it is true that a seizure and nationalization of all British companies might 
have played best into the hands of the PKI, the GOI‘s swift reaction in prohibiting further 
takeovers suggests that it was not even seriously entertaining the idea of 
seizure/nationalization before the beginning of the week. While officially the GOI did not 
welcome new foreign direct investment, it seemed content to whittle away quietly at 
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existing FDI and not take any radical steps; nationalization simply was not an option that 
was realistically considered. Such an extreme measure would likely have provoked some 
sort of British retaliation or response (though in reality the British could have done little), 
and of course GOI officials knew from their nationalization of Dutch companies that 
compensation would be demanded.  Besides, their plate was full in dealing with the 
tension over Malaysia. It was also highly likely that nationalization would have resulted 
in no CoWs being signed with the big three foreign oil companies. GOI officials 
obviously were aware of the importance of the oil companies to the Indonesian economy 
and the potentially disastrous impact if their operations were halted. The GOI‘s reaction 
to the seizure of Shell‘s Pladju facility was clear testament to the principle of oil 
company exceptionalism.  Hence, insofar as there was a nascent contradiction between 
the signing of the CoWs and the trade break, there was no question that oil company 
exceptionalism dictated that the arrangements be finalized. This was certainly made even 
more imperative when trade relations were severed; had the GOI severed economic ties 
and then failed to enter into the CoWs, the Indonesian economy would have taken a 
double punch. 
Why, then, did the GOI make the puzzling and fateful decision to sever economic 
links? The answer is still unclear. It may well be as suggested above that Sukarno and the 
GOI were under pressure to take some kind of forceful action, backed into a corner of 
their own making. It is also possible that the GOI had contemplated for some time some 
form of economic retaliation, and the formation of Malaysia was seen as the right time to 
implement these measures. Indeed, one observer argues that the decision to cut trade ties 
was actually made by Sukarno when the KOTOE special committee was set up on 17 
September. The same observer suggests that the GOI was also heavily provoked – 
inadvertently - by the misquoted statement of the Tunku on 18 September that Malaysia 
would break trade relations with Indonesia, and thus decided to break relations first.
104
  A 
contributing factor certainly was the resentment of many GOI officials over the perceived 
dependence on Singapore for Indonesia‘s trade and the long-standing desire to be rid of 
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 In fact, on 17 September, General Nasution gave a speech pushing for 
Konfrontasi in which he complained of Singapore‘s grip on the Indonesian economy and 
especially the dominant economic role of regional Chinese (Singapore was Chinese 
dominated).
106
 A final factor, unbelievable as it seems, may have been that President 
Sukarno and others pushing for a trade break were simply unaware of what a negative 
impact such a trade break would have on both the Indonesian economy and international 
support for the stabilization program. Indeed, US Ambassador Jones, after a meeting with 
First Minister Djuanda on 20 September during which this very problem was discussed, 
came away with ―the distinct impression Djuanda (and other GOI leaders) have not 
thought through full implications for Indonesia of break in Indo-Malaysian trade 
relations.‖
107
 Finally, perhaps equally plausible, the GOI officials at the 21 September 
meeting at which the decision was made were aware of the possible impact but so upset 
over the formation of Malaysia that they were prepared to deal with the economic costs 
of an economic break, though certainly none could have foreseen the longer-term impact.  
 A third, related line of inquiry concerns the government‘s decision to place the 
four Jakarta-based seized companies under government supervision and not return them 
to owner control as was done with Shell Pladju. In short, if the government were not 
going to nationalize them, as government officials consistently emphasized, then why not 
return them? Why keep the companies‘ status in limbo? Given the heated atmosphere, it 
seems likely that returning the companies might have been seen as going against the tide 
of nationalism, patriotism and the Revolution and as caving in to the British. It thus could 
become an issue that could be exploited against the government, especially by the PKI.  
Hence the GOI opted for a compromise solution; take control of the companies away 
from the DPS-KBKI (which was something that apparently most GOI officials could 
agree on) and wait and see what happened after the situation had calmed down.  Such 
reasoning was given at the diplomatic level, where despite British government enquiries 
the official status of these companies remained undetermined. British Ambassador 
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Gilchrist, who had been pushing for a meeting for several weeks, at last met with Foreign 
Minister Subandrio on 12 October to discuss the takeovers. Subandrio assured Gilchrist 
that the GOI in principle intended to hand back the companies as soon as possible, though 
in certain cases this might not happen, in which case the GOI would consider 
compensation. It appeared to Gilchrist that ―deviation [i.e., a non-return] might arise 
either from ideological reasons or because of the political strength of the labour unions 
whose power Subandrio admitted and feared.‖ Subandrio also raised the possibility of 
establishing a joint Indonesian/British committee to work out the details of the returns.
108
   
Five days later, after consulting with the Foreign Office and the Indonesia Association (a 
London based group of British companies with interests in Indonesia), Gilchrist wrote to 
Subandrio agreeing to the formation of such a committee, the purpose of which would be 
to ensure restoration of full control to British management of the companies under 
supervision and to arrange for removal of protective surveillance over British firms when 
conditions permitted.  Gilchrist further proposed that the committee be restricted to 
members of the British embassy and the GOI Ministry of Foreign Affairs, though of 
course others could be called in for advice.
109
 However, neither Subandrio nor any other 
GOI official ever responded to the letter (despite several inquiries by the British 
embassy), and the joint committee was never formed.
110
 
Another reason for keeping the companies may have been the possibility now 
open for GOI ministers and officials in charge of the companies to gain access to 
resources and new patronage opportunities. As we shall see in the next Chapter, this was 
clearly a factor in 1964 when most British companies were placed under GOI control, but 
in the case of the British companies taken over in September 1963 this element appears to 
have been minimal (except with respect to Dunlop Rubber). Moreover, as we shall see in 
the next section, ―supervision‖ in practice was different for each company. 
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B. Impact of Government Intervention on the Companies. 
What, exactly, did government supervision mean? The impact of GOI 
intervention on the seized companies was mixed and ranged from complete takeover to 
nominal supervision. These results in part mirrored the initial responses of the different 
levels of the GOI to the takeovers as described above. Generally speaking, the firms 
placed under supervision of the West Java government experienced no significant 
interference. By contrast, the central government appointed supervisory teams for each of 
the four firms in Jakarta initially taken over by the DPS-KBKI on 17 September 
(Harrisons & Crosfield, JA Watties, Dunlop Rubber and Commercial Union insurance), 
and these teams exercised different levels of control. In general, it appears that the 
government officials under whose supervision the companies were placed were given 
great discretion over how to implement it. Finally, with respect to Shell, oil company 
exceptionalism was again on display as Shell‘s Pladju refinery operations were 
immediately returned to Shell management. However, in a curious dichotomy that 
exposed divisions within the GOI, the limits of oil company exceptionalism were also 
apparent, as Shell‘s Balikpapan operations were taken over by the regional army 
commander of East Kalimantan for the remainder of 1963 and not returned to Shell 
control until late December. These different experiences are all described below.  
1. Firms under West Java Provincial Supervision.  
On 20 September, a day after the issuance of West Java Governor Mashudi‘s 
decrees on British firms in West Java, the West Java Estate Inspection Office issued 
another decree that suggested supervision in West Java would not be stringent.
111
  The 
measures prescribed in the short directive did not appear to be onerous and clearly were 
designed to ensure that existing management remained responsible for managing the 
estates.  This directive stated that the purpose of supervision was to safeguard production 
on the estates. Responsibility for production, the labor force and security remained with 
existing management, and the relations between the management and the head office 
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should continue as usual.  The directive stipulated that the supervisor was to be involved 
in the following ways: first, contact between management and head office should be 
made with the knowledge of the supervisor, second, the management should notify the 
supervisor of all plans concerning general policy matters at the estates, third, all principal 
measures taken by the management should be with the knowledge of the supervisors, and 
fourth the relations between management and the supervisors should be arranged so that 
there were no bottlenecks. Finally, the directive specified that investigation of financial 
measures could only be undertaken by the Chief of the Estate Inspectorate Office of West 
Java.  The supervisor‘s role was in essence limited to being aware of what was happening 
on the estates and at the management level.  The stipulation that only the Chief of the 
Estate Inspectorate Office could investigate financial measures seemed to be a clear 
warning to the supervisors to stay away from financial matters.   
Consistent with the foregoing and with other decrees issued by West Java 
Governor Mashudi on 19 September, in practice the government of West Java exercised 
very little supervision over the British firms it had placed under its wing. Supervisory 
teams were appointed for many of these firms, but generally the supervisory teams were 
not stationed on site and often only rarely even came around to the companies. No 
existing management was replaced, and there was no reported interference in 
management at all. The BAT factory in Cirebon was initially the subject of a conflict for 
control between the West Java provincial government and the mayor of Cirebon, who on 
20 September tried to install his own supervisory board. This move was successfully 
resisted by the local managers, however, and was put to rest when a letter was received 
from the Governor of West Java appointing a two-man supervisory team.
112
  
―Supervision‖ was perhaps the most visible at P&T Lands, though even there it 
did not result in interference in management or operations until January 1964 when the 
company was actually taken over by workers for several days (see Chapter Five).
113
 On 
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20 September Lt. Col Sami Rahdjo along with a team of 10 assistants arrived at the P&T 
Lands‘ headquarters in Subang.
114
  Lt. Col Rahdjo had been appointed by Governor 
Mashudi on 19 September to be the supervisor of P&T Lands, and he was directly 
responsible to the Governor himself.
115
 P&T Lands was initially unclear what the scope 
of the supervision would be – to what extent would the supervisory team involve itself in 
the business operations of the company? The company itself felt that it had little choice 
but to accept the supervision and to protest only when the same actually resulted in 
interference with normal business operations. The company manager did believe, though, 
that the supervision would remain indefinitely and that the company would never recover 
its previous position.
116
  Despite these apprehensions, however, for the first few months 
the supervisory team exercised only nominal supervision and did not interfere with the 
company‘s operations, though team did carefully observe the company.
117
    
2. Commercial Union/Ocean Accident.  
This office was taken over on 17 September by the DPS-KBKI labor federation 
and the British manager and his assistant were ejected from the office.  Apparently DPS-
KBKI control ended on September 20-1, but it is not clear who was in charge 
immediately thereafter. Pursuant to Presidential Decree 194, the Department of Finance 
was the GOI ministry put in charge of the company, and sometime in late September, a 
supervisory team led by a Lt. Colonel Sulaiman was installed in the office. Around the 
same time, the Surabaya office of the company was also taken over by Sulaiman‘s team. 
Lt. Colonel Sulaiman exercised full managerial powers; the British manager and his 
assistants were never allowed to return to the office, and the head office in London had 
almost no contact with the Jakarta office. Thus the company was effectively taken over 
by the GOI in late September. The head office allowed the British manager to remain in 
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Jakarta for a few months, but when there was no change in the situation finally withdrew 
him in early February 1964. Interestingly, in April 1964 Sulaiman tried to revive the 
operations of the company by sending out letters to various customers, but Commercial 
Union got wind of the effort and disavowed all responsibility for the office‘s affairs.
118
 
3. Harrisons & Crosfield Jakarta Office. 
Apparently DPS-KBKI control over this office also ended around September 20-
1, but the two British managers were also not allowed to return to the office. As the office 
was involved in both trade and estate management, supervision of the office pursuant to 
Presidential Decree 194 initially fell to both the Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Sadjarwo) and the Minister of Trade (Dr. Suharto). On 3 October a supervisory 
team led by an official from the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs, Danardjo 
Hadisasono, was appointed and assumed complete control over the office and 
management. On 10 October Danardjo met with the H&C British managers and told them 
that although they were being excluded from management and were no longer allowed to 
enter the office or to contact the estate managers, he still requested and expected their full 
cooperation. Danardjo also said that nationalization was out of the question and these 
were temporary measures, and his primary goal was to ensure the smooth operation of the 
business (he also indicated that profits and remittances would not be affected). Danardjo 
further made it clear that the labor unions would not have any power whatsoever. As the 
months passed, the old management did meet fairly regularly with the Indonesian staff as 
well as the supervisory team, but they clearly had no management power or authority. 
The seven estates in West Java and Sulawesi that were managed by the office were also 
put under government supervision. These estates were already managed by Indonesian 
nationals so there was no change in management personnel. The supervision on the 
estates apparently was very light and was undertaken by management from neighboring 
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state-owned estates who did not reside on the H&C managed estates.
119
 H&C‘s larger 
Medan (North Sumatra) office was not affected by these events and continued to operate 
under the control of H&C.   
4. JA Wattie.  
 The two British managers of Watties were also prohibited from entering the 
office after 17 September, and at some point in early October a GOI team from the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs was appointed to supervise and manage the 
office. Apparently the supervisory team had little involvement or contact with the office, 
and the pre-takeover Indonesian staff operated the office along normal lines, meeting 
regularly after office hours with the British ex-managers. Thus it appeared that except for 
barring the two British managers from the office, little had changed. Few details 
regarding the situation on the Watties-managed estates, which numbered around 25 and 
were scattered across Java, are available.  As we have seen, supervision on the West Java 
estates by the West Java provincial authorities was nominal and was apparently 
undertaken by managers from neighboring state-owned estates who did not reside on the 
estates. With respect to the other estates managed by Watties in East and Central Java, 
apparently there were no cases of British or European staff being removed from their 
places or of government officials establishing supervision.
120
 In sum, from the very 
limited information available, initially there appeared to be little change at Watties and 
the estates it managed except for the ejection of British management in the Jakarta office.  
This treatment thus appears to differ somewhat from the treatment of H&C‘s Jakarta 
office and estates, though in neither case is it clear regarding the extent to which the 
supervised offices and estates were cut off from the companies‘ operations (for example, 
what happened to revenues? were they sent on to the British owners?).  
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5. Dunlop Rubber.  
The situation at Dunlop Rubber was a sharp contrast to the other three companies 
whose Jakarta offices were seized. Here, the owner-appointed foreign managers were 
eventually able to regain control of the company, though it remained under GOI 
supervision. Pursuant to Presidential Decree 194, the company was placed under the 
Ministry of Basic Industry and Mining (headed by Minister Chaerul Saleh). In early 
October, the Ministry appointed a supervisory team for the company headed by Sardju 
Ismunandar, the assistant minister for Basic Industry and Mining (and who had served as 
the head of BAPPIT, the GOI body that controlled the nationalized Dutch industrial and 
mining companies). Although the two Dunlop foreign managers were still denied access 
to the office (they had not been back since 17 September), Sardju did indicate that the 
company would be returned under certain conditions that had yet to be determined. In the 
meantime, Goodyear had since 17 September suspended production of Dunlop tires.
121
  
Around 21 October, Dunlop‘s foreign management was invited to return to the 
office. The reason for this apparently had to do with an attempt by the Ministry of Labor 
(headed by Minister Ahem) to force Goodyear (whose Bogor factory produced tires for 
Dunlop) to release Dunlop tires to offices of Dunlop which were then controlled by the 
Ministry of Labor (it is unclear where these offices were located). Goodyear refused to do 
this on the grounds (a) that such a move would violate Goodyear‘s international contract 
with Dunlop, and (b) that because Goodyear was responsible to the Minister of Basic 
Industry and Mining, it could only take orders from him. Several other factors were also 
involved which went against the Ministry of Labor‘s attempt – as the US embassy saw it 
– to take over some of Dunlop‘s operations, including the withdrawal by Dunlop 
headquarters of the manager‘s check writing authority, as well as the cooperation of the 
chief of police of Bogor, who had closed the warehouse where the Dunlop tires were 
stored. Afterward there was a meeting among representatives of Dunlop, Goodyear and 
the Ministry of Basic Industry and Mining at which, after much negotiation, it was agreed 
that Dunlop-appointed management would return to the office and continue, but under 
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continuing supervision of the Ministry of Basic Industry and Mining.
122
 There are 
obviously some missing details to the story, but it appeared as though interference from 
the Ministry of Labor as well as the obstinacy of Goodyear resulted in the decision by the 
Ministry of Basic Industry and Mining to bring back Dunlop management. This sequence 
of events also suggests that the Minister of Basic Industry and Mining Chaerul Saleh was 
in conflict with the Labor Ministry Ahem over Dunlop. 
From then on owner-appointed management seemed to retain control of Dunlop 
for another year and one-half, though the relationship with the GOI supervisory team was 
often uneasy. Dunlop-appointed management‘s power slowly declined however, and the 
gradual decline in control, coupled with the uncertainty generated by the GOI takeover of 
the Goodyear tire plant in Bogor in March 1965, led to the withdrawal of the British 
managers in July 1965.
123
 
6. Shell Oil.  
The situation at Shell‘s facilities was the most bizarre of all and illustrates the 
divisions within the GOI and the limits of oil company exceptionalism.  The Pladju 
refinery in South Sumatra was restored to Shell control on 20 September, meaning that 
Shell management only lost control of the facility for one day.
124
 Thereafter there was 
little trouble at the facility.  A ‗commissar‘ was appointed by the Minister of Basic 
Industry and Mining in accordance with Presidential Order No. 41/KOTI to ensure 
compliance with the order, and his role in practice was to act as liaison with the GOI and 
help enforce security measures.  Thus, Shell management remained in control.
125
 In 
addition, the CoW with Shell (and Stanvac and Caltex) was signed on 25 September; the 
takeovers at Shell had not derailed the new arrangements under which the big three oil 
companies would operate in Indonesia. However, the situation at Shell‘s Balikpapan 
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(Chaerul Saleh) dated 21 September; the individual appointed was one Colonel Harjono.  
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refinery in East Kalimantan was completely different. There, the East Kalimantan 
military commander, Colonel Soehardjo, seemingly in defiance of Minister Chaerul Saleh 
but with the apparent support of President Sukarno, was in control of the facility until late 
December 1963. Soehardjo‘s actions were a clear violation of Shell‘s Contract of Work. 
That Shell could actually sign the CoW when the situation at the Balikpapan facility was 
so unsettled and its employees were under house arrest and suffering (see below) did not 
reflect well on Shell (though it certainly reflected the large dollar amounts at stake). 
On 21 September Minister of Basic Industry and Mining Chaerul Saleh issued 
two decrees regarding Shell‘s Balikpapan facility.
126
  The first decree, Decree No 635, 
appointed Colonel Soehardjo as the GOI Commissioner and Atung Kontawa, the 
chairman of the Ministry of Basic Industry and Mining‘s Oil Supervisory team, as 
Deputy Commissioner pursuant to Presidential Order 41/KOTI.
127
 The preamble to the 
decree, citing the importance of oil and gas to the national defense, economy and 
reconstruction, and the necessity of uniformity of action between the people and the 
government in the context of Konfrontasi, stated that for the sake of supervising and 
safeguarding Shell in Kalimantan it was necessary to appoint a GOI representative to act 
as Commissioner. The decree instructed the two officials to (i) implement supervision 
over and safeguard the production and operations of Shell in Kalimantan, (ii) protect the 
persons and property of British nationals, (iii) direct the supervisory team to be 
established by the Minister of Basic Industry and Mining, and (iv) review the personnel 
situation and where necessary put in order all matters at variance with the GOI‘s policy 
of Indonesianization (referring to the replacement of foreign expatriates by Indonesian 
nationals).  Minister Saleh‘s second decree, Decree No 636, established a security team 
for Shell‘s Kalimantan facilities.  This team was to report directly to the GOI-appointed 
Commissioner and was to be comprised of individuals (the identity and number of whom 
were not stated) from the provincial government of East Kalimantan, the Oil Supervisory 
team at Balikpapan, the armed forces, the workers of Shell, and the National Front. The 
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team‘s duties were to exercise supervision over and safeguard Shell in Balikpapan. 
Presumably this ―security team‖ of Decision 636 was actually the ―supervisory team‖ 
referred to in Decision 635, even though it had a different name. In any case, the general 
structure seemed clear: Colonel Soehardjo, the regional military commander in East 
Kalimantan, would, as the appointed GOI Commissioner, be in charge of supervising and 
safeguarding Shell, and he would be assisted by a security team made up of individuals 
from different organizations.          
As events unfolded, however, it appears that Minister Chaerul Saleh was unable 
to control Colonel Soehardjo, who went well beyond what Minister Saleh had intended 
for Shell‘s Balikpapan facilities. As noted previously, Soehardjo on 17 September had 
taken control of the Balikpapan facility by instructing all Shell‘s expatriates (some 66 
employees, including top management) to remain at home.  These employees were in 
effect under house arrest, and they were not allowed to communicate with the outside 
world (thus, no one knew what was happening to them). On 24 September, Shell reported 
that Soehardjo had agreed to consider returning Balikpapan to Shell‘s control provided 
none of the management at Balikpapan were British nationals.
128
 On 26 September, US 
Ambassador Jones received a letter dated 23 September from the Shell Balikpapan 
manager that had been smuggled out.  The letter appealed for urgent assistance and 
indicated the expatriates there were suffering from conditions equaling imprisonment. 
Another message from Shell Balikpapan to the British, American and other embassies 
indicated that the expatriates were in protective custody and requested immediate 
evacuation.
129
  Then, on 25 September, General Yani, the army commander and perhaps 
most powerful military figure in the country, apparently issued an order to release those 
in custody.
130
   These events, of course, were occurring just as Shell was finalizing its 
CoW; clearly, Shell was not about to let the situation in Balikpapan affect its future in 
Indonesia. Finally, on 28 September, Shell‘s Balikapan expatriates were allowed to 
resume working.  
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As it turned out, Shell‘s expatriates were only allowed to resume work because of 
the arrival on 28 September of a KOTI team appointed by the central government.
131
 As 
General Yani essentially headed KOTI in his position as chief of staff of KOTI, 
presumably it was Yani who appointed and sent the team to ensure that his 25 September 
order to release the foreign staff was being carried out. The KOTI team leader was a 
Colonel Sunarso, and the team was accompanied by representatives from the Ministry of 
Basic Industry and Mining, the US and British consuls, and senior officials from Shell 
Jakarta.  After a day‘s investigation, Sunarso told the senior Shell representatives that 
because of the tense situation, it would be best if a temporary liaison team consisting of 
local Indonesian staff members of Shell were formed to serve as a bridge between 
expatriates and Indonesian personnel.  This liaison team would serve until conditions 
permitted a resumption of direct contact between expatriates and Indonesian personnel. 
Senior Shell officials, eager to defuse the situation, agreed to the temporary arrangement.  
At a meeting the next morning (29 September) of Shell representatives, Colonel 
Soehardjo and the KOTI team, Soehardjo indicated he supported the idea of a liaison 
team and said he would appoint such a team after further discussions between his office 
and Shell. A meeting to discuss the appointments was arranged for the next morning 
(September 30) because Soehardjo was leaving town the afternoon of the 30. However, 
that meeting never took place; instead, before he left town, Soehardjo appointed a team of 
13 ―assistant commissars.‖
132
   
Through a variety of measures, including the expansion of the authority of the 13 
assistant commissars far beyond what had been anticipated by Shell, Colonel Soehardjo 
was able to maintain control of the facility.  For example, direct contact between 
expatriates and Indonesians other than the 13 assistant commissars was prohibited, and 
the assistant commissars were regularly unavailable to act as communication channels.  
This resulted in intermittent communications among the oil field, the pipeline and the 
refinery. Expatriates were not even allowed to telephone each other except via 
representatives of the National Front, and even medical doctors could not give orders to 
staff. Contact with the world outside Balikpapan was extremely limited, and at one point 
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in early October foreigners were even prohibited from speaking on the phone.  More 
importantly, none of the foreign staff was making any management decisions; the 
assistant commissars had completely usurped their authority.  Instructions from the 
foreign managers were ignored by the assistant commissars, and unauthorized staff 
signed a number of contracts and over 80 payment vouchers.  Further, changes in 
Indonesian personnel were frozen as of 30 September.
133
  A team of Shell expatriates 
from Sumatra was even prevented by local authorities from visiting the facilities. Shell-
appointed management was clearly no longer in control of the Balikpapan facility and the 
nearby oil fields.  
There was little that Shell could do but appeal to the central government in Jakarta 
to intervene, specifically to Minister of Basic Industry and Mining Chaerul Saleh (under 
whose jurisdiction Shell fell).  In the absence of danger to person, Shell obviously did not 
want simply to pull out the expatriates already in place, as such a gesture might be 
interpreted as tantamount to surrender. In early October it began working on a plan to 
replace the British expatriates with other foreign nationals, but it was evidently hoping 
that the situation would, somehow, resolve itself.
134
  Finally, on 19 October, Shell 
representatives met with Minister Chaerul Saleh, who had clearly gone to great efforts to 
avoid meeting them. The Shell representatives described what was happening and then 
proposed a plan by which they would overhaul the entire management of Balikpapan by 
removing all current 66 expatriates, replacing 27 expatriates with Indonesians, injecting 
34 new non-British expatriates, and essentially eliminating the other five positions held 
by foreigners. Saleh described Soehardjo as a ―cowboy‖ and a ―bad joke‖ and indicated 
that things would never be satisfactory as long as Soehardjo was in control. However, he 
indicated that removing Soehardjo was a very difficult matter; he would consider sending 
Ibnu Sutowo (a very important GOI oil official, see Chapter Three) to Balikpapan to 
check out the situation.  He also suggested that Shell contact other senior GOI officials, 
such as First Minister Djuanda, Foreign Minister Subandrio, and General Yani, the idea 
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being that only pressure from these men could get President Sukarno to remove 
Soehardjo from Balikpapan. Saleh also requested that the situation in Balikpapan be 
documented, a request that Shell happily complied with.
135
  The meeting clearly indicated 
that Minister Saleh had little control over Soehardjo and in Saleh‘s view Sukarno was the 
only one who had the power to remove him.  
Unfortunately for Shell, the meeting with Chaerul Saleh on 19 October changed 
nothing over the next two months. The situation remained the same in Balikpapan, and 
even worsened, as Shell management continued to be effectively frozen out and acts of 
harassment continued.
136
 On 4 November Shell representatives saw Minister Chaerul 
Saleh and First Minister Djuanda, both of whom commented on the difficulty of 
removing Soehardjo given the favor he enjoyed with President Sukarno.
137
  On 
November 13, Minister Saleh at another meeting with Shell representatives said he had 
appointed Sutowo to deal with the situation. Saleh also indicated that he would shortly 
issue new regulations which would abolish the post of GOI Commissioner and assistant 
commissars in an effort to reduce Soehardjo‘s control over Shell Balikpapan.  He even 
suggested that he might visit Balikpapan himself and take Soehardjo, who was currently 
in Jakarta, with him. Saleh made it clear, however, that he had no power to remove 
Soehardjo from his positions as military commander for East Kalimantan and regional 
head of the National Front, and thus the situation would continue to be difficult as long as 
there were British expatriates.
138
 However, Saleh did not issue any decrees, nor did he 
visit Balikpapan, and nor, for that matter, did Sutowo.  Meanwhile, Shell began 
withdrawing the expatriates in early November, though it was unable to replace them yet.  
In mid-December, things finally began to change, and by the end of the month 
newly-appointed Shell management was in control of the facility.  On 12 December, 
Minister Chaerul Saleh issued a decree that, inter alia, approved Shell‘s new personnel 
program and eliminated the assistant commissars.
139
  However, on 18 December this 
decree was rescinded (the explanation given was that it needed improvement), which 
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 Surat Keputusan Menteri Perdatam no 932/M/Perdatam/63 dated 12 December 1963. 
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forced Shell‘s new Balikpapan management team (headed by an American), finally 
assembled, to remain in Jakarta. On 20 December Minister Saleh issued a new, slightly 
modified decree,
140
 the primary difference with the 14 December decree being that 
although the assistant commissar system was rescinded, it could be reinstated upon 
appeal. In addition, Minister Saleh on 18 December also issued a separate decree which 
rescinded Decree No. 636 of 21 September, meaning that the security team set up by 
Decree No. 636 was now abolished.
141
 Interestingly, these decrees were given to Shell 
only – they were not made public, though copies found their way to the US embassy. 
Shell‘s new management team, consisting of seven expatriates and 12 Indonesians, left 
Jakarta and arrived in Balikpapan on 21 December.  Colonel Soehardjo was conveniently 
out of town, but the assistant commissar system had already been abolished and there was 
no trouble at all.  The new management team was immediately able to take control of 
Shell‘s operations in Balikpapan and the nearby oil field, without incident.
142
 Stiles, the 
new American manager, later told the British Embassy that Soehardjo, at a meeting on 19 
December with union leaders (a few days before the new management team arrived), 
claimed that he had gotten the 12 December decree rescinded and the new decree left 
open the possibility of a return of the commissar system. He also explained that the new 
decree had to be complied with and told the unions not to make any trouble.
143
  
What is the explanation for the bizarre series of events at Shell‘s Balikpapan 
facility in the fall of 1963 which defied the general rule of oil company exceptionalism? 
How was Colonel Soehardjo able to take over Shell‘s installations for a three month 
period in defiance of the Contract of Work as well as Minister Chaerul Saleh and others 
who supported Shell‘s operations in Indonesia? The answer probably has to do with the 
relationship between President Sukarno and Colonel Soehardjo. As Chaerul Saleh had 
intimated to Shell, Soehardjo was close to President Sukarno and could not be removed 
without Sukarno‘s approval; indeed, he had the reputation ―as a ‗palace man‘ who would 
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often report directly to President Sukarno even before he reported to Army headquarters,‖ 
a habit that did not sit well with General Yani.
144
 Whether Soehardjo was acting on 
President Sukarno‘s behalf or on his own is unclear, but clearly President Sukarno was 
protecting and even tolerant of Suhardjo‘s actions (in spite of Sukarno‘s personal 
involvement in the negotiations with the oil companies in late May/early June in Tokyo). 
Within the context of the Sukarno/Soehardjo relationship, it seems likely that Soehardjo‘s 
support for and prosecution of Konfrontasi was a key factor. As we saw in Part I above, 
Soehardjo as the military commander of East Kalimantan had assisted in the training, or 
at least permitted the training of, members of the TNKU group which had crossed into 
and initiated the rebellion in Brunei in December 1962. Moreover, East Kalimantan was 
strategically located along the border with Sarawak and Sabah (where most of the 
physical fighting in Konfrontasi occurred); while apparently most of the military 
incursions prior to September 1963 originated from West Kalimantan, not East 
Kalimantan, incursions into Sabah that began after Konfrontasi broke out could only 
come from East Kalimantan.
145
 It seems likely that President Sukarno, the impetus behind 
Konfrontasi, was willing to provide Soehardjo with abundant leeway, provided Soehardjo 
conducted Konfrontasi in accordance with Sukarno‘s wishes. That is, Sukarno was 
willing to overlook Soehardjo‘s seizure of Shell‘s facilities in defiance of the CoW as 
long as Soehardjo supported Sukarno‘s Konfrontasi efforts. 
 Why, then, was Colonel Soehardjo so determined to control Shell? Aside from 
the question of whether Soehardjo was acting on behalf of President Sukarno, Soehardjo 
clearly held some strong feelings against the British, evidenced not only by his words and 
actions but also by his returning the facility to Shell control once British personnel were 
gone and the non-British management team arrived. This may of course have something 
to do in part with patriotic feelings stirred up by Konfrontasi, but Soehardjo‘s strong anti-
British feelings ―reportedly resulted from the suffering his family experienced at the 
hands of the British at the time of the battle of Surabaya in the first year of the 
Revolution.‖
146
  Thus, it may be that Soehardjo‘s actions were more anti-British than 
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anti-Shell (though Shell was British-owned). It is also possible, though there is no 
evidence, that Soehardjo thought the facilities of Shell – its refining operations and 
supply of oil – would be very useful for the army if significant fighting broke out in 
Kalimantan. In any case, something in December 1963 happened – it is unclear what the 
deciding factor was – that either changed Soehardjo‘s mind or his influence with 
Sukarno. It may simply have been that Shell, with the replacement of most of its 
expatriates in Balikpapan and the arrival of a brand new management team in Jakarta in 
mid-December – had finally met Soehardjo‘s clear precondition of expulsion of British 
nationals. It is also possible that Sukarno bowed to pressure from Chaerul Saleh, General 
Yani and others who realized the importance of Shell‘s continuing its operations 




7. Status at End of 1963. 
At the end of 1963, the status of the seized British companies was as follows. 
Three of the four British firms in Jakarta which were taken over by the DPS-KBKI in 
mid-September 1963 – Harrisons & Crosfield Jakarta office, Commercial Union 
insurance, and JA Watties - remained under GOI control. In these three cases, expatriate 
management had been displaced; at Watties, it appeared that Indonesian staff were 
mostly managing operations, while at the other two GOI representatives were clearly in 
charge. While the owners of all three firms had lost control of management, at least in the 
case of Watties it appeared that operations at the office and on the 25 plus estates 
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managed by the firm continued as normal, suggesting that there may not have been a real 
break with ownership. The owner-appointed management of Dunlop Rubber, the fourth 
British company taken over by the DPS-KBKI in September, was able to regain control 
of the company after about a month, though a GOI supervisory team remained on 
premises and seemed to interfere continually in varying degrees. With respect to Shell 
Oil, its operations at the Pladju refinery had been restored to owner control after one day, 
but its operations at Balikpapan had been returned to owner control only in late 
December. As for the numerous British enterprises placed under supervision by the 
Governor of West Java, supervision was either non-existent or nominal at best; there are 
no reported cases of significant interference in management or control. Outside Jakarta, 
West Java, and Shell‘s operations in Pladju (South Sumatra) and East Kalimantan, the 
only other reported takeover activity was (a) the appointment by the Ministry of Peoples 
Industry of a joint ‗supervisor‘ for the Semarang (Central Java) offices of Shell, BAT and 
Maclaine Watson (however, this person in no way interfered with operations of 
management and apparently had little contact with the companies) and (b) as noted 
previously, the takeover by the Department of  Finance of Commercial Union‘s office in 
Surabaya. 
Interestingly, the Governor of East Java in early October issued two regulations 
involving British firms there. These decrees did not seek to control or supervise the 
companies, but instead sought to establish ―assistance teams‖ that could help improve 
production at the firms.  The teams were meant to be composed of various officials from 
the East Java provincial government.  These decrees only came to light in mid-November 
when the East Java Governor sent them to four British manufacturing companies in the 
Surabaya area and asked for suggestions about how to implement them. The companies 
never responded, and nothing more was heard regarding the decrees except once in mid-
January, when, as we shall see in Chapter Five, the teams made a brief appearance. The 
intent behind the decrees is not clear, though it may have been an attempt to forestall any 
labor union takeovers (the idea being that the Governor could argue that government 
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teams were already in place in the companies and so there was no need for the labor 




III.  The Takeover of Malaysian Enterprises and 
Aftermath. 
 
In contrast to the official government ―no touch‖ policy toward British companies 
in the fall of 1963, the GOI policy in the case of Malaysian enterprises was to place them 
all under government control. There was no equivocation by the GOI in the case of these 
enterprises, and these takeovers were clearly motivated by foreign policy considerations, 
primarily the outbreak of formal Konfrontasi in September 1963. There were no reports 
of labor union or worker activity which precipitated the imposition of GOI control, 
another indication that the reason was strictly related to Konfrontasi. Unfortunately, 
however, there is little reliable information available with respect to the takeover of these 
companies. In particular, it is unclear how many firms were taken over; a GOI report in 
early 1967 claimed that 20 Malaysian rubber remilling firms had been taken over, but I 
have found evidence of only 10 (see Appendix A). (This is in addition to about 20 estates 
owned by individual Malaysians.)  In general, the best we can do for the moment is to 
describe the measures the GOI took against these businesses.
149
  These initial measures 
appeared chaotic, impromptu and uncoordinated, suggesting that the various authorities 
and officials of the GOI were not altogether on the same page.  
The first measure taken was the revocation on 15 October 1963 of the business 
license of the Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation, a bank headquartered in 
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Singapore, by the Indonesian Central Bank.
150
  It is unclear how big OCBC‘s operations 
in Indonesia were, but presumably it had branch offices in at least Jakarta and Medan (the 
business capital of North Sumatra which had a large ethnic Chinese population). The 
revocation of OCBC‘s license was taken even before the GOI announced what measures 
it was going to take against Malaysian firms. 
On 29 October 1963, President Sukarno issued a decree under which the GOI 
took control over (dikuasai) all rubber remilling enterprises and smokehouses that were 
partially or wholly owned or financed by either Malaysian citizens or people who resided 
in Malaysia.
151
 The decree cited national economic development and confrontation in the 
economic field against Malaysia as reasons for the measure. The decree specified that the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs was to take control over (penguasaan) and 
be responsible for these enterprises, though no firms were specifically named.
152
 It also 
indicated that screening to determine ownership status should be turned over to provincial 
governments. Though the decree was limited to remilling companies and smokehouses 
instead of all Malaysian companies, it was expansive in three ways; first, it included 
firms that were only partially owned/financed as well as fully owned/financed, second it 
included not just firms that were owned but also firms that were financed, and third it 
included not just businesses partially or wholly owned/financed by Malaysian citizens but 
also by anyone who resided there.  
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presumably it was in preparation for the assumption of control over the Malaysian firms.  Likewise, 
whether Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs Sadjarwo was acting on his own initiative or was 
under orders from higher authorities is also unclear. Surat Keputusan Bersama Menteri Perindustrian 
Rakyat (A. Saleh) dan Menteri Pertanian dan Agraria (Sadjarwo) No. 139/SK/X/63 dan SK 236/PA/1963 
Tentang Penjerahan Urusan Rumah Pengasapan Karet dan Urusan Perusahaan Remilling Karet Kepada 
Menteri Pertanian Dan Agraria, dated 12 October 1963. 
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The next measure was a regulation issued by Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs Sadjarwo on 31 October that again indicated GOI policy was not yet 
coordinated.
153
 This regulation established a ‗Center for Rubber Estates in Riau Province‘ 
(Pusat Perkebunan Karet Negara Riau or ‗PPN Karet Riau‘) whose function was to  
control (penguasaan) and manage (menjelenggarakan ketatalaksanaan) estates, rubber 
remilling firms and smokehouse that (a) were partially or wholly owned or financed by 
Malaysian citizens or people residing in Malaysia and (b) were located only in Riau 
province (on Sumatra island). It is unclear why the regulation was limited geographically 
to Riau only.  The regulation did not even mention Sukarno‘s decree on Malaysian 
remilling and smokehouse firms issued two days before, though the language of 
―partially or wholly owned or financed by Malaysian citizens or residents of Malaysia‖ 
was practically identical. Instead, the regulation stated that the decision to take over the 
companies was reached during discussions between the Minister of Agriculture and 
Agrarian Affairs and representatives of KOTI/KOTOE on 25 October, and that the 
measures were being taken while awaiting a decision from the President. Of course, only 
a few days had elapsed since the issuance of Sukarno‘s decree on 29 October, so it is 
perhaps understandable that there was some confusion, but certainly there was an obvious 
lack of communication. In addition, the limiting of the regulation to Riau province is also 
very puzzling. The regulation did not state who the members of the PPN Karet Riau 
were. It did provide, however, that until the PPN Karet Riau was formed, matters would 
be handled by a preparatory body which was headed by an official from the BPU PPN 
Karet (the management board for state-owned rubber companies) and consisted mostly of 
officials from the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs based in Riau province.  
In implementing GOI control, the preparatory body was also charged with ensuring the 
continuation of production and sales.  The Governor of Riau would provide advice to the 
body, and the Governor was also responsible for ‗screening‘ the enterprises, which 
presumably meant ascertaining the ownership of the businesses to ensure they were 
owned/financed by Malaysians. 
                                                 
153
 Peraturan Menteri Pertanian Dan Agraria (Sadjarwo) No 23 Tahun 1963 Tentang Pelaksanaan 
Penguasaan Perkebunan-Perkebunan, Remilling-Remilling dan Rumah-Rumah Asap Didaerah Tingkat I 
Riau, dated 31 October 1963.  
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On 27 November, President Sukarno issued another decree that effectively placed 
all Malaysian companies under the control (penguasaan) of the GOI.
154
  This decree thus 
in theory significantly expanded Sukarno‘s decree of 29 October, which was limited only 
to rubber remilling and smokehouse firms.  Specifically, the decree ―froze‖ (dibekukan) 
and then placed under GOI control (dikuasai) all companies in the field of trade, 
production (agriculture or mechanical), and service (including ships and other means of 
transport) that were partially or completely ―owned/financed/controlled‖ by Malaysian 
citizens or those who resided in Malaysia. The decree cited the development of the 
national economy as well as Konfrontasi against Malaysia in the economic field as 
reasons for the measure. The decree instructed various GOI ministers and officials to 
implement the measure, and provided that all implementing measures would be 
coordinated by the Commander of the First Operation of KOTOE.   Thus it appeared that 
KOTOE would in effect be in charge of the takeovers. In addition, the decree specified 
that ―screening measures‖ (not defined, although presumably meant to ascertain 
ownership) were to be undertaken primarily by provincial Governors.        
Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs Sadjarwo then issued two rather 
confusing regulations that attempted to coordinate with the two Presidential decrees, 
though again the process did not appear to be particularly smooth. On 16 November the 
Minister issued Regulation 25, which was designed to implement Sukarno‘s decree of 29 
October; however, something was wrong with the decree, and it had to be amended and 
then reissued again on 10 December.
155
  The final version stated that control 
(penguasaan) and management (ketatalaksanaan) over the rubber remilling and 
smokehouse firms referred to in President Sukarno‘s decree of 29 October would be 
given to the BPU PPN Karet, the overall managing board for the state-owned rubber 
companies. (This seemed to contrast slightly with the Minister‘s Regulation 23, which in 
the case of Riau indicated that Malaysian companies in Riau would be controlled by a 
                                                 
154
 Keputusan Presiden (Sukarno) No. 241/1963 Tentang Pembekuan dan Penguasaan Semua Perusahaan 
Jang Sebagian atau Seluruhnya Dimiliki/Dimodali/Dikuasi oleh Pihak-Pihak Bewarga-Negara ―Malaysia‖ 
atau Warga Negara Republik Indonesia Jang Berdomicili/Bertempat-Tinggal di Daerah ―Malaysia,‖ dated 
27 November 1963.   
155
 Peraturan Menteri Pertanian dan Agraria (Sadjarwo) No. 25 Tahun 1963 (Disempurnakan), Tentang 
Pelaksanaan Keputusan Presiden/Panglima Besar Kotoe No. 7/KOTOE/63, dated 16 November 1963, and 
modified and reissued on 10 December 1963. I have not found a copy of the 16 November version. 
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PPN Karet Riau, although its membership was not certain.) Each province in which one 
of these firms was located was to form a screening team to investigate the status of the 
firms; the screening teams would be headed by the provincial Governors and comprised 
mostly of officials from the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs based in the 
respective province. The BPU PPN Karet was to implement control over the firms only 
after receiving confirmation from the screening team of their status, and in managing the 
firms it was to ensure the continuity of production and sales. In each province, the BPU 
PPN Karet was to be advised by a supervisory board (Badan Pengawas), comprised of 
the provincial Governor (who served as chairman), four officials from the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs who were based in the province, a representative from a 
state bank, and an unspecified number of representatives from farmers and workers 
organizations who were to be appointed by the Governor. 
The second regulation issued by the Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs 
was Regulation 1 of 1964, which was intended to supplement President Sukarno‘s decree 
of 27 November.
156
  This regulation did several things. First, regarding Malaysian-owned 
businesses in Riau, it expanded the scope of Minister Sadjarwo‘s regulation of 31 
October 1963 – which had applied only to estates, remilling and smokehouse businesses 
– to cover all Malaysian businesses in Riau. It made a few adjustments to the composition 
of the Riau ―preparatory board‖ and also said that if any of the businesses were not 
related to rubber then control should be given to the appropriate management board. The 
bottom line was that in Riau province, but nowhere else, the PPN Karet Riau and 
preparatory team would remain. The reason for this distinction between Riau and other 
provinces was not given. Second, the regulation indicated that the provisions of 
Regulation 25 regarding screening teams, control/supervision and management, and 
advisory boards should be extended to all Malaysian companies, not just remilling and 
smokehouse firms. If a Malaysian firm were not in the rubber industry, control over it 
should be given to the appropriate state management board, which should manage the 
company in the same way as the BPU PPN Karet.  In addition, the screening teams were 
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 Peraturan Menteri Pertanian Dan Agraria (Sadjarwo) No 1 Tahun 1964 Tentang Pelaksanaan Keputusan 
Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 241 Tahun 1963, dated 6 January 1964.  
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to be expanded by the addition of an unspecified number of representatives from workers 
organizations. This was clearly a gesture to the workers. 
There appears to have been no implementing regulations issued by other 
ministries in respect of Malaysian businesses.  President Sukarno did, however, issue one 
last decree targeted against Malaysians.
157
  Under this decree, issued in early April 1964, 
the GOI froze and then seized all bank accounts registered in the name of Malaysian 
citizens or in the name of Indonesian citizens who lived in Malaysia.  However, account 
holders were allowed to withdraw a total of Rp. 50,000 per month for daily needs.  
The actual number of Malaysian companies taken over under these decrees, and 
how the decrees were implemented in practice, remains unclear. As indicted earlier, the 
GOI reported in 1967 that 20 Malaysian remilling firms were taken over (as well as about 
20 estates owned by individuals, mostly of Chinese descent), though other GOI records 
name only 10 (see Appendix A).
158
  An Antara (the state news agency) article of 28 
November 1963 indicated that 143 Malaysian remilling companies and 259 smokehouses 
had been placed under GOI control, though these numbers seem extraordinarily high.
159
 
Other Antara reports indicate that screening was underway by mid-November.
160
  If the 
decrees were followed, once Malaysian ownership was established then control over the 
remilling and smokehouse firms was to go to the BPU PPN Karet, the managing board 
for all state-owned rubber companies. 
In practice, it appears that over the next several years the Malaysian remilling 
companies were controlled by three separate groups. At least ten of the factories were 
handed to provincial or local governments to manage, at least six factories were ―rented‖ 
to private Indonesian businesses, and some four remained under the control of the BPU 
PPN Karet (see Appendix A for details).
161
 A decree issued by KOTOE in mid-
                                                 
157
 Keputusan Presiden (Sukarno) No. 73/1964 Tentang Pembekuan dan Penguasaan Rekening Pada Semua 
Bank Jang Tertjatat atas Nama Warganegara ―Malaysia‖ atau Warganegara Republik Indonesia Jang 
Berdomicili/Bertempat Tinggal di Daerah ―Malaysia,‖ dated 2 April 1964. 
158
 See p. 1 of Laporan Kedua of the Panitya Ad Hoc Interdepartemental Urusan Penjelesaian Penguasaan 
Perusahaaan2 Asing  dated 9 January 1967 (ANRI, EKUIN files). 
159
 Antara, 28 November 1963 (p. 7 of ‗Ekonomi dan Keuangan‘ section). 
160
 See, e.g., Antara dated 10 November 1963 (p. 3 of ‗Ekonomi dan Keuangan‘ section) and 11 November 
1963 (p. 12 of ‗Ekonomi dan Keuangan‘ section).  
161
 See p. 1 of Laporan Kedua of the Panitya Ad Hoc Interdepartemental Urusan Penjelesaian Penguasaan 
Perusahaaan2 Asing  dated 9 January 1967 (ANRI, Ekuin files); see also list of Malaysian companies in 
Pengembalian Remilling2 Ex Malaysia Kepada Pemiliknya (160/IX/EKUIN/68) (ANRI, EKUIN files).  
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September 1964 indicated that the companies could be transferred to both state 
enterprises and ―progressive‖ private Indonesian enterprises meeting the following 
requirements: (i) experience and skill in the rubber trade, (ii) responsible enough for the 
safety and maintenance of production equipment, (iii) able to remove, and operate 
without, elements of Malaysian capital, and (iv) such other requirements as KOTOE may 
impose from time to time.
162
 The practice of ―renting out‖ the companies to private 
Indonesian businessmen suggests that the government may not have had the resources or 
personnel to manage the companies, but it may also have been a case of doling out 
patronage to supporters. The private companies were required to sign contracts with the 
government, under which the private companies agreed to pay deposits of Rp. 100 
million as well as annual lease payments. It is unclear how the lease payments were 
determined. One government report indicated that six private companies (NV Metro 
Trading, PT Teluk Harapan, Rachman Tamin, Daood Djafar, PT Piola, and PT Windu) 
had each paid the Rp.100 million deposit as well as made a combined total of Rp.373 
million in lease payments (out of the total of Rp.398 million due) for the years 1964-7.
163
 
Pursuant to decrees issued in late October 1964, money from the rents was supposed to 
be used to encourage the growth of smallholder rubber and was to be turned over to a 
body named Dana Tanaman Keras for that purpose. That same body was also assigned 
the duty of exercising ―technical supervision‖ over the Malaysian companies, even 
though they were now leased out to private Indonesian companies; it is unclear what 
―technical supervision‖ entailed in practice.
164
          
An analysis of the Chinese in the South Sumatran rubber industry provides some 
details of the takeover and management of the five Malaysian remilling factories located 
in Palembang, which together accounted for 53% of the production in 1962 of remilled 
                                                 
162
 See Decree of Commander of Operation Unit I KOTOE (Leimena) No./26/KO-I/64 dated 16 September 
1964 (English translation only, from BKS-PPS, Keputusan 2, V-2, 1964-5).    
163
 Letter dated 18 December 1968 from Menteri Negara Ekonomi, Keungan dan Industri (acting via 
secretary  Selo Soemardjan) to Menteri Keuangan (ANRI, R-16, No. 69). 
164
 Peraturan Menteri Koordinator Komparteman Pertanian dan Agraria (Sadjarwo) No SK 
107/Kompag/1964 Tentang Penggunaan Uang Sewa Perusahaan-Perusahaan Remilling/Rumah Asap Karet 
Milik Warga-Negara ―Malaysia‖ Jang Disewakan Oleh Pemerintah Kepada Pengusaha-Pengusaha Swasta 
Nasional, dated 26 October 1964, and Peraturan Menteri Koordinator Komparteman Pertanian dan Agraria 
(Sadjarwo) No SK 109/Kompag/1964 Tentang Pengawasan Technis Atas Perusahaan-Perusahaan 
Remilling dan Rumah Asap Karet Milik Warga-Negara ―Malaysia‖ Jang Disewakan Oleh Pemerintah 
Kepada Pengusaha-Pengusaha Swasta Nasional, dated 26 October 1964. 
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rubber produced in the area (Palembang was a major center for this business).
165
 These 
five factories, Hok Tong, Sunan Rubber, Sumatra Rubber, Remco and Remifa (see 
Appendix A), were all owned by Malaysian Chinese. Hok Tong was managed by the 
PPN Karet, Sumatra Rubber and Remco apparently were initially leased to a company 
named PT Peksin (which was owned by five state-owned banks), while Remifa was 
leased to a pribumi Indonesian and Sunan Rubber to an Indonesian Chinese. Owner-
appointed management was allowed to remain for the companies leased to private firms, 
but in the companies controlled by the government or its agents top Chinese managers 
were removed.  A dispute over control of Sumatra Rubber broke out between the central 
GOI (acting through PT Peksin) and the regional government of South Sumatra, though it 
is unclear what the disagreement was about.  In July 1965 the central government finally 
relinquished control over Sumatra Rubber in exchange for the regional government 
ending a requirement that the remilling companies enter into compulsory remilling 




The full outbreak of Konfrontasi in September 1963 resulted in two waves of 
takeovers of foreign companies by the Indonesian government. A handful of British 
companies in Jakarta were seized by the DPS-KBKI labor federation, forcing an 
ambivalent GOI to place these companies under government supervision, a deliberately 
ambiguous term that not only avoided the severe connotation of terms like 
‗nationalization‘ and ‗expropriation‘ but also gave the GOI time to figure out what to do 
with the companies. Thus, these takeovers resulted primarily from domestic political 
instability. In practice, supervision varied from company to company but overall seemed 
fairly light. More importantly, President Sukarno and the GOI came out unequivocally 
against further takeovers of British companies, imposing a prohibition on further 
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 Thomas and Panglaykim, ―The Chinese in the South Sumatra Rubber Industry,‖ pp. 178-88. See also 
Far Eastern Economic Review dated 12 December 1963 (‗Round Up‘ section), reporting that five 
Malaysian remilling firms in Palembang had been taken over by the provincial government of South 
Sumatra.  The discussion in this paragraph comes from Thomas and Panglaykim‘s account pp. 178-88.   
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seizures. Shell Oil was treated somewhat ambiguously; on the one hand, the immediate 
return of its Pladju facility was a testament to oil company exceptionalism, but on the 
other hand the treatment of its Balikpapan facility showed the limits of that principle. 
The contrast between the takeovers of the British firms and the takeovers of the 
Malaysian firms, which began in late October, is instructive. Unlike the case of the 
British firms, there was no equivocation by the GOI in the takeover of the Malaysian 
firms. The GOI did not need the trigger of labor union/worker activity to seize control of 
these firms; President Sukarno, without any pretenses or ambiguity, was obviously 
determined to move against them, though the process itself was rather belabored and 
uncoordinated. Clearly the takeover of Malaysian companies was GOI-driven and 
essentially a weapon of foreign policy used in the Konfrontasi conflict. In legal terms, the 
seizure of the Malaysian companies was a clear-cut case of confiscation, while the 
takeover of the British firms was far more ambiguous and varied from company to 
company. 
The reasons for this contrast are not all that clear, but we can guess. In the first 
place, there was little to fear from Malaysia regarding retaliation given (i) the relative 
economic insignificance of the companies, (ii) that economic relations with Malaysia had 
already been severed, and (iii) that Konfrontasi had already broken out. In a very real 
sense, the seizure of these Malaysian companies was principally a symbolic gesture in the 
Konfrontasi conflict.  The situation regarding the British companies was quite different. 
The GOI did not initiate the takeovers, and seemed ill-prepared to deal with them in the 
chaos of the week of September 16. Moreover, British economic interests in Indonesia as 
a whole were far more significant than Malaysian economic interests, and thus seizing the 
entirety of British enterprises risked greater retaliation, resistance and economic 
disruption, particularly in the case of Shell. While it was easy enough to act against 
newly formed Malaysia, to act directly against a western power like Great Britain risked 
greater problems. As we shall see in the next Chapter, however, over the course of the 
next year these circumstances would change. 
In the larger picture, the outbreak of Konfrontasi had great ramifications. As we 
saw in Part I above, it ended the only serious attempt by the GOI under Guided 
Democracy to reform the Indonesian economy, which would continue to deteriorate 
 256 
 
quickly after the scuttling of the economic stabilization package. In foreign relations, 
Konfrontasi was in effect an undeclared war with Malaysia and Great Britain which not 
only added an element of great uncertainty to Indonesia‘s foreign affairs but also firmly 
ensconced the conflict with imperialism and OLDEFOs as the dominant feature of 
Indonesia‘s foreign policy.  This policy course would eventually result in Indonesia‘s 
alliance with the PRC and isolation from the rest of the world. Konfrontasi also spilled 
over into domestic politics in numerous ways. As we shall see in the next Chapter, in late 
1963 the PKI would make a number of decisions that would result in 1964-65 in its 
becoming much more visible and voluble on the domestic front, and Konfrontasi was a 
vehicle used by the PKI in its quest for further power. One of the means by which the 
PKI asserted this new attitude was the attempted seizure of a number of British firms in 
January 1964, which would trigger a process of creeping confiscations of these firms over 
the course of the year. Aiding this newfound assertion of influence by the PKI was the 
lifting of martial law in May 1963, which in reducing the powers of the army allowed for 
a limited revival of the larger political parties, chiefly the PKI but also the PNI. 
Complementing the events of 1963 – the outbreak of Konfrontasi, the jettisoning 
of the economic stabilization program, the lifting of martial law, the two waves of 
takeovers of foreign companies - were significant developments within the GOI resulting 
from the death (by illness) of First Minister Djuanda on 7 November 1963. In the first 
place, the government lost an administrator of great experience and skill who was able at 
times to act as a moderating influence on President Sukarno. Secondly, Djuanda‘s death 
marked the intensification of the ongoing power struggle not only to influence President 
Sukarno but also to succeed him. In particular, Ministers Subandrio and Chaerul Saleh 
emerged as the two principal rivals for power behind Sukarno, with Subandrio the 
frontrunner.
166
 In November 1963 after Djuanda‘s death the cabinet was reshuffled again 
and also restructured; the small Pimpinan Kabinet was reorganized and renamed the 
Presidium Kabinet, whose apparent purpose was to enable a small group of high cabinet 
officials to provide advice and guidance to President Sukarno. The Presidium Kabinet 
was comprised of three individuals who now had the titles of Deputy Prime Minister 
(with Sukarno acting as Prime Minister and President): First Deputy Prime Minister 
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 Agung, Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy, p. 313; Mackie, Konfrontasi, p. 240. 
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Subandrio, Second Deputy Prime Minister Leimena, and Third Deputy Prime Minister 
Chaerul Saleh (who seemed to replace Djuanda, as both Subandrio and Leimena were 
Deputy First Ministers in the old structure). Subandrio retained his position as Foreign 
Minister, and was named Coordinating Minister of the newly formed Compartment of 
Foreign Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations. Chaerul Saleh retained his position as 
Minister of Basic Industry and Mining and was also elevated to the position of 
Coordinating Minister for the newly created Compartment of Development, which had in 
it the Ministry of Basic Industry and Mining (Minister Chaerul Saleh), the Ministry of 
Peoples Industry (Minister Azis Saleh), the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs 
(Minister Sadjarwo), the Ministry of Labor (Minister Ahem Erningpradja) and four other 
ministries.
167
 Over the next two years, the influence of both Subandrio and Chaerul Saleh 
would grow as each jockeyed for position around President Sukarno amidst the general 
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 See Simanjuntuk, Kabinet Kabinet Republik Indonesia, pp. 238-43. Adam Malik was also appointed to 
the cabinet as Minister of Trade. 
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Chapter Five:  The Creeping Confiscations of British 
Enterprises in 1964 
 
 
The third phase of the takeovers of foreign businesses in Indonesia from 1963-65 
was the creeping confiscation of British companies over the course of 1964. Altogether 
some 42 British enterprises, many of which were in the estate business (accounting for 
some 86 British-owned estates), were confiscated by the GOI.
1
 The course of the 
takeovers and the reasons behind them were very confusing, reflecting a situation that in 
general was extremely ambiguous, and I hope to impart some of this messiness and 
confused state of affairs – on the part of the GOI as well as the companies – in the 
following pages. I argue that initially the primary reason for the takeovers was domestic 
political struggle and instability in the form of a challenge to the GOI by the PKI, and 
that once the companies were put under government supervision they became even more 
susceptible to the vagaries of Indonesian politics, especially to competition within the 
GOI itself for the valuable economic resources they represented. Most of the takeovers by 
the government were accomplished in a very gradual manner, though in a few cases it 
was done quickly, and the timing varied from company to company. The method of GOI 
takeover invariably involved the usurpation by government-appointed personnel of 
managerial authority from owner-appointed managers and the eventual expulsion of the 
latter, a process that the companies for the most part were unable to resist, though a 
variety of ways were tried. Hence I use the term ―creeping confiscation‖ to describe this 
drawn-out process.  By the end of 1964 virtually all British companies – with the major 
                                                 
1
 The number of enterprises taken over does not include the four British companies taken over in 
September 1963. In addition, the figure of 86 estates does not include (i) the seven estates owned by British 
H&C/Lonsum in Java and Sulawesi that were taken over in September 1963, which would raise the total of 
British-owned estates taken over to 93, nor (ii) at least 12 non-British estates that were taken over during 
1964 because they were managed by a British company, which would raise the total number of estates 
taken over in 1964 to 98.   
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exception of Shell Oil, a reflection of oil company exceptionalism - were firmly under the 
control of the GOI and had been effectively confiscated. 
Perhaps the main reason for the ambiguity and drawn-out nature of the takeovers 
was because it was not the GOI which initiated them. Instead, the entire process started 
with the seizures or attempted seizures (most were not successful) of British companies 
in January 1964 by SOBSI-affiliated labor unions and the National Front. As we saw in 
Chapter Two, SOBSI was the PKI-controlled labor federation, and the National Front 
was also dominated by the PKI by 1964. Thus, it appears that the PKI was behind these 
attempted seizures. In fact, these January seizures were just one of many measures taken 
by the PKI in 1964-65 as it broke out of its shell of ‗domestication‘ and went on a major 
political offensive, with Konfrontasi and its strongly nationalist and anti-imperialist 
stance providing an excellent vehicle through which the PKI could flex its agitational 
muscles.  The greatly increased visibility and volubility of the PKI resulted in domestic 
politics becoming increasingly polarized at all levels, and battle lines were drawn most 
especially between the army and the PKI. The show of strength exhibited by the PKI led 
to the observation by some commentators that by late 1964 (if not sooner according to 
some) the domestic political power structure no longer took the form of a roughly equal 
but uneasy partnership between President Sukarno and the army, but rather had 
transformed into a rough ‗triangle‘ of power among President Sukarno, the army, and the 
PKI. The PKI-led attempted seizures of British companies in January 1964 were in direct 
contravention of Presidential Decree 194/1963, which as we saw in the previous Chapter 
was issued by President Sukarno in September 1963 in the wake of the seizures of a few 
British companies and specifically prohibited the takeover of British firms unless ordered 
by the President himself. I argue that the attempted seizures by the PKI constituted a 
direct challenge to President Sukarno and the government over the course of Konfrontasi. 
These attempted seizures, and the different responses by regional governments, 
precipitated central government intervention in which the GOI in late January and early 
February placed all the affected British companies under its ―control and supervision.‖  
The key question was what exactly did this government intervention mean? As 
with the September 1963 takeovers, the GOI studiously avoided the use of the words 
‗nationalization‘ or ‗expropriation,‘ for GOI officials were aware from their experience 
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with the takeovers of Dutch companies in 1957-58 that such terms gave rise to the 
obligation to pay compensation to the companies under generally accepted international 
law principles.  Instead, the terminology the GOI generally used to explain the 
companies‘ status was that the companies were under the government‘s penguasaan 
(control) and/or pengawasan (supervision). Such phraseology not only avoided the severe 
connotations of ‗nationalization,‘ but also gave GOI officials plenty of time and leeway 
in determining just what was meant by these ambiguous terms. Indeed, it is arguable that 
the GOI in fact did not initially know what to do with these companies once they were 
put under its control but instead was playing for time. Complicating the situation was that 
the implementation of ―control/supervision‖ was left to the discretion of the individual 
ministers under whose sectoral jurisdiction the companies fell, so that there was little 
coordination. Certainly, most of the companies were initially uncertain what these terms 
meant, though most were generally resigned to eventually losing their assets. Indeed, I 
argue that the placement under government control and supervision of the British 
companies affected by the attempted seizures in fact ultimately led to the confiscation of 
those companies as the GOI gradually wrested control over the companies away from 
owner-appointed management. In many instances it is not clear precisely when control 
over a company changed hands; hence the term ―creeping confiscation‖ applies not only 
to the process within British firms individually but also to British firms as a group over 
time. Though the timing varied significantly, even within the same industry, ultimately 
all British businesses, with the important exception of Shell Oil (reflecting oil company 
exceptionalism) and the minor exception of Dunlop Tire, were effectively confiscated by 
the GOI by the end of 1964.       
In general, the ministers under whose ―control and supervision‖ the British 
companies were placed were given great discretion over how to implement it. However, I 
argue that the economic resources of the individual companies, in this case primarily 
precious foreign exchange revenues, were the major determining factor in how the 
minister implemented control/supervision. Usually a ministry takeover team was installed 
at the company, and it was this team which gradually usurped control/authority from the 
owner-appointed management, who were allowed to stay on for different lengths of time. 
Minister of Peoples Industry Azis Saleh did not seem to take a hard line toward the 
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British companies under his supervision (none of which generated much foreign 
exchange), as control over these companies was only gradually tightened. On the other 
hand, Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs Sadjarwo seemed much more 
aggressive in implementing GOI control over the estates, which constituted by far the 
largest sector of the British companies put under GOI control/supervision and as noted in 
Chapter Three were large earners of valuable foreign exchange. In fact, as we shall see in 
this Chapter, the takeover of these British estates triggered a major conflict within the 
GOI over control of these precious resources. Clearly, government ministers and other 
officials viewed the estates as valuable economic resources and as instruments of 
patronage, a means of doling out resources to supporters and increasing their own 
prestige, power and wealth, and likewise conversely viewed it as critical to keep such 
valuable resources and control over manpower away from their rivals inside and outside 
the government. There were, of course, other comparatively minor considerations present 
in the way in which the individual ministers and officials implemented 
―control/supervision,‖ such as attitudes towards foreign investment in general and outside 
pressures (often from labor unions). 
The ambiguous position of the British companies was effectively resolved in late 
November 1964 with the issuance by President Sukarno of Presidential Decree 6/1964. 
This decree was a clear affirmation by President Sukarno, who had not issued any 
decrees with respect to foreign companies since his decree 194/1963 in September 1963, 
that all British companies in Indonesia (except Shell) were under government control and 
management. The motivations for the issuance of this decree were unclear, but a major 
factor appears to have been to settle the conflict within the GOI over control of the 
valuable British estates. It may also have been a reflection of Indonesia‘s increasingly 
strident anti-imperialist foreign policy, a topic we shall examine in the next Chapter. This 
decree, like others before it, studiously avoided the usage of terms such as 
‗nationalization‘, ‗expropriation‘ or ‗confiscation,‘ though in practice it left no doubt that 
the British estates had been effectively confiscated by the GOI. 
This Chapter is divided into six Parts. Part I traces both the PKI political offensive 
begun in early 1964 as well as the course of Konfrontasi over 1964. Part II analyzes in 
detail the attempted seizures of British enterprises by PKI-linked groups in January 1964 
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and the GOI response to this. Part III traces the creeping confiscation of the British 
companies by the GOI over the course of 1964, while Part IV analyzes the major struggle 
for control over the British estates that broke out within the central government. Part V 
discusses Presidential Decree 6/1964 of late November 1964 and its impact, and Part VI 
offers some concluding observations. 
 
I. Background: The PKI in Domestic Politics and the 
Course of Konfrontasi. 
 
As suggested in the introduction to Chapter Four, the outbreak of Konfrontasi in 
September 1963 had far-reaching implications for Indonesian domestic politics in that it 
provided the PKI with an opportunity to become a much more visible, voluble, and 
aggressive political force and thus interject itself into the prevailing political power 
structure of an uneasy, competitive partnership between President Sukarno and the 
Indonesian army.  The PKI took full advantage of the strongly nationalist and anti-
imperialist thrust of Konfrontasi, and in early 1964 went on the political offensive – 
indeed, this Chapter argues that the PKI-led attempted seizures of British companies in 
January 1964 were one manifestation of this new political dynamism. The overall effect 
of the PKI‘s new aggressiveness was a much intensified polarization of domestic politics 
throughout 1964 and 1965, and the Indonesian army in particular was on the defensive as 
it continued to jockey for position with President Sukarno.  As we saw in Chapter Four, a 
major contributing factor for the army‘s decline was the lifting of martial law on 1 May 
1963, which in addition to reducing the powers of the army also resulted in a significant 
increase in activity by the PKI, the PNI, and other groups. Section A of this Part I 
outlines the PKI‘s political offensive over 1964.  
Section B traces the course of Konfrontasi over 1964. Konfrontasi continued to be 
the most important foreign policy issue for Indonesia over most of the year, and it also 
continued to be intertwined with domestic politics.  Indeed, one of the many paradoxes of 
the conflict was that given the enormous attention paid to it domestically, one would have 
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expected Konfrontasi to develop into a major military engagement; however, the conflict 
never reached that level, though it clearly set Indonesia firmly on a strongly anti-
imperialist course in its foreign policy. This is partly a reflection, I believe, that the 
parties in Indonesia most involved with the conflict – President Sukarno, the army, and 
the PKI, among others – each recognized that little could be gained by a full-scale war, 
instead seeking to keep the conflict at a very low level of intensity and using it to advance 
their own domestic political interests. In fact, as we shall see in this Chapter, Konfrontasi 
in many respects provided the backdrop for the takeovers of British companies in 1964, 
though initially not in a way one might expect.  
A. The PKI and Domestic Politics. 
The political offensive launched by the PKI in early 1964 and the PKI‘s 
emergence as a dynamic force in domestic politics over the course of the year, taking 
major political initiatives of its own, has been noted by numerous scholars.
2
 Whether this 
political offensive actually resulted in a paradigmatic shift in the balance of power into an 
uneven triangle of power among President Sukarno, the army and the PKI as commonly 
thought is unclear given the ease in which the PKI was destroyed in late 1965 (see 
Chapter Seven, Part III), but it is certainly arguable that the PKI political offensive in 
1964-65 resulted in a feeling that the balance of power was changing. The public 
visibility and volubility of the PKI also undoubtedly contributed to the rapid polarization 
of Indonesian politics, particularly between the PKI and its opponents, even as the army 
and President Sukarno continued to jockey for position. Moreover, after 1963 President 
Sukarno increasingly appeared to identify publicly with the PKI‘s position on a variety of 
ideological issues, suggesting to many observers that both the President and Indonesia 
had ‗turned to the left.‘ This was accompanied by an apparent intensification of 
ideological indoctrination in the political sphere in which obtuse ideological abstractions 
and justifications became the focal point of political conflict, masking deeper struggles 
for power, as new slogans relating to Konfrontasi emerged and old slogans such as 
                                                 
2
 See, e.g., Crouch, Army and Politics in Indonesia, pp. 51, 69; Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under 
Sukarno, pp. 169, 204-5, 238-9; Sundhaussen, Road to Power, p. 181; van der Kroef, Communist Party of 
Indonesia, p. 279; Hauswedell, ―Sukarno: Radical or Conservative,‖ pp. 120-1; Feith, ―The Triangle Takes 
Shape.‖     
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‗completing the Revolution‘ continued to permeate political discourse. As one observer 
has argued, it was not just the PKI which took advantage of the change in circumstances; 
the PNI and other parties also tried to increase their power and influence, but the PKI was 
able to do it much better.
3
 The principal means for the parties to express themselves was 
by mobilization of mass support in the form of rallies, demonstrations, and the like, and 
hence there was a noticeable increase in 1964-65 in these mass actions.   
For the PKI, the decisive moment towards this new course appears to have been 
the meeting of the Central Committee Plenum of the party from 23-26 December 1963. 
Certainly the decisions taken there were formulated over the course of the year, but this 
meeting was where they finally coalesced into a new approach, largely because the 
outbreak of Konfrontasi had enhanced the position of the PKI vis-à-vis Sukarno and party 
leaders ―felt more secure and capable of taking political initiatives.‖
4
 The initiative was 
apparently led by Aidit, the PKI leader, whose report to the central committee outlined a 
new ―comprehensive theory of political change adapting the united front national strategy 
to the circumstances of Guided Democracy.‖
5
 Aidit tasked the PKI with keeping 
Konfrontasi going so that Indonesia‘s new anti-western course would continue and the 
PKI‘s position would thus be strengthened. He judged that the time was right for the PKI 
to go on the political offensive, in particular that the party could ―press its program on the 
                                                 
3
 Rocamora, Nationalism in Search of Ideology, pp. 8-9, 317-24. Rocamora argues that there was a 
significant increase in PNI influence from 1963 to 1965 primarily because President Sukarno‘s relationship 
with the army worsened and he came to depend more on both the PKI and PNI for support. Sukarno also 
recognized that the parties were the most effective means of mobilizing mass support. Aided by the lifting 
of martial law on 1 May 1963, the increase in the parties‘ influence came at the expense of a slow ‗erosion‘ 
of the army‘s influence.  However, of the 10 political parties only the PKI and PNI were able and willing to 
compete for influence at the national level.  See also Mackie, Konfrontasi, p. 241.   
4
 Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno, pp. 132-40, 205, 226-37, 269-72, 296-304, 353-7 
(quoted language from p. 204). Mortimer (p. 204) argues that this enhancement of the PKI‘s position vis-à-
vis Sukarno came about because when Konfrontasi broke out the PKI ―escaped its subordinate ideological 
role [which it had during the West Irian campaign] and began to provide the theoretical concepts that 
underwrote the campaign. Sukarno‘s themes remained prominent, but they were progressively 
overshadowed by the innovations devised by the PKI leadership, and Sukarno himself came to borrow 
more and more extensively from the PKI‘s ideological armory.‖ Mortimer analyzes the decisions taken at 
this December 1963 central committee meeting in separate chapters, and thus the significance of the  
meeting as a turning point in the PKI‘s approach is somewhat downplayed.  
5
 Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno, p. 205. For an English translation of this report, see 
D.N. Aidit, Set Afire the Banteng Spirit! Ever Forward, No Retreat: Political Report to the Second Plenum 
of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia (Djakarta 23-26 December 1963) 
(Peking: Foreign Language Press Peking, 1964). 
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government by means of mass mobilization and intense campaigning.‖
6
 One major theory 
Aidit suggested was that the main contradiction in the world was between imperialism 
and oppressed nations, which led to two core themes regarding the anti-imperialist 
struggle: first, that the nationalist independence movements in the third world were the 
central focus of the anti-imperialist struggle, and second that Southeast Asia was the 
central focus of this struggle and that Indonesia itself would play a central role in ousting 
imperialism.
7
 Moreover, under the cover of Konfrontasi, the PKI‘s immediate tasks were 
―to strengthen Indonesia‘s ties with the militant anti-imperialist countries, expel US 
influence from the country, radicalize the government, and remove right wingers…from 
administrative posts,‖ and in fact these were exactly the party‘s main objectives over the 
next two years.
8
 In a related vein, the report clearly indicated that the PKI had tilted 
toward the PRC and away from Moscow.
9
 
On economic matters, among other ideas Aidit suggested that self-reliance 
(BERDIKARI - see Chapter Seven) was the answer to Indonesia‘s chronic shortage of 
food and clothing and that ―the main effort should be directed toward arousing the 
peasants to carry out radical land reform,‖ by which he meant ―confiscation of all 
landlord holdings and their distribution free to landless and poor peasants.‖
10
 In making 
radical land reform a centerpiece of the PKI‘s revolutionary offensive, Aidit pushed for 
the peasants to act on their own, and the report was effectively the beginning of the aksi 
sepihak (unilateral action) movement described below.
11
 In addition to encouraging the 
peasants to act on their own in implementing radical land reform, Aidit called for the 
nasakomization (meaning adding representatives from the PKI and other communist 
organizations) of land reform committees, retooling of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Agrarian Affairs, and the establishment of land reform courts.
12
   
                                                 
6
 Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno, p. 296. 
7
 Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno, pp. 227-30. Mortimer seemingly suggests that Aidit 
was influenced heavily by the PRC in following this line; that may be true, but as we saw in Chapter Two 
(Part II Section B) President Sukarno had two years before already espoused this notion of imperialism and 
colonialism being the major problem of the world.    
8
 Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno, p. 234. 
9
 Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno, pp. 353-7. 
10
 Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno, pp. 270, 297. 
11
 Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno, p. 296.  
12
 Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno, p. 297. 
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The PKI almost immediately began to follow the new direction laid out at the 
December 1963 central committee meeting. As I shall argue in Part II, the PKI-led 
attempted seizures of British firms in January 1964 were one manifestation of this new 
approach. Then, in May 1964 the PKI also undertook a campaign against US cultural 
penetration which took the form of a boycott of US films (see Chapter Six). The party 
also began attacking the army more stridently, demanding the banning of the army-
controlled SOKSI labor federation, the reduction of army influence in the provinces, and 
accusing the army leadership of corruption and other malfeasance.
13
  The PKI was more 
outspoken in its calls for the ―retooling‖ (meaning replacement of personnel) and/or 
nasakomization of various governmental agencies and departments. President Sukarno 
seemed supportive of the PKI calls for these measures with respect to the army as he 
continued to spar with army leadership for position. For example, the President in May 
1964 abolished the body responsible for supervising the loyalty of government officials 
(known as PARAN, an acronym for the ‗Committee for Retooling Government 
Apparatus‘) chaired by General Nasution and replaced it with a new body (known as 
KOTRAR, an acronym for ‗Supreme Command for Retooling the Apparatus of the 
Revolution‘) under his own leadership which included General Yani as the chief of staff 
but did not include Nasution.
14
   Naturally, the party also supported President Sukarno in 
his anti-imperialist foreign policy, such as the growing alliance with the PRC and 
attempts to hold a second Afro-Asian conference.
15
   
Perhaps the most well known feature of the PKI‘s new political offensive was the 
aksi sepihak (unilateral action) movement referred to above. The thrust of this movement 
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 Sundhaussen, Road to Power, p. 182.  
14
 Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesia in 1964: Toward a 'People's Democracy'?," Asian Survey 5, no. 2 (1965), p. 
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15




was that the PKI encouraged and led peasants in taking unilateral actions to enforce the 
provisions of the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law, which as we saw in Chapter Two placed both 
maximum (the amount varied by location) and minimum (two hectare) limits on family 
landownership, with land redistribution from families whose holdings exceeded the 
maximum limits to families whose holdings were less than the minimum. The minimum 
figure of two hectares was quite unrealistic in Java given the enormous population 
relative to land, and the program had been only spottily implemented by 1964. The 
fomenting of the aksi sepihak was in fact the first time the PKI had departed from the 
united front strategy developed in the early 1950s and emphasized class struggle as a 
centerpiece of its program.
16
  In the first few months, the PKI began a public relations 
campaign that included publishing reports of research undertaken in Java regarding the 
1960 Basic Agrarian law that emphasized its lack of implementation.
17
 The PKI was 
highly critical of the lack of progress and urged peasants to take matters into their own 
hands. By April 1964 peasants in Central Java, undoubtedly aided by the PKI, began to 
take various unilateral actions, which ranged from presenting petitions to organizing 
demonstrations to seizures of land or crops and led to the first major conflicts with larger 
landowners and others, including the PNI. By June, peasant unilateral actions had also 
spread to East Java, where they resulted in serious violence and became a national issue; 
the central government was obviously divided over the question, and President Sukarno 
initially appeared to favor the actions.
18
 Much of the violence (ranging from destruction 
of property to kidnapping to killing) pitted PKI-led peasants against NU and ex-Masjumi 
landlords, and religious conflict became intertwined with class conflict as much of the 
land at stake was owned by staunch Muslims.
19
 By June the aksi sepihak had spread to 
Bali.  
The aksi sepihak and resulting violence continued well into 1965, despite efforts 
by the government and the PKI to tone down the conflict. By September 1964 the 
pushback against the PKI in the aksi sepihak appeared to be gaining ground, but the 
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 Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno, pp. 299-300. 
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 Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno, pp. 314, 320-1. 
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conflicts and violence continued. As the violence mounted, the government finally tried 
to intervene decisively; on 12 December 1964, as part of the Bogor meeting of President 
Sukarno and the 10 political parties (see below), all sides agreed to a vague declaration 
that emphasized consultation and consensus without insinuation, intimidation or violence 
in dealing with land questions.
20
 However, the aksi continued for another few months, 
though at a clearly declining pace. By this time, the ire of many Muslims in East Java 
was inflamed, and there was a distinct rise in violence against the BTI (the PKI-
controlled farmers organization) and its members, with the violence peaking in February 
and March 1965. The reaction against the aksi sepihak was clearly a partial defeat for the 
PKI, which only begrudgingly admitted that its position in East Java, Central Java and 
Bali had become precarious.
21
 The precariousness of the PKI‘s position, and the depth of 
the conflict aroused by the aksi sepihak, would be revealed in late 1965; Central Java, 
East Java and Bali, where most of the aksi sepihak took place, were also the places where 
most of the killings occurred (see Chapter Seven). 
 At the national level, much of the opposition to the PKI offensive was led by the 
Murba party, which as we saw in Chapter Two was led mostly by followers of Tan 
Malaka such as Trade Minister Adam Malik and was a bitter enemy of the PKI, even 
though it styled itself as a ‗nationalist communist party.‘ The party‘s basic approach in 
countering the PKI was to identify itself as closely as possible with President Sukarno 
and his ideology while simultaneously trying to get President Sukarno to contradict, 
inadvertently, positions taken by the PKI.
22
  Hence, in what was clearly a move directed 
against the PKI, in April the Murba party proposed that all 10 existing political parties be 
dissolved and a brand new single party be created, a proposition which resembled 
previous calls by Sukarno. A raging polemical debate broke out in the newspapers over 
the next few months over this proposal, and naturally not just the PKI but also the PNI 
and the NU (the three large parties) opposed the measure. The issue died down in July 
after the government ordered a halt to the debate.
23
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The second and best known Murba-led pushback against the PKI was the 
establishment in early September 1964 of an organization called Badan Pendukung 
Soekarnoisme (‗Body to Support/Promote Sukarnoism,‘ better known by its acronym 
BPS).
24
  Though led by figures from the Murba party such as Minister Adam Malik, B.M. 
Diah and Sukarni, by November it emerged as the focal point of opposition to the PKI 
and was supported by members of the PNI and the Moslem parties, members of the army 
such as army commander General Yani, various ministers including Chaerul Saleh (who 
was associated with the Murba party, though he claimed not to be a member), much of 
the national press, the smaller Protestant and Catholic political parties, and a host of 
others whose most common denomination seemed to be opposition to the PKI.  The BPS 
ostensibly was concerned with the explanation and promotion of President Sukarno‘s 
teachings, but the real purpose was to rally the anti-PKI forces. This was done by 
demonstrating that Sukarno‘s teachings were quite different from communist doctrine 
and that the PKI was deliberately twisting Sukarno‘s teachings for its own ends. Another 
fierce polemic between the PKI and the BPS ensued in the newspapers over the next 
several months, with extended debates over the meaning of various Sukarnoisms such as 
Pantja Sila and NASAKOM, as each side simultaneously claimed to possess the true 
understanding and attacked the other side for its interpretation. President Sukarno initially 
refrained from taking sides (presumably waiting to see what course events would take) 
and then went on an overseas trip from 17 September to 5 November. He kept silent upon 
his return, and the debate continued as the two sides waited to see which side Sukarno 
would support. When tensions over the BPS, the aksi sepihak and other issues seemed to 
reach a boiling point, President Sukarno summoned the leaders of the 10 political parties 
to the Presidential Palace in Bogor (just outside Jakarta) on 12 December in an attempt at 
reconciliation. We saw earlier how the aksi sepihak issue was resolved, and with respect 
to the BPS the result was another vaguely worded joint declaration in which the ten 
parties stated ―we are unanimously determined to foster and maintain the revolutionary 
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and progressive national unity with Nasakom as its core,‖ and also pledged to refrain 
from interpreting the doctrines of the others.
25
 
Apparently the above formulation did not satisfy President Sukarno because on 17 
December, just five days after the Bogor meeting, he suddenly ordered the dissolution of 
the BPS. A few weeks later on 6 January he ordered the suspension of the Murba party 
and its associated organizations and the arrest of over 20 Murba leaders; in February, a 
number of newspapers which had supported BPS were also shut down.  As we shall see 
in subsequent Chapters, the PKI followed these actions with campaigns directed at both 
Trade Minister Adam Malik and Minister Chaerul Saleh. It appeared to most observers 
that the PKI had won a decisive victory, as not only had it had successfully neutralized its 
strongest challenge to date but also President Sukarno had decisively tilted in its favor. 
Moreover, as discussed in Part V and in subsequent Chapters, the banning of the BPS and 
the suspension of Murba coincided with measures taken by President Sukarno in both 
foreign affairs and with respect to foreign companies.  
B. The Course of Konfrontasi. 
The outbreak of Konfrontasi in September 1963 into open conflict did not result 
in the conflict becoming any less ambiguous or ad hoc than it was before September 
1963. The events of September did thrust Konfrontasi front and center onto the domestic 
political scene, and its domestic politicization made it increasingly difficult for President 
Sukarno to withdraw from the conflict without some measure of face-saving. To a large 
degree, it seemed as though the tail of domestic politics was wagging the dog of 
Konfrontasi. Hence, the ―campaign against Malaysia was still pursued in a tentative and 
haphazard fashion, notable more for its high-flown rhetoric than for its effectiveness.‖
26
 
A major problem in resolving the crisis internationally was that it simply was not clear 
what exactly Indonesia‘s goals were, which was perhaps a reflection that President 
Sukarno and the GOI did not know either. Thus, Indonesia‘s demands were ambiguous, 
and Malaysia and the other parties involved were hard-pressed to come up with solutions. 
The conflict never developed into a full-scale military conflict, though, and was primarily 
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played out in the diplomatic arena. Yet, one thing was clear: for President Sukarno, 
Konfrontasi was a perfect example of the dangers of imperialism and the centrality of the 
NEFO/OLDEFO conflict, and thus provided him with a concrete example to support his 
strongly anti-imperialist ideology.
27
      
In the immediate aftermath of the outbreak of Konfrontasi in September 1963, 
there was a lull in diplomatic activity as the dust settled from the September events. 
There was a brief effort at mediation led by Thailand, but ultimately this led nowhere as 
the parties were still cooling off. There was, however, a noticeable increase in rhetoric. 
On the military side, the September events marked the beginning of a third phase of 
operations that lasted until around April 1964 and increasingly featured the use of 
Indonesian troops (rather than TNKU troops) and PARAKU troops (mostly ethnic 
Chinese disgruntled over Malay political dominance in Malaysia, supported and trained 
by Indonesian troops) in cross border raids along the long Borneo jungle border, 
primarily into Sarawak. However, ―the scale of military activity was not stepped up 
significantly beyond the earlier level reconnaissance and probing raids,‖ though the 
objectives may have changed from information gathering to creating disturbances and 
fomenting discontent. The British responded by increasing their troop strength along the 
border (the British were bound to protect Malaysia under the terms of the London 
Agreement), and most of the limited fighting was small scale and took place in remote, 
sparsely populated areas along the border. There were no major pitched battles, and most 
of the physical conflict was a cat and mouse game between these small groups (from 
September 1963 through early June 1964, there were only around 20 incursions by 
groups of 25 or more men) making brief incursions into Malaysian territory and attempts 
by the Malaysians and British to chase them back.
28
    
  The first major effort at diplomatic resolution of the conflict was the result of an 
initiative by the United States in January 1964. Increasingly fearful of being drawn into 
the conflict because of ANZUS treaty commitments to Australia and New Zealand (who 
themselves were in danger of being drawn into the conflict because of commitments to 
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the British), the United States was clearly more concerned with Vietnam and its buildup 
there; moreover, it did not want to see its efforts to cultivate friendly relations with 
Indonesia, with the goal of keeping Indonesia out of the communist camp, go to waste.
29
 
However, the immediate impetus for US diplomatic intervention came from recently 
passed (mid-December 1963) US congressional legislation that required the President to 
make a public determination that it was in the United States‘ national interest to provide 
Indonesia with economic and military assistance before the same could be granted. 
Konfrontasi had obviously made the imminent renewal of US aid to Indonesia more 
difficult to justify on this ground. At a National Security Council meeting on 7 January 
1964, it was suggested that the decision be temporarily deferred while a presidential 
emissary was sent to President Sukarno explaining how Konfrontasi jeopardized this aid 
and then giving Indonesia a chance to halt the conflict. Attorney General Robert Kennedy 
was selected as the emissary, in part because of the ―reservoir of good will‖ built up with 
Sukarno during Kennedy‘s intervention in the West Irian conflict in February 1962.
30
 As 
the plan was refined over the next week, the Kennedy mission was given two objectives. 
The main purpose was to ―get across as forcefully as possible to Sukarno that the policy 
of military confrontation which he is pursuing against Malaysia will have disastrous 
consequences for our relations with his country,‖ and Kennedy was to ―use every 
possible argument to persuade Sukarno to abandon his military activities in Borneo 
completely, or at least agree to cease-fire.‖ The second, related goal was to bring 
Sukarno, Philippine President Macapagal, and Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul 
Rahman ―back to the negotiating table…the Attorney General will not himself attempt to 
negotiate their difficulties; his job is help clear away the obstacles to the three of them 
getting together and coming up with an Asian solution.‖
31
 Tokyo was set as the meeting 
place.  
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On the evening of 15 January, President Sukarno, Foreign Minister Subandrio, 
General Yani and other GOI officials arrived in Tokyo, where they were joined from 16-
19 January by Robert Kennedy. The initial results of meetings over the several days were 
promising. When Kennedy left Tokyo on 19 January, he had secured Sukarno‘s 
agreement that if Malaysia would also agree, Indonesia would declare a temporary cease 
fire in the conflict as a preparatory step to a tri-party meeting among representatives of 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia. Kennedy then went to Manila for consultations 
with President Macapagal, during which he secured Macapagal‘s agreement to a tri-party 
meeting if there were a ceasefire, and then on to Kuala Lumpur, where he secured the 
Tunku‘s agreement to a ceasefire and a tri-party meeting, again provided that Sukarno 
agreed to the ceasefire. On 22 January, Kennedy arrived in Jakarta to inform President 
Sukarno of Macagapal‘s and the Tunku‘s agreements. After some wrangling over what 
had actually been agreed to in Tokyo, on the morning of 23 January Sukarno, at a joint 
press conference with Kennedy, publicly announced a temporary ceasefire. The promise 
of this announcement, though, was somewhat dampened by Sukarno‘s statement later in 




 While the ceasefire did not last long, Kennedy‘s intervention led directly to two 
series of meetings among the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines in Bangkok in early February and early March, which in turn paved the way 
for an unsuccessful summit in Tokyo in June among President Sukarno, the Tunku and 
President Macapagal. A major reason for the almost immediate collapse of the ceasefire, 
and an issue that would plague the diplomatic resolution of the conflict over the next five 
months, was on the question of withdrawal of military forces. For the Malaysians, 
‗ceasefire‘ meant not only cessation of hostilities but also the withdrawal of Indonesian 
troops from the Malaysian part of Borneo, and it was certainly a pre-condition for any 
diplomatic talks.  The Indonesians, however, argued that ceasefire implied no such 
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further step, and after the ceasefire announcement of 23 January ordered its troops to stay 
put. This issue proved to be an insurmountable obstacle in the first Bangkok meeting of 
foreign ministers from 5-10 February (which occurred despite the ceasefire and lack of 
withdrawal). Another problem plaguing the discussions at the Bangkok meeting, at least 
from the Malaysian perspective, was what exactly the Indonesians wanted to do to settle 
the dispute; the Indonesian side kept pushing for a ‗return to the Manila agreements‘ of 
August 1963, but the Malaysians of course asserted that they had followed these 
agreements. When the Malaysian side asked the Indonesian side to explain in detail how 
the Manila agreements had been violated, no answers were forthcoming, and moreover 
the Indonesians refused to specify what concessions or demands they seeking, other than 
to secure an admission from Malaysia that it had mistakenly implemented the Manila 
agreements. The same issues remained unresolved at the second Bangkok meeting of 
foreign ministers on 4 March. Despite the deadlock, the parties managed after much 
delay and wrangling to have a meeting of the three heads of state in Tokyo on 20 June, 
but the summit had no chance. The parties still could not agree on the ceasefire and 
withdrawal issues, which was merely the tip of the iceberg of disagreement between 
Indonesia and Malaysia over the formation of the latter, as the Indonesian side insisted 
that political talks over the existence of Malaysia should accompany the 
ceasefire/withdrawal process. For the Malaysians, of course, the challenge to the 
existence of Malaysia was a non-starter, and the summit ended without any agreement. 
The Tokyo summit was the last sustained attempt at a diplomatic resolution of the 
conflict - following this meeting, there were no serious high level negotiations to end the 
dispute until May 1966.
33
 
 Meanwhile, as preparations were underway for the Tokyo summit, the GOI also 
appeared to be preparing for escalation of the military side of the conflict. On 3 May in a 
speech before a huge crowd in Jakarta, President Sukarno announced the Dwikora, an 
acronym for Dwi Kommando Rakyat or ‗two people‘s commands.‘ Such terminology 
obviously harked back to Sukarno‘s ‗Trikora‘ speech of December 1961 that signaled the 
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final phase of the West Irian conflict (see Chapter Two, Part II, Section B). In the 
Dwikora speech, the President addressed the supposedly 21 million volunteers who had 
already registered to fight against Malaysia as part of a campaign started a few weeks 
earlier to drum up volunteers for Konfrontasi. Describing Malaysia as a threat and 
challenge to the Indonesian Revolution, Sukarno issued two commands of ―increasing the 
strength and resistance of the Indonesian revolution‖ and ―supporting the revolutionary 
people of Malaya, Sarawak, Sabah and Singapore in the dissolution of the puppet state of 
Malaysia.‖ For one seasoned veteran of the Indonesian foreign office, this proclamation 
marked ―the point of no return for president Soekarno with regard to the handling of the 
Malaysia issue. Henceforth, to hope for a solution of the problem through negotiation and 
consultation was not feasible.‖
34
 Symbolically, the speech ―subsequently acquired [the 
status of] the hallowed source of moral authority for the struggle against Malaysia,‖ and 
―obeisance to Dwikora came to be required in almost every public utterance about 
confrontation.‖
35
  On 16 May, President Sukarno established for the first time a special 
military command known as KOGA (short for Komando Siaga or ‗Vigilance Command‘) 
to take charge of military operations against Malaysia. However, in a move that reflected 
Sukarno‘s distrust of the army and led to inter-service conflict, Sukarno named Air Force 
Commander Omar Dhani as commander of KOGA.
36
 Yet, despite the ominous nature of 
these measures, there was no significant intensification of military operations in Borneo, 
where a stalemate of sorts was reached.
37
 
However, in August and early September 1964 the conflict quickly escalated to its 
most dangerous phase militarily and threatened to blow up from a small, low intensity 
conflict to a major war when Indonesia shifted its attacks from the relatively isolated 
Borneo border to the Malaysian peninsula. On 17 August 1964, some 40 guerillas (about 
half of whom were from the Indonesian army), landed in the Johore area of the southern 
Malaysian peninsula. This was the first significant incursion on the peninsula and the 
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intent appears to have been either ―to arouse pro-Indonesian elements among the Malay 
communities there or to provoke further communal conflict in an area where serious anti-
Chinese riots had broken out in 1964.‖
38
 This attempt was ineffective however, as half 
the invaders were captured almost immediately and the other half over the next few 
months. Then, a few weeks later on the night of 1-2 September, some 100 troops (mostly 
from the Indonesian air force) were dropped by parachute near Labis (also in the Johore 
area of the southern peninsula), which had a large Chinese population. The objective 
appears to have been to set up a camp in the jungle area of the nearby mountains and 
foment local Chinese discontent in hopes of igniting the failed Chinese communist 
insurgency (known locally as the ‗Emergency‘) of the late 1940s and 1950s.
39
 This 
operation was also a disaster for the Indonesians and had little military impact. However, 
these two measures resulted in the serious consideration by the British of retaliatory 
measures against Indonesia such as ―commando raids on the islands of the Riau 
archipelago and a retaliatory air strike against Indonesian airfields.‖
40
 The only measure 
the British actually took was the sending of an aircraft carrier through the Indonesia‘s 
Sunda Straits (between Java and Sumatra) on 27 August (the British seriously considered 
sending the carrier back through the Sunda Straits in early September, but did not), but in 
combination these events threatened a major escalation of Konfrontasi and indeed 
September 1964 appears to have been Konfrontasi‘s most dangerous flashpoint 
militarily.
41
     
Malaysia responded to the Indonesian incursions into the peninsula by taking the 
matter to the United Nations Security Council. The Indonesian representative to the 
council candidly admitted that Indonesian troops and volunteers had entered into 
Malaysian Borneo and made no attempt to deny that Indonesia had made the two 
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incursions into peninsula Malaysia. Instead, he sought to reframe the question into the 
larger political issue over the formation of Malaysia as a British neo-colonialist plot, 
implicitly challenging Malaysia‘s very existence. After a week of debate, a resolution 
was crafted that (i) regretted all incidents that had occurred in the whole region, (ii) 
deplored the incident of 2 September, (iii) requested the parties to make every effort to 
avoid the recurrence of such incidents, (iv) asked the parties to refrain from the use of 
force and respect each other‘s territorial integrity, and (v) recommended further talks. 
Though somewhat weakly worded, the resolution, particularly clauses (ii) and (iv), 
clearly sided with Malaysia.  The resolution was initially passed on 17 September by the 
Security Council by a nine to two vote, with Bolivia, Brazil, Taiwan, France, Ivory Coast, 
Morocco, Norway, the USA and the UK voting for it, and the USSR and Czechoslovakia 
voting against it; however, the USSR finally vetoed it.
42
 Nevertheless, the fact that 
Indonesia had to rely on the Soviet Union to block the resolution and that the Afro-Asian 
countries (Taiwan, Morocco, and the Ivory Coast) had voted for the resolution constituted 
a victory for Malaysia and an implied defeat for Indonesia.  
GOI officials apparently realized that the events outlined above had brought it 
perilously close to the outbreak of a major military conflict with the British and quickly 
sought to de-escalate the situation. On 16 September, President Sukarno made a secret 
overture to the Malaysian Prime Minister, indicating that Konfrontasi would be called off 
if the Malaysians agreed to hold a plebiscite in Borneo within five years. The Malaysians 
did not accept this, however, and similar feelers made to the British were also ignored.
43
 
There were no more incursions of significance on peninsula Malaysia, just a number of 
nuisance raids by sea which had no impact.
44
 As one observer noted, the ―crisis seemed 
to have established a threshold for Indonesian activities in Malaya, beyond which they 
would not go in case it triggered a wider war.‖
45
 The decision to escalate the conflict into 
peninsula Malaysia also seriously alarmed the Indonesian army, which was willing to go 
along with a low level conflict (from which it reaped political benefits as well as weapons 
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and financing) but had not approved of the landings on the peninsula precisely because of 
the possibility of a great escalation into a conflict they were unlikely to win. Henceforth 
the army stepped up its involvement in two ways in order to contain the conflict. First, it 
convinced President Sukarno to reorganize the KOGA into a new structure called 
KOLAGA (the ‗Mandala Vigilance Command‘, reminiscent of the Mandala Command 
from the West Irian conflict) which allowed the army to exercise much greater control 
over the conflict. In addition, beginning 1 January 1965, army general Suharto, who had 
also headed the Mandala command and in 1963 was appointed commander of the army 
strategic reserve command (KOSTRAD), was appointed deputy commander of 
KOLAGA. Indeed, in the latter part of 1964 and in 1965, 
army leaders carried out a series of maneuvers designed to obstruct the 
effective implementation of the policy of confrontation. While they 
probably appreciated that the president himself did not want Indonesia to 
slip into a full-scale war, they had little faith in his judgment after the 




Secondly, a very select group of top level Indonesian army leaders, including Generals 
Yani and Suharto, began in September secretly contacting Malaysian officials to express 
their intent to keep Konfrontasi limited. In so informing Malaysian officials of the 
―army‘s reluctance to give full support to Sukarno‘s campaign in the hope of avoiding 
misunderstandings that could have led to wider war,‖ army leaders ―were able to reduce 




After the peak of September 1964, Konfrontasi essentially became a stalemate for 
the next 20 months, both militarily and diplomatically. The focus of the fighting returned 
to the border area in Borneo, but this was still limited to very low level fighting, mostly 
by cross-border incursions. In late December 1964 and January 1965 there was a 
significant build-up of forces by both sides along the Borneo border (with each side 
having roughly 20,000 troops there), which though initially ominous only reinforced the 
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  As we saw earlier, from the diplomatic perspective efforts to resolve the 
conflict petered out after the failed Tokyo summit of June 1964. In terms of foreign 
relations, by early 1965 Konfrontasi, while still continuing, was very much pushed to the 
side as anti-imperialism became the dominant theme of Indonesian foreign policy, though 
of course Konfrontasi provided the springboard for this anti-imperialist focus (see 
Chapter Six). Domestically, Konfrontasi, while still serving as a rallying cry for many, 
was also pushed to the side in 1965 as the political struggle among President Sukarno, the 
army and the PKI played out.  
 
II. January 1964 PKI-Led Attempted Seizures of British 
Firms and Government Response.  
 
The PKI initiated a wave of takeovers of British companies in January 1964 
which eventually resulted in most of the British companies in Indonesia coming under 
government control.
49
 These events were extremely confusing and at the time it was very 
difficult to get an accurate picture of what exactly was happening at the individual 
companies, let alone as a group. The wave began with well-coordinated attempted 
takeovers of British firms in mid-January in Jakarta/West Java, then in Medan/North 
Sumatra, and then in Surabaya/East Java; in most cases, the takeovers failed, and owner-
appointed management remained in control. Konfrontasi with Malaysia, and Great 
Britain as the primary backer of Malaysia, was again a common theme of the takeovers. 
The attempted seizures were initiated through the PKI-controlled SOBSI labor federation 
and the PKI-dominated National Front and constituted the first time the PKI and its 
affiliated groups, which were inconspicuous during the September 1963 takeovers, led 
the takeover of foreign companies in this period. The actions were in direct contravention 
of President Sukarno‘s Decree 194/1963 of September 1963, which as we saw in Chapter 
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Four prohibited the takeovers of British companies except by direct order of the 
President. These measures were thus a challenge to the central government and were one 
of numerous measures the PKI took as it went on the political offensive in 1964. 
These attempted takeovers led to different responses by different parts of the 
government. The central government initially took two measures to deal with the 
takeovers – Second Deputy Prime Minister Leimena‘s announcement to the public of 20 
January and General Yani‘s order to various regional officials of 23 January (each 
described below), but these seemed to have no effect in terms of preventing labor union 
activity from breaking out. The impact of these measures at the provincial levels of 
government also appears uncertain, as various regional governments each reacted 
differently, indicating clear divisions within the government. Finally, about two weeks 
after the wave of takeovers began, the central government intervened more decisively 
with the issuance of Minister Chaerul Saleh‘s circular of 31 January placing all affected 
British companies under GOI control and supervision, which paved the way for the 
issuance of further decrees by individual ministers regarding the companies. As with the 
September 1963 takeovers, the terms ‗nationalization‘ or ‗expropriation‘ or ‗confiscation‘ 
were not used. The placing of the affected British companies under GOI control and 
supervision initially appeared to be an ad hoc measure which gave the government time 
to decide what to do with the companies, but it also opened the door to subsequent 
confiscation. 
A. The Attempted Takeovers and Regional Government 
Response. 
This section traces the takeovers or attempted takeovers of British firms in 
January by SOBSI-affiliated labor unions and the National Front and the initial reaction 
of the local or provincial government. These takeovers or attempted takeovers were 
primarily limited to three distinct areas: Jakarta/West Java, Surabaya/East Java, and 
Medan/North Sumatra. The takeovers started in Jakarta/West Java on 18 January and 
within a few days spread to the other two regions. The actions were in direct 
contravention of President Sukarno‘s Decree 194/1963 of September 1963, which 
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continued to be in force; yet despite its continuing applicability, as well as two attempts 
by the central government (Second Deputy Prime Minister Leimena‘s announcement to 
the public of 20 January and General Yani‘s order to various regional officials of 23 
January, each described below) to elicit compliance with it, each regional/local 
government responded differently to the attempted takeovers. The Governor of Jakarta 
reacted strongly against the takeovers and took measures to neutralize any further 
activity, but in the other areas the local government attitude was more ambiguous. In 
West Java, the takeover of P&T Lands lasted three days but was eventually reversed; 
West Java Governor Mashudi seemed to have reversed course from his strong anti-
takeover stand of September 1963 and appeared supportive of the takeover. In East Java, 
the Governor did not react decisively against the takeovers and in effect allowed unions 
in three companies to appoint their own management team, but this union management 
had no real power or authority.  At the far end of the spectrum, the Governor of North 
Sumatra hesitated, then ignored General Yani‘s order of 23 January and appointed teams 
to manage and supervise the companies. It appeared, though, that things for the moment 
had not really changed significantly in the operation of the companies in North Sumatra. 
In form, there were many similarities to the DPS-KBKI labor union takeovers of 
September 1963. The general pattern was the announcement by labor leaders of a worker 
takeover (in many cases, the worker group tried to get management to sign a ‗surrender‘ 
document), followed by the attempted expulsion of owner-appointed management (often 
expatriate) and the appointment of new management. In some cases, such as P&T Lands, 
the takeover group then proceeded to the local authorities to report their actions. In 
addition, like the actions of September 1963, these attempts were all non-violent. Yet, 
there were also clear differences between the September 1963 and January 1964 actions. 
Unlike the DPS-KBKI led-takeovers of September, the SOBSI/National Front led 
takeovers of January were mostly failures, and they were often little more than weak 
attempts. However, the scope of the takeovers was much larger than in September 1963, 
as a large majority of British companies in Indonesia were affected, not just five.  
Moreover, as we shall see in Section C below, the motivation appeared quite different. 
Before turning to the takeovers and regional responses, however, it is necessary to 
discuss briefly the immediate events that ostensibly triggered these activities, though as 
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we shall see later these events really disguised the underlying reason. As discussed in 
Part I, on the evening of 15 January, President Sukarno, Foreign Minister Subandrio, 
General Yani and other GOI officials arrived in Tokyo for meetings with US Attorney 
General Robert Kennedy to discuss Konfrontasi. Upon arrival in Tokyo on 15 January, 
Minister Subandrio issued a statement apparently ―charging that the British were taking 
arbitrary measures in Hong Kong against Indonesian interests‖ and that the GOI was 
reviewing the situation to see if this was the beginning of a general offensive.
50
  What 
Subandrio was referring to were several actions taken by the Hong Kong authorities, 
which at the time was a British colony.  First, at the request of Singapore (at the time part 
of Malaysia), in December 1963 the government of Hong Kong had declined to approve 
the sale of two merchant ships to Indonesia. Second, also in December, the British 
government had instructed the Hong Kong government to refuse to issue export licenses 
for certain commodities which could be used for military purposes, such as 16 aircraft 
engines for C-130 planes owned by the Indonesian air force.  These engines were 
currently in Hong Kong being serviced. The third action was the detention of two 
Indonesian ships, the Ambulombo and the Tampomas, which were owned by PELNI, the 
Indonesian state-owned shipping firm, and had in the past been used to make the Haj, the 
Moslem pilgrimage to Mecca. The British government had nothing to do with their 
detention; they were detained in legal actions by plaintiff writs from one Dutch company 
and one Chinese company who alleged breach of contract and failure to pay bills on the 
part of PELNI. The case was scheduled to go to court on 31 January, and the British 
Foreign Office anticipated that PELNI‘s claim of immunity from prosecution (because of 
government ownership) would prevail.
51
 The latter two actions were often cited in the 
worker takeovers that followed in the next 10 days; the third measure, the seizure of the 
Haj ships, was in particular emotionally charged. Of course, rarely, if ever, was the 
background or the reasons for the measures actually discussed.  
Finally, before describing the flurry of attempted takeovers and different reactions 
of the various provincial governments, it should be noted that the central GOI initially 
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took two measures to halt the takeovers. The first measure was an announcement 
published in Antara, the GOI news agency, on 20 January, two days after the takeovers 
began in Jakarta, by acting President Leimena (who as Second Deputy Prime Minister 
was acting as President in Sukarno‘s (and First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio‘s) 
absence from Jakarta from 15-21 January). The announcement stated that although the 
government could understand the desire of the people to take action against British 
property in response to the British takeover of Indonesian ships and property in Hong 
Kong, the government hoped the people would not act until government policy was 
decided. Apparently Leimena‘s appeal was also broadcast on the radio several times.
52
 
The second, more forceful action was an order issued on 23 January – the day President 
Sukarno declared a ceasefire in Konfrontasi and Robert Kennedy wound up his peace 
mission in Jakarta - by General Yani, the army commander and chief of staff of KOTI, 
acting on orders from President Sukarno. Yani‘s order went out to every regional military 
commander, police chief, Governor and prosecutor of Indonesia and instructed 
government agencies to enforce Presidential Decree 194/1963 prohibiting the takeovers 
of British companies. General Yani‘s order also singled out Shell Oil, explicitly calling 
for the prevention of the takeover of that company.
53
 As we shall see, however, these two 
measures had limited success in stemming the tide of takeover attempts.  
1. Jakarta.  
From 18 January through 22 January there were various takeover attempts of 
three British firms in Jakarta - Unilever, British American Tobacco, and Maclaine 
Watson. There was also significant worker activity at Shell Oil‘s headquarters in Jakarta. 
However, in none of these cases were the takeover groups actually able to take control of 
the company. The police and the Governor of Jakarta were quick to intervene and as 
described below actually posted security teams to ensure there would be no more 
attempts. The Governor of Jakarta‘s reaction was the swiftest and most determined of the 
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regional responses. It should be noted that on 18 January, the day the takeovers started, 
there was also a peaceful demonstration against the British embassy in Jakarta; the 
demonstrators presented a resolution protesting the British government refusal to permit 
spare parts to be exported from Hong Kong, the detaining of the two pilgrim ships, and 
the brutality of British imperialism, and demanded the severing of diplomatic relations as 
well as the confiscation of British businesses.
54
  
Unilever. From 18-22 January there were various attempts by workers, led by the 
SERBUNI labor union (an acronym for Serikat Buruh Unilever, the ‗Workers Union of 
Unilever‘, affiliated with SOBSI), to take over the Jakarta head office of Unilever as well 
as its three factories in Jakarta. (In addition to its three factories in Jakarta, Unilever also 
had a factory in Surabaya; the factories made soap, margarine, coconut oil, toothpaste and 
other edible oils).  The takeover statement for Unilever‘s Angke factory cited, among 
other things, British imperialism, Konfrontasi, the opening of a British offensive as 
evidenced by the seizure of spare parts for the air force, and the seizure of the two Haj 
ships, as well as recent statements by President Sukarno, as the reasons for its actions. 
Management resisted these efforts and immediately called in the police, who were able to 
prevent the factories from being taken over. However, the police did not have enough 
manpower to cover the head office as well, and there was more interference with 
management there. Yet except for one day, 20 January, on which expatriate managers 
were told by the company not to come into the office, it appears that Unilever-appointed 
management remained mostly in control at the head office. On 21 January there was a 
long meeting between management and union leaders which was mediated by a 
representative from the Governor of Jakarta‘s office, and it was agreed that the unions 
would move out of the head office and Unilever-appointed management would resume 
full control.
55
    
Shell Oil. On 20 January, a joint delegation of workers notified management in 
Shell‘s Jakarta headquarters that workers were taking over the company and would then 
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hand it over to the GOI. They also intended to appoint their own management. Shell 
management rejected these claims and the delegation departed peacefully, stopping only 
to post signs on the building saying ―Indonesian property.‖  Interestingly, just after 
leaving Shell‘s office, the non-communist unions involved in the action came to the US 
embassy and informed US officials that the attempted takeover at Shell was led by the 
PERBUM union (which was affiliated with SOBSI and the largest oil workers union in 
the country) and that the other unions were forced to participate in order to protect their 
position with the workers.
56
   On 23 January, at a meeting between the Shell manager, 
Third Deputy Prime Minister/Coordinating Minister Chaerul Saleh and Labor Minister 
Ahem Erningpradja, Minister Saleh said the GOI had no intention of letting the labor 
unions take over British companies and that KOTI would soon be issuing orders to stop 
them.
57
  There were no more incidents of note at Shell‘s Jakarta headquarters. 
Meanwhile, at Shell Pladju there was no worker activity of note. However, in 
Balikpapan, there was initially some minor interference in management, but full control 
was restored by 26 January. A small worker takeover team had installed itself in one 
office for a few weeks, but it had no impact. Communications between Balikpapan and 
Jakarta were also not allowed for two weeks until 6 February.
58
 
British American Tobacco. BAT was a cigarette manufacturing company with 
factories in Surabaya (East Java), Semarang (Central Java) and Cirebon (West Java) and 
a head office in Jakarta. On 22 January there was an attempted worker takeover of BAT‘s 
Jakarta head office, but the workers apparently held off pending a meeting with the 
Governor of Jakarta. Thus the office was never taken over.
59
  (Meanwhile, in Cirebon, 
West Java, the BAT facility was taken over on 20 January, but management control was 
restored the next day.
60
) 
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Maclaine Watson. Maclaine Watson was a trading firm with its main office in 
Jakarta and branch offices in Semarang, Surabaya, Bandjarmasin (Kalimantan) and 
Makassar (Sulawesi). On 22 January there was an attempt to take over the Jakarta office 
of Maclaine Watson. At one point the owner-apointed management was actually detained 
in the office, but the police intervened and by the next day (23 January) owner-appointed 
management was back in control.
61
 In addition, Maclaine‘s office in Makassar was 
actually taken over for a few days, but owner-appointed management was restored by the 
Governor of South Sulawesi, albeit with a security team in place similar to those of 
Jakarta.
62
    
Thus, in Jakarta the police and the Governor‘s office initially took firm measures 
to prevent the takeovers. The Governor‘s office actively mediated in the attempt at 
Unilever, and the Governor even assured the British embassy several times that he was 
carefully monitoring events and would deal firmly with the situation.
63
  On 24 January, 
after the issuance of General Yani‘s order instructing GOI officials to prevent takeovers, 
the Governor installed teams at the offices of BAT, Unilever, Maclaine Watson and 
Chartered Bank (which had been threatened with a worker takeover, but nothing ever 
happened). The role of these teams was not to ―supervise‖ but to ensure that that there 
was no trouble with workers; as the Governor explained to representatives from the 
British embassy, the teams had no powers of control and their ―only function was to keep 
workers in check and assist in the ‗cooling off‘ process.‖
64
 The teams were headed by 
police officers, and other members included representatives from the Governor‘s office, 
labor, management, and sometimes the army. (In the case of Unilever, the team was 
comprised of a police officer (acting as head of the team), two representatives from the 
Governor‘s office, some members of the board of directors, and two representatives from 
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)  The teams did not interfere at all in management or operations and 
appear genuinely to have been there for protective purposes.
66
  
2. West Java. 
On 18 January, numerous workers led by the National Front took over P&T 
Lands, the large British estate company with 21 estates located in West Java.
67
 
Presumably this takeover was effected by occupying the company‘s head office in 
Subang. No violence was involved, and European staff personnel were ordered by the 
management to stay at home.
68
 A takeover statement justifying the seizure was issued, 
and it specifically referred to: (i) Article 33, Clause Two of the 1945 constitution (which 
provided that  ―branches of production which are important for the state and which affect 
the life of most people shall be controlled by the State‖), (ii) MANIPOL (noting that the 
Indonesian Revolution is a national revolution which opposes imperialism and 
colonialism, that foreign capital should not play a negative role, and that foreign capital 
should not help counterrevolutionaries or engage in sabotage), (iii) DEKON (Indonesia is 
now in its first revolutionary stage, and it is our duty to eliminate the remains of 
imperialism and feudalism in the economic field and build a national economy free from 
imperialism and feudalism),
69
 and (iv) the imperialistic steps the British had recently 
taken which were not friendly to Indonesia, including the creation of the neo-colonialist 
project Malaysia, the attempted assassination of President Sukarno, the seizure of spare 
parts for the military in Hong Kong, the seizure of Indonesia Haj ships, undertaking 
military activities on the Indonesian border of North Kalimantan, undertaking other 
subversive activities, etc. (all of which related to Konfrontasi).  All the above, the 
statement noted, 
have pushed the progressive people of the Subang area into taking 
progressive revolutionary steps against the British imperialist owners and 
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their capital in the Subang area….Today [18 January], the step is being 
taken of taking over the entire P&T Lands which will then become 
property of the Republic of Indonesia, and we will surrender the company 




The statement was signed by six leaders of the workers group and also by a 
representative (ketua periodic, or rotating head/leader) of the National Front.
71
 A separate 
statement named 13 individuals to lead various divisions of the company, and apparently 
separate labor committees were appointed to run individual estates.
72
   
Later that same day, some of the leaders of the takeover group as well as members 
of the National Front went to meet both Governor Mashudi of West Java and Minister of 
Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs Sadjarwo in what the British embassy thought was an 
effort to get official government support (at both the national and provincial levels) for 
the unauthorized action.
73
 It is unclear if Minister Sadjarwo ever met with these 
representatives, but the other delegation did meet with Governor Mashudi and the result 
was a joint statement issued by Governor Mashudi and the leader of the National Front in 
West Java, Ibrahim Adjie, who was also the commander of the West Java based 
Siliwangi division of the army.
74
  The joint statement stated that (i) the complete takeover 
of P&T Lands on 18 January was done by the West Java management board of the 
National Front and by the provincial government of West Java, (ii) in a short time there 
would be discussions with all sides, including the central government in Jakarta, 
regarding the steps to be taken next, and (iii) the company should be operated as usual 
and all sides must take responsibility regarding safety and public order, especially 
regarding material, property and people.
75
   
                                                 
70
 Piagam Ambil-Alih Perusahaan P&T Lands Didjadikan Milik Negara Republik Indonesia, dated 18 
January 1964 (ANRI, R-22, 271). Translations are my own. 
71
 The names of these men are mostly illegible, and it is not clear who they were. 
72
 Piagam Penjerahan Pimpinan Perusahaan Bekas P&T Lands, dated 18 January 1964 (ANRI, R-22, 271). 
British Embassy telegram (Gilchrist) dated 21 January 1964 (UKNA, FCO 371/175281). I have the names 
of these men, but do not know anything about their background.  
73
 British Embassy telegram (Gilchrist) dated 18 January 1964 (UKNA, FCO 371/175281). 
74
 Like Colonel Soehardjo in East Kalimantan, General Ibrahim Adjie served simultaneously as the 
provincial military commander and provincial leader of the National Front. General Adjie, a strong 
supporter of President Sukarno, was also strongly anti-communist.  See p. 16 of O.G Roeder, Who's Who in 
Indonesia: Biographies of Prominent Indonesian Personalities in All Fields (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 
1971).    
75
 Pernjataan Pemerintah Daerah TKI Djabar dan PD FN Djabar (ANRI, R-22, 271).  
 289 
 
It seems fairly clear from the above that the National Front played a leading role 
in the takeover of P&T Lands, though certainly SOBSI was involved and indeed the 
British Embassy believed that SOBSI was actually behind the takeovers.
76
  Of more 
immediate interest perhaps were the roles played by West Java Governor Mashudi and 
Siliwangi commander General Adjie. That the leaders of the takeover were able so 
quickly to secure a meeting with so high an official as Governor Mashudi indicates that 
he certainly knew what was going to happen before it did and obviously made no effort to 
stop it. In addition, there is the evidence of the 18 January joint statement itself (signed 
by Governor Mashudi) that makes clear that the takeover was carried out by both the 
National Front and the provincial West Java government. In fact, based on the very fast 
same day meeting with the workers, the joint statement itself, as well as later statements 
to the press which encouraged the central government to nationalize the company, it 
seems likely that Governor Mashudi actually encouraged the workers to act.  If so, this 
was almost a complete reversal of his efforts in September 1963 to prevent a worker 
takeover. As we shall see, this would not be the first instance of local authorities 
complicit in labor actions against foreign companies, either by inaction in the face of 
prior knowledge or downright open encouragement. The role of General Adjie, with his 
joint positions of commander of the Siliwangi division of the army and leader of the 
provincial National Front, is harder to fathom – was he directly involved in instigating 
the takeover, or was he trying to control and limit it? From the section of the statement he 
signed with Governor Mashudi indicating that ―the company should be operated as usual 
and all sides must take responsibility regarding safety and public order,‖ it could be 
inferred that he was trying to control events, but it is difficult to know for sure.         
The worker takeover of P&T Lands lasted only three days. It was unclear just 
who was behind the return to management and what exactly happened. According to the 
British embassy, it was the supervisory team installed by Governor Mashudi back in 
September, heretofore largely unobtrusive, which forced the workers to back down; 
without the supervisory team, it might well have been impossible for the company to 
reassert control and run the business. Furthermore, the British embassy reported that the 
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order to make the workers back off had come from the central government in Jakarta.
77
 
The US embassy, in contrast, initially reported that Governor Mashudi and General Adjie 
were trying to return the estates to owner control.  The next day, the US embassy reported 
that according to the P&T Lands manager it was the army who returned control to owner 
management.
78
 In any case, by 21 January the foreign staff had returned to their posts, 
though some estates had not yet been brought back under P&T Lands‘ control. In 
addition, some of the workers involved in the takeover were arrested. 
However, the temporary takeover signaled that changes were afoot. In the first 
place, the worker takeover immediately led to greater interference in P&T Lands‘ affairs 
by the supervisory team installed back in September by Governor Mashudi. The 
supervisory team was apparently under new instructions from the central government to 
take a much greater interest in the company‘s affairs, especially on the financial side.
79
  If 
this is true, it is interesting because the central government was now directing a team 
appointed by the Governor of West Java. Apparently the supervisory team did begin to 
interfere more in the management of the company; for example, the leader of the 
supervisory team began insisting on countersigning checks.
80
 Second, in addition to 
internal pressures on P&T Lands, over the next few weeks there was also increasing 
national momentum and calls for the GOI to take action with respect to the company. For 
example, an Antara article quoted Governor Mashudi on 30 January as saying ―P&T 
Lands will definitely become the property of Indonesia in the future.  We are only 
waiting for the day, maybe tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. All those arrested (28 in 
all) at the attempted takeover would now be released.‖
81
 Thus Governor Mashudi, as 
suggested above, seems to have completely retreated from his September 1963 position 
of protecting P&T Lands, though without any evidence it is futile to speculate why 
Mashudi would do this. Similarly, on the same day Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian 
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Affairs Sadjarwo told a delegation of workers that P&T Lands would shortly be taken 
over by the government.
82
 The pressure was clearly being ratcheted up.  
3. Medan/North Sumatra. 
On 22 January, four days after the attempted takeovers began in Jakarta, British 
interests in North Sumatra began to experience takeover activity. As we saw in Chapter 
Three, there were numerous British interests in North Sumatra in the form of estate 
companies, but virtually all these estates were managed by one of three large estate 
management firms. The largest was the Harrisons & Crosfield/London Sumatra group, 
whose operations in Sumatra were run separately from the Jakarta operations and were 
not affected at all by the takeovers of the H&C office in Jakarta in September. H&C, with 
its office in Medan, acted as estate managers for the London Sumatra estates and also 
engaged in shipping, trade, insurance and engineering services, mostly related to 
marketing the produce of the estates. The estates H&C managed were mostly owned by 
companies within the London Sumatra group, and there were 17-18 estates altogether. 
H&C‘s Medan office was managed by a British national, and altogether there were 
around five expatriates in the office; of the estates it managed, some five to ten were 
managed by foreigners and the rest by Indonesians. The second large estate manager was 
Anglo Sumatra Estate Agency, a 50/50 joint venture between a Belgian estate company 
and a British estate firm which managed about a dozen estates, about half of which were 
rubber estates owned by various British companies and the other half palm oil estates 
owned by different Belgian companies. Anglo Sumatra‘s office in Medan had three 
expatriates, including a Swiss manager, but the individual estate managers were 
Indonesian. The third estate management firm was a British company named Guthries, 
which had extensive interests in Malaysia but only managed a few estates in North 
Sumatra. Its head office was also in Medan, and the sole European expatriate (a British 
national) in the office was the manager. Aside from the individual British estate owners 
(whose estates were mostly operated by one of these management firms), the only other 
British interest in North Sumatra was the Chartered Bank, with an office in Medan; 
however, there was no significant takeover attempt at Chartered Bank and its operations 
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were left alone. Since H&C/Lonsum was the largest of the three estate management 
companies and the one for which there is the most information, the following discussion 
focuses on it.   
On the morning of 22 January, various labor union leaders – it is not clear who 
exactly they were, how many there were, or where they were from – entered the H&C 
main office in Medan and read a proclamation announcing the takeover. In addition they 
asked the manager, a British national named John McLeod, to sign a takeover statement. 
McLeod refused to do so and instead telephoned the police and the British consul in 
Medan. Just as the police were arriving, the union leaders left the office and went to see 
Governor of North Sumatra Ulung Sitepu.
83
  Around noon, the union leaders returned to 
the H&C office and announced that at their meeting Governor Sitepu had authorized the 
takeover of the company by a team appointed by the Governor himself. Hearing this 
news, McLeod and other H&C representatives rushed off to see Governor Sitepu, who 
proposed to them that H&C should be taken over the next day as a temporary measure 
until clarification regarding President Sukarno‘s intentions toward British enterprises 
could be received. Around 3:00 in the afternoon, the British consul in Medan met with 
the Governor, who declared that the takeover at H&C was a fait accompli and he was 
forced to intervene and take over the company himself to ensure the smooth operation of 
the company. This declaration came despite there being no actual takeover of the office – 
all that had occurred had been the declaration of a takeover, and H&C management was 
still in complete control - and despite previous assurances from the Governor and Chief 
of Police that there would be no takeovers unless authorized by the central GOI. 
Governor Sitepu told the British consul that he was in a tough position; if he prevented 
the takeover, and then was told by the President to allow the takeovers, where would he 
be then? The best solution was to have a temporary takeover, lasting two to three days, 
until the picture cleared up. Still later in the evening, the British consul met with General 
Kosasih, the head of the All Sumatra Regional Command (KOANDA) and probably the 
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highest ranking military official in Sumatra, who was worried that the Governor had gone 




The next morning (23 January), Governor Sitepu telephoned the British consul to 
say that the European managers could go anywhere they pleased.  When McLeod and the 
others arrived at the office, however, they were presented by union leaders with a copy of 
the decision regarding the takeovers that the Governor was to issue later in the day. This 
decision, among other things, appointed both a management team and a supervisory team 
for H&C‘s office. Another H&C manager, Johnstone, raced off to talk to the Governor 
about the composition of the team. According to Johnstone, the Governor begged him not 
to make a fuss, saying that the measures were only to last for two to three days. As it 
turned out, the Governor did dispatch the Deputy Governor to Jakarta for clarification. In 
any case, by mid-day the teams appointed by the Governor were in place. It appeared also 
that similar teams were in place at Guthries, though at Anglo Sumatra the Swiss manager 
had told the arriving teams that it was impossible to take over half the office (Anglo 




The Governor‘s takeover decree was a masterpiece of ambiguity, compromise and 
dexterity which juxtaposed falsehoods and stretched truths so that the Governor could 
justify his actions.
86
 The preamble to the decree noted the following: (i) that workers took 
over H&C and its affiliated companies on the morning of 22 January and then at 10:30 
surrendered them to the Governor (neither of which had actually happened), (ii) that for 
the safety of the companies and the continuity of business, the provincial government of 
North Sumatra would take over the actions of the workers (i.e., assume responsibility for 
the companies), (iii) that it was in the best interest of the people and the country that the 
companies should be run smoothly, and to manage and supervise the companies it was 
necessary to appoint temporary management and supervisory teams, (iv) the opinion of 
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the National Front of North Sumatra, and (v) the announcement of the Acting President 
of Indonesia (Leimena) on 20 January. By claiming (falsely) that workers had already 
taken over the company and surrendered it to him, the Governor was in effect saying that 
he had no choice but to take over the company in order to prevent the company from 
being managed by the workers; such an action was in essence the only choice left if the 
Governor were to carry out Minister Leimena‘s appeal of 20 January that had warned 
against takeovers by the people. Naturally, the Governor would have to appoint people to 
run the companies once he took them over. In fact, the Governor actually appointed two 
teams under the decree, a management team and a supervisory team. The management 
team was comprised of three people, and its duties were to continue to manage the 
companies to increase production, not to make any major changes without the consent of 
the Governor, and to report on developments to the Governor. The supervisory team was 
comprised of four people, and its duties were to supervise the company so that it ran 
smoothly and production increased, to ensure that the instructions of the Governor were 
carried out, and to report on developments to the Governor. The duties of these two teams 
obviously overlapped, and there was no clear separation of roles nor any explanation of 
what was meant by supervision. 
The ambiguity of the decree over the exact roles of the two teams was cleared up 
somewhat by the actual membership of the two teams. The three members of the 
management team were all Indonesian staff employees of H&C. The supervisory team, 
on the other hand, consisted of (i) a representative from the Governor‘s office, (ii) the 
secretary of the National Front in Medan, (iii) the secretary of a labor union, and (iv) a 
labor union representative within H&C‘s office.
87
 Presumably the Governor really did 
want to make sure that the office was properly run, hence he appointed existing staff to 
the management team. The supervisory team, however, was clearly a concession to the 
labor unions (and National Front) which had attempted to take over the company. It is 
unclear how much leeway the Governor wanted to give the labor unions; it seemed the 
two teams would have to work out for themselves the boundary and scope of their 
respective roles. As things turned out, the supervisory team indeed managed to retain 
quite a bit of influence over the next several months. 
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The situation in the Medan offices of the three British estate management 
companies over the next few weeks was not altogether clear, but it seems that in practice, 
with the exception of H&C, there was little immediate change.  This only becomes 
evident in hindsight, however; at the time, there was great confusion and uncertainty over 
how the situation would play out, and the composition and role of the ―supervisory team‖ 
seemed quite ominous. H&C seemed to be affected the most. Foreign managers were 
allowed to go to the offices, and even retained some control over important documents 
and financial matters, but the day-to-day management regarding the estates was done by 
the management team and Indonesian staff, with the foreign managers only ―advising.‖   
Trade and shipping activities continued to be run by the foreign managers. At the offices 
of Guthries, a team had been appointed and was in place, but members of the Indonesian 
staff were on the team and in practice little changed. Anglo Sumatra had experienced 
hardly any interference in management, and there was not even a takeover team in place 
at the office as of early February. It also seemed that for the most part British-Indonesian 
personal relations remained quite cordial.
88
 
On the British-owned estates themselves the picture was even murkier. On the 
morning of 22 January, numerous British-owned estates in North Sumatra – the actual 
number is not clear - were also taken over by labor unions. These takeovers were 
obviously coordinated with the attempted takeovers of the management companies‘ 
offices in Medan. For example, at London Sumatra‘s Dolok estate, the estate manager 
was forced by the labor unions to sign a surrender document.  The document, also signed 
by representatives from the KBKI federation, SARBUPRI union (this union represented 
estate workers and was a member of SOBSI) and BTI (the  PKI-controlled organization 
of farmers), cited Konfrontasi, the British confiscation of spare parts in Hong Kong, the 
British seizure of the Haj ships, and DEKON and other revolutionary slogans, as some of 
the reasons why the unions decided to take over all British companies, which the 
declaration noted were immediately turned over to the GOI.
89
  However, details of what 
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was actually happening on the various estates after 22 January are scarce.  There were 
about seven foreign estate managers on the Lonsum estates, and each of these managers 
lost effective control of their estates around 22 January and were made inactive. It 
appears that Indonesian staff members ran the estates in their absence, and there was little 
change in practice. It is not clear what was happening on the estates already managed by 
Indonesians, but there also seemed to be no great changes in practice.  Anglo Sumatra, 
none of whose estate managers were British, reported that seven estates had been taken 
over and were being nominally run by appointees but that there was little interference and 
things were proceeding normally. Guthries had managed to keep its estates clear from 
any teams. In sum, there appeared to be little immediate change on the estates except for 
the rejection of the British managers.
90
 
In the meantime, the British consul in Medan was trying to meet with any 
Indonesian official who could shed some light on the situation and what the GOI‘s 
intentions were. In particular, the British consul asked various officials how the Governor 
of North Sumatra could get away with such blatant defiance of General Yani‘s order of 
23 January affirming that there should be no takeovers of British companies unless 
ordered by the President. The consul included this charge in a letter sent to the Governor, 
the regional military commander of North Sumatra and the Police Chief of North 
Sumatra, only to receive a reply which indicated that the Governor was awaiting further 
instructions from Jakarta (he had sent the Deputy Governor there on 23 January).
91
 In his 
various reports to the British ambassador in Jakarta, the British consul further noted that 
the army in general seemed to be following the line of ―disapproval without 
involvement.‖ For example, General Kosasih, the head of KOANDA, clearly indicated 
his disapproval of the Governor‘s actions, yet did little to stop them.
92
  No doubt General 
Kosasih was also waiting to see what Jakarta had in mind. 
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4. Surabaya/East Java.    
 On 24 January, SOBSI-affiliated unions attempted takeovers of three British-
owned factories in Surabaya - Unilever, BAT and Fraser & Neave (a Singapore-based 
soft drink company which had soft drink/bottling plants in Jakarta and Surabaya). All 
three facilities were managed by Indonesian nationals. Similar to the other areas, the 
situation was initially very confusing. As had happened with the attempted takeovers in 
Jakarta a week earlier, on the same day there was demonstration at the British consul in 
Surabaya, this time by the Youth Front of East Java, who, citing Konfrontasi, the 
detention of the two ships in Hong Kong, the sabotaging of the Indonesian air force‘s 
spare parts in Hong Kong, and Subandrio‘s speech on 15 January in Tokyo, declared, 
among other things, their support for the labor unions‘ actions to take over all British 
firms in Jakarta. The entire effort from the demonstration at the consulate to the takeover 
of the three companies was obviously well-coordinated. The unions appeared to take 
control of the companies briefly; the manager of F&N actually signed a 
takeover/surrender document, but managers of the other two complained to the Governor 
of East Java, who later in the day told the unions somewhat indecisively that control 
should be handed back to the owners. Instead the unions appointed new management 
teams at all three companies. Later that day or the next morning, the Governor of East 
Java, after consultations with the local army and police officials, issued a statement 
asking the public to pay attention to Presidential Decree 194/1963 (prohibiting takeovers 
except on the President‘s order) and instructing officials to report any takeovers. 
However, the labor unions persisted in their efforts over the next few days, and the 
British consul reported that there was a tug-of-war between labor unions and local 
authorities. The US consul in Surabaya also reported that the police had at some point 
been instructed to restore the situation, but were not acting very decisively.  Then, a few 
days later around the 27-28 January, there were other attempted takeovers at Shell‘s 
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The Governor of East Java initially seemed genuinely unsympathetic to the 
takeovers, but also seemed to be wary of the power of the unions. The US consul in 
Surabaya reported that in the week before the takeovers, the assistance teams appointed 
by the Governor of East Java under decrees issued back in October (see Chapter Four, 
Part II, Section B7) had actually materialized at the plants and urged that the workers 
comply with Minister Leimena‘s announcement of 20 January. The Governor also took 
the measures described above on 24-5 January, but these were not very strong, and he 
allowed the union-appointed management teams to persist for some time. When 
managers of the firms pressed him to deal strongly with the unions, he referred them to 
the police, who in turn complained that they had received no instructions from the 
Governor.
94
 Thus it appeared that the Governor hoped the situation would die down and 
he would not have to confront directly the unions.  On 27 January the Governor met with 
the British consul in Surabaya and assured him that steps were being taken, though it was 
unclear what these were.
95
  On 28 January, the Governor made public an order - actually 
issued on 7 January – that forbade any more takeovers and ordered all companies to be 
returned. Interestingly, on 29 January various union leaders met with the Surabaya 
municipal Tjatur Tunggul (comprised of the Mayor, the local military commander and 
police chief, and the local prosecutor). The Governor‘s order was read to them, 
whereupon they requested that the matter be referred to the central GOI.  After a few 
minutes consultation, the Mayor so agreed. As the US consul reported, it was not clear if 
this event was simply a scripted affair by which the Governor would publicly bow to 
union pressure or was a genuine move by the Mayor to undercut the Governor.
96
     
In fact, despite the confusion, it appears that the union–appointed management 
teams at Unilever, BAT and F&N had little power and did not wrest control away from 
existing management.  Apparently, the initial union-appointed management team for 
                                                                                                                                                 
January 1964 (Vandivier), and US Embassy telegram (Jones) dated 28 January 1964 (USNACP, RG 59 
Central Files 1964-66, Inco 15-2 Indon, Boxes 1072-3). 
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 Report of British Surabaya Consul (Brayne) dated 25 January 1964 (UKNA, FO 371/175281); US 
Surabaya Consul telegram (Walkin) dated 26 January 1964 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1964-66, Inco 
15-2 Indon, Boxes 1072-3). 
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 Report of British Surabaya Consul (Brayne) dated 27 January 1964 (UKNA, FO 371/175281).  
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 US Surabaya Consul telegrams (Walkin) dated 2 February 1964 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1964-
66, Inco 15-2 Indon, Boxes 1072-3). According to Crouch, the mayor of Surabaya was a PKI member; 
Crouch, Army and Politics in Indonesia, p. 143. 
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Unilever even refused to assume their new duties. The US consul also reported that the 
KBKI branch of BAT, which was the largest union at the facility, had publicly disavowed 
the takeover, and that the non-communist unions of Unilever and F&N did not cooperate 
with SOBSI in the takeovers there.
97
 It is unclear how long the union-appointed teams 
remained in place.  Whether this lack of authority was a result of the Governor‘s efforts 
behind the scenes is uncertain. 
Another view of these events comes from one of their participants in what is the 
only first-hand account of a takeover from the workers/labor union perspective that I 
have been able to find for all the takeovers from 1963-65. The account is particularly 
instructive for the light it sheds on the organization of the takeover and the attitude of the 
workers involved. It comes from Mr. Pudji Rahardjo, who worked at BAT‘s Surabaya 
factory and was the head of the BAT Surabaya branch of the Serikat Buruh Rokok 
Indonesia (SBRI, or ‗Union of Cigarette Workers of Indonesia‘).
98
 The SBRI was a 
member union of SOBSI,
99
 but Pudji himself insisted that he was not a PKI member. 
From Pudji‘s account, it is clear that SOBSI was behind the attempted takeovers of 
British companies in Surabaya, and that SOBSI used a demonstration by the National 
Front at the British consulate in Surabaya as cover for its actions. 
According to Pudji, several days before the takeover, the National Front held a 
meeting in Surabaya at which it informed the attendees (including Pudji) that it was 
organizing a major demonstration at the British consulate in Surabaya in a few days. 
However, there was no mention of takeovers at this meeting; in fact, some of the member 
groups of the National Front, such as the NU and PNI, did not support the takeovers. 
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 Report of British Surabaya Consul (Brayne) dated 25 January 1964 (UKNA, FO 371/175281); US 
Surabaya Consul telegrams dated 26 January 1964 (Walkin) and 29 January 1964 (Vandivier) (USNACP, 
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the story is instructive for the insights it provides on the organization of the takeover as well as the motives 
of the workers. 
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Indonesia, p. 142.  See also Castles, The Kudus Cigarette Industry, pp. 81-2.   
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Then, one or two days before the attempted takeovers, SOBSI held a large meeting of 
leaders of workers in Surabaya and suggested that because the planned National Front 
demonstration against the British consulate would be very large and would certainly draw 
many police, it would be a good time to seize the British businesses. After this meeting, 
SOBSI formed a group in Surabaya called Komando Aksi Pengambilan Alih Perusahaan 
Inggris (‗Action Command to Takeover British Companies‘), the purpose of which was 
to seize the British companies; this group was a local branch of the Komando Aksi 
Pengambilan Alih Perusahaan Inggris Seluruh Indonesia (‗Action Command to 
Takeover British Companies Throughout Indonesia‘), based in Jakarta. Apparently 
SOBSI formed similar local Action Commands in each area and also tried to form teams 
within some of the companies. Pudji was designated the head of this Surabaya branch of 
the Action Command; the other two leaders were the leaders of the workers at the 
Bintang beer factory (ex Heineken managed) and the Fraser & Neave soft drink factory.  
SOBSI did not appoint the individual members of the Surabaya Action Command, but 
instead instructed the workers to do so and also provided the broad outlines of the 
planned takeovers. 
On the designated day, the National Front held the demonstration in front of the 
British consulate, which as predicted drew much police attention and provided an 
excellent diversion as it resulted in no police presence around the BAT factory. Pudji was 
in touch with both the National Front and SOBSI on this day. The workers gathered 
around the BAT factory, and a statement of surrender (Naskah) was presented to the 
factory manager around 9:00 am. However, the manager refused to sign it, resulting in 
the workers ejecting both the manager and other directors, with the workers occupying 
the factory; later in the day, the workers turned the plant over to the local government, 
which then turned it over to the central government. Although the takeover was designed 
to appear spontaneous, it was in fact not spontaneous at all. Government officials knew 
the takeover was going to happen and were at the factory ready to take over the factory 
from the workers. In addition, the other foreign companies in Surabaya were also taken 
over that day, including the beer factory and the Fraser & Neave plant. However, Pudji 
believed that there was no person or group behind the scenes influencing SOBSI or the 
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workers to take over the BAT factory. Workers from other groups such as the NU and 
PNI also participated.  
Why had the workers taken this action? According to Pudji, the workers did this 
voluntarily because of Konfrontasi with Malaysia. The workers had received a ‗signal‘ 
from President Sukarno that they should take this action. President Sukarno never 
actually said to take over the companies, but he asked the people to support the 
movement against Malaysia; to them, Sukarno gave the signal in many speeches by 
telling the workers to participate in the struggle against Malaysia, that everyone should 
join in the struggle, and he had urged action from the beginning of Konfrontasi. Pudji 
believed that the government did want the companies to be taken over, but because the 
government‘s problem was with Malaysia it would have been wrong for the government 
to take over the companies itself. Hence, the government encouraged the workers to seize 
the companies.  By the time of the takeover, the people were very angry and ready to take 
action; they had reached the peak of their anger, and the action represented an effort to 
participate in Konfrontasi by people who loved their country, a gesture of solidarity. 
Apparently the workers had little problem with BAT itself and were quite happy working 
there; the company was well managed, often sent workers abroad for training, and had a 
form of social security for retirement.   
B. Central Government Response. 
The sequence of events described above posed several challenges to the central 
government. In the first place, as I shall argue in Section C, the highly visible and 
publicized takeover attempts were a direct challenge from the PKI to the central 
government over the course of Konfrontasi. Secondly, the varying local/regional 
government responses described above called out for a more consistent response from the 
central government.  The central government‘s first efforts to deal with the situation, 
Second Deputy Prime Minister Leimena‘s announcement of 20 January and General 
Yani‘s order of 23 January, were ignored by the SOBSI-affiliated unions and the National 
Front which initiated the takeovers and not followed by several of the regional 
governments. From the central government‘s point a view, a more forceful third response 
was necessary to meet these challenges. 
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1. Minister Chaerul Saleh’s Circular of 31 January. 
The central government‘s response came on 31 January in the form of a written 
circular from Third Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul Saleh that initiated a slow, gradual 
takeover of virtually every British enterprise in Indonesia over the next 10 months.
100
 
Because of its importance, the circular, which was very brief, is worth examining closely. 
Addressed to various GOI ministers, the circular placed the British companies which had 
been ―taken over‖ directly under the control and supervision (penguasaan dan 
pengawasan) of the relevant minister (according to the industry sector, though it did not 
assign specific companies to specific ministers). The circular indicated that each minister 
should try to get the former management to continue to assist in order to guarantee the 
continuation and safeguarding of production and equipment, and for these reasons a 
settlement with the former management should be made. The ministers could request 
assistance from the armed forces to maintain security if necessary, and if there were 
problems the ministers could not resolve they were requested to contact the Presidium 
Kabinet.  The circular also noted that ministers‘ authority would continue until there was 
a further decision from the President.   The companies that had been taken over were 
listed in an attachment, and included Shell (Jakarta head office, Semarang office, and 
Balikpapan), BAT (all offices and facilities), Unilever (all offices and facilities), F&N 
(Surabaya only), Maclaine Watson (Jakarta head office and Semarang), P&T Lands 
(including its estates),  six estates in Central and East Java,  H&C‘s office in Medan, and 
about 30 estates in North Sumatra (most of which were managed by either H&C or Anglo 
Sumatra).
101
 The circular cited Presidential Decree 194/1963, Second Deputy Prime 
Minister Leimena‘s announcement of 20 January, and General Yani‘s order of 23 January 
as the bases for the decision, and said the measures were necessary in order to guarantee 
both the continuation and safety of production and equipment, which were important for 
the Indonesian economy, and the unity of command of the President.  
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 Surat Ederah No D/VII/0452/H5/1964 (Wakil Perdana Menteri III Chaerul Saleh) Tentang Perusahaan2 
dan Perkebunan2 Milik Inggris Jang Telah Diambil Alih, dated 31 January 1964. 
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 Curiously, the circular itself did not refer to an attachment. I was able to locate two copies of the 
circular, one which had the attachment and one which did not.   
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A few initial points are noteworthy. First, only the companies that had been taken 
over by unions/workers were now being put under control/supervision.  However, as we 
have seen, in reality very few companies were actually seized by labor unions or the 
National Front, and those that were taken over (such as P&T Lands) were generally back 
under the control of owner-appointed management (except perhaps H&C‘s Medan office 
and a few of the estates it managed). Second, it appeared that the stated goal of the 
circular was to ensure that the companies continued to operate with no or minimal 
interruption. As we have seen, this was a stated goal for some of the previous decrees on 
the takeovers, and it would be characteristic of many of the future takeover decrees. Left 
unstated was where the possible interruption might come from; however, given events 
and the private explanations (see below), it was pretty clear that this was targeted against 
further labor union (i.e., PKI) activity that might disrupt company operations. Third, 
individual ministers were charged with authority over the companies, and this spread of 
responsibility and authority over various ministries would be a key feature in how the 
GOI assumed control over the companies. Fourth, there was no explanation of ―control 
and supervision‖; what exactly did this mean in practice, and how was it to be 
implemented? As there were no explanations, presumably the individual ministers could 
act as they saw fit. Fifth, characteristically there was no mention of the terms 
‗nationalization‘ or ‗expropriation‘ or ‗confiscation.‘ The notion that the ministers should 
enlist the former managers to assist in operations certainly suggested that old 
management was being displaced, however.  Finally, despite the mention of Shell Oil in 
the circular, control/supervision was not exercised over it, another example of oil 
company exceptionalism. However, as we shall see, the fact that numerous other British 
interests were not included in the circular made little difference ultimately, as they too 
were eventually taken over.            
  There was no official explanation from the GOI to the British government about 
this and other measures described below, but there were at least several explanations in 
private. First, on 3 February First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio told US Ambassador 
Jones that after lengthy discussions the cabinet had decided that British firms would be 
allowed to continue to operate but under some form of control which would be detailed 
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later, and that P&T Lands would be nationalized outright.
102
 Jones also reported that at a 
9 February meeting with Third Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul Saleh, Saleh ―reaffirmed 
what Subandrio had told me earlier: that [the] GOI was now in [the] process [of] taking 
control from labor unions and that this is [the] first step in restoring enterprises to British 
control,‖ the exception being P&T Lands.
103
 Finally, in a rather tense meeting on 12 
February between Minister Chaerul Saleh and British Ambassador Gilchrist, Saleh 
indicated that the 
whole series of decisions regarding British firms represented an effort to 
prevent any ill-effects arising from the politically-minded workers, while 
giving them some measure of satisfaction. In the interest of Indonesia 
production must be maintained. It was intended that real interference with 
management would be as restricted as possible, and that the profits of 
firms, their access to foreign currency, their handling of exports (where 
applicable), would be as before. 
 
In other words, GOI assumption of control was only meant to appease the workers, and 
interference with management would be as limited as possible, and that behind the scenes 
little would change. Gilchrist responded that while the GOI‘s hand ―might have been 
forced by the Unions, the Government might have been willing partners in the process,‖ 
and then suggested that the GOI was trying to force the firms out of Indonesia without 
properly nationalizing them so as to avoid claims of compensation. Minister Saleh 
―vigorously‖ denied this, and said nationalization was not on the agenda and the firms 
would be returned, citing Shell as an example. When asked when the firms would be 
returned, Minister Saleh responded that it would depend on two factors: first, ―an 
improvement in the political situation vis-à-vis Britain,‖ and second ―the establishment 
by the Indonesian Government of greater control over the workers.‖ Saleh hoped the 
returns would be as soon as possible.
104
  
Minister Saleh‘s 31 January circular spawned the issuance of various decrees by 
at least two ministries, the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs and the Ministry 
of Peoples Industry, the two ministries under which most of the British enterprises fell.  It 
was pursuant to these decrees that the two ministries began to exercise their authority 
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2 Indon, Boxes 1072-3). 
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over the various companies, which was generally done by establishing 
control/supervisory teams at the companies. As such, these decrees are also worth 
examining closely. 
2. Decrees of Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs.  
On 1 February, the day after Minister Chaerul Saleh issued his circular, Minister 
of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs Sadjarwo issued a decree placing British estate 
companies that had been seized under the temporary control (penguasaan) of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs.
105
 Noting that Minister Chaerul Saleh‘s 31 
January circular had instructed ministers to execute temporary control over the British 
estates that had recently been taken over by workers, the decree cited the continuity and 
smooth running of production as the main rationales for the imposition of temporary 
control. The decree confusingly appointed three separate groups. First, to implement 
control, the decree directed that a ‗Temporary Control Board of British Estates‘ (Badan 
Penguasaan Sementara Perusahaan2 Perkebunan Ingris) be established in each province 
concerned.  The Temporary Control Boards were to be appointed by Minister Sadjarwo 
and were responsible to him for the smooth operation of the estates. There were three 
board members: the head inspector from the estate division (Djawatan Perkebunan) as 
chairman, one representative from the state-owned estate companies, and one 
representative from the Bank of Indonesia. The second group appointed was at the level 
of the estates themselves. For each organized or legal unit (presumable this meant each 
separately incorporated company or estate), there was to be a Head/Manager and Deputy 
Head/Manager. These two positions were appointed by Minister Sadjarwo and 
responsible to the Temporary Control Board, and presumably their function was to 
manage the estates. As a temporary measure, until such appointments could be made by 
the minister, however, the current leaders/managers of each unit who were of Indonesian 
nationality should act as Head/Manager and Deputy Head/Manager. The third group was 
the Supervisory Boards (Badan Pengawas) that, like the Temporary Control Boards, 
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 Surat Keputusan Menteri Pertanian dan Agraria (Sadjarwo) No AK/31/MPA/1964 Tentang Perusahaan 
Perkebunan Inggris Untuk Sementara Langsung Dibawah Departemen Pertanian dan Agraria, dated 1 
February 1964.  
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were established at each provincial level. Their function was to supervise and provide 
guidance and assistance, and they were composed of the Governor of the province, the 
Tjatur Tunggal (the local bodies comprised of the representatives from the prosecutors 
office, police, armed forces and provincial Governor), one representative from the 
National Front, three representatives from labor organizations, three representatives from 
farmers‘ organizations, one representative from Bank Indonesia, and the local Inspector 
of Agriculture. A final important provision in the decree stipulated that in order to 
safeguard production, the old channels of marketing and payment should be used until 
there were further instructions.  This was a clear sign that Minister Sadjarwo did not want 
the new appointees to make too many changes.   
Again, the decree merits a few comments. First, the swiftness with which the 
decree was issued after 31 January suggested that a draft had been prepared well 
beforehand and that Minister Sadjarwo was waiting for an opportunity to use it. Indeed, 
as we saw in Chapter Two (Part III, Section C), Minister Sadjarwo already had the 
experience of establishing supervision over Dutch estates when the Dutch companies 
were seized in December 1957, and in early 1964 he acted even more swiftly. Second, the 
decree clearly indicated that ―control‖ and the teams were to be temporary; this was a 
brand new feature, as Minister Saleh‘s 31 January circular had not indicated the measures 
were temporary. Third, in characteristic fashion there was again no mention of the terms 
‗nationalization‘ or ‗expropriation‘; the situation was described as ―control,‖ without 
elaboration.  Fourth, it was not clear from the decree what the powers, authority and 
functions of the Supervisory Boards were vis-a-vis the Temporary Control Boards and 
the unit Head/Managers. The decree seemed to establish the Temporary Control Boards 
as the overall group in charge, the body to which the Head/Managers, who were 
responsible for the individual estates and companies, were to report.  The degree of 
supervision the Supervisory Boards could exercise was not clear; in the case of a conflict, 
who trumped whom? A look at the composition of the teams might provide some clues. 
The Temporary Control Boards and the Head/Managers were comprised of professionals, 
mostly from the field of estate management; they were professional managers. However, 
the membership of the Supervisory Boards were obviously not professional managers but 
rather mostly individuals from the political sphere (the Governor, Tjatur Tunggal, 
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National Front) and labor and farmers groups.  Thus the creation of this group may have 
been a concession to both local political interests and to organized labor; similarly, it may 
also have been a gesture or concession mainly to organized labor, with the other members 
included so that they might act as a counter to labor. Unfortunately, there is simply not 
enough available information to determine what the real motivations behind these 
Supervisory Boards were or the role they actually played.         
To round out the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Affair‘s control, on 6 
February Minister Sadjarwo issued a second decree which established a Team within the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs.
106
 The function of this Team was to 
provide leadership and guidance to the various Temporary Control Boards and 
Supervisory Boards, and to provide advice to the Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs regarding the British estates. Thus it was probably intended to centralize policy 
making and administration over the estates within the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Agrarian Affairs so that the various Temporary Control Boards and Supervisory Boards 
would act in a coordinated fashion.  This Team was headed by the minister himself and 
included eight other officials from the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs and 
from the management boards of the state-owned plantations.  In short, it was a team of 
career GOI officials primarily involved with estates. 
3. Decree of Ministry of Peoples Industry. 
On 5 February, the Minister of Peoples Industry, Major General Azis Saleh, 
established a working team to prepare a plan to organize the imposition of control and 
supervision over British companies as called for by Minister Chaerul Saleh‘s 31 January 
circular.
107
 The team, which consisted of officials mostly from within the ministry, must 
have worked quickly because on 8 February Minister Saleh issued another decree which 
placed all the facilities and operations of four British-owned manufacturing concerns, 
Unilever, BAT, Fraser & Neave, and Nebritex (a textile mill outside Surabaya, East 
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Java), under the control/supervision of the Ministry of Peoples Industry.
108
 The decree 
also established a Control Team (Badan Penguasaan Perusahaan2 Inggris) within the 
ministry to take charge of and implement the control and supervision over the companies. 
(Presumably the ministry at some point issued further decrees, but these two are the only 
ones available.)  Unlike its counterparts from the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs, this decree apparently did not indicate that the control/supervision would be 
temporary. The control structure in this case was much simpler than that of the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs, which probably reflected that it was only 
supervising four companies, not dozens of separate estates. Finally, similar to the other 
decrees, the actions taken by the ministry were described as ―control/supervision,‖ and 
there was no mention of the terms ‗nationalization‘ or ‗expropriation.‘    
C. Analysis. 
As the takeover attempts were led by the PKI-controlled SOBSI and the PKI-
dominated National Front, it seems clear that it was the PKI which initiated the seizures. 
Moreover, because the attempted seizures directly contravened Presidential Decree 
194/1963, which was issued by President Sukarno in September 1963 in the wake of the 
seizures of British companies and specifically prohibited the takeover of British firms 
unless ordered by the President himself, these actions constituted a direct challenge to the 
GOI. In fact, as discussed in Part I, Section A, these actions were just one of the first of 
many measures taken by the PKI in 1964-65 as it embarked upon a major political 
offensive, with Konfrontasi‘s strongly nationalist and anti-imperialist focus providing the 
vehicle for flexing the PKI‘s agitational muscles. As one observer noted, ―it was a 
measure of the PKI‘s new-found boldness that this was the first occasion on which it had 
taken the lead in a major takeover movement, and also the first occasion when it appeared 
to challenge the president directly over foreign policy.‖
109
 The episode also highlighted 
the weakness of the central government viv-a-vis the PKI: writing one year after these 
events, another commentator argued that 
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the government takeover [of the British companies] marked something of 
a turning point in the operations of the present Indonesian power structure, 
because there is little question that the government was coerced or let 
itself be coerced into taking this step and that as a result of Communist 




For another observer, the events demonstrated how control over the course of 
Konfrontasi was slipping from President Sukarno‘s grasp: ―the episode raised serious 
doubts about Soekarno‘s capacity to override the PKI on the confrontation issue.‖
111
  
The motivation behind the PKI‘s initiation of seizures of British firms appears to 
have been the possibility of a resolution of the Konfrontasi conflict brought about by the 
Robert Kennedy mission. As we saw in Part I, Section B, over the course of several days 
in Tokyo beginning on 17 January  Kennedy met with President Sukarno in an attempt to 
de-escalate Konfrontasi by arranging for a temporary ceasefire and tri-party summit 
meeting. Having secured Sukarno‘s conditional agreement, Kennedy left Tokyo on 19 
January to secure the agreement of Malaysia and the Philippines, which he was also able 
to do. On 22 January, Kennedy arrived in Jakarta for further meetings with Sukarno, and 
on 23 January Sukarno announced the temporary ceasefire. The PKI‘s initiation of 
takeovers of British companies on 18 January occurred precisely during the course of 
these Tokyo meetings. The PKI leaders recognized the seriousness of the Tokyo talks and 
the threat to the PKI‘s investment in the continuation of Konfrontasi as a vehicle through 
which the party could exercise the political initiative, as we saw earlier the major thrust 
of the PKI‘s new strategy. In fact, on 17 January the PKI‘s daily newspaper contained a 
statement by Aidit, the party leader, ―who insisted that ‗it is our obligation to avoid 
efforts which have the nature of compromise,‘ and that efforts to ‗crush Malaysia‘ be 
continued.‖
112
 The subsequent takeover attempts in direct contradiction of GOI policy 
meant that ―Aidit was in effect indicating to Sukarno that he could not restrain his 
followers in the event of a deal being made with the imperialists, as well as striking at the 
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president‘s sensitivity about being identified with right wing policies.‖
113
  The PKI‘s 
approach was very clever, for as we have seen the seizures were often justified on the 
patriotic grounds of supporting the Konfrontasi effort against the British imperialists. The 
PKI was in effect using Sukarno‘s own policies and slogans against him at a time when 
the President genuinely seemed to want to tone down the conflict. Thus the British 
companies in effect fell into a conflict between President Sukarno and the PKI over the 
direction of Konfrontasi, becoming intertwined not only within the politics of 
Konfrontasi but also within Indonesia‘s domestic politics. 
In the days after the initial seizures the PKI continued to try to drum up support 
for the takeovers. On 25 January a KBKI delegation as well as a SOBSI delegation 
headed by SOBSI leader Njono himself met with Foreign Minister Subandrio. Njono 
explained that the actions of the labor unions were measures to support Konfrontasi and 
were also a safety valve for the workers to let off steam against British imperialism.
114
 On 
30 January another Njono-led SOBSI delegation met with Minister of Agriculture and 
Agrarian Affairs Sadjarwo and the Chief of Police, and on 31 January yet another 
delegation met with Minister of Peoples Industry Azis Saleh.
115
 The PKI used these 
SOBSI meetings to push the GOI to take over officially the companies and to give 
SOBSI a greater role in their management. For example, after the 25 January meeting 
with Minister Subandrio, Njono called for greater cooperation between the workers and 
police and hoped that actions hostile to workers, the people, and the Revolution could be 
avoided.
116
 Similarly, at the 28 January meeting apparently SOBSI requested that 
Minister Sadjarwo open negotiations with the labor unions to settle the question of the 
taken-over estates, demanded that the GOI support the management teams set up by the 
workers, and also demanded the release of workers (citing 86) arrested in connection with 
the takeovers.
117
  On 4 February, Aidit, the PKI chairman, issued a statement supporting 
the takeovers. The statement said that the takeovers were Sukarno‘s ―own child‖ because 
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the GOI had asked the people to take up the struggle to ganyang Malaysia (‗crush 
Malaysia‘). The fact that Sukarno had ordered GOI officials to negotiate with the workers 
(it is not clear what this was referring to) was a good sign and much better than 
negotiating with Robert Kennedy in Tokyo. The statement further called upon the 
workers to defend the takeovers to the last and even to take over other British firms, both 
of which would provide the GOI with support in the upcoming Bangkok talks (5-10 
February). If the British dissolved Malaysia, then the companies would be nationalized 
and paid for, but if the British remained stubborn, the companies would simply be 
confiscated (and not paid for).
118
  
The attempted seizures indeed appear to have been effective in forcing the hand 
of the GOI because the government intervened by placing the companies under its control 
and supervision pursuant to Minister Chaerul Saleh‘s circular of 31 January. The real 
intention of the GOI in taking this step remains unclear, and there were likely multiple 
motives. As suggested by Minister Chaerul Saleh to Ambassadors Jones and Gilchrist 
(Section B above), it appears that placing the companies under GOI control/supervision 
was at a minimum a compromise solution by which the GOI could head off further labor 
union (i.e., PKI-led) takeover actions by claiming that the companies were already under 
effective GOI control. Whatever the GOI‘s ultimate intentions, clearly most of its 
officials did not want the British companies to fall under the control of the labor unions, 
which in all likelihood meant that the companies were under the control of the PKI. 
Under this GOI ‗supervision,‘ the owner-appointed management could continue to 
operate the companies as normal, with certain superficial changes. It was left to the 
individual ministers to adjust to circumstances as necessary. In addition, placing the 
companies under government control/supervision also gave the government time to 
ponder its next move; it was a step which made the GOI look as though it were taking 
action but also allowed the government breathing room to let the dust settle and then 
decide what to do. On the other hand, it also appeared from his statements to Ambassador 
Gilchrist that Minister Chaerul Saleh considered the companies to be hostages in the 
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Konfrontasi conflict; the ambiguous status of the companies was a lever to be used 
against the British, as placing the companies under the government‘s ―control and 
supervision‖ clearly opened the door to full scale nationalization, a charge that was 
leveled by many as the GOI‘s real objective. The scheme may well have been intended 
by Minister Saleh to combat labor union and particularly PKI aggressiveness as well as to 
pressure the British, but in allowing so much discretion to individual ministers it also 
opened the door for ultimate GOI control, which is exactly what happened.  
Though the central government policy clearly did not favor the PKI-led seizures 
of British firms, undoubtedly some individual GOI officials supported the takeovers. That 
there was diversity of opinion regarding the takeovers at the provincial level has already 
been demonstrated by the divergent reactions to the attempted seizures, such as that of 
Governor Mashudi of West Java or Governor Sitepu of North Sumatra. At the national 
level, one very public example of this was Minister of Labor Ahem, whose DPS-KBKI 
labor federation had initiated the seizures of the British companies in September 1963. 
On 17 January, the Joint Secretariat of Labor, a group chaired by Minister Ahem, issued a 
statement in the wake of Subandrio‘s 15 January announcement from Tokyo that urged 
the GOI to seize all British property in retaliation for the detention of the Haj vessels.  
This resolution had apparently been drafted before Subandrio‘s speech, but was only 
made public after (the takeovers began the day after it was issued).
119
 On 22 January that 
same body urged the GOI to accept the management of the taken-over companies and 
declare the companies the property of Indonesia.
120
  Minister Ahem‘s position reflected 
that the GOI was hardly a monolithic entity, speaking in one, unified voice. There were 
certainly officials within the GOI who were happy to see the companies taken over, and 
there were certainly some who did not. After all, as we saw in Chapters Two and Three 
the role of foreign capital in the Indonesian economy since 1949 had been very 
contentious.   
Given the tight press controls and lack of survey opinions or polls, it is also 
difficult to measure the public attitude toward the takeovers. The account of Pudji 
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regarding the takeover of BAT Surabaya (Section A4 above) suggests that many workers 
were responding to constant exhortations by President Sukarno in his many speeches to 
take actions in support of Konfrontasi. Short of participating in the fighting, what could a 
worker do to demonstrate support other than seizing a company from the imperialist 
dalang (puppeteer) behind Malaysia, the British. Thus for some workers, seizing British 
companies was a genuine measure of patriotic support, though it certainly expressly 
contravened existing government decrees. On the other hand, the refusal of other workers 
to participate in the seizures indicates that not all workers shared the same beliefs. In the 
politics of mass mobilization, the aims of the leaders of the mass organizations (e.g., the 
intent of the PKI leaders to use the seizures as a means of challenging the government‘s 
policy on Konfrontasi) did not always match the aims of the followers in the mass 
organizations (e.g., Pudji‘s contention that the workers were acting patriotically to 
support Konfrontasi). Furthermore, how much we can extrapolate from Pudji‘s 
explanation concerning the attitude of the general public is impossible to know.   
  
III. Impact of Decrees and Other Measures: Creeping 
Confiscations. 
The placement of various British enterprises under the control and supervision of 
the government pursuant to Minister Chaerul Saleh‘s 31 January circular opened the door 
for the de facto confiscation of most British enterprises in Indonesia. Over the next ten 
months, various ministries of the GOI gradually assumed control over virtually every 
British enterprise in Indonesia, with the exception of Shell Oil, a process I call ―creeping 
confiscation‖ because of its slowness and gradualness. Confiscation was accomplished by 
the usurpation by government-appointed personnel of managerial authority from owner-
appointed managers and the eventual expulsion of owner-appointed managers from the 
company as well as the prohibition of contact with the foreign headquarters of the 
company. Most of these takeovers were done under the aegis of the decrees issued by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs and Ministry of Peoples Industry described 
in Part II above. In particular, control/supervisory teams from these two ministries began 
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showing up at British companies in mid-February, and in most cases gradually (though in 
some cases quickly) over the course of many months usurped the authority of owner-
appointed management. The timing varied in each company, and in many instances it is 
not clear precisely when control over a company changed hands; hence the term 
―creeping confiscation‖ applies not only to the process as applied to British companies as 
a group but also as applied internally within individual British firms.  
That the pace of GOI assumption of control varied so much was a direct reflection 
of both the intentional vagueness of GOI decrees, especially Minister Saleh‘s 31 January 
circular, regarding the meaning of ―control/supervision,‖ and most especially the fact that 
individual ministers apparently had full discretion to implement whatever measures they 
felt were appropriate. As I suggested in Part II, while the GOI‘s initial intentions in 
placing the companies under control and supervision cannot be ascertained with certainty, 
such a strategy did give the GOI a minute to catch its breath, to play for time while it 
figured out what to do, while at the same time trying to neutralize any further labor union 
activity. However, it also opened the door for not only the ministers in charge to pursue 
inconsistent approaches in assuming control, but also the possibility that these ministers 
might take measures which other officials in the GOI did not agree with (such as with 
respect to P&T Lands, see below). It also exposed the ministers and their supervisory 
teams to outside pressures, such as the influence of labor unions (such as the case of 
Unilever, see below). Other factors influencing the pace of assumption of control may 
have included the status of Konfrontasi as well as the particular minister‘s own 
disposition and interests, especially his attitude toward foreign investment.  
However, I believe that the single biggest factor affecting the pace of assumption 
of control was the economic importance of the specific company and the opportunities 
for patronage, influence peddling and increasing power and wealth arising from the 
economic value of the company. In particular I am referring to the position of the British 
estates as earners of scarce and valuable foreign exchange, in contrast to the position of 
the manufacturing companies which generated little to no foreign exchange. An industry 
comparison confirms that control over the estates was imposed much more quickly than 
in the case of the manufacturing companies. Most, if not all of the British estates 
appeared to be under the control of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs by 
 315 
 
the end of June 1964, including some estates that had not been mentioned in Minister 
Chaerul Saleh‘s 31 January circular.
121
 In addition, by this point there were no British 
expatriates residing on British estates (there had been about 40 a year earlier), and, as we 
shall see in Part IV, Minister Sadjarwo in late June began taking measures that indicated 
a new phase of ministry control over the British estates was beginning.
122
 Contrast this 
with the four manufacturing companies taken over by the Ministry of Peoples Industry, 
headed by Minister Azis Saleh, beginning February 1964. Here, GOI control was 
generally much looser, and British management appeared to last well into the fall of 
1964. For example, at Unilever control probably did not pass until November 1964; 
similarly, in the case of Nebritex, the owner-appointed managers were in charge until 
after the issuance of Presidential Decree 6/1964 in late November (see Part V). 
123
  As 
described in Part IV, the reason for Minister Sadjarwo‘s attempt to assert control over the 
British estates in early June was precisely because a major fight within the GOI was 
underway for control over these resources.  
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In fact, in a report to various GOI ministers dated 24 March, Minister Sadjarwo 
claimed that 93 estates previously under British management were now under the 
temporary control of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs.
124
 In addition to 
describing the measures taken under the decrees of 1 February and 6 February noted 
previously, the report described other instructions that the ministry had provided 
regarding the estates, most of which highlighted the importance of keeping revenues 
flowing. First, the ministry had instructed that production and sales continue smoothly 
and the business must be guarded well and operated efficiently. Second, for as long as 
possible, existing sales and payment channels should be used so as not to create 
difficulties. Third, for psychological reasons and in order to guarantee the smoothness of 
production, foreign managers were not allowed to take an active role in the business, but 
would continue to be given the same facilities as before (this seems to be a reference to 
houses, cars, etc). Foreigners could, however, act as advisors, but this should be done 
through the Temporary Control Boards. Finally, Minister Sardjowo noted that for now 
the old forms of organization were still being used for convenience. Yet, there were some 
deviations from this in cases where the old management was managing not just British 
estates but estates of other nationalities; in such case, there was a division, and a new 
management team was appointed to supervise the British estates, while the old 
management continued to manage the non-British estates. (This was clearly a reference to 
Anglo Sumatra‘s office in Medan, where the Swiss manager and several other expatriates 
continued to manage the Belgian-owned estates and the GOI team managed the British 
estates.)    
Before discussing several examples of how the various GOI ministry teams 
assumed control over British companies, I would like to mention briefly the two other 
methods by which British enterprises were either taken over or squeezed out of Indonesia 
during this period.  First, in at least two cases, P&T Lands (see below) and Maclaine 
Watson (a trading company), the relevant GOI ministry issued a specific decree which 
took over the company. In a pattern similar to P&T Lands, Maclaine Watson was initially 
put under the supervision of the Ministry of Trade in early March 1964, and then on 1 
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July 1964 the Ministry of Trade took full control over it.
125
  The second method was 
simply squeezing out companies by imposing restrictive laws and regulations. For 
example, the British embassy reported in early February 1964 that new regulations 
prevented insurance companies from re-insuring abroad, a development that restricted the 
two remaining British insurance companies to Rupiah-denominated business and surely 
marked a severe limit on their business.
126
  Similarly, the US Embassy reported in early 
July that a new March law prohibited foreign companies from acting as shipping agents 
in Indonesia, a measure that when implemented would effect Maclaine Watson, 
Harrisons & Crosfield, and others.
127
  In perhaps the best example of this kind of 
measure, on 18 May 1964 the Coordinating Minister for Finance issued a decree 
prohibiting foreign banks from establishing branch offices outside Jakarta.
128
 As 
Chartered Bank was effectively the only foreign bank operating in Indonesia, this decree 
was clearly aimed at it.
129
 The decree allowed six months for the branch offices outside 
Jakarta to be shut down (Chartered Bank had branches in Surabaya and in Medan, both of 
which were accordingly shut down in mid-November 1964).  
Rather than doing a company-by-company survey of how the various GOI 
ministry teams assumed control, I shall focus on three enterprises, P&T Lands, the 
Harrisons & Crosfield office in Medan, and Unilever.  These examples are both 
illustrative of what probably happened to other companies in the plantation and 
manufacturing businesses as well as excellent examples of the creeping nature and 
ambiguity of the takeovers. They also serve to highlight the similarities and differences in 
how the GOI assumed control over different companies. The P&T Lands case in 
particular is a fine illustration of the divisions among GOI officials over takeover policy 
and what to do with the companies. In contrast to P&T Lands, whose managers lost 
control almost immediately in mid-February, the managers at H&C were able to remain 
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in a position of semi-authority until June, when they were finally forced out. Unilever‘s 
managers lasted even longer, losing control sometime in the last few months of the year. 
Another difference in the takeovers was the role played by the local supervisory teams 
appointed by regional authorities prior to the central GOI getting involved; in the case of 
H&C, there was an apparent conflict between the team appointed by North Sumatra 
Governor Sitepu and the central government team, with the local team (comprised of 
representatives of labor unions and the National Front) continually exerting pressure to 
eject the foreign managers. In the case of P&T Lands and Unilever, it appears that the 
locally appointed teams quickly faded away. In the case of Unilever there was concerted 
labor union pressure, despite the ostensible GOI intention to put the company under its 
supervision to neutralize such pressure. Similar pressure was brought in the case of H&C 
by the locally appointed team. Finally, the companies‘ reactions also varied considerably, 
though in general each was ultimately powerless to stop the loss of control. 
A. P&T Lands. 
The experience of P&T Lands appeared to be quite different from that of other 
British companies in the sense that it was among the first to be effectively confiscated by 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs. We saw in Part II Section A that P&T 
Lands was one of the few companies where there was actually a successful (though 
temporary) takeover by workers and the National Front/SOBSI. After the end of this 
three day period there had seemingly been more pressure on the GOI to take definitive 
action, and there were even calls for outright nationalization of the company. Even after 
Minister‘s Chaerul Saleh‘s 31 January circular and Minister Sadjarwo‘s 1 February 
decree, there was still the hint that the case of P&T Lands was different from the other 
British companies. For example, on 3 February First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio 
privately told US Ambassador Jones that P&T Lands would be nationalized, and then on 
9 February Minister Chaerul Saleh indicated to Jones that P&T Lands would be treated 
differently from the other British enterprises taken over and a new basis of operations, 
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perhaps similar to the oil companies CoWs, would have to be established.
130
 In fact, P&T 
Lands was treated differently, as its owner-appointed managers lost control of the 
company almost immediately. While GOI control was initially supposed to be only 
temporary, as events developed it was in fact permanent control.   
Acting pursuant to Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs Sadjarwo‘s 1 
February 1964 decree, on 13 February the West Java Board for Temporary Control over 
British Estates (Badan Penguasaan Sementara Perusahaan Perkebunan Milik Inggeris 
Dati I Djawa Barat) assumed temporary control over P&T Lands. Antara reported that 
there was actually a transfer ceremony at the Subang headquarters at which West Java 
Governor Mashudi spoke and declared that all plantations would become the property of 
Indonesia.
131
  A few days later, Mr. Meyer, the P&T Lands manager, sent a report to 
London headquarters that indicated: (i) responsibility for management had indeed passed 
to the GOI, with any remaining old managers to act in an advisory capacity as long as 
they stayed on; Indonesian departmental heads had been appointed, and foreign staff 
were not allowed to go to the office, (ii) the new GOI manager and Governor Mashudi 
were both pushing for full nationalization, and (iii) Meyer thought there was very little 
chance that the company would be returned, though there was a good chance 
compensation would be paid at some point.
132
 A circular from the chairman of the parent 
company Anglo Indonesian Plantations (AIP) to shareholders dated 27 February 1964 
noted the GOI‘s actions were ―ostensibly to prevent British enterprises from being taken 
over by labour unions or other unauthorised bodies, whose feelings were said to have 
been aroused by the Indonesian policy of confrontation of Malaysia.‖  The chairman‘s 
circular further informed that remaining British staff was not ―allowed any part in 
management, and are not being used as advisors…‖ The circular also advised that 
developments were being monitored closely and that dependents of expatriates may be 
evacuated at some point.
133
 In fact, there was very little the parent company could do in 
light of these developments, and it had little choice other than to accept the situation and 
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see how things played out.  The reality was that by late February the authority of owner-
appointed management had been effectively usurped and it had lost control to the West 
Java Board for Temporary Control over British Estates. AIP could perhaps take some 
comfort in Minister Sadjarwo‘s stated posture that supervision would be temporary and 
AIP might at some point be able to resume full control, but this possibility seemed 
remote.  
Indeed, two measures by the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs over 
the next few months made clear that despite Minister Sadjarwo‘s ostensible intent that 
supervision would be temporary, mid to late February 1964 constituted a clear point at 
which de facto confiscation was reached. The first of these measures was a decree issued 
by the Minister of Agriculture on 18 March 1964 which appointed a new ―temporary‖ 
manager for each of P&T Land‘s estates as well as one other position, in all 22 new top 
managerial appointments.
134
  The decree stated that all these appointees were responsible 
to the West Java Board for Temporary Control over British Estates. This step constituted 
an enormous, sweeping change in management; the estate manager was a key position, 
and now all the owner-appointed estate managers had been pushed aside. The second 
measure was the establishment of ―full control.‖ On 16 May 1964 Minister Sadjarwo 
issued a decree which placed P&T Lands under full control of the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Agrarian Affairs - the pretense of ―temporary‖ was dropped altogether.
135
 Citing the 
consideration that ―at the present state of struggle in finishing the Indonesian Revolution 
it was in the public, national and state interest to do so,‖ the minister, while awaiting the 
final decision from President Sukarno, took full control over P&T Lands, appointed new 
directors of the company and expressly forbade any contact between the old owner-
appointed directors and the company. The decree did not use the words expropriation or 
nationalization or confiscation, but instead clung to the word control (menguasai and 
penguasaan; menguasai is a verb form).  According to British embassy reports, Minister 
Sadjarwo, together with West Java Governor Mashudi and accompanied by a 
―considerable contingent of military and police,‖ personally served the decree on 
                                                 
134
 Surat Keputusan Menteri Pertanian dan Agraria (Sadjarwo) No SK98/MPA/1964 dated 18 March 1964.     
135
 Keputusan Menteri Pertanian dan Agraria (Sadjarwo) No SK46/KA/1964 Tentang Penguasaan 
Perusahaan Perkebunan P&T Lands, dated 16 May 1964. An English translation may be found in British 
Embassy Note to British Foreign Office dated 7 June 1964 (UKNA, FO 371/175282). 
 321 
 
company headquarters in Subang.   Expatriate staff were given 48 hours to leave Subang 
(with the exception of the acting manager and accountant who had to stay on a few extra 
days), though some could remain in Jakarta until the end of May.
136
 By 28 May, all 
foreign staff (perhaps as many as 20 plus spouses) had left the Subang headquarters and 
estates, and by the end of June AIP had but a single representative on the ground in 
Indonesia (Mr. J.A. Cannell, in Jakarta).
137
 
The GOI did not provide a clear reason for the decision to assume ―full control‖ 
of P&T Lands in mid-May 1964, which I believe reflects both the confusion within the 
GOI regarding what to do with P&T Lands and other British companies placed under 
―control and supervision,‖ and perhaps more importantly the competing interests of 
groups within and without the GOI for the valuable economic resources represented by 
P&T Lands.
138
 On the surface, Konfrontasi appeared to be a major driving force behind 
the takeovers. Antara quoted Minister Sadjarwo as saying that the May ―action was 
within the framework of Indonesia‘s confrontation of the neocolonialist project of 
Malaysia and considering the special position occupied by the company so far.‖
139
 
Indeed, the mid-May decision came about two weeks after President Sukarno issued his 
famous Dwikora call on May 3 (see Part I, Section B). At the same time, however, 
Konfrontasi in many instances also provided the excuse or vehicle through which 
interested parties could act in furthering their own interests, which probably had little to 
do with Indonesia‘s foreign policy. In the case of P&T Lands, extremely valuable 
economic resources were at stake; as we saw in Chapter Three, the company generated at 
least $6.7 million in scarce foreign exchange in 1963, it employed some 30,000 people, 
and the possibilities for patronage opportunities were considerable.   
An excellent illustration of the competing interests and different outlooks within 
the GOI with respect to P&T Lands can be found in the attitude of the GOI Minister of 
Trade, Adam Malik, versus those of Minister Sadjarwo and the newly appointed (June 
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1964) Minister of Estates Frans Seda (for details of Minister Seda‘s appointment, see Part 
IV). Minister Adam Malik appeared to be sympathetic to the company‘s plight. Malik 
apparently told AIP that the GOI had taken over P&T Lands ―in order to preempt the 
army and the left wing unions, both of whom thought the degree of supervision 
insufficiently rigorous, and would themselves have stepped in…if the government had 
not acted first.‖  Separately, in a meeting in Germany with company representatives after 
the full takeover, Malik may also have agreed that the company would be purchased by 
the GOI on a 10 year basis.
140
  He also told British Ambassador Gilchrist that ―he had 
done his best to ‗save‘ P&T because he, as Minister of Trade, badly needed the export 
earnings it fed in.‖
141
  In early July 1964, Cannell, the lone remaining AIP representative 
in Indonesia, was advised by Malik (a) not to put in any claim to the GOI for 
compensation, (b) to continue to gain control of the company‘s exports by buying them at 
favorable prices (see below), and (c) immediately see Minister Seda and ―sound him out‖ 
regarding some form of joint operation of P&T Lands‘ estates. The basis for such a joint 
arrangement would be three-pronged: (i) P&T Lands would continue to own the estates, 
but (ii) the estates would be controlled and managed by the government, and (iii) P&T 
Lands would be repaid by the export earnings. Later that same day, Cannell managed to 
meet both Minister Sadjarwo and Minister Seda jointly. Minister Seda flatly told Cannell 
that there was no chance of any kind of jointly operated enterprise and that while the 
takeover of the company had been ―hastened by the Malaysia issue,‖ because ―of local 
feeling it had become inevitable that the P&T must be nationalized. Any question of 
compensation must now depend on how the Malaysia issue works out.‖
142
  A few weeks 
later Minister Malik, through an intermediary, expressed to AIP his embarrassment that 
negotiations over the status of P&T Lands had failed, and despite the tough stance by  
Seda, Malik continued to push (a least for several more weeks) for some kind of joint 
venture arrangement, perhaps using a Dutch subsidiary vehicle.
143
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What was owner AIP‘s reaction to the takeover of P&T Lands? In general, AIP 
recognized that it was powerless to stop the advance.  It employed a ‗wait and see‘ 
approach, which did not prevent it from making efforts to salvage what it could.  As we 
saw above, some of the managers of P&T Lands recognized as early as mid-February that 
P&T Lands was being taken over and most likely would not be returned. In October 1964 
AIP‘s chairman noted that ―even if there should be an improvement in the political 
atmosphere, it seems unlikely that we shall be in a position to resume operational control 
of the estates…‖
144
 Nevertheless, as we saw above, AIP tried to float the idea of some 
sort of joint operating agreement, and apparently something was still being negotiated in 
secret with the GOI as late as October 1966.
145
 
AIP may have also been mollified early by its initially successful efforts to 
purchase tea from its ex estates on international markets. On 25 March 1964 AIP 
distributed a general circular warning to the international community that tea grown on 
P&T Lands estates was being marketed and sold by unauthorized people. AIP asserted its 
ownership rights to this produce and noted that it would maintain these rights by 
whatever legal action necessary.
146
  It is unclear if this threat was effective, but in June 
1964, after P&T Lands had been taken over completely, AIP reported that it had bought 
P&T Lands tea via a Dutch intermediary at a reasonable price and that it was trying to 
make this a permanent arrangement.
147
  This was one of the arrangements that Adam 
Malik told Cannell in early July to continue (see above). How much of the estates‘ tea 
produce AIP was able to buy, and how long this arrangement continued, are unclear, 
however. In August 1965, a year later, AIP successfully petitioned a Dutch court to seize 
                                                                                                                                                 
―temporary control‖ of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs, may have found out about a 
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a consignment of P&T Lands‘ tea in Amsterdam that had been sent by a Chinese 
businessman.
148
 While AIP‘s lawsuit was successful, the incident suggests that AIP was 
unable to control its ex-estates‘ tea output.  On the other hand, AIP claimed that as late as 
March 1966 it was ―organizing the disposal of the entire tea output‖ of the estates.
149
 In 
what appears to be a separate but similar endeavor, in July 1965 AIP told the British 
Foreign Office that ―they have achieved a fair amount of success in persuading European 
importers of Indonesian rubber and tea to regard it as ‗British‘ estate produce and to pay, 
apparently with Indonesian agreement, a percentage commission to the Head Office in 
London.‖  AIP further reported that they were in unofficial touch with their ex-estates, 
and that the Indonesian management teams told AIP that they ―would rather sell estate 
produce to Western Europe in view of the higher export commission,‖ as sales to the 




AIP was also faced with a more important legal decision to make: should it 
attempt to claim compensation from the GOI based on the argument that P&T Lands had 
been confiscated? Initially, it was a tricky question, for as shown above the GOI 
strenuously avoided characterizing the takeover as expropriation or nationalization or 
confiscation but rather as an assumption of full control, resulting in an extremely 
ambiguous situation.  AIP sought the legal advice of a lawyer in Holland, who responded 
that absent ratification of the full control measure by President Sukarno, the GOI‘s 
actions did not constitute nationalization.
151
  This advice mirrored that of the legal 
advisor to the British embassy.
152
 In addition, the British embassy itself initially advised 
Cannell, AIP‘s representative in Jakarta, not to put in a claim against the moveable assets 
seized on the grounds that it would not succeed and that it might destroy the possibility of 
creating a permanent mechanism to buy the ex-estates produce (which, at the time, 
seemed feasible).
153
  In any event, AIP, made the strategic decision not to pursue openly a 
claim for compensation because to do so, in the words of its chairman a few years later, 
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 Yet it is not clear how such a status would harm 
AIP‘s interests, except perhaps that it might force the GOI to pay for the estates and thus 
lead to difficult valuation negotiations, as opposed to the alternative which would simply 
be to return the estates.   Another possible consideration for AIP was the ability of the 
GOI to pay; in October 1964 the AIP chairman noted that given ―the present economic 
and political conditions in Indonesia, it would be unrealistic at this moment to base any 
hopes on the receipt of early and adequate compensation.…‖
155
 Thus better to cling to the 
fiction that AIP still owned the estates, rather than admitting that the estates were lost 
with no prospects for compensation. 
P&T Lands was explicitly listed in President Sukarno‘s Decree 6/1964 of 26 
November 1964 (see Part V), but AIP had lost control of P&T Lands long before this.  
Like other companies as well as the British embassy, AIP was somewhat confounded and 
hampered by the vagueness of the decree. However, like many other British companies 
who acted at the suggestion of the British embassy, AIP did submit to the GOI in late 
April 1965 a ‗Reservation of Rights‘ letter. The letter referred to the various measures 
taken against P&T Lands over the past few years and stated that AIP held the GOI liable 
for the assets of P&T Lands, would not accept responsibility for losses or claims, and 
reserved all rights. Furthermore, as Decree 6/1964 had the appearance of de facto 
expropriation, AIP requested the GOI to inform it immediately if the GOI‘s intention was 
to expropriate P&T Lands, and if so what steps the GOI would be taking to make 
compensation.  In addition, AIP offered the idea of entering into some form of production 
sharing arrangement with the GOI.  Finally, if expropriation were not the GOI‘s 
objective, then AIP requested the return of management and control of P&T Lands.
156
 As 
far as I have been able to determine, AIP never received a response to the letter. 
B. Harrisons & Crosfield Medan Office. 
As we saw previously, in late January/early February there was an uneasy 
coexistence in H&C‘s Medan office between the H&C management and the two teams 
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appointed by the Governor of North Sumatra. The first team was a management team 
comprised of Indonesian staff employees of H&C. The second team, the supervisory 
team, consisted of a representative from the Governor‘s office, the secretary of the 
National Front in Medan, and two representatives from labor unions. Foreign 
management was in a state of limbo; foreign managers were allowed to go to the office 
and even retained some control over important documents and financial matters, but the 
day-to-day management regarding the estates was done by the management team and 
Indonesian staff, with the foreign managers only ―advising.‖ However, as the 
management team consisted of professional Indonesian staff members from H&C who 
were asking for and receiving advice from the expatriate managers regarding the estates, 
the actual estate management part of the business of the office did not seem to change all 
that much. All correspondence was supposed to be approved by one of the teams.  Trade 
and shipping activities, however, continued to be run by the foreign managers. On the 
estates, foreign managers had been made inactive and appeared to have no authority at 
all, and Indonesian staff employees, overseen by supervisory teams, appeared to be 
running things.
157
  H&C‘s Medan office had been specifically mentioned in Minister 
Chaerul Saleh‘s circular of 31 January, and clearly Minister Sadjarwo‘s 1 February 
decree also applied to it.  
On 5 February John McLeod, the H&C manager, plus representatives from each 
of Anglo Sumatra and Guthries, the other two British estate management firms in Medan, 
met in Jakarta with Minister Sadjarwo to discuss their situation. Sadjarwo informed them 
that under the new decrees a team of three people would be set up in North Sumatra and 
would be generally in control of all British estates there. Foreign managers would be 
allowed to stay on in the office in an advisory capacity.  The arrangement was to be 
temporary, and much would depend on the current tri-party talks in Bangkok (5-10 
February) regarding Konfrontasi.
158
   Sometime in mid-February H&C learned that the 
Temporary Control Board (established under Minister Sadjarwo‘s decree of 1 February) 
would be headed by Mr. Soerowo from the Estates Bureau in Medan. However, as of 18 
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February neither Soerowo nor the Bank Indonesia representative on the team had 
received any instructions on how to implement the minister‘s decree. Then, on 22 
February, Soerowo met McLeod and told him that beginning 24 February foreign staff 
would not be allowed to enter the office, though they would be expected to continue to 
sign checks and documents. However, by the end of the meeting Soerowo backed away 
from this position. McLeod reported that according to his sources the order to exclude 
foreign managers had come from Simpang Ginting, who was the National Front 
representative on the supervisory team appointed by the Governor of North Sumatra. 
Ginting had apparently threatened to use the National Front to demonstrate against 
Soerowo and have him removed.
159
  There was clear conflict between Soerowo, the 
leader of the Temporary Control Board appointed by Minister Sadjarwo, and Ginting, the 
National Front representative from the supervisory team appointed by the North Sumatra 
Governor. 
The situation continued to be in flux over the next few months. It appears that 
there was continuing conflict between the Temporary Control Board appointed by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs and the supervisory team appointed by the 
Governor of North Sumatra. It also appears that Soerowo did not appoint any other 
Indonesian managers to H&C, and that he was content to let the management team 
appointed by the Governor of North Sumatra to continue on, to operate in effect as the 
‗Head/Managers‘ and ‗Deputy Head/Managers‘ as set forth in Minister Sadjarwo‘s 1 
February decree.  They were, after all, professional staffers from H&C. Foreign managers 
continued to attend the office and provide advice to the Indonesian management, though 
there was some pressure from the National Front not to do so. Foreign managers also 
retained control of financial matters and over shipping and trade matters, which were in 
fact the key parts of the business. However, not all was well. In late February, McLeod 
complained that ―our organization is slowly crumbling to pieces.  Nobody is working 
properly, as they do not know what or who they are working for, and the ‗Strong Men‘ of 
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the Unions are disregarding all forms of discipline and planning.‖
160
  In addition, foreign 
estate managers never regained their authority on the estates. 
H&C‘s basic attitude during all this was to stay the course as much as possible, to 
fight the takeover to the end. It would rather have forced the GOI to nationalize it 
officially instead of leaving and handing over the assets to the GOI without any hope of 
compensation.
161
 McLeod, the manager, had several times tried to secure a meeting with 
the Governor of North Sumatra, whom he had not seen since 22 January, but was 
consistently rebuffed. He was determined, however, to continue to have the foreign 
managers attend the office until the Governor sent written orders to the contrary.  
Separately, in late February the British consul in Medan did meet with General Thalib, 
the chief of staff to the All Sumatra Regional Command (KOANDA) that was headed by 
General Kosasih. Thalib told the consul that the British should make every effort to 
remain at their offices and in Indonesia, as doing so showed confidence in the Indonesian 
group representing law and order, and leaving just played into the hands of irresponsible 
elements.
162




On 25 April, Soerowo wrote to McLeod and politely asked that beginning 27 
April European staff not attend the office.  The letter indicated that European staff would 
continue to receive all their facilities, and they could still give advice when necessary and 
countersign payments from the bank.  Furthermore, they could come into the office from 
time to time, as long as this was made known beforehand. The British consul in Medan 
reported that this request was the result of increased pressure from the communist unions 
and the National Front. However, McLeod ignored this request and along with the other 
European staff continued to come into the office over the next few days. On 29 April 
McLeod met with Soerowo, who, among other things, claimed that the instruction came 
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from the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs. The meeting was not conclusive, 
and the next day McLeod wrote to Soerowo and claimed he still had the right to attend 
the office because much of H&C‘s business – shipping and trading – was not yet subject 
to official GOI control. McLeod and the other European staff continued to attend the 
office as before.  On 1 May, just after this incident, the supervisory team appointed by the 
Governor of North Sumatra was quietly withdrawn and dissolved, leading the British 
consul in Medan to speculate that the entire incident resulted from a demand made by the 
supervisory team before they would allow themselves to be dissolved.
164
 
The denouement came in early June. In late May, Soerowo had gone to Jakarta to 
consult with Minister Sadjarwo over the situation, and thus it seems Soerowo was 
operating under orders from the minister. On 8 June, McLeod was forcibly prevented 
from entering the office by a crowd of employees and trade union representatives, and on 
the advice of the police McLeod instructed the other British staff not to go to the office.  
It is unclear what Soerowo‘s role in this incident was, but he certainly did not take any 
measures to allow the foreign management to return. On 23 June, the British consul in 
Medan reported that Soerowo had issued orders (for all the British estate firms in North 
Sumatra) that (i) the Indonesian managers should open separate bank accounts at the 
local Indonesian Bank, (ii) managers and European staff were no longer permitted to 
enter the office, (iii) sales of rubber would be arranged through PPN Baru (a trading firm 
operated by GOI estates) or Tri Bhakti (a GOI-owned trading firm), and (iv) 
correspondence from UK directors of H&C was to be ignored. These measures were 
obviously designed to sever completely British owner control over the company. The US 
consul in Medan later reported that McLeod had actually arranged the involvement of Tri 
Bhakti and PPN Baru in controlling sales in an attempt to head off ―a local plan to siphon 
this income into local hands.‖ Apparently McLeod had gone through a friend at the 
Presidential Palace in Jakarta, and acting President Leimena had issued instructions 
regarding sales to the Governor of North Sumatra. Presumably H&C was hoping to retain 
a small percentage of proceeds from the sales, but it is unclear if it actually did so.
165
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C. Unilever.  
In contrast to the takeovers at H&C and P&T Lands, it is very difficult to pinpoint 
an exact point in time at which Unilever-appointed management lost control over the 
company.  It seems reasonably certain that this point was reached sometime in the fall of 
1964, but the circumstances were more ambiguous, as Unilever‘s loss of control was 
much more gradual than either of P&T Lands‘ or H&C‘s.
166
 In addition, it appears that 
pressure from labor unions was a major factor driving the assumption of government 
control. 
At the time, Unilever Indonesia was wholly-owned by one of Unilever‘s British 
holding companies (Unilever itself was mostly publicly owned). Unilever Indonesia‘s 
shares had been transferred to this British subsidiary from a Dutch subsidiary to avoid 
nationalization in 1957-58 when all the Dutch companies in Indonesia were taken over 
and subsequently nationalized. In October 1963, a Unilever executive from London 
named Temple had visited Indonesia in hopes of learning more about the situation there. 
Perhaps reflective of the influence Unilever carried, Temple met separately with both 
Minister Subandrio and President Sukarno. Subandrio emphasized that Unilever‘s 
position in Indonesia was linked to the Malaysia situation and advised that British 
managers be replaced with others, even suggesting that a Dutchman would be a good 
choice for the chairman. President Sukarno promised that Unilever would be allowed to 
continue to run its business provided it did not attempt to introduce any element of 
colonialism.
167
 Acting on Subandrio‘s suggestion, Unilever in December 1963 appointed 
a Dutchman, Quarles van Ufford, to replace the British national in charge of Unilever 
Indonesia. Van Ufford assumed his new post in early February 1964, and at the same 
time Unilever began to replace other British managers with non-British management. 
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In Indonesia, Unilever‘s head office was in Jakarta, and it had three factories in 
Jakarta and one in Surabaya. As we saw in Part II, at the end of January the Governor of 
Jakarta had installed protective security teams at its head office and factories to ensure 
that there was no trouble with workers. The teams did not interfere at all in management 
or operations.  Meanwhile at the Surabaya factory, there had been an attempted takeover 
led by SOBSI-affiliated SERBUNI, but management – which was all Indonesian 
nationals - was still in control.  Nevertheless, Unilever was specifically named in both 
Minister Chaerul Saleh‘s circular of 31 January and in Minister of Peoples Industry Azis 
Saleh‘s decree of 8 February.   
By mid-February, the Ministry of Peoples Industry had appointed supervisory 
teams for both the Jakarta facilities and the Surabaya factory. On 10 February, the 
ministry team was installed in the head office in Jakarta with the ostensible mission of 
maintaining security and production, and a few days later other supervisory teams were 
put in the Jakarta factories (the same thing was also happening to BAT and Fraser & 
Neave; the security teams appointed by the Governor of Jakarta departed). The Ministry 
of Peoples Industry gave assurances that there was no intention to nationalize the 
company or ―interfere with the authority of management over staff‖ and that the 
management retained direct control over the staff, although management itself was 
subject to the advice and possibly direction of the team.
168
 The head of the team in the 
Jakarta head office was Lt. Col. Suwondo, and he was known as the Kepala Kuasa Usaha 
or KKU (in English, he was called the ‗Supervisor‘ or ‗Charge d‘Affairs‘). On 14 
February another KKU (from the state-owned soda factory in East Java) was appointed to 




Over the next nine months, the KKUs and the supervisory teams, apparently 
under labor union pressure, gradually usurped the authority of Unilever-appointed top 
management. On 12 February, just a few days after his installation, the KKU in Jakarta 
began requiring that certain measures be followed: these included requiring that internal 
correspondence be in Bahasa Indonesia (not English), that letterhead should indicate that 
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Unilever was under the control of the Ministry of Peoples Industry, that the supervisory 
team had the right to attend board meetings and meet with department heads, and that the 
monthly Indonesian flag ceremony be introduced.
170
 Aside from these measures, initially 
there seemed to be little interference in management. However, in March the KKU in 
Jakarta forced various management changes. The KKU sent both the general manager 
and personnel manager of the Surabaya factory, both of whom were Indonesians, on six 
months leave. In Jakarta, the German general manager and engineer at one of the 
factories was forced to transfer to the head office. Unilever reported that the KKU was 
―clearly acting under pressure from trade unions, who were seeking to remove managers 
from active participation in the operation of the business and act simply as advisors.‖ 
Meanwhile, Unilever‘s business was increasingly strained, in part because of general 
economic conditions and in part because of increasing interference by the KKU and 
supervisory teams, and for the first time in a very long time Unilever Indonesia was 
operating at a loss.
171
   
Increasingly concerned, Unilever in late April sent Temple (who had visited 
Indonesia in October 1963 and met with both Foreign Minister Subandrio and President 
Sukarno) and another executive from London to Indonesia to assess the situation. On 20 
April they met with Minister Subandrio and Mr. Umardji (Deputy Director for Economic 
Affairs). Subandrio told the executives that he had decided that Unilever was now ―hands 
off‖ and that he had informed SOBSI of this new policy. He confirmed that Unilever 
would now be fully in charge of its business, but he also asked for understanding, and the 
parties agreed that the KKUs should be kept on in an advisory role as consultants. 
Minister Subandrio said he ―wished to regard Unilever as an example of co-operation 
between the Netherlands and Indonesia,‖ and he thus advised Unilever to transfer the 
ownership of Unilever Indonesia back to the Dutch subsidiary and to replace British 
managers.
172
  On 21 April the executives met with Minister of Peoples Industry Azis 
Saleh, the KKU and the deputy KKU of Jakarta, and others.  At this meeting, Minister 
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Azis Saleh stated that he accepted Subandrio‘s decision, but that it would be best not to 
change anything to the outside world; he thus advised that the KKU be left in place and 
not be withdrawn, for otherwise the labor unions may react violently. This suggestion 
was accepted by the Unilever side, although the details of how this was to be 
accomplished remained to be worked out.
173
    
In fact, it appears that the labor unions were never told about the new status of the 
KKU. The Unilever executives quickly became aware that ―SOBSI is not going to accept 
the decision of the Government and that our ‗supervisors‘ are not going to show too 
much courage to make their changed position clear.‖  When one of the foreign executives 
went to visit a factory in Jakarta in the next day or so, he was met with union-organized 
worker demonstrations. The union advised Indonesian managers not to attend a 
managers‘ lunch with the executive, and only four of 40 Indonesian managers ended up 
attending. Many managers later privately expressed their embarrassment and offered 
apologies.  Finally, due to labor union pressure only about one-third of the managers 
attended a farewell dinner for the executive; they were afraid of being ‗Slametized‘ (so 
named after the Indonesian manager Slamet who was sent away from Surabaya for six 
months). It was clear that the labor unions controlled the workers, and it was also clear 
that the KKU was unable or unwilling to stop these tactics.
174
 
Control continued to slip away. By the beginning of May, there were only six 
expatriate managers left in Indonesia. The British nationals had been replaced by 
managers from Holland and Germany, and the latter were all located at the head office, 
not at the factories. (It was only due to the intervention of Foreign Minister Subandrio 
that work permits were obtained for the new managers in the face of union pressure.)  In 
June, the transfer of shares of Unilever Indonesia from the British subsidiary to the Dutch 
subsidiary was completed, but this change in ownership had little real impact. There was 
continuing labor union pressure to oust the remaining expatriate managers, and by 
August expatriate managers were not allowed to enter the Surabaya factory and were 
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allowed to communicate with Indonesian managers only in writing.  The business, 
however, seemed to continue even as Unilever‘s control deteriorated. Most of the work 
was done by Unilever-trained Indonesian managers, who performed admirably in spite of 
the difficult position they were in.
175
 
In August, the Special Committee of Unilever in London decided to make an offer 
to the GOI for the GOI to purchase up to 40% of the shares in Unilever Indonesia. 
Several factors drove Unilever to make this bold step. First was the overall deterioration 
of the political situation in Indonesia, as the influence of the PKI on the GOI was 
growing and the GOI increasingly seemed to be moving toward nationalization. 
Secondly, there was continued great pressure from the unions to oust foreign managers of 
Unilever. Unilever was planning on sending out a new Dutch finance director in the next 
two weeks, an action that would certainly create another showdown with the unions. 
Thirdly, Unilever hoped it could gain some benefit from the promises of Minister 
Subandrio and President Sukarno. Offering the GOI a share in the business – making it a 
co-owner - seemed the best way to defuse these problems by striking preemptively.
176
  
With the GOI as a partner, nationalization would be unnecessary, and the unions could 
not complain. Indeed, it was a measure both of how Unilever‘s control over the business 
had deteriorated so much and of Unilever‘s sense of the future that Unilever was willing 
to take this drastic step.  Accordingly, in mid-September Quarles van Ufford sent 




Neither Subandrio nor any GOI official responded to Unilever‘s offer, however. 
Meanwhile, Unilever‘s position in Indonesia continued to deteriorate economically as it 
was faced with some new regulations that would certainly negatively impact the business. 
In addition, the new finance director arrived in Jakarta in September but was never able 
to secure a work permit because of labor union pressure. He stayed in Indonesia for 
                                                 
175
 Extract from Minutes of Directors‘ Conference dated 1 May 1964 (UA, PS Special Committee and 
Overseas Committee Meetings, Box 43), and Minutes of Meeting of Special Committee of 18 August 1964 
(UA, PS Special Committee and Overseas Committee Meetings, Box 43). See also Wamsteker, 60 Years of 
Unilever, pp. 62-6. 
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 Minutes of Meeting of Special Committee of 18 August 1964 (UA, PS Special Committee and Overseas 
Committee Meetings, Box 43). 
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 Minutes of Meeting of Special Committee of 22 September 1964 (UA, PS Special Committee and 
Overseas Committee Meetings, Box 43). 
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another seven months, but was unable to work and was finally sent home in April 
1965.
178
 On 8 November 1964, Quarles van Ufford was told that he was no longer a 
manager but an advisor; however, van Ufford asked the British embassy to keep this 
development quiet.
179
 In any case, it seems pretty clear that by this point Unilever-
appointed management had little authority or control. Indeed, in June 1965 van Ufford 
would lament that for ―almost the whole of 1964 we had a position where the 
Government had the authority and little responsibility, and we had the responsibility but 
no authority.‖ He also noted that 
quite early it became clear that the Supervisor himself was basically in 
sympathy with the demands of the trade unions to nationalize foreign 
capital. This was our first problem, and the second was that the Supervisor 
had no real authority or backing to stand up against the unions, and the 





For a time after early November 1964 it appeared that the Unilever ship was not 
sinking, but this was appearance, not reality. Unilever was explicitly mentioned in 
Presidential Decree 6/1964 (see Part V), but was exempted from this by another decree 
issued by Minister Chaerul Saleh on 14 December.
181
 This exemption came on the heels 
of Dutch government intervention – Unilever Indonesia was now wholly owned by the 
Dutch subsidiary -  and the US embassy commented that this may have been the result of 
bad publicity generated by the takeover that damaged current GOI efforts to ―cultivate 
[the] Dutch for economic reasons.‖
182
 Remaining expatriate managers were prevented 
from entering the office for a few days, but then were allowed back in.
183
  By mid-
February 1965, it was clear to Unilever management that control of the company was 
completely lost to the ‗advisors,‘ and Unilever began to consider whether it should take 
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any other actions.  However, it was felt that any action might further jeopardize the 
company‘s tenuous position.
184
  President Sukarno‘s Decree 6/1965 issued in April 1965 
(see Chapter Seven) made any further action useless. Quarles van Ufford, though, 




IV. Ministerial Politics in the Kompartemen of 
Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs and the Fight for Control 
and Influence over the British Estates. 
 
What happened to the British companies once control had been fully assumed by 
the various GOI teams? The purpose of this section is to address that very question with 
respect to the estates, since they constituted the vast majority of British enterprises taken 
over. At the heart of the matter was the ability of the estates to generate revenues, 
especially foreign exchange, which easily distinguished them from their manufacturing 
brethren. As one of the few revenue generating sources within Indonesia, the estates were 
indeed valuable commodities and sought after by many individuals and institutions. 
Somewhat ironically, many of these estates were not particularly wealthy or productive, 
but they were perceived to be, and in any case at a time of great economic malfeasance 
anything was better than nothing. As important economic resources, their fate naturally 
became somewhat intertwined with the central political issues of the day, in particular the 
apparent growing influence of the PKI and its allies and the challenges presented thereby. 
Moreover, the story of the estates highlights the great divisions within the GOI itself, 
particularly at the ministerial level, and also reflecting larger political differences 
domestically. It is these divisions within and outside the GOI, and how access to the 
perceived wealth of the estates was fought over, that are the focus of this Part IV.  
                                                 
184
 Minutes of Meeting of Special Committee of 16 February 1965 (UA, PS Special Committee and 
Overseas Committee Meetings, Box 43). 
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 US Embassy Bi-Weekly Economic Review dated 15 October 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 
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(see Section V). 
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Before turning to the British estates, however, it may be useful to discuss the 
general management pattern of the companies once the GOI assumed full control. As we 
have seen, control over the companies was left to the various government ministries of 
the related field who were generally free to manage the company as they saw fit.  In other 
words, there were no universal principles applicable to each taken-over company, and 
even among companies under the control of a single ministry there was not necessarily 
uniformity of management. In the first place, expatriate personnel were removed and all 
contact with the owners severed. Second, the respective ministries then appointed a top 
layer of directors (often only 3-5 people), some of whom were professional managers 
from state-owned companies but many of whom appear to have been political appointees 
with limited managerial expertise. This top layer of appointed directors, who were 
directly responsible to the respective ministries, were then supported by Indonesian 
managers and employees who had already been working at the foreign company. It was 
generally these existing Indonesian employees who executed the day-to-day management 
of the company, and in some cases they were actually promoted. As a whole though, the 
picture that emerges from available evidence is that much of the change in personnel 
occurred at the very top level of director appointees and their staffs. In addition to the top 
level directors, ―advisory‖ boards, whose exact function was unclear, were often 
appointed, at least in the early stages of the takeover. Often these advisory board 
positions were filled by representatives from the mass organizations, National Front, and 
regional representatives, suggesting that these positions were a concession to such 
interests.    
It was often by appointment to the very top level of directors that most individuals 
and institutions sought to gain access to the potential resources of the company. That is to 
say, appointment to these positions was often the subject of fierce struggle. From such an 
influential position, the appointee could peddle patronage, often by directing contracts 
toward associates (with kickbacks) or hiring associates as staff members. Indeed, one 
feature of GOI control, evident when many of the companies were returned in 1967-68, 
was tremendous bloating of staff. Perhaps more importantly, such positions also allowed 
for access to and control over foreign exchange and the important resource of manpower, 
particularly on the estates with their thousands of laborers.  In addition, these positions 
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offered personal benefits, such as salary, other in-kind benefits such as housing, cars, and 
a food allowance, and access to foreign exchange to import prized but scarce goods from 
overseas.
186
   
Nowhere among the taken-over foreign companies was the fight for control over 
potential sources of wealth and power more fought over and contested, and the interplay 
with domestic politics more evident, than in the case of the British estates.
187
 As we saw 
earlier, Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs Sadjarwo was very quick to a 
promulgate several decrees in early February regarding British estates once Minister 
Chaerul Saleh issued his circular of 31 January. These two decrees established a central 
control team within the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs, headed by Minister 
Sadjarwo himself, whose purpose was probably to centralize control over and coordinate 
administration of the estates. In addition, Temporary Control Boards of three individuals 
were appointed at the provincial level to administer GOI control in the relevant 
provinces. At the estate level, individual Indonesian managers or deputy managers were 
to be appointed to manage the estates. In addition, the provincial level temporary control 
boards were to be advised and assisted by Supervisory Boards consisting of regional 
representatives and representatives of mass organizations such as labor and farmers 
groups.  The pace of assumption by the Ministry of Agricultural and Agrarian Affairs of 
control over the estates varied somewhat, but it appears that by early to mid-June, if not 
before, most of the British estates were firmly under the ministry‘s control. 
Early to mid-June as the time when most British estates finally came under the 
control of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs was certainly no coincidence, 
because it was precisely in early June 1964 that a major contest within the GOI for 
control over the seized estates had its genesis in the form of a reorganization by President 
Sukarno of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs. Prior to this point, the 
Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs was the only cabinet level official from the 
agricultural realm, and it was part of the ―Development Compartment‖ (a grouping of 
                                                 
186
 For a nice description of some of these issues, see the Indoconsult Report prepared in April 1968 in 
connection with the possible return of the P&T Lands estates (UKNA, FCO 15/217).  
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 There were 86 British-owned estates taken over in 1964, which added to the seven taken over in 1963 
yields a total of 93. In addition there were at least 12 non-British estates taken over in 1964 because they 
were managed by British-owned firms. Thus the total number of estates under the Dwikora structure 
described below was 105.  
 339 
 
ministries involved in economic development, such as industry, workers, agriculture, 
etc.) headed by Coordinating Minister Chaerul Saleh (who in addition to being 
Coordinating Minister for Development was also Minister of Basic Industry and Mining 
as well as influential Third Deputy Prime Minister). On 3 June, the field of agriculture 
was elevated to the level of a ―Compartment,‖ with Minister Sadjarwo serving as 
Coordinating Minister for the ―Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs Compartment.‖ This 
Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs Compartment had five brand new ministerial positions 
under it: the Minister of Farmers (also Sadjarwo), the Minister of Forestry, the Minister 
of Fishing, the Minister of Agrarian Affairs, and finally the Minister of Estates.
188
 Frans 
Seda, who to this point had not held a position in government administration, was 
appointed to fill the new position of Minister of Estates. The individual ministers within 
the Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs Compartment were presumptively subordinate to the 
overall authority of the Coordinating Minister (Sadjarwo), but as we shall see in practice 
it was not often clear what the power relationships actually were.  
The reasons for the appointment of Frans Seda as Minister of Estates were 
somewhat mysterious, at least initially. Seda, who held a degree in economics from a 
Dutch college, was a strong Catholic and staunch anti-communist, and at the time of his 
appointment was head of the small Catholic Party of Indonesia, which was effectively in 
opposition to Sukarno‘s government.
189
 Recalling the circumstances of his appointment, 
Seda said that when President Sukarno called him in to discuss the appointment, it was 
not even clear which ministry he would head up - there was talk he may be the new 
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 These changes to the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs actually preceded by several months 
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Minister of Fishing. Seda told Sukarno that he was against the PKI and against 
nasakomization,
190
 but Sukarno apparently still wanted him and gave him a day to think it 
over. The next day General Yani, the head of the Indonesian army, called Seda to urge 
him to accept the appointment. Yani informed Seda that the appointment would be for the 
Minister of Estates and that Yani supported his appointment because he knew Seda was 
anti-communist and would keep the estates out of the hands of the PKI. Apparently the 
army did not mind that many estates were foreign-owned, but did mind if they fell under 
the control of the PKI. Moreover, Yani urged, it was better for Seda to work within the 
cabinet than from outside, and the nation needed him to fight the PKI.  Seda then 
accepted the appointment, which was opposed by the PKI.
191
  From this story it appears 
that the army was pushing for the appointment of Seda in the hopes that he would prevent 
the estates from falling under the control of the PKI.  It is unclear if Yani‘s focus was on 
the British estates only, whose takeover by the GOI was about to be completed, or on all 
government-owned estates; presumably it was for all government-owned estates, and as 
we shall see in subsequent Chapters Minister Seda‘s authority also extended to foreign 
owned estates. President Sukarno‘s position on the appointment was also unclear: was he 
pressured into it by the army, or did he have his own reasons, such as nasakomizing the 
cabinet or possibly countering the influence of Minister Sadjarwo? Whatever the reason, 
Seda‘s appointment directly contradicted the popular notion that President Sukarno in 
1964 was ‗turning to the left.‘  
Certainly it was evident at the time that there was a great likelihood that Seda, the 
anti-communist Catholic, and Minister Sadjarwo, the left leaning ex BTI and PNI man, 
would not get along. As we saw in Chapter Two, Sadjarwo had been a Minister of 
Agriculture/Agrarian Affairs since April 1957, the first cabinet appointed by President 
Sukarno under martial law. Sadjarwo was originally a member of the PKI-controlled BTI 
(Barisan Tani Indonesia, a large farmer‘s organization) and later the left wing of the PNI, 
and was often seen as sympathetic to the PKI and its allies. As events transpired, Seda 
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 As we saw earlier, ‗nasakomizing‘ the cabinet and other parts of the government administration meant 
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religious elements – to positions in the government so that all three would be represented. In particular, it 
became a rallying cry for the PKI and its allies to push out GOI officials and replace them with PKI 
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 Interviews with Frans Seda 10 February 2006 and 10 October 2006. 
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and Sadjarwo did not get along at all, and one of the areas they quarreled over was the 
treatment and control over foreign estates. According to Seda, Sadjarwo did not believe 
in compensating the estate owners for their seized estates and simply took the estates 
over. Seda, on the other hand, believed in the compensation principle for seized assets 
and thus defended the estates against the PKI and others who wanted to take them over 
(see subsequent Chapters). Seda did recognize, however, that Sadjarwo was under great 
pressure from the PKI to take over the estates. Another area of disagreement was the 
nasakomization policy, with Seda against it and Sadjarwo favoring it. The extent of their 
general disagreement was so great that Seda often simply disregarded various decrees 
issued by Sadjarwo, refusing to implement them.
192
 As we shall see, however, it took 
Minister Seda well over a year to gain control over the already-seized British estates.  
In late June 1964, now Coordinating Minister Sadjarwo issued a series of three 
confusing and ill-coordinated decrees concerning the administration of the seized British 
estates.
193
 These decrees had two main effects. Most importantly, it was made clear that 
Sadjarwo as Coordinating Minister would have exclusive authority over the British 
estates.
194
 Thus it seemed as though Sadjarwo was responding to the reorganization of his 
ministry and the appointment of Seda in early June by asserting his jurisdiction over the 
British estates, even though Seda was now Minister of Estates and the presumptive 
competent authority. It is unclear if this was meant as a challenge to President Sukarno, 
but it certainly was for Minister Seda.  
The second effect was to add a bizarrely complicated supervisory structure over 
the British estates whose purpose was difficult to ascertain but presumably allowed 
Minister Sadjarwo to appoint trusted associates in positions that would allow him to 
control the estates. The Team within the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs in 
overall charge of the British estates (appointed back in February) was renamed (it became 
the Badan Pusat Penguasaan Perusahaan Perkebunan Milik Inggris or Badan Pusat 
Penguasaan (‗Central Control Board‘)) and its composition enlarged and changed. The 
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old eight person team now became a 15 person team, eight of whom were new appointees 
(including Minister Seda as vice-chairman), with Minister Sadjarwo continuing as 
chairman. The Central Control Board‘s specified duties included establishing policy 
regarding supervision and control of the estates, supervising the implementation of such 
policy, and providing advice and guidance. A Daily Management Board, consisting of 8 
members of the Central Control Board, was also formed to implement the daily duties 
and responsibilities of the Central Control Board. Yet a third body named Direksi 
Penguasaan was established along with the Central Control Board and the Daily 
Management Board; it was responsible to the Central Control Board and was charged 
with leading the business and organization of the British estates as well as supervising the 
continued implementation of GOI control. It consisted of three GOI officials. The Direksi 
Penguasaan was also assigned direct authority over the provincial Temporary Control 
Boards established back in February. However, except for this last designation of 
authority over the provincial Temporary Control Boards, it was simply not clear from the 
described duties where the responsibilities of one group began and the other left off. The 
combined effect of these three decrees and the two issued in February resulted in a 
supervisory structure as follows: at the top level in Jakarta was the Central Control 
Board, Daily Management Board and Direksi Penguasaan; in each province there were 
Temporary Control Boards and Supervisory Boards (Badan Pengawas, consisting of the 
Governor, Tjatur Tunggal representatives, and representatives from the mass 
organizations); and at the estate level there were the appointed managers and deputy 
managers. The structure at the top level was extremely confusing and very difficult to 
deal with, recalled one individual who was intimately familiar with the situation, and the 
whole enterprise was a ―comedy,‖ run by people who were mostly from political parties 
and not professional managers.
195
 
In early September 1964 Coordinating Minister Sadjarwo further complicated the 
above structure by two measures, both decreed on the same day. It is unclear what 
prompted these measures; as noted in Part I Section B, September 1964 was the most 
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 Interviews with Soedjai Kartasasmita 22 March 2006 and 20 September 2006. Mr. Kartasasmita 
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working on various state-owned plantations from the early 1950s until late 1964 or early 1965, when he 
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dangerous and tense period of Konfrontasi, though this may have been coincidental. In 
the first measure, all the seized British estates were to be grouped into five working units 
known as Dwikora.
196
  As ‗Dwikora‘ was President Sukarno‘s famous two commands 
made in his speech on 3 May 1964 that subsequently became one of the most popular 
slogans of Konfrontasi (see Part I, Section C), the use of this name by Minister Sadjarwo 
explicitly linked the ex-British estates to the Konfrontasi struggle and the Indonesian 
Revolution. Each Dwikora unit was to be led by managers appointed by Coordinating 
Minister Sadjarwo, and these managers were charged with supervising, controlling and 
managing the estates in its group. These five Dwikora units were geographically and 
company based. For example, Dwikora I was all the H&C/London Sumatra estates in 
North Sumatra, Dwikora II was a mixture of other estates in Sumatra, Dwikora III was a 
mixture of estates primarily on Java, Dwikora IV were almost exclusively the P&T Lands 
estates, and Dwikora V were a grouping of estates in East Java whose management had 
been accused of illegal activity, resulting in the takeover of the estates.
197
 This was the 
beginning of the Dwikora estate structure, which would undergo numerous changes and 
evolve into a bureaucratic superstructure where the contest for access to the resources of 
the British estates was played out. 
   The second change decreed by Coordinating Minister Sadjarwo in early 
September 1964 was the establishment of ‗advisory boards‘ (Badan Pertimbangan) at 
each of the Direksi Penguasaan level, the Dwikora unit level, and individual estate 
level.
198
 These advisory bodies were supposed to provide advice regarding production 
and security, and to help ensure the continued production of the estates.  Although the 
chairmen of these advisory boards were from the Direksi Penguasaan and the Dwikora 
unit managers and estate managers, respectively, most of the remaining members were 
representatives of mass organizations, such as workers and farmers groups, who were 
appointed by the National Front. In fact, in order to qualify for appointment as 
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representative of one of the mass organizations on the Badan Pertimbangan, the 
individual had to be a member of the National Front. Interestingly, all members had to 
pledge an oath to the Coordinating Minister, though the contents of the oath were not 
disclosed. Thus the purpose of the advisory boards appeared at a minimum to be to 
appease the PKI, the National Front, and workers and farmers‘ mass organizations by 
placing their representatives in apparent positions to access the wealth and resources of 
the estates via the appointments to the boards. How much power and authority the new 
advisory boards actually exercised is unknown; as noted, they were chaired (and thus 
presumably controlled) by the appointees from the related units (the Direksi Penguasaan, 
and the managers of the Dwikora units and individual estates).  Furthermore, they were 
only supposed to meet once per month, and their decisions were not supposed to conflict 
with the decisions of the Coordinating Minister.  Similarly, it is unclear whether Minister 
Sadjarwo did this of his own accord or was pressured into it by these groups.  The 
concept, of course, was not novel, and we have already seen similar arrangements in the 
decrees issued by Minister Sadjarwo in February. 
In late October 1964 Coordinating Minister Sadjarwo revised the structure yet 
again by revamping the Direksi Penguasaan into a three man team comprised of a 
General Director, Marketing Director, and Production Director. As the titles suggest, the 
General Director was to be responsible for general affairs, the Marketing Director for 
selling the produce from the estates, and the Production Director for production.
199
 The 
purpose of these changes was left unstated, but presumably it was an attempt to 
coordinate the three specified activities throughout the five different Dwikora units by 
centering authority for the activities in three individuals at the central level. The 
appointments were notable in particular because of the appointment of Mirza Mustakim 
as Production Director; he would later be appointed by Minister Seda as head of the 
entire Dwikora structure.
200
 Mustakim was also staunchly anti-communist and had little 
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experience in business. Thus, his appointment was obviously a political one, probably 
one forced upon Coordinating Minister Sadjarwo.
201
  
   Up to this point it seems clear that Coordinating Minister Sadjarwo was 
principally in control over the British estates, despite the appointment of Seda as Minister 
of Estates back in early June. However, Minister Sadjarwo‘s authority over the estates 
was wrenched away by President Sukarno‘s Decree 6/1965 of late November 1964 (see 
Part V), which clearly placed authority over the British estates into the hands of Minister 
Seda. From this point on Minister Seda would have authority over the British estates 
(thereafter, it appears that Minister Sadjarwo issued no decrees regarding the estates), 
though according to Seda‘s own account many of his own instructions were initially 
ignored and it would not be until early October 1965 – almost 10 months later – before he 
was able to overhaul completely management of the Dwikora structure. The reasons 
behind President Sukarno‘s clear affirmation of Minister Seda as the competent authority 
over the British estates are not clear. As we saw earlier, it was Sukarno himself who had 
initially reorganized the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs into a 
‗Compartment‘ and appointed Seda to fill the new position of Minister of Estates. 
However, it was also evident that there was a strong push by the army in support of Seda, 
and thus the November 1964 firm placing of the estates under Minister Seda may have 
been sponsored by the army.  
In any case, Minister Seda immediately sought to establish control over the 
British estates.  On 30 November 1964, just four days after Sukarno‘s Decree 6/1964, 
Minister Seda issued two decrees that affirmed the general Dwikora grouping of estates 
but completely replaced the complicated administrative structure Coordinating Minister 
Sadjarwo had devised.
202
  The swiftness with which Minister Seda reacted after 
Sukarno‘s Decree 6/1964 suggests that the decrees were already prepared and Seda was 
simply waiting for the right time to issue them. The general thrust of the changes was to 
centralize all decision-making and control over the estates at the central governmental 
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level in Jakarta, including the all-important revenues generated by sales of produce. This 
was accomplished primarily by creating a Badan Pimpinan Umum Dwikora (‗Central 
Board of Directors for Dwikora‘ or ‗BPU Dwikora‘ for short) that had overall 
responsibility for all the estates in the Dwikora structure. The BPU Dwikora‘s duties 
included formulating policy and planning in the areas of production, sales, personnel, and 
provisioning/supplying of the entire Dwikora, arranging for the financing of the entire 
Dwikora, and also arranging for marketing the produce of the Dwikora units. The BPU 
Dwikora was comprised of four directors plus their staffs and various departments. The 
BPU Dwikora directors included a ‗First Director‘, who was in overall charge of the 
Dwikora, as well as a Director of Production (in charge of organizing overall estate 
production and planting), Director of Marketing (in charge of all sales, as well as 
procuring supplies needed for production), and associate Director of Finance (who had a 
somewhat undefined role over financial affairs).  The four BPU Dwikora directors were 
assisted by numerous staff personnel as well as numerous departments (e.g., in the case 
of the Production Director, a planting department, technical department, and food 
production department) that were under their direct control. All four BPU Dwikora 
directors were appointed directly by Minister Seda. The change was a major foundational 
block in the development of a bureaucratic superstructure that would continue to grow 
into a self-sustaining behemoth, with an estimated office staff (not counting the Dwikora 
units or the individual estates) of at least 700 people by early 1967.
203
  
Minister Seda also decreed a number of other changes. At the Dwikora unit level, 
Seda affirmed the five unit estate grouping (Dwikora I through V) and further clarified 
the management structure of these units. The units were to be headed by individual 
boards of directors (Pimpinan Kesatuan) comprised of one senior director, who was in 
overall charge of the unit, and one or two junior directors. These unit-level boards of 
directors were directly responsible to the BPU Dwikora and were charged with 
implementing the plans of the BPU Dwikora, especially in the production realm (but not 
in the sales/marketing area). Four staffing divisions were established in each Dwikora 
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unit to assist the directors (a general division, production division, supply division, and 
purchasing division). Thus, like the BPU Dwikora, each Dwikora unit also had its own 
staff and bureaucracy, though the staffing appeared to be much smaller than the BPU 
Dwikora. Within each province where a Dwikora unit was located, Minister Seda also 
established a supervisory board (Badan Pengawas) consisting of the provincial governor 
and various GOI agricultural officials at the provincial level. Their nominal function was 
to supervise generally the production activities within the Dwikora unit; however, it is 
quite likely that these were mostly political appointees.
204
 Finally, at each level of BPU 
Dwikora, the Dwikora units, and the individual estates, Production Advisory Boards 
(Badan Pertimbangan Produksi) were to be set up. These bodies were chaired by 
members of the BPU Dwikora or directors from the Dwikora units or estates, but they 
were comprised of representatives of mass organizations of workers and farmers who 
were members of the National Front as well as representatives of regional interests. Their 
function was to advise regarding production targets, budgeting, and safeguarding 
production. Clearly these bodies were set up to appease the mass organizations and the 
PKI, presumably by asserting that such bodies represented the nasakomization of the 
Dwikora structure; even a staunch anti-communist such as Minister Seda was unable to 
resist such pressures. As with the BPU Dwikora, however, the Dwikora unit board of 
directors, the managers of the individual estates, the provincial advisory board members, 
and the Production Advisory Board members of all three levels were each to be appointed 
by Minister Seda, assuring him control over these posts. 
How much of this structure and its subsequent iterations Minister Seda was 
actually able to implement over the next 11 months or so is unclear. Years later, Seda 
described how it took him a very long time to appoint individuals to the various positions 
because of opposition within the government, presumably in part from Coordinating 
Minister Sadjarwo. Seda‘s primary criteria for such appointments were two: first, the 
individual had to be a professional manager, and second, the individual had to be anti-
communist. How successful Seda was in ensuring these criteria were met is not certain, 
as Seda came under extreme pressure from the PKI, PNI and other parties to appoint their 
choices to positions within the Dwikora as well as to positions within the ministry itself. 
                                                 
204
 Interviews with Soedjai Kartasasmita 22 March and 20 September 2006. 
 348 
 
Foreign Minister Subandrio apparently also pressured Seda to appoint PKI members as 
directors, but Seda was able to resist this. Seda, who claimed that he opposed all parties‘ 
(including the political parties and the army) efforts to influence the estates, not just the 
PKI‘s, complained about the pressure from the parties to President Sukarno, who told 
him not to worry, that NASAKOM was his (Sukarno‘s) problem to deal with. In any 
case, it appears that over the first nine months of 1965 Minister Seda was gradually able 
to make some appointments to various positions within the Dwikora structure, though 
some of these, including the elevation of Mirza Mustakim to the First Director of BPU 
Dwikora (the head of the entire Dwikora structure) and the appointment of Sjamsudin 
Aminudin as Director of Marketing for BPU Dwikora, were admittedly motivated 
primarily by the strong anti-communist stance of the individuals instead of their 
managerial expertise and knowledge.
205
 Meanwhile, Minister Seda continued to tinker 
with the Dwikora structure, including regrouping the estates in early January 1965 from 
five into seven Dwikora units (see Appendix B for a listing of these estates).
206
   
Minister Seda was not the only one being pressured by various political groups – 
the political parties, the army, and other organizations – for access to the estates. Mirza 
Mustakim, who became the First Director (the top position) of the Dwikora structure in 
1965, recalled that one of the biggest problems he faced was continued interference by 
these groups, especially the political parties. They saw the estates as sources of funds and 
manpower, and because of the NASAKOM policy they all wanted representation on the 
various Dwikora boards. They were successful to a certain extent in obtaining these 
positions - Mustakim did appoint many members of the NU political party (which he was 
affiliated with) to various positions, in part because of the pressure the NU‘s labor arm 
was able to exert. They also sought to acquire financial data relating to the estates, such 
as cash flow statements and salary levels. Apparently the estates continued to generate 
revenues; though no figures are available, Mustakim claimed that in 1965 sales of 
produce generated $15 million in foreign exchange revenue, a substantial sum in 
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Indonesia at the time.
207
 Similar pressure was also felt at the Dwikora unit level. Soedjai 
Kartasasmita, one of the professional managers Minister Seda appointed to Dwikora II, 
also recalled the great pressure the political parties (not just the PKI) exerted to gain 
access to the resources of the estates, principally via appointment to positions within the 
Dwikora structure and on the estates. There was constant plotting and intrigue, and 
Kartasasmita himself had to fend off many of these maneuverings. There was apparently 
much greater jostling over the estates in Java than on Sumatra (presumably a function of 
geographical proximity to the capital Jakarta).
208
 Other sources also suggest that there 
was greater politicization in the Dwikora units on Java (Dwikora IV through VII) than 
those in Sumatra (Dwikora I through III). In fact, one staff member at Dwikora VII 
(located in East Java) noted that most of the Dwikora VII unit directors were political 
appointees from different political parties; ―politics was king,‖ and the professional 
managers were ―number two.‖
209
 From these and other accounts, one senses that Minister 
Seda was not completely successful in keeping the estates away from the reach of various 
interest groups, though both Mustakim and Kartasasmita claimed he was very effective at 
it.     
In early October 1965 Minister Seda issued two decrees which suggested that the 
contest with Coordinating Minister Sadjarwo for control over the estates had finally 
ended in Seda‘s favor.  The first decree made some further revisions to the Dwikora 
structure, and the second was a sweeping reshuffling of the major administrative posts 
within the Dwikora structure. The timing of these decrees, issued on the heels of the 
September 30 Movement (see Chapter Seven, Part III), was not coincidental. The 
September 30 Movement introduced a period of great confusion and uncertainty into 
Indonesian politics as well as the extermination of the PKI, and the allies of the PKI as 
well as its sympathizers had to tread very lightly. Seda recalled that the September 30 
Movement may have helped with the issuance of the decrees, though he was planning on 
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issuing them at some point anyway. Coordinating Minister Sadjarwo opposed the new 
staffing decree in particular, but was unable to prevent its issuance because Minister Seda 
was in direct contact with President Sukarno and answered only to him, effectively 
bypassing Sadjarwo.
210
 This decree involved the appointment of individuals to the 32 
highest positions within the Dwikora structure, including the BPU Dwikora board of 
directors, the directors of each of the seven Dwikora units, as well as appointments to the 
positions of the newly created post of inspectorate.
211
 Though in some cases the decree 
merely affirmed existing appointments, in general it was a thorough cleansing and 
reshuffling of positions, signaling that Minister Seda had successfully retooled the 
Dwikora structure to his liking.  
The staffing decree piggybacked off a decree issued the day before which made 
some modifications to the Dwikora structure and established what appears to have been 
the final form of the Dwikora structure (at least for a few years).
212
 As the explanation to 
the decree noted, a primary objective of the decree was to ensure the concentration of 
policy-making, planning and control, particularly in the area of sales and marketing of the 
produce, while ―de-concentrating‖ production and security. Within the BPU Dwikora, the 
position of Associate Finance Director was dropped, so that the BPU Dwikora was led by 
three Directors (the First Director, the Production Director, and the Marketing Director). 
Eight new divisions were created within the BPU Dwikora to assist the directors, adding 
greatly to the numbers of staffing. In addition, new positions of inspectorates and 
regional coordinators were created. A new Marketing and Services Unit was established 
within the BPU Dwikora to coordinate the dispatch and storing of estate goods as well as 
the purchasing of supplies for the estates. At the Dwikora unit level, the board of 
directors was revamped slightly to have one senior director who was in overall charge of 
the unit and two junior directors, one for production and one for finance, each with their 
own staffs.  However, Minister Seda kept the existing Badan Pengawas (the provincial 
level board comprised of the provincial Governor and other officials) as well as the 
Badan Pertimbangan Produksi (the boards at all three levels of BPU Dwikora, Dwikora 
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unit, and individual estate which were comprised principally of representatives from mass 
organizations and was to advise regarding production), instead giving them new names.   
Thus, by October 1965 a large administrative superstructure known as Dwikora 
had been created to manage the 105 (mostly British) estates taken over by the GOI in the 
course of 1963-64. Uniquely, of all the foreign companies taken over from the entire 
period 1963-65, only with respect to these estates did such an administrative 
superstructure develop. Comprised of a central body in Jakarta known as the BPU 
Dwikora, seven individual Dwikora units in Sumatra and Java into which the estates were 
grouped, and the individual estates themselves, the superstructure was the end product of 
a roughly 18 month long struggle within and outside the GOI to assert control over the 
valuable economic resources represented by the estates. Its primary objective was to 
centralize in Jakarta, in the hands of the central government (though whose hands within 
the central government were the subject of great struggle), control over the estates. In 
particular, sales and marketing were controlled by the BPU Dwikora in Jakarta, which 
meant that all revenues from the sales of estate produce were controlled by the BPU 
Jakarta. The seven Dwikora units, and least of all the individual estates, thus had virtually 
no control over the sales of their produce or the revenue generated by such sales; their 
primary function was to ensure continued production of the estates according to plans 
dictated by the BPU Dwikora, and they were mostly dependent on the BPU Dwikora to 
provide them with funding and material resources for production. On the estates 
themselves, it appeared that the top level of management was appointed by Jakarta, and 
that other positions were initially filled primarily by Indonesians who had already been 
working at the estates. The Dwikora superstructure would continue to grow (as noted, by 
early 1967 the staff of the BPU Dwikora alone totaled an estimated 700 people) such that 
by 1967, when the returns of foreign companies were getting underway, there were 




V. President Sukarno’s Decree 6/1964 of 26 November 
1964 and Aftermath. 
 
Towards the end of 1964, the official status of the confiscated British companies 
remained somewhat in limbo. By November 1964, almost every British firm (with Shell 
Oil the major exception), had been put under GOI ―control‖ and/or ―supervision.‖ In 
most cases, such a position had resulted in effective GOI control over the companies, so 
that by November there were very few British firms whose owner-appointed management 
retained any semblance of control over the company (Dunlop Rubber being the clearest 
example). Moreover, most of the companies‘ head offices had lost contact with their 
Indonesian operations. In his famous Tahun Vivere Pericoloso or ‗Year of Living 
Dangerously‘ (often shortened to TAVIP) independence day speech on 17 August 1964, 
President Sukarno had suggested not only that the British companies would not be 
returned to their owners but that the future of all foreign investment was in peril: 
As for the British financed enterprises which were taken over by the 
workers and are now coming under government control, I had better 
reaffirm that fundamentally and eventually no imperialist‘s capital will be 
allowed to operate on Indonesian soil. Imperialists‘ capital which is still 
operating here must fully submit to Indonesian national laws. The ex-
British capital will be under full control of the Government. Of course the 
procedure followed can vary, it can be nationalization with compensation, 
it may also be confiscation without compensation. The method to be 





Coordinating Minister Sadjarwo, who as we saw in Part IV above had embarked on a 
series of measures beginning in June which suggested that the government was not about 
to return the British estates anytime soon, echoed President Sukarno‘s position publicly 
on 16 October, when he announced not only that the British estates would not be returned 
but also that the question of compensation was wholly dependent on the British 
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  Yet despite these pronouncements, there was still no decree or law issued 
which affirmed the implied position that ―control or supervision‖ meant either 
confiscation or expropriation/nationalization. 
The issuance by President Sukarno of Presidential Decree 6/1964 on 26 
November 1964 conclusively dashed any hopes that control over the British companies 
might be returned to their owners, though it did not answer the confiscation versus 
expropriation question.
215
 The issuance of this decree was a major capstone, for 
Presidential Decrees were in effect the highest law of the land, and President Sukarno had 
not issued any decrees regarding the takeovers since Presidential Decree 194/1963 in 
September 1963 that forbade takeovers absent Presidential approval. Thus the decree 
served in part as a sort of postfactum Presidential affirmation of the imposition of 
government control (and consequent wrenching away of owner control) over the British 
companies over the course of 1964.  
Declaring that the steps already taken by the GOI against British companies were 
in accordance with Konfrontasi against Malaysia, Decree 6/1964 stated that it was 
necessary to clarify the control by the GOI over the companies by integrating all 
decisions/decrees of the GOI that had previously been issued into one basic law in the 
form of a Presidential Decree. The decree then stated that all British companies in 
Indonesia that were listed on an attachment were now fully and directly controlled 
(dikuasai) and managed (diurus) by the central government, effective from the date of 
Minister Chaerul Saleh‘s circular of 31 January 1964. The decree further specified that 
the control and management of the companies in various sectors would be carried out by 
specifically-assigned individual ministries. The ministries and companies listed in the 
decree were: (i) the Ministry of Trade was responsible for trading companies (Maclaine 
Watson), (ii) the Ministry of Peoples Industry and the Ministry of Basic Industry and 
Mining were responsible for industrial companies (Unilever, BAT, Fraser & Neave and 
Nebritex were placed under the Ministry of People Industry; Dunlop Rubber was placed 
under the Ministry of Basic Industry and Mining), (iii) the Department of Revenue and 
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Finance was responsible for insurance companies (Ocean Insurance of the Commercial 
Union insurance group, Sun Insurance, and Union Insurance of Canton), (iv) the Ministry 
of Estates was responsible for estates (Harrison & Crosfield, Guthrie & Co, P&T Lands, 
JA Wattie, Anglo Sumatra, Ross Taylor, Grummit Reid, PT Indraswari (Francis Peek)), 
and (v)  the Central Bank of Indonesia was put in charge of Chartered Bank.
216
 The 
decree specified that the companies should be managed by safeguarding production and 
working efficiency and that ministers should further arrange for the payment of wages, 
salary and social security benefits of the workers of the companies.  Issues arising from 
the implementation of the decree were to be resolved by the individual ministries, 
mindful of the principles specific to the industry and individual companies. In addition, 
all forms of control and management by various GOI bodies that conflicted with the 
decree should either be cancelled or conformed. 
A few observations regarding Presidential Decree 6/1964 are necessary. First, the 
words ‗nationalization‘ or ‗expropriation‘ or ‗confiscation‘ were not used; the measures 
were described as the government fully controlling (dikuasai) and managing (diurus) the 
companies. The GOI obviously wanted to retain some flexibility regarding the official 
status of the companies, as there was no explanation either of what this meant vis-à-vis 
expropriation or confiscation or of how long this state of affairs would last. Second, Shell 
Oil was not listed or affected by the decree, again reflecting oil company exceptionalism. 
Third, the companies were placed under individual ministries that apparently had some 
leeway in how they would manage the company (the ministers had to be mindful of the 
special principles in their fields and the ―integrity‖ of the businesses themselves).  
Finally, as can be seen in Appendix A, there were literally dozens of small British estate 
holders which were not even mentioned. Many of these estates, however, were managed 
by Anglo Sumatra, Guthries, JA Wattie or Indraswari (ex Francis Peek), which were 
mentioned in the decree. It is quite possible that the GOI was simply not sure of the 
ownership of many of the estates; many of the ownership arrangements were indeed 
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tangled and difficult to figure out. Listing the largest estate companies and the primary 
managing agents may instead have been enough to get the message across. In any case, 
most of these estates were already under GOI control anyway, and the failure of their 
names to appear in the decree did not exempt them in practice from GOI control. 
It is not clear why President Sukarno finally chose to issue a decree on the 
takeovers at this time, after 14 months of shying away from issuing decrees on the matter 
and when virtually all the British companies were already under effective GOI control. 
One objective of the decree really may have been to integrate and coordinate the 
administration of the companies under the official Presidential seal of approval. The 
language of the decree itself suggests that President Sukarno – or his advisors – felt it was 
necessary to clarify the various decrees regarding the takeovers, to ―integrate‖ them and 
to cancel other decrees which conflicted with this. But what prompted this? In fact, the 
various decrees already issued by various GOI ministers were not that different from each 
other. The only things Presidential Decree 6/1964 really added were (i) a clear statement 
that the companies listed on the attachment were now under the control and management 
of the GOI, and (ii) a clear allocation or placement of companies under specific 
ministries. With respect to (i), the scope of Presidential Decree 6/1964 was somewhat 
broader than Minister Chaerul Saleh‘s 31 January circular by virtue of listing more 
companies – all the known British companies in Indonesia, as opposed to just the ones 
affected by the attempted takeovers of January 1964 (which Minister Saleh‘s 31 January 
circular purportedly covered). Presidential Decree 6/1964 also covered the four 
companies initially taken over in September 1963 by the DPS-KBKI, whose status until 
this point still had not been clarified. However, most of the companies listed in Decree 
6/1964 had already been taken over under other decrees or in practice. There may also 
have been some significance attached to the description in Presidential Decree 6/1964 as 
the companies being under the ―control‖ and ―management‖ of the GOI, as compared to 
―control‖ and ―supervision‖ under Minister Saleh‘s 31 January circular; the term 
―management‖ is stronger than ―supervision‖ in terms of indicating government control, 
and parts of Decree 6/1964 certainly highlighted management of the companies. In a 
related vein, the decree may also have been a message to some ministers to take more 
forceful measures over the companies already nominally under their control.  For 
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example, as noted in Part III, the owner-appointed management of companies under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Peoples Industry generally seemed to last longer and have 
more influence than those under the Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs. 
Perhaps President Sukarno felt that it was now time for all the ministers to exercise 
roughly the same level of control/management over the different British companies. 
The major change, however, was with respect to (ii) above regarding the clear 
placement of companies under specific ministries, which I believe was a major 
motivation behind the decree. Most of the companies were already under the control of 
the ministries assigned under Decree 6/1964, with the great exception of the estates. As 
we saw in Part IV above, prior to this point the British estates were under the control of 
Coordinating Minister Sadjarwo, but under Decree 6/1964 they were placed under the 
control and management of Minister of Estates Seda. Hence, the decree may have been 
meant to resolve the conflict over control of the estates triggered in June 1964 with the 
creation of the Compartment of Agricultural and Agrarian Affairs. In fact, after this date 
virtually all the GOI decrees involving the British estates would be issued by Seda, not 
Sadjarwo.  
There may also have been some reasons relating to foreign relations and domestic 
politics behind the issuance of Presidential Decree 6/1964, though these are also 
somewhat obscure. There does not appear to be anything happening in Konfrontasi per se 
at the time that would have triggered such a move. The tension of September seems to 
have abated somewhat, and the conflict was essentially mired in stalemate in Borneo. In 
fact, on 20 November Foreign Minister Subandrio and British Ambassador Gilchrist had 
a very cordial meeting which the United States hoped might lead to British moves to 
further ease tensions.
217
 A better explanation internationally may be the general direction 
of Indonesian foreign policy. This will be discussed in more detail in the following 
Chapter, but for now we can note that one effect of Konfrontasi was greatly increased 
stridency in President Sukarno‘s anti-imperialist stance in foreign relations such that anti-
imperialism became the primary focal point of Indonesia‘s foreign policy, which 
increasingly left Indonesia isolated in the world. The UN Security Council debate in 
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September over Indonesia‘s actions on the Malaysian peninsula had been a slap to 
Indonesia‘s face. As we shall see in the next Chapter, Indonesia similarly failed to win 
support for Konfrontasi within the non-aligned movement, and as relations with the 
United States deteriorated dramatically, the Peoples Republic of China had stepped in to 
fill the void. Indeed, after President Sukarno‘s return from his extended overseas trip of 
17 September to 5 November, these developments became increasingly evident, and thus 
it could be that Presidential Decree 6/1964 was a reflection of this increasingly rabid anti-
imperialist stance and resulting isolation. Moreover, as we shall see in subsequent 
Chapters, this decision was the first in a string of several over the next five months under 
which foreign investment was virtually eliminated from the country. Insofar as domestic 
politics, it also coincided roughly with other measures taken by President Sukarno that 
seemed supportive of the PKI, such as the dissolution of the BPS in mid-December and 
suspension of the Murba party in early January (see Part I, Section A and Chapter Seven).  
Regardless of the possible explanations for Presidential Decree 6/1964, as most of 
the British companies had already been taken over in practice, control over only a few 
British companies changed as a result of the decree. One of these was Chartered Bank, 
which had been forced to close its Surabaya and Medan offices in mid-November (see 
Part III) but still operated its main office in Jakarta. In a rather messy situation, the 
Central Bank took control over Chartered Bank‘s Jakarta office on 8 December.  The 
British manager was allowed to stay on for a few weeks in mostly an advisory capacity 
(Chartered Bank‘s head office had revoked his authority when the takeover occurred).
218
   
Other companies, such as Nebritex (a textile factory), witnessed the complete takeover by 
GOI teams who were already on site but prior to that time were content to allow British 
management to run the company. In Nebritex‘ case, the British manager was also allowed 
to stay on as an advisor for at least several more weeks.
219
 The situation at Unilever, as 
we saw earlier, was more ambiguous; expatriates were allowed to stay on, but they 
exercised little influence. Besides Unilever, there appears to have been only two cases 
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where owner-appointed management survived into 1965.  The first was Dunlop Rubber‘s 
management, which withdrew in July 1965; the takeover in March 1965 of the Goodyear 
tire factory, which made tires for Dunlop Rubber, was a major reason Dunlop threw in 
the towel.
220
 The second case was Shell Oil, which we shall examine in more detail in the 
next Chapter.  For the rest of the companies, the decree merely resulted in the drying up 
of whatever limited communication there had been between the head office and 
Indonesia. 
Presidential Decree 6/1964 did galvanize the British government in two ways, 
however. The first was the sending of several formal diplomatic notes to the GOI. The 
British government had sent notes after the formal takeovers of P&T Lands (16 May) and 
Maclaine Watson (1 July) inquiring as to the status of these specific companies. 
Beginning in September, and mostly at the prompting of the Rubber Grower‘s 
Association (a London-based group of British estate owners), the British Foreign Office 
began to consider sending a note to the GOI seeking clarification of the status of British 
firms.  The Foreign Office, however, was under no illusions that the companies would be 
returned.
221
  Before a formal note could be delivered, though, Presidential Decree 6/1964 
was issued, which then spurred the Foreign Office to take action.  On 1 December, the 
British embassy delivered Note 644 to the GOI Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The note 
expressed concern over the treatment of British companies and requested that the GOI 
―clarify its intentions towards British enterprises and.…define their present status under 
Indonesian law.‖  The note further suggested that GOI measures amounted to ―de facto 
dispossession and expropriation and thereby give rise to an obligation to provide 
compensation in accordance with international law.‖ Unless an explanation was 
forthcoming, the British government would be forced to assume that this indeed was the 
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  The GOI never replied to the note. The British government sent two 
more notes over the next eight months, but these too were ignored.
223
       
The second measure the British government took over the next half year was to 
provide some assistance to British companies that sought to make compensation claims. 
The tricky part in this, of course, was that despite Presidential Decree 6/1964 officially it 
was still not clear what the GOI intended to do with the companies, and thus a claim for 
compensation because of nationalization was not as clear as in other cases. (Subsequently 
British officials began a mad search of newspapers and other materials to see if there 
were any statements by GOI officials that might shed light on the GOI‘s intentions.)  The 
most important of these measures was assistance in drafting ‗Reservation of Rights 
Letters,‘ which were letters from the individual companies to Foreign Minister 
Subandrio. The impetus for this again came from the Rubber Growers Association, which 
asked the Foreign Office to comment on its draft letter.  The Foreign Office did so and 
then coordinated the delivery of the letters to the GOI via the British embassy in 
Jakarta.
224
  By early May 1965, no less than 32 Reservation of Rights letters had been 
delivered.
225
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 British Embassy Note 644 dated 1 December 1964 (UKNA, FO 371/180350). 
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 British Embassy Note 79 dated 25 February 1965, and British Embassy Note 273 dated 20 July 1965 
(UKNA, FO 371/180350). 
224
 See RGA letter to British Foreign Office dated 29 January 1965, British Foreign Office Note (Cable) to 
RGA dated 9 March 1965, and British Foreign Office Note (Murray) dated 1 April 1965 (UKNA, FO 
371/180350). 
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 The Reservation of Rights letters were for the most part virtually identical. Typically, the letter began by 
referring to the various GOI measures taken in respect of the company, including Presidential Decree 
6/1964. The letter then noted that these measures appeared to constitute de facto expropriation and asked 
that the company be restored if that were not the case. The letter also indicated that the company was 
holding the GOI ―liable for all the assets of the company taken over, the day to day operation of the 
company, and any loss of income or profits during the period of such control. This company will not accept 
responsibility for any losses, debts or claims which may arise….This company accordingly reserves all of 
its rights during the operation of the said Presidential Decision No 6…‖ The letter further indicated that the 
company would take measures to obtain prompt and adequate compensation. See, e.g., Anglo Sumatra 
Rubber Company Reservation of Rights letter to Foreign Minister Subiandro dated 4 May 1964 (UKNA, 
FO 371/180351). In some cases, companies listed their assets and properties on a separate attachment. It is 
unlikely that these letters had any real legal value, and practically they appeared to have no impact on the 
GOI, as it appears never to have responded to any. As useless as they were, they did set the record straight 
and provided a good indication of which firms were taken over. 
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 These were basically forms in which the individual companies could describe their lost assets and 
property in some detail; the company would then give the completed form to the British government, which 
could use the information in future legal actions.  However, it is unclear if the British government actually 
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These measures, however, were too-little-too-late and of little use to the 
companies in resisting the takeovers, and indeed highlighted the impotence of the British 
government. Even before the takeovers began, the British government acknowledged that 
it was powerless to do anything about them. In July 1963 the Foreign Office recognized 
that the only potential economic weapon it held over Indonesia in the event British 
companies were confiscated was the possibility of pressuring the United States to 
withhold aid, in effect to try to sabotage Indonesia‘s stabilization efforts. Of course, as 
we have seen, at that point the US was fully committed to ensuring the success of the 
stabilization effort. British Ambassador Gilchrist even went as far as to suggest that 
British fixed assets in Indonesia ‗were doomed.‘
227
 The outbreak of Konfrontasi and the 
abandonment of the stabilization effort in September 1963 took away even this one 
potential lever. At the same time, Konfrontasi rendered the threat of military force, even 
if the British wanted to go this far, a non-viable one;  as the two countries were already 
engaged in a low level military conflict, the GOI had little to fear from the opening of 
hostilities. Further, there was considerable pressure from the Americans not to allow 
Konfrontasi to get out of hand and engulf the world powers. Finally, as there were few, if 
any, Indonesian businesses located in the United Kingdom, the common response of a 
retaliatory expropriation was unavailable - there were no assets to be seized.  The British 
government was certainly aware of this weakness, and throughout the period of takeovers 
frequently lamented its lack of power. A February 1964 Foreign Office note nicely 
summarized this recognition: referring to the takeovers, it noted there 
is no real hope of reversing the process, although a political settlement 
with Indonesia might postpone the end for a few years…It must be 
recognized that in these circumstances there is no effective action we can 
take to restrain the Indonesians. We are already being as unpleasant to 
them as we can without frightening the Americans and our only 
Indonesian hostage – the sixteen aircraft engines- would be an 
insignificant bargaining counter. Probably the only considerations that 
                                                                                                                                                 
distributed the forms, and if distributed and then returned they do not seem to have made any impact. See 
British Foreign Office Confidential Minutes dated 11 February 1965 (Tonkin) (UKNA, FO 950/793), and 
17 March 1965 (Puleston) and 19 March 1965 (Puleston) (UKNA, FO 950/792). 
227
 British Foreign Office Confidential Note (Warner to Gilchrist) dated 30 July 1963 (UKNA, FO 
371/169923); British Embassy telegram (Gilchrist) dated 6 August 1963 (UKNA, FO 371/169924) and 




seriously deter the Indonesians are their present economic difficulties and 







 The takeover by the GOI of British enterprises in Indonesia in 1964 was triggered 
by the attempted seizure of British enterprises by PKI-linked groups in what was one of 
several measures initiated by the PKI as it went on the political offensive in 1964. In a 
series of well-coordinated actions, the PKI used patriotic support for Konfrontasi in an 
attempt to prevent President Sukarno from de-escalating the conflict as a result of the 
Robert Kennedy mission in January. These attempted seizures contravened Presidential 
Decree 194/1963 and thus were a direct challenge to the central government, and they 
successfully forced the government to place all affected British companies under GOI 
control and supervision. Hence, domestic political conflict and instability was the 
immediate cause behind the takeovers, as the British enterprises were, in effect, hostages 
of Indonesian domestic politics and to a lesser extent foreign policy, caught in a web of 
domestic political and international conflict and the interaction between the two. 
In leaving it up to each ministry to determine the appropriate level of control and 
supervision, the government opened the door to the creeping confiscation of British 
companies over the course of the year. Most of the takeovers were accomplished in a 
very gradual manner as owner-appointed management was displaced by GOI-appointed 
management. Despite the disclaimers and studious avoidance by government officials of 
terms like nationalization, expropriation or confiscation, the end result was clearly the 
confiscation of the companies.  A major factor determining the pace of confiscation was 
the perceived economic wealth of the companies, particularly the estates whose benefits 
included revenue, highly prized foreign exchange, a salary with many in-kind benefits 
such as housing and food, and perhaps even control over the thousands of workers on the 
estates. Consequently, there was a great struggle for control over the estates within the 
GOI itself between Ministers Seda and Sadjarwo, who were also at different ends of the 
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political spectrum, with Seda ultimately the winner. Minister Seda‘s emergence as the 
victor by late 1964 was at a minimum an example of the political balancing President 
Sukarno was known for, but it also clearly bucked the supposed trend of Sukarno‘s ‗drift 
to the left.‘ In addition to the struggle within the GOI, there was also great pressure from 
the political parties, the army and other groups for access to the wealth of the estates, 
primarily by securing a position within the giant Dwikora structure or a management or 
staff level position on the estates. Hence, many appointees were political ones and not 
based on the managerial skill of the individual. However, such competition over 
resources was not unusual in Indonesia during the early 1960s. As one individual with 
intimate knowledge of the situation has observed, the same thing was happening in the 
government-owned estate system.
229
 The politics and economics of the time were simply 
that way, and it was virtually impossible to escape from. 
President Sukarno‘s Decree 6/1964 signaled the end for British enterprises in 
Indonesia. It not only affirmed that British companies already placed under GOI 
supervision and control were there to stay, but also led to the takeover of the few 
remaining British firms that were not yet under GOI control. Moreover, it signaled the 
end of the struggle within the GOI for control over the taken-over estates. By the end of 
1964, virtually every British company was completely under GOI control, with the major 
exception of Shell Oil, a reflection of oil company exceptionalism. As we saw in Chapter 
Four, however, the position of Shell in East Kalimantan in the fall of 1963 indicated that 
even Shell was not totally immune to this principle, and in 1965 this principle would be 
subjected to heavy pressure.  
With the takeovers of British companies complete by the end of 1964, American 
companies, led by oil companies Stanvac and Caltex, were probably the most important 
remaining foreign companies in Indonesia, though certainly Belgian estate interests were 
also significant. Belgium as a country, however, was not nearly as visible, powerful, or 
representative of imperialistic interests and ambition as the United States, whose 
relationship with Indonesia was rapidly deteriorating. President Sukarno appears to have 
made some major decisions regarding British and American companies around the same 
time; as we shall see in the next Chapter, within two weeks of issuing Presidential Decree 
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6/1964 in late November, President Sukarno appears to have decided to target American 
companies for takeover. The American phase of the takeovers of foreign companies was 








Chapter Six:  The American Phase in Early 1965 
 
 
In the roughly six week period from late February to mid-April 1965, the 
government of Indonesia took over 13 foreign companies. The size of the enterprises and 
the different industries they represented, as well as the takeover process and treatment of 
the enterprises, varied considerably, but the common thread was that 11 of the 13 were 
American-owned.
1
 Moreover, this wave of takeovers virtually eliminated American 
foreign investment in Indonesia, and thus the GOI seizures of the early months of 1965 
can be grouped together into an American phase of takeover activity.
2
 These takeovers 
were a direct reflection of the deterioration of the bilateral relationship between the 
United States and Indonesia, which reached an all-time nadir in 1965. Thus, the 
companies fell victim to Indonesia‘s foreign relations, although intertwining Indonesian 
domestic politics also played an important role. The decline in the US-Indonesia 
relationship was itself multi-causal, but major factors were the dominance of anti-
imperialism as the defining thrust of Indonesian foreign relations in 1965 and American 
support for Malaysia in Konfrontasi. 
While 1965 in Indonesia is primarily known as the pinnacle of the domestic 
political conflict among President Sukarno, the army and the PKI, it was also the pinnacle 
of Indonesia‘s anti-imperialist foreign policy. We saw in Chapter Two that President 
Sukarno, who under Guided Democracy formulated and controlled Indonesia‘s foreign 
policy, initiated in 1960 a strongly anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist element to 
Indonesia‘s foreign relations. The primary feature of this approach was the identification 
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 Of the two non-American companies, the first was Shell Oil, which was taken over along with the other 
two major oil companies (both American companies, Stanvac and Caltex).  The second non-American 
company was PT Filma, which originally was owned by the American company Proctor & Gamble but in  
late 1963 was sold to Indonesians acting via a Swiss company (see Chapter Three, Part I Section B3).    
2
 Thereafter there was only one American company – Singer Sewing Company – with an operational 
presence in the country which was not under official government management or control, and its operations 
were quite small. As we shall see in the next Chapter, it was quickly taken over in May 1965. 
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of colonialism and especially imperialism as the principal evil and the root of all tensions 
in the world, as well as the notion that the world was divided into two camps, NEFOs 
(‗newly emerging forces‘) and OLDEFOs (‗old established forces‘). As we saw in 
Chapter Four, the Konfrontasi conflict with Malaysia and the British was a major test 
case for these ideas, because the creation of Malaysia was seen as a means for the 
OLDEFO Great Britain to continue to involve itself in Southeast Asian affairs. In fact, 
Konfrontasi accelerated and intensified the anti-imperialist thrust of Indonesian foreign 
policy so that by 1965 it was by far the dominant feature of Indonesia‘s foreign affairs. 
Indeed, by 1965 Konfrontasi against Malaysia and the British had expanded into 
confrontation against all the imperialist and colonial powers of the world, and it led to 
Indonesia‘s withdrawal from the United Nations in January 1965 and relative diplomatic 
isolation.  Perhaps the greatest symbol of this new orientation, however, at least in the 
minds of many observers, was the anti-imperialist alliance with the Peoples Republic of 
China that developed over late 1964 and 1965 and culminated in President Sukarno‘s 
famous proclamation in August 1965 of the Jakarta-Phnom Penh-Hanoi-Peking-
Pyongyang axis.  
In this world view, the United States was the greatest imperial power in the world, 
and the relationship between the USA and Indonesia declined accordingly.  The outbreak 
of Konfrontasi ended the upward drift in US-Indonesian relations during the Kennedy 
administration, and over the course of 1964 US-Indonesian relations became increasingly 
strained, despite the efforts of US Ambassador to Indonesia Howard P. Jones. US support 
for Malaysia in Konfrontasi, as well as increasing US involvement in Vietnam, were also 
more immediate causes for the decline, at least from the Indonesian point of view. 
Certainly the domestic political situation also was a factor, as the apparent ‗drift to the 
left‘ of Sukarno and Indonesian politics over late 1964 and 1965 also influenced 
Indonesia‘s foreign relations and caused the US to adopt new policies, including the 
fomenting of armed conflict between the PKI and the army in hopes that the army would 
prevail. The negativity of the diplomatic relationship spilled over into Indonesian daily 
life; from August 1964 through September 1965, there were repeated demonstrations and 
attacks, often led by the PKI youth front, on US installations in Indonesia, such as USIS 
(United States Information Service) libraries and even consulates. By March 1965, 
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relations had deteriorated so badly that US President Johnson sent Ellsworth Bunker to 
Indonesia to assess the state of the relationship and provide recommendations, which 
immediately led to the adoption of America‘s ‗low posture‘ policy in the following 
months. The takeovers of American companies in the first part of 1965 clearly reflected 
this deteriorating relationship. 
The course of the takeovers and the subsequent treatment of the American 
companies during this period also reflected to a large degree the economic importance of 
the respective companies.
3
 In an apparent slap to oil company exceptionalism, all three 
major foreign oil companies – Shell, Stanvac, and Caltex – were placed under GOI 
control and supervision, but in reality the GOI continued to let owner-appointed 
management run the companies and rarely interfered in management and operations, 
making control/supervision over the big three during this period for the most part 
nominal. The greatest pressure the GOI brought to bear on the oil companies was for the 
Indonesianization of top management.
4
 Following the three major oil companies, the next 
most important businesses to be taken over were the two large American rubber estate 
companies, Goodyear Plantations and United States Rubber, both generators of precious 
foreign exchange. After the takeover of these estates was announced, the GOI quickly 
appointed a management team that within a week displaced owner-appointed 
management and assumed control. However, in a few short weeks the Ministry of Estates 
indicated its willingness to enter into a form of production-sharing arrangement that 
featured a buy-out of the companies using the future produce of the estates as payment in 
kind, with owner-appointed representatives allowed to stay on in advisory and monitoring 
capacities and the foreign companies continuing to market the produce overseas. Again, 
the ability to generate foreign exchange revenues was a driving factor in this 
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 The overall value of American companies in Indonesia at this time is extremely difficult to pinpoint, as 
estimates range from as high as $500 million to as low as $178 million. The US government, for example, 
estimated that the total value in 1965 was about $500 million (see Memorandum of Conversation dated 22 
January 1965, p. 215 in Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-68: Volume XXVI, Indonesia, 
Malaysia-Singapore, Philippines); Lindblad estimates the total value as of 1959 was $401 million 
(Lindblad, Bridges to New Business, p. 172); Gillespie argues that the value as of 1960 was $178 million 
(see JL Gillespie, "Rhetoric and Reality: Corporate America's Perceptions of Southeast Asia, 1950-1961," 
Business History Review 68 (1994), p. 351.       
4
 As we saw in Chapter Three, there was a newcomer to the Indonesian oil scene in 1962, American-owned 
Pan American Oil, which in 1965 was still in the exploring stage and not producing any oil. It too was 
placed under nominal GOI supervision.  
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arrangement. The other American companies taken over were mostly in the 
manufacturing and services sectors and did not generate significant amounts of foreign 
exchange. In each case owner–appointed management was displaced fairly quickly by 
GOI-appointed managers (though in several cases there appeared to be some confusion 
and infighting within the GOI over what to do with the companies) and no compensation 
was offered. Of these, the two largest were the Goodyear Tire factory in Bogor, just 
outside Jakarta, which employed around 1200 people, followed by Union Carbide, whose 
battery factory in Jakarta employed some 300 people. It was probably the American film 
consortium, the Motion Picture Export Association of America, though, which had the 
biggest presence in Indonesia, as the films it imported were distributed and shown 
throughout the country. The other three companies, National Cash Register, American 
and Foreign Insurance Association, and Hawaiian Sumatra Plantations, had very small 
presences in Indonesia.   
The GOI takeover of these companies was ostensibly triggered by labor union and 
worker activity, either in the form of an actual seizure/takeover or a threatened takeover. 
SOBSI, the PKI-controlled labor federation, and KBM, the labor federation of the PNI, 
were the two labor groups leading the takeovers.
5
  Of course, for the PKI, the SOBSI-led 
takeovers or attempted takeovers were another part of the political offensive begun in 
1964 (see Chapter Five) that culminated in the great political conflict and cataclysm of 
1965, and also were clear expressions of the PKI‘s view that the United States was 
Indonesia‘s – and the PKI‘s – greatest imperialist enemy. The KBM/PNI‘s motives for 
the takeover actions were less clear, however, though certainly its actions appeared 
nationalistic and supportive of Indonesia‘s foreign policy, in particular against US 
imperialism (including against US involvement in Vietnam) and pro-Konfrontasi. 
Moreover, as discussed in the next paragraph, at least some of the takeover actions by 
both SOBSI and KBM were supported (if not orchestrated) by President Sukarno. In the 
case of Goodyear Plantations and United States Rubber, great labor union and worker 
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 KBM, short for Kesatuan Buruh Marhaenis, was the renamed DPP-KBKI, which as we saw in Chapter 
Two (Part I, section B3) was fighting the DPS-KBKI leadership for control over PNI‘s KBKI labor 
federation in 1962-63. By the end of 1963, the DPP-KBKI emerged victorious, and in 1964 the federation 
changed its name to KBM.  The KBM grew quickly, and by 1965 had 1.6 million members, including some 
500,000 from its affiliated plantation workers union (Rocamora, Nationalism in Search of Ideology, p. 
357).   
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pressure, led by a group dominated by SOBSI and KBM, led directly to GOI intervention 
ostensibly intended to preempt labor union seizures. In the case of the big three oil 
companies, labor union takeover was not imminent, though there was certainly some 
pressure, with PKI-linked groups also leading the way; again, the GOI acted 
preemptively in taking over the oil companies. In both the case of the rubber companies 
and the oil companies, it appeared that the primary reason for GOI intervention, at least 
in the minds of some GOI officials, was to prevent the companies from falling under the 
control of the PKI (via its labor arm). In all other cases, there was an actual seizure of the 
company or its assets by labor or other groups, with SOBSI/PKI-linked and KBM-linked 
groups playing leading roles, which precipitated GOI assumption of control.  
A key difference between the SOBSI-led seizures of British enterprises in January 
1964 and the takeover or threat of takeovers by SOBSI and other groups of American 
companies in early 1965 was that the seizures of American companies had the support of 
President Sukarno. As discussed in the previous Chapter, the SOBSI-led attempts in 
January 1964 to seize British companies were actually a direct challenge by the PKI to 
President Sukarno over the direction of Konfrontasi, and hence the GOI initially acted 
somewhat hesitantly with respect to the British companies. In the case of the American 
takeovers in early 1965, it appears that President Sukarno himself decided to proceed 
with the takeovers of the American companies and instructed the labor unions to begin 
agitating. The US embassy in Jakarta reported that at an 8 December 1964 meeting 
including President Sukarno, Third Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul Saleh, Coordinating 
Minister for Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs Sadjarwo, Minister Chaerul Saleh‘s 
assistant Suryo Sediono, and possibly others, the President decided to proceed with the 
takeovers of American companies 
at first occasion. Labor group heads were called in on following day and 
instructions were despatched [sic] Dec 10 to labor groups [to] begin 
agitations which will create atmosphere for ‗protective‘ takeover by GOI 
along lines Dutch and British assets takeover pattern. Slogans to be used 
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 US Embassy telegram (Jones) dated 14 December 1964 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1964-66, Inco 
15-2 Indon, Boxes 1072-3). 
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It was not specified which labor leaders and groups received instructions. In an effort to 
confirm the foregoing, an official from the US Embassy met with Minister Chaerul 
Saleh‘s assistant Sediono, who was the original source for this information; Sediono 
would only indicate that the specific target was the Goodyear estates in Sumatra, that the 
takeover could not be stopped, and that the oil companies were safe because they 
operated under the CoWs.
7
 No decree was ever issued publicly confirming this decision, 
though it is quite possible that there may have been some internal GOI decree or 
instruction, and it is unknown to whom the decision was transmitted. Moreover, as we 
shall see in this Chapter, despite the direct involvement of President Sukarno in the 
takeovers of both the rubber estates and the oil companies, the GOI seizure of the 
companies was far from smooth or coordinated and there were still clearly divisions 
within the GOI about the takeovers, such as the protection by the army and police in 
North Sumatra that prevented the physical takeover of the American estates by 
demonstrators. In any case, even in the context of different opinions and interests within 
the government, with the authority of President Sukarno behind the takeovers it is clear in 
retrospect that the American companies were in for a very difficult time, and perhaps the 
only real uncertainty was how GOI control would be established and implemented.  
 One interesting feature of the takeovers of 1965 was the refinement of the GOI‘s 
position on whether its actions constituted nationalization or expropriation. As we saw in 
previous Chapters, in order to evade the customary practice of paying compensation for 
nationalizations or expropriations, the GOI carefully avoided the use of these terms, using 
instead words like ‗control‘ or ‗supervision‘ or ‗management‘ to describe its actions.  The 
refinement the GOI added in 1965 was a clear statement in almost every decree issued 
that the ownership rights of the foreign owners would not be affected by the GOI‘s 
assumption of control/supervision/management of the firms. As the US embassy in 
Jakarta pointed out numerous times, it was an attempt to separate ownership itself from 
the various attributes of ownership such as control and management. In effect, the GOI 
was arguing that even though the foreign owners no longer controlled or managed their 
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 US Embassy telegram (Jones) dated 14 December 1964 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1964-66, Inco 
15-2 Indon, Boxes 1072-3). Mr. Sediono confirmed in 2006 that this December 1964 meeting with 
President Sukarno and other officials regarding the takeovers of US companies took place. (Interview with 
Suryo Sediono 15 July 2006)    
 370 
 
companies, the owners still owned the companies, and thus there could not be any claims 
of nationalization because there had been no change in ownership.
8
 In fact, the GOI 
takeovers of the American companies, like the GOI takeovers of British and Malaysian 
companies, undoubtedly constituted confiscations, with the very important exception of 
the big three oil companies. The argument separating management and control from 
ownership is patently false; management and control are obviously the greatest single 
attributes of ownership and are quite inseparable, particularly in the business world. As 
the British embassy often described the predicament of the British companies, the 
situation was akin to having no authority or responsibility but suffering all the 
consequences. As I shall show in this Chapter, with the exception of the big three oil 
companies, the GOI swiftly took over management control of the companies or their 
assets, leaving the owners and their appointed managers with no say whatsoever in the 
running of the business, such that the owners clearly lost control of the company to the 
fullest extent possible. 
This Chapter is divided into five Parts. Part I analyzes Indonesian foreign policy 
generally from late 1964 to 1965, with a particular emphasis on the US-Indonesian 
relationship. I then shift to an analysis of the takeovers of American companies as they 
occurred chronologically.  Part II describes the takeovers of the Goodyear and US Rubber 
estates, and as there is a comparatively rich amount of source material these two will be 
the primary case study for the American takeovers of 1965. Part III analyzes the 
takeovers of the oil companies, which because of their importance merit close 
examination. As we shall see, the GOI decision to assume control over the two estate 
companies and the big three oil companies reached the highest levels within the GOI.  
Part IV then examines the takeovers of the other American companies, and is followed by 
a brief conclusion in Part V. 
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 This appeared to be a novel approach internationally in arguments over nationalizations. This line reached 
a rather absurd climax in 1967 when then Finance Minister Frans Seda told a shocked British Foreign 
Minister Brown that that the British should pay the GOI for managing the British estates for several years 
and keeping them safe from the PKI! (Interviews with Frans Seda, 10 February 2006 and 10 October 2006) 
Indeed, the GOI clung to this line of ‗no nationalizations‘ even as the companies were returned in 1967-68; 
the GOI continued to eschew the use of ‗nationalization,‘ ‗expropriation‘ and the like and instead insisted 
on using terms such as ‗return of management.‘ 
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I. 1965: the Pinnacle of Indonesia’s Anti-Imperialist 
Foreign Policy.   
 
The year 1965 was the pinnacle of President Sukarno‘s anti-imperialist foreign 
policy. This policy identified imperialism, colonialism, and NEKOLIM (an acronym for 
neo-colonialism, colonialism and imperialism) as the primary evil in the world, and it 
divided the nations of world into the two camps of NEFOs and OLDEFOs. President 
Sukarno, who controlled Indonesia‘s foreign policy under Guided Democracy, initiated 
elements of this policy as early as 1960, and the conflict with the Dutch over West Irian 
in 1961-62 and most especially Konfrontasi with Malaysia and Great Britain cemented 
this policy as the dominant element of Indonesian foreign policy. In effect, by 1965 
Konfrontasi against Malaysia and the British had expanded into confrontation against all 
the imperialist and colonial powers of the world, leading to Indonesia‘s relative 
diplomatic isolation, withdrawal from the United Nations in January 1965, and the anti-
imperialist alliance with the Peoples Republic of China that reached a zenith with 
President Sukarno‘s declaration in August 1965 of the Jakarta-Phnom Penh-Hanoi-
Peking-Pyongyang axis.  The United States was identified as the greatest imperial power 
in the world under this policy, and the relationship between the USA and Indonesia 
consequently declined, aggravated primarily by US support for Malaysia and to a lesser 
extent by increasing US involvement in Vietnam. Like other aspects of Indonesian 
foreign policy, this deteriorating relationship spilled over into and became intertwined 
with Indonesian domestic politics, particularly in the form of demonstrations and assaults 
against US facilities and, of course, the takeover of US companies. Relations reached 
such a low point that the US government dispatched presidential emissary Ellsworth 
Bunker to Indonesia in April 1965 to assess the relationship, and following the 
recommendations of Bunker and others the US adopted a ‗low posture‘ policy. 
A. Foreign Policy Generally, late 1964-65. 
Both ideologically and practically, the major impetus for the ascension of anti-
imperialism as the dominant thrust of Indonesia‘s foreign relations from the second half 
of 1964 through September 1965 was Konfrontasi against Malaysia and the British; 
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ideologically because Konfrontasi appeared to confirm for President Sukarno the 
centrality of the NEFO-OLDEFO conflict in the world, and practically because it had the 
effect of leaving Indonesia increasingly isolated from the rest of the world, as most 
nations, with the exception of the Peoples Republic of China and a few countries within 
its orbit, were unwilling to follow Indonesia‘s increasingly militant stance. Konfrontasi 
intensified the anti-imperialist thrust of Indonesian foreign policy so that, as one observer 
noted, it was ―metaphysically transformed‖ into ―a grander confrontation of the entire 
imperialist world in 1965.‖
9
 This policy led to Indonesia‘s leaving the United Nations in 
early January 1965 and a failed attempt to build a rival CONEFO (Conference of Newly 
Emerging Forces), Indonesia‘s increasing isolation from the countries of the non-aligned 
movement (which in theory included Indonesia‘s staunchest allies), the anti-imperialist 
alliance with the PRC, and of course the deteriorating relationship with the United States.   
This anti-imperialist thrust of Indonesian foreign policy appears to have 
accelerated particularly after the ill-fated Indonesian incursions onto the Malayan 
peninsula in August and early September 1964, which as we saw in the previous Chapter 
was the most dangerous phase militarily of Konfrontasi.  As a result of these incursions, 
Malaysia took the matter before the United Nations Security Council, which, had it not 
been for a last minute Soviet veto, would have clearly and overwhelmingly found against 
Indonesia by a nine to two vote (with Taiwan, Bolivia, Brazil, the Ivory Coast and 
Morocco, all ‗non-western‘ and ‗underdeveloped‘ nations, voting against Indonesia).   
Soon after this UN vote, President Sukarno went on an extended overseas trip from 17 
September to 5 November, where one of his major stops was the Second Conference of 
the Non-Aligned Movement in Cairo from 5-10 October.
10
 Undeterred by Indonesia‘s 
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 Mackie, Konfrontasi, p. 276; see also Bunnell, ―Guided Democracy Foreign Policy 1960-1965,‖ pp. 45-6, 
noting that by 1965 Indonesia developed a policy of ―full ‗confrontation‘ against imperialism and 
colonialism.‖   
10
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lack of support at the UN vote a few weeks earlier, Sukarno unsuccessfully tried to enlist 
the endorsement and support of the 47 nation meeting for Indonesia‘s struggle against 
Malaysia. Moreover, the meeting only accentuated the split in the non-aligned movement 
between the larger group (led by India) which favored peaceful coexistence and non-
alignment between the American and Soviet blocks and identified the American/Soviet  
conflict as the pre-eminent one in the world, and a smaller block (led by Sukarno) that 
favored a more militant anti-imperialist approach.
11
   
President Sukarno‘s speech at the Cairo conference, entitled ‗The Era of 
Confrontation,‘ emphasized the continuing conflict between the NEFOs and OLDEFOs 
and neatly framed most of the elements of Indonesia‘s anti-imperialist policy for the next 
year.
12
  In the speech, President Sukarno insisted that the old order forces, including 
colonialism and imperialism, were still powerful and ―their influence still extends 
throughout the world.‖ Political independence alone was not enough, but the new 
countries should also ―build social justice, develop welfare and work for the prosperity of 
the country.‖ Moreover, ―being faced by the pressures and interferences of those old 
powers, even after independence, our further development is dependent upon our strength 
to combat those forces of domination. Even after independence we have to face those 
forces, and we have to conquer them.‖ Hinting at what would later be enunciated as the 
BERDIKARI (self-reliance) policy, he noted that ―if our independence is to be real, we 
must rely on ourselves, we must consolidate our resistance to the forces of the old powers 
of domination through solidarity amongst all who seek to eradicate those forces and to 
build a new world.‖ Peaceful coexistence between the USA and USSR was not the 
biggest problem in the world, he asserted; instead, the more ―complicated and urgent 
                                                                                                                                                 
Foreign Policy, pp. 433-5.)  The second overlapping strand was the Afro-Asian movement, the first and 
only meeting of which was the Bandung Conference of 1955 hosted by Indonesia. Indeed Agung and 
Hauswedell both note that Indonesia and the PRC beginning in late 1963 were trying to drum up support 
for a second Afro-Asian meeting in 1964, but were initially foiled by the moderate group of non-aligned 
nations (led by India, Egypt and others) who successfully countered with the Second Non-Aligned 
Conference in Cairo – only after the Cairo conference was held was agreement reached to hold a second 
Afro-Asian conference (which actually was never held). (Agung, Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy, 
pp. 343-7, 519-31; Hauswedell, The Anti-Imperialist United Front, p. 342.)   
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 Agung, Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy, pp. 347-52; Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy, p. 102; 
Hauswedell, The Anti-Imperialist United Front, pp. 341-44. 
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 For a copy of the speech, see Sukarno, "The Era of Confrontation (Address by President Sukarno to the 
Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, Cairo, 6 October 1964),"  (Department of Information, 
Republic of Indonesia, 1964). Cited portions from pp. 11-12, 15, and 19-20.  
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matter‖ was the ―serious problem of peaceful coexistence between the old forces of 
domination and the new developing nations,‖ citing in particular the big powers‘ military 
bases and economic power. ―We must understand that economic development will bring 
benefits to our people only when we have torn up by their roots all the institutions, all the 
links that make us subservient in any way, in any fashion, to the old order of 
domination.‖ 
Indonesia‘s failure at the Cairo conference to garner support for Konfrontasi and 
establish anti-imperialism as predominant over ‗peaceful coexistence‘ did not detract 
from further efforts to win over members of the Afro-Asian movement over the first six 
months of 1965. Indeed, preparations for the second Afro-Asian conference, scheduled 
for June 1965 in Algiers, ―absorbed an extraordinary amount of Indonesian diplomatic 
energy and attention in the first half of 1965,‖ and no less than three separate meetings 
were held in Indonesia in March-April to prepare for the conference and celebrate the 
10
th
 anniversary of the first meeting in 1955 in Bandung.
13
 A primary objective of 
Sukarno was to exclude Malaysia from the Afro-Asian movement, but this sticky 
question ―became entangled with that of Russia‘s inclusion in the conference,‖ which 
was opposed by the PRC, and despite much diplomatic maneuvering the questions 
remained unresolved right up to the eve of the conference and threatened a very open 
split in the movement.
14
 There were also other issues dividing the members, including the 
question of whether to adopt the strongly anti-imperialist line advocated by Indonesia and 
the PRC, or the alternative ‗peaceful coexistence‘ line advocated by India and others, as 
well as concern that CONEFO might be forced on some members.
15
 However, the 
movement was spared resolution of these issues because of the overthrow of the host 
Algerian government on 19 June, just a few days before the conference was to begin, 
which forced the initial postponement of the conference until November, and ultimately 
the conference was never held.   
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Another important development in Indonesian foreign policy from late 1964 
through September 1965 was the emergence of the anti-imperialist alliance with the 
Peoples Republic of China. Indonesia‘s escalation of Konfrontasi in late August and early 
September 1964, its failure at the UN, and President Sukarno‘s subsequent failure to gain 
the support of the non-aligned countries for Konfrontasi at the Cairo Conference all 
contributed to the alliance with the PRC that had been germinating for the past year but 
coalesced in late 1964.
16
 The PRC since the mid-1950s had pursued a broadly anti-
imperialist united front approach in its foreign policy that was aimed primarily against 
the involvement of western nations in Asia,
17
 and it had also attempted to develop closer 
relations with Indonesia that for a variety of reasons were unsuccessful. However, aided 
by Konfrontasi‘s cementing of anti-imperialism as the focus of Indonesian foreign 
relations, both countries‘ foreign policies were now aligned in an anti-imperialist front 
that (using different terminology) identified imperialism and the NEFO/OLDEFO 
conflict as the primary conflict of the world, so that in 1965 each became the other‘s 
major foreign ally.
18
 As one observer noted, ―the developing convergence of Chinese and 
Indonesian foreign policy aims and interests led to a tacit power alliance that seemed to 
obscure the conflicts underlying their relationship.‖
19
 This anti-imperialist alliance 
operated primarily in the three main arenas of Southeast Asia (in which Konfrontasi and 
the Vietnam war were both hot spots), the Afro-Asian world (see above), and in 
challenging ―the superpower dominated system.‖
20
 
There were also a number of practical reasons for the alliance beyond its 
ideological foundation of anti-imperialism. From the Chinese perspective, the alliance 
was critical because of the Sino-Soviet split, which was heavily exacerbated by the 1963 
USA-USSR test ban treaty and which left the PRC searching for allies opposed to both 
superpowers.
21
 (Not coincidentally, this mirrored the USSR-Indonesia relationship, 
which began to decline swiftly in 1963 due to a combination of factors, including the 
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outbreak of Konfrontasi (which Moscow did not favor), Indonesia‘s delay in making 
payments on the huge loans taken from Moscow from 1956 to the early 1960s, 
Indonesia‘s lack of support for Moscow‘s attempt to participate in Afro-Asian meetings, 
and the growth of the Indonesian-Sino alliance.
22
) Moreover, the PRC also viewed 
Malaysia as proof of ―the imperialists‘ intention to establish a chain of anticommunist 
regimes in Southeast Asia and thus a sufficient reason for Peking to join forces with any 
power opposed to the federation. The formation of Malaysia thus intensified China‘s 
determination to pursue a militant anti-imperialist strategy in the region.‖
23
 From the 
Indonesian perspective, the PRC filled the vacuum created by Indonesia‘s international 
isolation (itself largely the result of Konfrontasi). In addition, President Sukarno may 
have also been trying to take advantage of great power politics; the American CIA 
reported that on 8 January 1965 the President in a meeting with right wing political 
leaders claimed he was bringing 
Indonesia closer to communist China for one important reason: he 
expected communist China and the United States to be at war within a few 
years, either through American escalation of the Vietnam war or through a 
direct American attack on communist China…the United States will be so 
worried about Indonesian support of China, should a war break out, that it 
will go to any lengths to bring Indonesia back to the neutral camp. 
Sukarno said he believes that the United States will even turn its back on 
Malaysia and withdraw support to that country in return for an Indonesian 




Finally, the decline in foreign aid to Indonesia after 1963 from the United States and 
other western countries and the Soviet block, combined with the possibility of PRC aid, 
may also have been a practical consideration from the Indonesian perspective.
25
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Late 1964 was the pivotal time in the development of the Sino-Indonesian 
relationship. On 4 November, at the tail end of his world tour from 17 September to 5 
November, President Sukarno met in Shanghai with Chinese premier Zhou En-Lai, after 
which the PRC-Indonesian alliance seemed to grow visibly. This secretive visit was 
followed a few weeks later by the visit of PRC foreign minister Chen Yi to Jakarta from 
27 November to 3 December, during which Chen Yi offered a $50 million credit to 
Indonesia for economic development. The press release issued at the end of this visit 
―revealed an unprecedented degree of agreement between Djakarta and Peking on a wide 
range of global regional issues,‖ including PRC support for Indonesia in Konfrontasi and 
the common struggle against imperialism and colonialism.
26
  The alliance was cemented 
in late January 1965 by the visit of Indonesian First Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister Subandrio, who led the largest delegation of high ranking GOI officials (42 in 
all) to visit the PRC during this period. The 28 January joint statement issued in 
conjunction with Subandrio‘s visit ―announced mutual agreement on virtually every 
major international question,‖ including targeting the United States as the leader of 
imperialism in Asia and other parts of the world, full support for Konfrontasi, and 
expansion of technical cooperation, trade and military contacts.
27
 Though the relationship 
was certainly not without problems, over the next eight months it continued to grow and 
found primary expression in a flurry of personnel exchanges between the two countries 
and mutual support in the diplomatic arena.
28
 The relationship culminated with President 
Sukarno‘s declaration in his annual 17 August independence day speech of 1965 of the 
formation of the anti-imperialist axis of Jakarta-Pnom Penh–Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang.
29
 
However, this axis, while it generated great publicity (and alarm among some), never 
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materialized and in fact seems not to have been supported by its other members, and 
hence its primary impact was symbolic rather than substantive.
30
  
The development of the Indonesian–PRC anti-imperialist alliance paralleled the 
growth of the PKI-PRC relationship. Prior to 1963, the PKI actively tried to navigate a 
middle course between the two major communist powers and pursue its own independent 
path, though it often tilted slightly towards the Soviet line.
31
 In 1962, the PKI began to tilt 
toward the PRC side for a variety of reasons, including PKI wariness of Moscow‘s 
attempts to limit the independence of communist parties around the world, the Chinese 
emphasis on the anti-imperialist struggle (as opposed to the Soviet emphasis on peaceful 
coexistence), which the PKI increasingly favored ideologically in part as it brought the 
party closer to President Sukarno, and internal party dynamics.
32
 In the summer of 1963, 
just as the Sino-Soviet split became evident and both sides were trying to bring other 
communist parties into their respective camps, PKI chairman Aidit went on an extended 
world tour that included visits to both the Soviet Union and the PRC. Upon his return to 
Indonesia, it was clear that Aidit had decided in favor of the Chinese side, a tilt that was 
officially confirmed at the party‘s late December 1963 central committee meeting, which 
as we saw in Chapter Five was the same meeting at which the PKI decided to launch its 
political offensive in 1964 (see Chapter Five, Part I, Section A).
33
  Over the course of 
1964-65, the PKI‘s displeasure with Moscow and its alignment with the PRC were 
increasingly evident.  Moreover, while the PKI clearly retained its independence from the 
PRC and was hardly an ‗agent‘ of the Chinese as some critics charged, ―the PKI‘s 
ideology in the final years of Guided Democracy showed a marked increase in borrowing 




Another event that exemplified Indonesia‘s increasingly hard anti-imperialist line 
was President Sukarno‘s sudden decision to leave the United Nations in early January 
1965.  This decision ―caught most if not all of the Indonesian leadership by surprise,‖ and 
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 379 
 
―appalled members of the Indonesian Foreign Office, the diplomatic community, foreign 
governments, and influential segments of the Indonesian public.‖
35
 The main reason for 
the decision was Malaysia‘s joining the UN Security Council at the beginning of 1965 for 
a one year term, a decision actually announced months earlier, but as the date neared 
President Sukarno evidently became increasingly infuriated. On 31 December, Sukarno 
in a speech announced that Indonesia would leave the UN if indeed Malaysia took up its 
new position, and after this threat failed to halt Malaysia‘s accession to the Council the 
President a week later in a speech on 7 January declared that Indonesia was in fact 
leaving the UN and its sister organizations.
36
  Around the same time, President Sukarno 
began to lobby strongly for the establishment of a body to rival the UN known as 
CONEFO (an acronym for ‗Conference of Newly Emerging Forces‘), which would be 
headquartered in Jakarta and as the name suggests would consist of all countries of the 
newly emerging forces allied against imperialism.  With substantial PRC financial and 
technical support, Indonesia in April 1965 began building a facility to house such a 
body.
37
 However, despite the elevation of the concept to a featured plank of Indonesia‘s 
foreign policy for much of 1965, CONEFO never materialized, and when the building 
was finished it became the home of Indonesia‘s parliament. Indeed, the primary impact of 
the Indonesian withdrawal from the UN was only to increase Indonesia‘s isolation and 
strengthen the alliance with the PRC as Indonesia‘s primary foreign ally.
38
  Indonesia 
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completed its withdrawal from ‗imperialist‘ international organizations on 17 August 
1965 when it withdrew from the World Bank and IMF.
39
  
 The decision to leave the UN was also couched in the language of self-reliance or 
BERDIKARI, a concept that assumed primary importance in Indonesian economic policy 
in 1965 and also acquired increasing traction as an explanation for Indonesia‘s 
international posture over the same period.
40
 We shall explore the importance of 
BERDIKARI in depth in the next Chapter, and so at this point I only touch on it as it 
related to Indonesia‘s foreign policy. The idea that Indonesia would have to stand alone 
and rely on herself in international affairs naturally fed off the practical reality of 
Indonesia‘s increasing isolation in the world community as it promoted stringent anti-
imperialism and withdrew from the UN. As we saw above, President Sukarno had hinted 
at the importance of self-reliance in foreign relations in his speech at the Cairo 
conference in October 1964, suggesting that ―if our independence is to be real, we must 
rely on ourselves,‖ and that ―economic development will bring benefits to our people 
only when we have torn up by their roots all the institutions, all the links that make us 
subservient in any way, in any fashion, to the old order of domination.‖ In his speech on 
31 December announcing that Indonesia was prepared to leave the UN, Sukarno 
explicitly linked the possibility to BERDIKARI, noting that although many newly-
independent nations considered that the pinnacle of independence was membership in the 
UN, in fact ―the crowning of independence is not membership in the United 
Nations…The crowning of independence is to be able to stand on your own two feet…As 
an independent nation we must be able to stand on our own two feet.‖
41
 Moreover, the 
President‘s 7 January speech declaring Indonesia was withdrawing from the UN was 
entitled ‗The Crown of Independence is not Membership of the UN but Standing on 
One‘s Own Feet.‘
42
  Over the course of 1965 President Sukarno continued to develop this 
theme of self-reliance as an antidote to the poisonous influence of imperialism such that 
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―the doctrine of self reliance was characterized as the highest realization, the ‗summit,‘ of 
an independent foreign policy.‖
43
  
B. Deterioration of Relations with the United States, 1964-65. 
The United States was targeted as the greatest imperial power in the world under 
Indonesia‘s strongly anti-imperialist foreign policy, and the relationship between the 
USA and Indonesia declined and reached a nadir in 1965. Within the broad rubric of 
Indonesia‘s anti-imperialist foreign policy, United States support for Malaysia in 
Konfrontasi, made evident in late July 1964 when Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku 
Abdul Rahman met in Washington with US President Johnson, was perhaps the most 
important factor in the deterioration of the relationship. Increasing US involvement in 
Vietnam over 1964-65 also symbolized US imperialism, particularly in Southeast Asia, 
adding further fuel to Indonesia‘s anti-US rhetoric, though it never ―became a matter of 
pressing national concern for most Indonesian leaders.‖
44
 The United States government, 
in turn, was dismayed by Indonesia‘s apparent ‗turn to the left‘ in 1964-65, both 
internationally with the pinnacle of the anti-imperialist foreign policy, and domestically 
as the PKI went on the political offensive and seemed to gain public support and 
President Sukarno increasingly seemed to favor it (see Chapter Five, Part I, Section A, 
and Chapter Seven, Part III, Section A). The declining relationship suited the PKI, which 
had for a number of years identified the United States as its principal enemy. Similar to 
other events and trends in foreign policy, this deteriorating bilateral relationship became 
intertwined with Indonesian domestic politics and manifested itself in the form of very 
public and visible demonstrations against and seizures of US facilities and the takeover of 
US companies. The declining state of bilateral relations eventually resulted in President 
Johnson dispatching Ellsworth Bunker to Indonesia in the first two weeks of April to 
assess the situation, and Bunker‘s recommendations paved the way for the adoption of 
what was termed a ‗low posture‘ policy. 
The outbreak of Konfrontasi in September 1963, combined with the assassination 
of US President Kennedy that November, left US policy towards Indonesia in tatters, and 
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over the next three to four years the United States seemed unable to regain its footing in 
the relationship.
45
 We saw in Chapter Five that the US initially attempted to remain 
neutral and mediate in the Konfrontasi dispute with the Robert Kennedy mission in 
January 1964, but after this the US played an insignificant role in resolution of the 
conflict.  Moreover, the US increasingly seemed to favor the Malaysian side, as the 
policy of accommodation of Sukarno and Indonesia favored by US Ambassador Howard 
Jones slowly gave way to a more-hard-line approach. In late March 1964 US Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk, testifying before the US Congress on the possibility of further US aid to 
Indonesia, noted that resolution of Konfrontasi would be of paramount importance. This 
remark was covered widely in the Indonesian press, and the next day in Jakarta at a 
building dedication attended by US Ambassador Jones, President Sukarno declared that 
Indonesia would never accept aid with political strings attached, and if so offered would 
tell them to – using English -  ―Go to hell with your aid.‖ This outburst, apparently 
directed at Ambassador Jones and the United States, predictably drew much press 
coverage and criticism back in the US.
46
 Perhaps more substantively important were 
developments in early May 1964. As we saw in the previous Chapter (Part I, Section B), 
on 3 May in a highly publicized speech President Sukarno announced the Dwikora, the 
two people‘s commands, to supposedly 21 million volunteers registered to fight, in what 
seemed to be an escalation of Konfrontasi. Apparently reacting to this, in a 5 May speech 
new US Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs William Bundy stated that 
the US would be forced to eliminate entirely remaining aid programs if Indonesia 
expanded Konfrontasi to the point where it could be characterized as aggression. Bundy‘s 
comments ―caused a stir,‖ and a few days later at a two hour meeting among US 
Ambassador Jones, President Sukarno and Minister Subandrio, Subandrio said that 
bilateral relations were ―approaching an all time low‖ and that ―Indonesia would have to 
react strongly to Bundy‘s statement and suggested that it might be in the interest of both 
parties for his government to announce that it would no longer accept any American 
assistance.‖ Both Sukarno and Subandrio had apparently concluded that Bundy‘s 
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statement signaled ―a major change of direction in US policy.‖
47
 Moreover, the public 
nature of the comments bothered both Subandrio and Sukarno as much as their content, 
and Subandrio suggested that the GOI was being repeatedly embarrassed by statements of 
US officials. Subandrio also used the occasion to blame the US for Indonesia‘s economic 
problems by failing ―to fulfill its promises regarding balance-of-payments assistance,‖ a 
charge that Ambassador Jones quickly attacked, saying Indonesia had done that herself 
by imposing an economic blockade against Malaysia. Jones believed this episode may 
have been the first time President Sukarno received ―an accurate picture of what 
happened.‖
48
  Perhaps not coincidentally, around the same time the campaign against 
American films commenced (see Part IV, Section C). 
The pivotal point of the bilateral relationship, however, came in late July-August 
1964, when during Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman‘s visit to 
Washington the United States clearly sided with Malaysia in Konfrontasi, a decision that 
triggered a vitriolic Indonesian response over the next month.
49
 As one historian has 
noted, the ―White House‘s decision to invite the Tunku to visit Washington in July 
confirmed the slow but steady ascent of the hard-liner current and ratified an important 
shift in US policy toward Malaysia.‖
50
 After several days of meetings between US 
President Johnson and the Tunku, a joint communiqué was issued on 23 July that said the 
US president ―agreed to provide military training in the United States for Malaysian 
personnel, and to consider promptly and sympathetically credit sales under existing 
arrangements, of appropriate military equipment for the defense of Malaysia.‖
51
 In 
addition, the communiqué also ―reaffirmed the support of the United States for a free and 
independent Malaysia.‖
52
  Certainly from the Indonesian perspective, the message that 
the US government now openly sided with Malaysia was abundantly clear.
53
  On 10 
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August, just a few days after the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution by the US 
congress cleared the way for greater US involvement in Vietnam, the GOI established 
diplomatic relations with North Vietnam.
54
 On 15 August, the USIS library in 
Yogyakarta was seized and ransacked by a mob of several thousand. Then, in his 1964 
independence day address on 17 August entitled Tahun Vivere Pericoloso or ‗The Year 
of Living Dangerously,‘ President Sukarno, among other things, scathingly attacked the 
United States, in particular the Johnson-Tunku communiqué, declaring it ―full of hostile 
words against Indonesia,‖ and ―really too much…it really exceeds all bounds.‖
55
 In one 
US government analysis, the speech explicitly confirmed Sukarno‘s 
accelerated swing to the left during the past 18 months. It charts a course – 
both international and domestic – which is close to the immediate 
objectives of the Indonesian Communist Party. The speech precludes any 
real relaxation of the intensified anti-Americanism in Indonesia of the past 
few months. Although the anti-American campaign may ebb and flow to 
suit the purposes of Sukarno or the Communist Party, the long range intent 




Moreover, as we saw in Chapter Five, the speech was accompanied by an escalation of 
Konfrontasi in the form of attacks on the Malaysian peninsula. 
The US-Indonesia relationship deteriorated steadily after this point, and from 
December 1964 through April 1965 entered a period of increasing frenzy and hostility 
marked by increasingly harsh anti-imperialist rhetoric, the seizure of US companies, and 
repeated demonstrations and mob assaults against US facilities.
57
 The US was the main 
target of President Sukarno‘s anti-imperialist rhetoric as anti-imperialism became the 
primary focus of Indonesia‘s foreign policy.
58
  The escalation of US military involvement 
in Vietnam in February 1965 added fuel to the fire, as it was viewed as a clear example of 
US imperialism in Southeast Asia. This rhetoric spilled over onto the ground in the form 
of demonstrations and attacks on US facilities; the official GOI involvement in these 
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actions is still unknown, but certainly the Indonesian government did little to discourage 
such actions.  The USIS library facilities in five cities (Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, 
Medan, and Makassar) in Indonesia were ―prime target[s] for displays of anti-
Americanism‖ by mobs, many of which were supposedly led by PKI or National Front 
elements.
59
 Some of these facilities were attacked earlier (e.g., the 15 August sacking of 
the USIS library in Yogyakarta), but the demonstrations and attacks intensified during 
this period.  On 4 December, the USIS library in Jakarta was sacked, with some 20% of 
its books destroyed, and on 7 December the library in Surabaya was similarly attacked, 
forcing the GOI to intervene and place the library under its protection. There were similar 
incidents at the other USIS libraries over the next few months (including the Medan 
facility on 18 February, just as the demonstrations on nearby US plantations reached a 
peak – see Part II), leading the US to announce on 4 March that all USIS libraries would 
be shut down.
60
  In late February, a large group of university students even forced their 
way into US Ambassador Jones residence to protest the death of Malcolm X; later that 
day, a leader of the group privately explained to a US official that the group had been 
deemed ―counterrevolutionary‖ by the PKI and was therefore forced to ―prove its 
revolutionary credentials if it were not to be banned by the president.‖
61
 US personnel 
and facilities were also subject to minor inconveniences, such as mail boycotts and 
electricity outages, and there were some boycotts against American ships and airplanes. 
In late February, President Sukarno banned from Indonesia four US-based publications, 
Time, Life, US News and World Report, and Newsweek.   
The targeting of the United States as the main imperialist enemy and the 
increasingly strained US-Indonesia relationship also dovetailed with the PKI‘s attitude 
toward the United States.  After the seizure and nationalization of Dutch companies from 
late 1957-59, the PKI increasingly began to view the United States as its most dangerous 
imperialist enemy, initially identifying ―United States penetration in the economic, 
political and social spheres‖ as a major threat.
62
   US economic penetration meant not 
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only US aid generally and support for economic reform and stability, but also US 
businesses operating in Indonesia.  With the resolution of the West Irian issue in the 
summer of 1962, in the PKI‘s outlook the United States overtook the Dutch and became 
the ―number one enemy and the most dangerous enemy of the Indonesian people,‖ 
particularly as the US supported economic stabilization attempt of 1963 became a major 
issue.
63
 As we saw in Chapter Four, the PKI was one of the most vocal opponents of the 
stabilization attempt, in part because if successful the reform program would certainly 
have drawn Indonesia closer to the US. Over the course of 1963 the PKI had been very 
critical of the United States policies, but the outbreak of Konfrontasi provided another 
arrow in the PKI‘s anti-American/anti-imperialist quiver, especially when US support for 
Malaysia became clear in July 1964, such that a major objective of the PKI‘s strategy was 
to expel US influence from Indonesia.
64
 Over the course of 1964 there were various calls 
by the PKI and its affiliated groups for the takeover of US companies, and as we shall see 
in Part IV, Section C, the PKI in May 1964 initiated an anti-American film boycott that 
―became the high point of struggle in the campaign against US ‗cultural penetration‘‖ and 
mirrored President Sukarno‘s own protests against the same.
65
 Moreover, as discussed in 
this Chapter, the PKI targeting of US economic penetration reached a pinnacle in 1965 
with the takeover of American companies, a process in which the PKI through its labor 
arm SOBSI was intimately involved.  
The deterioration of US-Indonesia relations, combined with President Sukarno‘s 
intensified anti-imperialist thrust in Indonesian foreign policy as well as the perceived 
alignment of Sukarno‘s interests with the PKI‘s and the apparent growing influence of 
the PKI over 1964-65, leading many to believe that Sukarno and Indonesia had ‗turned to 
the left,‘ led to a reassessment of US policy toward Indonesia.
66
 This reassessment 
process gained momentum after August 1964 as US officials were increasingly dismayed 
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over the direction Indonesia appeared to be heading, and by the summer of 1965 
culminated in the abandonment of Ambassador Jones‘ policy of accommodation in favor 
of the ‗low posture‘ policy featuring a reduced US presence. According to one observer, 
―the substance of US overt policy was one of largely consistent restraint in responding to 
President Sukarno‘s often provocative and hostile ‗march to the left‘,‖ an approach 
conditioned in part by the simultaneous escalation of US involvement in Vietnam and 
recognition of the limits of US influence in Indonesia.
67
 However, covertly the US 
government, acting primarily through the American CIA, on 19 November 1964 
approved and sometime later initiated a program whose two ―broad objectives‖ were to 
(i) ―create an image of the PKI as an increasingly ambitious, dangerous opponent of 
Sukarno and legitimate nationalism,‖ and (ii) ―encourage, coordinate and where possible, 
covertly assist ‗individuals and organizations prepared to take obstructive action against 
the PKI.‘‖
68
 As one historian has described, the introduction of this covert program 
effectively inaugurated the shift to the US low posture policy, and though the extent of 
the covert campaign remains classified, over the course of 1965 the US certainly 




Meanwhile, as the relationship with Indonesia continued to worsen, the US 
government dispatched presidential emissary Ellsworth Bunker to Indonesia both to 
assess the situation and to pave the way for the introduction of the new low posture 
policy.
70
 This decision to send Bunker was made in mid-March 1965 and was in part 
precipitated by the recent seizure of American estates and the perceived ―dangers of an 
imminent seizure of the American oil companies.‖
71
 Bunker, who as we saw in Chapter 
Two was in good standing with the Indonesians because of his role in resolving the West 
Irian issue in 1962, was in Indonesia from 30 March to 14 April 1965 and met with 
numerous Indonesian officials (including four times with President Sukarno and twice 
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with First Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Subandrio). In his written report 
to President Johnson dated 23 April, Bunker concluded that Indonesian-US relations were 
―unlikely to improve in the near future‖ and listed three ―ostensible reasons‖ given by 
President Sukarno for the deterioration of US-Indonesian relations: US support for 
Malaysia, US intervention in South Vietnam, and the US presence and bases in Asia.
72
 
However, Bunker also argued that more fundamental reasons for the state of the 
relationship were (i) ―Sukarno‘s ambition to solidify the Afro-Asian nations in a struggle 
of the NEFOS…against the OLDEFOS…and to occupy himself a dominant position in 
the struggle,‖ (ii) ―Characterization of the West as representative of neo-colonialism and 
imperialism (NEKOLIM), therefore as the enemy of the newly independent countries. 
The US as the most powerful leader of the developed countries is identified as enemy No. 
1,‖ (iii) ―the influence of the PKI…which looks to Peking for inspiration and whose 
avowed purpose is to drive the US out of Indonesia,‖ (iv) ―Sukarno‘s proclaimed 
Marxism and his avowed intention of doing away with capitalism in the process of 
socializing Indonesia,‖ (v) ―Sukarno‘s view that creation of national unity and a sense of 
national identity are more important than economic development…‖ (vi) ―Sukarno‘s 
confidence that he can bend the PKI to his will; hence his emphasis on NASAKOM…‖ , 
and (vii) ―Sukarno‘s mystical belief in his own destiny, hence his conviction that it is his 
mission to lead his country to unity and power; and because of doubts about his health, to 
accelerate the process.‖ Nevertheless, there were some ―elements of strength‖ in the 
situation, principally the military, the moderate Muslim political organizations, and other 
moderate political elements. However, a ―large and widespread US presence provides the 
PKI and other extremist elements targets for attack. A defense of the US presence, even 
by the forces of law and order, is embarrassing to them and to those friendly to US since 
it subjects them to attack as defenders or stooges of the imperialists.‖ Hence, the report 
recommended that ―US visibility should be reduced so that those opposed to the 
communists and extremists may be free to handle a confrontation,‖ that the US ―should 
maintain contact with the constructive elements of strength in Indonesia,‖ and that US 
policy ―be directed toward creating conditions which will give the elements of potential 
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strength the most favorable conditions for confrontation.‖
73
 These conclusions were then 
followed by a list of general and specific recommendations. 
The Bunker report not only provided the ―single most comprehensive formulation 
of the political assessment and policy rationale on which the low posture strategy was 
predicated,‖ but Bunker‘s prestige also helped secure President Johnson‘s approval of the 
new course.
74
 Over the next few months, the US drastically reduced its presence and 
personnel in Indonesia and adopted a very low public profile, and for a three month 
period from May to July 1965 there was a relatively quiet interlude in US-Indonesia 
relations. US Ambassador Jones left Indonesia for good in May (he had served as US 
ambassador since 1958), and was replaced in late July 1965 by hardliner Marshall Green, 
whose arrival seemed to trigger a new period of tensions in August and September. 
However, Green‘s arrival also put an exclamation point on the low posture policy, which, 
along with many of Bunker‘s recommendations, Green continued to implement.
75
  
With respect to the takeovers of US companies in early 1965, like the British 
government in 1964 the US government was unable to stem the takeover tide. Its primary 
lever, economic aid, had evaporated with Konfrontasi. In March 1965 a US State 
Department internal memorandum prepared in connection with an upcoming meeting 
with representatives of American companies in Indonesia noted that ―we have no 
effective leverages to influence Djakarta‘s conduct. We have tried conciliation on the one 
hand and warnings on the other, with no evident effect.‖ The memo urged that the 
companies withdraw all non-essential personnel, that the companies replace American 
personnel with non-US expatriates, and that the companies ―avoid precipitating a 
confrontation‖ between themselves and the GOI. The memo noted that while the US 
government would ―urge the Government of Indonesia to respect its contracts with the 
companies, we cannot now foresee what response would best serve the United States 
national interest if the Government of Indonesia breaches these arrangements and the 
companies withdraw.‖ Finally, the memo stated that ―we anticipate continuing hostility 
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towards the United States in Indonesia as long as President Sukarno is alive.‖
76
 Thus the 
US embassy, like the British embassy, could only deliver notes protesting the takeover of 
American companies and asking the GOI to restore the status quo.
77
   
 
II. Goodyear Sumatra Plantations and United States 
Rubber Plantations 
 
The first American companies to be taken over in this period were the Goodyear 
Tire and Rubber Company (―Goodyear‖) estates and United States Rubber Corporation 
(―USR‖) estate in North Sumatra, three of the oldest and largest rubber estates in 
Sumatra.
78
  The takeover of these estates was a highly visible affair, coming on the heels 
of large labor union and worker demonstrations organized by the ‗Action Command for 
the Destruction of US and Belgium Imperialism,‘ though in neither case were the estates 
actually seized by the demonstrators, despite constant press reports to the contrary. 
Rather, the GOI decision to take over the companies was cast as a pre-emptive strike to 
prevent a takeover by workers. The decision was made at the highest levels of the 
Indonesian government, as President Sukarno, First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio, 
Third Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul Saleh, Coordinating Minister for Agriculture and 
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Agrarian Affairs Sadjarwo, and Minister of Estates Seda were all involved. Moreover, 
these takeovers were almost certainly the outcome of the decision by President Sukarno 
on 8 December (described in the introduction to this Chapter) to proceed with the 
―protective takeovers‖ of American companies and subsequent instructions to labor 
unions to begin agitations to create the necessary atmosphere and conditions for 
government intervention. The GOI takeover of these estates was also unique in several 
ways.  First, it was the first time the GOI publicly used the formula of ‗takeover of 
management without takeover of ownership‘; all takeovers following this would 
henceforth follow that formula.  Second, and more importantly, the takeover of these two 
companies was the first time the GOI actually followed the takeover with negotiations to 
compensate the owners, though these discussions were not immediately finalized. As we 
shall see in this Chapter and the next, even thereafter the GOI would entertain 
compensation/buyout discussions only with respect to the big three oil companies and 
non-British foreign estates, including Goodyear and US Rubber.  
A. Background and Initial Measures. 
Goodyear operated two rubber estates in North Sumatra, the Dolok Merangir 
estate and the famous Wingfoot estate.
79
 However, as described below, Wingfoot in mid-
1964 was set to be exchanged for two GOI estates adjacent to Dolok Merangir in 
settlement of the one-third rule, which as we saw in Chapter Three required foreign estate 
holders to give up one third of their holdings in exchange for extensions of remaining 
concessions under the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law. The failure to implement this exchange 
became a fascinating additional complicating layer to the entire sequence of the takeover 
and return of the Goodyear estates. USR operated an estate in North Sumatra named 
Kisaran, which was actually a compilation of different adjacent concessions.
80
   
According to the US Embassy, while the PKI had been waging a propaganda 
effort against Goodyear and USR since the early part of 1964, the first takeover action of 
                                                 
79
 These are described in Chapter Three, Part Two, Section B. Briefly, Wingfoot was about 16,000 hectares 
in size and Dolok Merangir was about 6,000 hectares; together, the estates employed about 10,000 laborers, 
plus around 50 Indonesian staff employees and about 15 foreign staff.  
80
 The estate was about 17,500 hectares and employed around 7,200 workers, with an Indonesian staff of 85 
and foreign staff of 13. See Chapter Three, Part Two, Section B. 
 392 
 
any significance against the estates took place in August 1964 in connection with the 
proposed exchange of Wingfoot. Goodyear and the GOI had agreed a few months before 
that Wingfoot would be exchanged under the one-third rule for two GOI estates adjacent 
to Dolok Merangir named Dolok Ulu and Naga Radja, which were ex-Dutch estates 
nationalized in 1958-59 and together totaled about 8,000 hectares, about half the size of 
Wingfoot. Goodyear was ready to give up the entire Wingfoot estate in exchange for 
these two estates, which meant that Goodyear‘s holdings could be consolidated in one 
area (Wingfoot and Dolok Merangir were some distance apart).
81
 On 15 June 1964, Third 
Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul Saleh issued a decree approving the exchange.
82
  A few 
weeks later, Coordinating Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs Sadjarwo issued 
another decree directing what would happen to Wingfoot after the exchange was 
completed; the decree specified that ‗Wingfoot North‘ and ‗Wingfoot East‘ would be 
turned over to the government‘s state owned rubber plantation unit known as PPN Karet, 
but ‗Wingfoot South‘ would be used by two private firms, PT Hapinis  and NV Oriental 
Tyre.
83
 PT Hapinis was closely associated with the NU political party; it was apparently 
owned by high ranking officials of the party.
84
  On 29 July Wingfoot was symbolically 
handed over to the government in a signing ceremony, with the physical transfer 
scheduled for August 10.
85
  
The physical exchange never took place, however. As described by the American 
consul in Medan,
86
 opposition to the swap initially came from the management of PPN 
Karet VI, the GOI enterprise that managed Dolok Ulu, one of the two estates to be 
exchanged. The PPN Karet managers apparently did not want to lose an estate under their 
control, and they also feared losing their jobs once Goodyear began managing the estate. 
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SARBUPRI, the SOBSI-affiliated estate workers union, then turned the fight into a 
political one, building mass opposition to the exchange among the workers of Dolok Ulu. 
Aside from the PKI‘s general attitude against foreign investment, it is unclear what was 
motivating SOBSI; it could have been the consideration that a company linked to NU, a 
political enemy of the PKI, might take over a portion of Wingfoot.
87
 In any case, the 
ostensible reason for worker opposition was that the workers of Dolok Ulu were not 
consulted about the exchange. The Governor of North Sumatra, the same Ulung Sitepu 
whom we saw in the previous Chapter, then got involved and sent in teams to investigate 
the situation, just as Jakarta announced on 9 August that the exchange would be 
postponed by a few days. These teams appointed by Governor Sitepu found for the 
workers, and the chairman of the team was sent to Jakarta to report on the situation. 
Meanwhile, SARBUPRI had ―brought the workers to a fever pitch,‖ and on the night of 
14 August the Wingfoot manager called the American consul in Medan for help, saying 
there would be an attempt to take over Dolok Merangir the next day.  The American 
consul then telephoned the Indonesian police and army, and by the next morning a large 
contingent of police had arrived on Dolok Merangir. A crowd of workers – presumably 
from Dolok Ulu, though the consul report does not say - attempted to take over the estate, 
but were repulsed by the police, with warning shots fired. Back in Jakarta, Foreign 
Minister Subandrio told US Ambassador Jones that, with President Sukarno‘s approval, 
he had instructed General Yani to take special steps to protect Goodyear and instructions 
would be sent to all security forces to protect American property.
88
  Nevertheless, on 20 
August, Minister of Estates Seda informed Goodyear that he, Minister Saleh and Minister 
Sadjarwo had decided to postpone the Wingfoot exchange.   
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B. Intensification, December 1964 – February 1965. 
Things were fairly quiet on the American estates until the middle of December 
1964. There were a number of calls for takeovers, small demonstrations and actions 
against the companies, such as graffiti on the walls and worker slowdowns, but nothing 
significant in the way of takeover activity.  However, in mid-December, rumors of a 
takeover of the estates began to swirl around in Jakarta and on the estates themselves, 
rumors undoubtedly triggered by President Sukarno‘s 8 December decision to proceed 
with the takeovers of American companies and subsequent instructions to labor leaders to 
begin agitating. US Rubber officials reported that President Sukarno and Ministers Seda 
and Sadjarwo were considering a symbolic worker takeover of the estates, and that at a 
labor meeting at Kisaran there was open talk among workers of a takeover, indicating 
that labor agitation was underway.
89
 Meeting with US Ambassador Jones in Jakarta on 11 
December, President Sukarno said he would do his best to stop any takeover, but 
cryptically added that the US government needed to ―be careful in its relations with 
Asian-African countries.‖
90
  In light of Sukarno‘s decision just a few days earlier, such a 
pledge to prevent any takeover was patently false.  
Separately, General Mokoginta, the new All Sumatra Regional Commander 
(KOANDA), assured the American consul in Medan that he would prevent any seizures 
of American estates.
91
 Similarly, the Medan police chief on 23 December told the 
American consul that a takeover of American estates would not be permitted, and that 
Jakarta had not issued any new orders; the next day, though, the military commander for 
North Sumatra indicated that Jakarta had not decided the issue, though he thought the 
American estates would be allowed to continue their operations.
92
  Meanwhile, the 
Wingfoot exchange still had not occurred, even though PT Hapinis had begun occupying 
a 4,000 hectare portion of Wingfoot in October. Goodyear was powerless to stop this 
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advance, and in late December relations between Goodyear and Hapinis were 
exacerbated by a fire that broke out in a warehouse on Wingfoot being used by Hapinis.
93
  
Goodyear officials were assured separately by Ministers Saleh and Seda and the 
Governor of North Sumatra that the decision on the Wingfoot exchange now rested 
entirely with President Sukarno, but no decision was made.
94
  
In mid-January 1965, the intensity of the takeover campaign spiked, though there 
were no actual attempts to seize the estates. As the American consul in Medan reported, 
hardly a day passed without a speech, a petition, or a resolution from some 
far left source demanding the take over of all American enterprises in 
Indonesia…The PKI and its allies also generated a constant flow of 
rumors about imminent takeover actions, tried in various ways to 
intimidate Indonesian staffs of the American estates, and employed such 
psychological warfare tactics as publicly naming the officers-to-be of the 




The primary instrument behind this new intensity was the ‗Action Command to Crush US 
and Belgian Imperialism,‘ which in a well-organized propaganda campaign continually 
issued calls for takeovers of the American estates and also held numerous mass labor 
meetings designed to rally workers. Indeed, the Action Command was able to work most 
effectively through its member labor unions, which were the primary implementers of the 
Action Command‘s calls for takeover. That is to say, as we shall see below, labor unions 
and workers were at the public forefront of takeover activity by virtue of their 
demonstrations and actions against the estates in February, but their activities appeared to 
be organized by the Action Command. 
Established on 11 January 1965 for the sole objective of ―crushing US and 
Belgian imperialism,‖ the Action Command operated only in North Sumatra.
96
 According 
to Sayuti Hasibuan, who studied the Action Command at length, it had six member labor 
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organizations (SOBSI, KBM, GOBSII, SKBI, SARBUMUSI, and RKS SS/SB), but was 
clearly dominated by SOBSI and KBM, who were ―more committed‖ to takeovers of 
foreign companies than the other member organizations. It was led by a Major Muis, an 
ex-army major from GOBSII who was a compromise candidate agreeable to both SOBSI 
and KBM. Apparently SOBSI and KBM were fierce rivals within the Action Command, 
and thus it was necessary to have a neutral leader who was not a threat to either; in fact, 
Muis himself said that the divisions within the Action Command were so great that the 
only thing the member labor groups could agree on was taking over the American and 
Belgian estates. Indeed, Hasibuan suggests that neither the PKI nor the KBM actually 
cared that much about who was the leader as long as the takeovers proceeded, and for the 
PKI not having a visible leadership role helped with its united front strategy and made it 
seem less threatening. Hasibuan also argues that the Action Command was not simply a 
tool of the PKI, that in its takeover demands the Action Command represented the 
interests of other member groups as well, even though SOBSI and KBM were the 
dominant members who set the program and agenda.
97
 As we shall see below, though the 
actual identity of the demonstrators was not always clear, it appears that SARBUPRI (the 
SOBSI-associated plantation workers union) and other PKI-linked organizations were 
very prominent in the demonstrations. Certainly many observers (including US officials) 
thought that the PKI was behind the demonstrations and actions.
98
  
Despite the increased pressure from mid-January 1965 for a takeover, officials at 
the regional government and central government levels initially seemed to hold firm.  
First Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Subandrio told US Ambassador Jones 
on 17 January that he had issued instructions to prevent labor unions from taking over the 
estates, even claiming that the GOI had prevented SOBSI from taking over the estates on 
14 January.
99
 On 13 January All Sumatran Commander Mokoginta and Medan police 
chief Sujono both assured the American consul in Medan that they would not permit the 
takeover of American estates. General Mokoginta said that General Yani ordered that if 
civilian authorities failed to maintain order, then Mokoginta and the military should take 
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charge and prevent disturbances; Mokoginta further said he would ―clobber‖ the PKI if 
they made any trouble.
100
  Even Coordinating Minister for Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs Sadjarwo apparently told representatives from SARBUMUSI, the NU labor 
organization, that now was not the time for a takeover, in spite of the representatives‘ 
arguments for an immediate seizure.
101
  Meanwhile, on the Wingfoot estate exchange 
issue, Minister Subandrio also told US Ambassador Jones on 17 January that he had 
instructed Minister of Estates Seda to proceed with the exchange.  However, on 28 
January Minister Seda told Goodyear officials that he was in the process of sending 
instructions to Medan to proceed with the exchange when he received a telephone call 
suggesting that he wait for a while; Seda did not identify the caller, but waited as 
suggested.
102
 Oddly enough, on 1 February Goodyear received a letter from Coordinating 
Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs Sadjarwo demanding that Goodyear 
surrender 5,900 hectares of Wingfoot and 1,000 hectares of Dolok Merangir.  The reason 
for this demand was not clear but apparently involved the land being occupied by 
squatters, and in any case no further action was taken.
103
   
In mid-February mass demonstrations apparently aimed at seizing the estates 
broke out on those properties.  There had been much smaller demonstrations prior to this, 
but none of any importance that were aimed primarily at taking over the estates. The 
actual identity of the demonstrators was not often clear; apparently (although reports are 
vague) most were workers, though it is unclear if they were workers on the actual estates 
on which the demonstrations took place. Nevertheless, as highlighted above the 
demonstrations were certainly organized by the Action Command to Crush US and 
Belgian Imperilaism. None of the demonstrations was violent, and there was no 
significant property damage. These demonstrations broke out just as the United States 
began the public phase of its retaliatory bombing of North Vietnam, which was often 
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cited as one of the reasons for the demonstrations. In addition, most of the local 
newspapers mistakenly reported that the takeovers were successful. 
On 15 February there were demonstrations at each of Dolok Merangir, Wingfoot, 
and Kisaran, as well as the small Kwala Gunung estate owned by Hawaii Sumatran 
Plantations. USR reported that the demonstration at Kisaran was led by SARBUPRI, the 
SOBSI-affiliated union, while the American Medan consul reported that the 
demonstration at Kwalau Gunung was led by the ‗PKI.‘ In each case, the demonstrators 
proclaimed that the estate was taken over, and at Kisaran and Kwala Gunung leaders 
handed ‗takeover letters‘ to management, which were promptly rejected. At Kisaran and 
the two Goodyear estates, numerous police and security officials were on hand and 
prevented any takeover, while at Kuala Gunung the manager called in the police, who 
promptly arrived. None of the estates were actually taken over, as the security forces 
were in control.
104
 On the 19, 20 and 21 February there were more demonstrations at 
Kisaran, followed on 22 February by a smaller demonstration at Wingfoot.  The 
demonstrations of the 19 and 20 at Kisaran were comparatively small, with security 
forces remaining in control the entire time. The one on 20 February involved only about 
300 people, who were immediately dispersed by security forces. However, on 21 
February there was a giant day-long demonstration outside USR‘s main office at Kisaran 
involving an estimated 7,000 workers. This was by far the largest of the demonstrations 
and was clearly aimed at taking over the estate. Once again, though, security forces, 
numbering over 600 police and military personnel, prevented any seizure, denying the 
demonstrators access to the grounds, though they were forced to fire warning shots.  
Finally, on 22 February there was a small demonstration at Wingfoot that included 
several top Indonesian staff members but apparently was never threatening in the least; 
the police allowed the demonstrators to post flags and signs, but the police themselves 
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  Thus, in no case were any American estates actually taken over 
by demonstrators.  
The reaction of government officials was mixed.  I shall start with the reaction of 
the smallest unit of government and then proceed to higher levels. On 16 February, the 
day after the initial demonstrations on each of the American estates, the Bupati (district 
chief, the administrative unit below the provincial level) of the district in which Wingfoot 
was located told Goodyear officials that he was going to set up a control committee to 
deal with worker demands for a takeover. The Bupati explained that the committee was 
necessary to ―placate‖ the workers, that he needed such an instrument to ensure that 
Wingfoot was not seized, and that the committee would not have any policy-making or 
administrative power. He also requested office space at Wingfoot for the committee. 
Goodyear, with the advice of the US consul in Medan, quickly protested this action, and 
the US consul also sent letters to various regional authorities protesting the action. The 
committee was never formed, apparently because the local military forbade the Bupati 
from doing so.
106
 It is extremely difficult to judge the Bupati‘s intentions; he may have 
genuinely intended to protect Wingfoot, but he may also have had other things in mind. 
In Medan, the provincial capital, authorities seemed to be split. As indicated by 
the response to the Bupati‘s action regarding Wingfoot, police and military officials (who 
actually were part of the national GOI structure and not part of the provincial 
government) had consistently been against the takeovers and had acted decisively during 
mid-February to prevent the takeovers.
107
  On 21 February, the US consul in Medan met 
All Sumatran Commander Mokoginta, who said US property would continue to be 
protected against takeovers. The General explained that only the central GOI could order 
takeovers, and that no such order had been received; rather, he understood the GOI policy 
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was against such actions.
108
 This resolve of the Indonesian military contrasted sharply 
with the military‘s efforts to remain neutral in the case of takeovers of the British estates 
in North Sumatra in January 1964 (see Chapter Five, Part II, Section A3).
109
 However, 
non-military authorities in North Sumatra seemed much less determined to take action 
against the takeovers. Governor of North Sumatra Sitepu never made a public statement 
against the takeover attempts or denying the prevalent press reports that the estates had 
been taken over (nor did Mokoginta for that matter), though he did send a delegation to 
Jakarta to report on the situation. This report turned out to be so untrustworthy that 
Minister of Estates Seda called in the managers of the American estates to give their own 
versions of what happened. In fact, the US consul in Medan (though not necessarily 
objective in this matter) reported that high provincial authorities ―continually expressed 
approval for the ‗revolutionary spirit‘ of the takeover effort and an understanding of the 
‗people‘s anger against the imperialists.‘‖
110
  
Meanwhile, back in Jakarta at the central GOI level, the mood seemed to shift 
from the assurances of President Sukarno, First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio and 
other officials to US officials over the past few months that no takeovers would be 
allowed, to the idea that the GOI should take over the estates, though opinions clearly 
differed. Indeed, as late as 20 February and 23 February, Third Deputy Prime Minister 
Chaerul Saleh told US embassy officials (and President Sukarno also around that time 
told US Ambassador Jones) that the GOI did not intend to take over the estates.
111
 
However, the Goodyear and USR managers were told via private sources that at a 
meeting on 18 February of President Sukarno, Minister Chaerul Saleh, Labor Minister 
Sutomo, Minister of Estates Seda, and State Minister Oei Tjoe Tat it was decided that the 
estates would be supervised temporarily by the GOI in order to maintain the peace and 
production. A few days later Minister Seda called the managers of Goodyear and USR to 
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Jakarta to discuss the situation. On 21 February, before the meeting with the estate 
managers, Seda met with the US embassy  economic counselor and told him that ―recent 
events had created political problems that must be solved‖ and the GOI had to ―exercise 
stronger supervision‖ over the estates. He also indicated that he, First Deputy Prime 
Minister Subandrio and National Front Minister Sudibjo would go to Medan in the next 
few days to settle the situation. On 22 February, the managers of Goodyear and USR, 
Seda and a few of his assistants, representatives from the team sent by the Governor of 
North Sumatra, and the US embassy economic counselor met in Jakarta.  After the 
American managers gave their report, Seda said that the provincial authorities in North 
Sumatra were instructed to maintain order until the central GOI made its decision. Seda 
explained that the ―problem is more than one of rubber production; it involves [the] 
national and international political situation,‖ and that he, Minister Subandrio and 




C. GOI Takeover. 
On 24 February, First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio, Coordinating Minister 
for Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs Sadjarwo, Minister of Estates Seda, Minister of 
Agrarian Affairs Hermanses, National Front Minister Sudibjo, Minister seconded to 
Presidium Kabinet Nyoto, SOBSI Chairman Mohamed Munir, and SARBUPRI 
Chairman Warso Sukarto, arrived by plane in Medan.
113
 Minister Subandrio, after a short 
meeting with leaders of the Action Command to Crush US and Belgian Imperilaism, then 
went to Prapat (on Lake Toba), some four hours drive away, where he addressed a 
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meeting of North Sumatra‘s top officials as well as estate officials in Sumatra, both 
private and government. At this meeting, Subandrio said that what was important was not 
the issue of takeovers but rather production, which was too low and needed to be 
increased. Subandrio mentioned the American estates only briefly, saying that Minister 
Seda and the Governor of North Sumatra needed to reach some decision on them. 
Interestingly, Governor of North Sumatra Sitepu at the same gathering gave the opening 
speech in which he said that North Sumatra was the ―goose that laid the golden eggs,‖ 
and decisions concerning it must be made with great care. This presumed warning shot 
was answered by Subandrio with a remark that although he was not ashamed of the 
peoples‘ actions (referring to demonstrations and other measures), they were not ―clever‖ 
and ―made it difficult to speak about peace.‖  Subandrio returned to Medan the next day. 
On the morning of 26 February, Minister Subandrio, speaking at the closing 
ceremony of the Sixth Conference of the North Sumatra PKI, announced that 
management of the American estates would be taken over.  Separately, at about the same 
time in a meeting set up the day before with the American estate managers and the 
American consul, Minister Seda informed the American managers that the estates were 
being taken over and then read to them the decree implementing the takeover.
114
 Issued 
by Subandrio (not Minister of Estates Seda) in his capacity as First Deputy Prime 
Minister in the name of the Presidium Kabinet, the decree stated that in view of the 
intensification of the Indonesian Revolution, the determination and ability of the 
Indonesian people to implement BERDIKARI, and the safety and continuation of 
production, it was placing the American estate companies under the management 
(pengurusan) of the GOI, without diminishing the ownership rights of the companies. 
The decree further stated the GOI was responsible for the smooth operation of the 
companies, and to ensure this the GOI would appoint new Indonesian management, to be 
assisted by an advisory board, both of which were responsible to the GOI. The American 
owners were required to provide assistance as needed in order to ensure continued 
smooth production. To supervise and help with production, a supervisory team, 
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consisting of elements from the local authorities, workers, farmers and experts, would 
immediately be appointed. Finally, the relations and responsibilities between the GOI and 
the respective owner would be set forth in a separate agreement between the parties. 
In the 26 February meeting itself, Minister Seda explained that the decree meant 
that ownership of the estates was not affected and still remained with the American 
owners, and he repeatedly indicated that the action was not a nationalization. However, 
the GOI was assuming all managerial functions over the estates. Minister Seda would 
immediately set up a takeover team to assume these responsibilities, and the team would 
be directly responsible to him. The nature of the management arrangement would be set 
forth in a contract to be agreed to later. The American managers protested, saying that 
management rights were part of ownership rights, but Seda waved these off. Seda further 
indicated that the American managers would not be allowed to continue until the 
management contract was agreed to because the decision had already been publicly 
announced and the people would become angry if there were no visible change on the 
estates. Seda also emphasized several times that it was in the interests of their own safety 
that the managers cooperate. Finally, when queried about the status of the Wingfoot 
estate exchange, he said the exchange was off.  The managers had no choice but to accept 
the decision, even though they indicated to Seda that they were reserving all rights, were 
under duress, and had to consult with their home offices.
115
 
Years later, Seda recalled that the primary reason behind the GOI takeover of the 
American estates was to prevent the PKI from taking them over. Seda believed that the 
PKI desire to take over the companies was motivated by two primary reasons: first, the 
PKI was very nationalistic, and second, it wanted to turn the companies into sources of 
funding and manpower, much as the army had done with the Dutch companies seized and 
nationalized in 1957-59. He explained that his takeover policy was one of takeover of 
management and not of ownership, which he believed were easily distinguishable; the 
latter involved an obligation to pay compensation, while the former did not. Seda also 
recalled an incident shortly after his return to Jakarta from Medan after the takeovers. 
Meeting with both President Sukarno and PKI chairman Aidit at the Presidential Palace, 
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Seda was accused by Aidit of being duplicitous with the Indonesian people by 
distinguishing between ownership and management, with Aidit arguing that such an 
arrangement meant that there was no real takeover of the estates. Seda explained to both 
of them that with outright nationalization came an obligation of compensation, but since 
Indonesia had no money it could not compensate the owners and thus was better off 
assuming management only. Moreover, Indonesia was a civilized, cultured nation, not 
one of thieves, and it did not take the property of others. Seda claimed also to have told 
Sukarno that the President could find another Minister of Estates if he did not agree with 
this, and presumably Sukarno did agree as Seda kept his position.
116
 As we shall see, 
Seda indeed made determined efforts to reach agreement on compensating the owners of 
foreign estates taken over under his watch; except with respect to the buyout of Shell Oil 
(see next Chapter), no other GOI minister under the Sukarno administration attempted to 
compensate foreign companies for their losses.     
Minister Seda moved swiftly to set up a takeover team, issuing a decree later that 
same day of 26 February.
117
 The takeover team, comprised entirely of GOI officials, most 
of whom were from one of the agricultural ministries, met on 2 March with the American 
managers, the American consul in Medan, and the Governor of North Sumatra and 
informed the American managers that takeover ceremonies, which included the 
appointment of new managers, would be held the next day.
118
  All management authority 
– including control over bank accounts and funds - was to be surrendered to the new 
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managers, and from then on American personnel would act only as advisors, and only at 
the request of the new managers. The takeover team did state that all marketing 
arrangements and financial procedures would continue unchanged for the time being. The 
takeover team also informed the American managers that it would let them know when to 
come to Jakarta to negotiate the management contracts. In addition, the team informed 
Goodyear that the size of Wingfoot had been decreased (unilaterally) by 4,000 hectares; 




The next day, 3 March, less than a week after Minister Subandrio‘s decree taking 
over the estates was issued, formal transfer ceremonies stripping owner-appointed 
management of all authority were held as promised on both Kisaran and on one of the 
Goodyear estates. The ceremonies were apparently quite elaborate and required that USR 
and Goodyear management sign documents of transfer. Such spectacle, and one that they 
were forced to participate in as though concluding an arms-length business transaction, 
must have been a bitter parody for the American managers.  New head managers were 
also appointed: for Goodyear, the manager for both Wingfoot and Dolok Merangir was 
M. Koesmihadi, and for USR the manager was Makmum Sastranegara (the assistant 
managers were Bustamen and MPH Pandjaitan).  Both Koesmihadi and Sastranegara 
were officials on GOI-owned PPN estates; Koesmihadi was actually going to be the GOI 
appointed manager of Wingfoot had the estate exchange occurred.  However, 
Koesmihadi‘s deputy was none other than Major A. Muis, who was the head of the 
Action Command to Crush US and Belgian Imperialism, the very same group which 
campaigned for the takeovers and organized demonstrations against the estates.
120
 
 3 March 1965 indeed marked the end of owner-appointed management control 
for both USR and Goodyear. Thereafter, USR American managers were not permitted to 
enter the offices.  Goodyear‘s foreign managers were initially allowed back into the 
office as advisors, but by 11 March this was limited to three people, and this apparently 
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only lasted a few more weeks. On 5 March, the GOI changed the name of the Goodyear 
operation to Perusahaan Perkebunan Ampera I (Estate Company Ampera I), and the 
name of the USR operation to Perusahaan Perkebunan Ampera II (Estate Company 
Ampera II).
121
  AMPERA, as we saw in Chapter Two, was short for amanat penderitaan 
rakyat, or ‗message of the people‘s suffering,‘ one of the most popular slogans of Guided 
Democracy. 
D. Company Reaction and Initial Negotiations.  
The home offices and the managers in Indonesia for both USR and Goodyear 
quickly understood that there was little they could do regarding the takeover of their 
respective companies. While in theory the GOI takeover was of management only, and 
not ownership, both companies had seen what had happened to the British companies in 
the past 18 months and were probably quite realistic in their internal assessments. On 2 
March representatives of Goodyear and USR met in Washington DC with various US 
State Department officials. The company representatives indicated that they had little 
choice but to go along with the GOI, and under their current operations things could 
hardly get worse anyway. Neither company had remitted any profits since 1960; high 
taxes and the incredibly restrictive foreign exchange rules conspired to make remittances 
very difficult.
122
 Clearly, the companies were not directly profiting substantially from 
their Indonesian operations. The main reason the companies had remained in Indonesia 
was because their Indonesian operations provided an important source of latex for their 
rubber production processes outside Indonesia.
123
  In fact, by early 1965 most of the 
production of each company was in the form of latex – 75% for Goodyear and 95% for 
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 In public statements issued by the companies after the takeover, both companies indicated that the 
takeover would have a very minimal impact on profits, as neither company had been able to remit profits 
since the late 1950s. For USR, see New York Times and Wall Street Journal articles dated 24 March 1965 
(quoting chairman George Vila); for Goodyear, see New York Times dated 6 April 1965 (quoting chairman 
Russell De Young). 
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 Department of State Memorandum of Conversation dated 2 March 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 





 However, neither company asked for US government assistance regarding the 
takeovers, and the US government would not get involved in the future in any significant 
manner.    
In retrospect, perhaps the main factor contributing to the companies‘ equanimity 
was the hope held out by the GOI‘s apparent willingness to negotiate some kind of 
management agreement. This meant that while the companies would clearly lose 
management and operational control over the estates, the vital supply of latex that was 
the most important part of the companies‘ operations would continue to flow. Minister 
Seda in the meeting on 26 February had repeatedly emphasized that a contract would be 
negotiated, and as we saw Minister Subandrio‘s takeover decree also provided for this. 
President Sukarno told US Ambassador Jones on 27 February that negotiations over the 
new basis for operations would begin immediately, and suggested something along the 
lines of the oil companies CoWs; the main concern was division of income.
125
  Further, in 
the meeting on 2 March between the American managers and the takeover team, the latter 
indicated that all marketing arrangements would continue for the time being; however, 
rather ominously during the meeting a telegram arrived from Minister Seda ordering a 
temporary freeze on USR‘s cream latex (but not Goodyear‘s), though this order was soon 
lifted.
126
 In addition, Third Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul Saleh on 4 March told US 
Ambassador Jones that it was impossible for Americans to remain in the field for now, 
that negotiations for the new contract should begin immediately, and that the focus of the 
negotiation should be division of profits.  Minister Saleh also emphasized that it was 
important to ―adjust in [a] way which would prevent workers from seizing [the] initiative 
and in [a] way which would keep production going.‖
127
  Jones dutifully passed the 
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 US Embassy Bi-Weekly Economic Review dated 5 March 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1964-
66, E2-2 – E8, Indonesia, Boxes 722-3). 
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 US Embassy telegram (Jones) dated 27 February 1965 (LBJL, National Security Files, Country File 
Indonesia, Indonesia Cables (2 of 2), Volume III, 9/64 -3/65, Box 246). 
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 US Medan Consul telegram (Heavner) dated 2 March 1965 (LBJL, National Security Files, Country File 
Indonesia, Indonesia Cables (1 of 2), Volume IV, 3/65- 9/65, Box 247).  The reason given was to prevent 
the export to Singapore or a British port, even though the shipments affected were going to the USA. Later 
Seda said he had issued the order to demonstrate that he was in control.  See US Department of State 
telegram dated 5 March 1965 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1964-66, Inco Rubber Indon, Box 
1215).  
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 US Embassy telegram (Jones) dated 5 March 1965 (LBJL, National Security Files, Country File 
Indonesia, Indonesia Cables (1 of 2), Volume IV, 3/65- 9/65, Box 247).   
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message along to the companies, and, suitably buoyed, the home offices on 5 March each 
instructed their managers in Medan to proceed as soon as possible to Jakarta to begin 
negotiations. The main issues the head offices were most concerned about regarding the 
agreements were (a) the division and convertibility of profits, (b) the position of company 
personnel in management and particularly quality control, which was critical to maintain 
the quality of the latex for exports, (c) the maintenance of existing contracts to market 
latex (both Goodyear and USR marketed latex produced by GOI estates), and (d) the 
position of existing properties and assets.
128
  By 8 March – just 5 days after the takeover 
ceremonies – company representatives were in Jakarta ready to negotiate.   
It quickly became apparent, though, that the GOI was not quite ready to deal. 
While there seemed to be general agreement on the GOI side that a new arrangement was 
necessary, it was unclear what specifics the GOI had in mind. This hesitation was most 
likely due to two factors: first, because of the swiftness with which events had transpired, 
there had been no time for the Ministry of Estates – the GOI ministry in charge of the 
negotiations - to formulate a policy, and second because there was probably significant 
disagreement among GOI officials on what the terms should be. In fact, when 
representatives of the two companies met with Ministry of Estates official Danardojo 
(presumably this was the same Danardojo Hadisasono who was involved in the GOI 
management of Harrisons & Crosfield‘s Jakarta office dating back to early October 1963, 
see Chapter Four, Part II, Section B3) for the first time on 11 March, Danardojo asked for 
proposals from the companies by the next day!
129
 Both USR and Goodyear complied and 
the next day sent in similar letters asking for a return to the status quo pre 26 February 
and then indicated that they were willing to hear GOI proposals on the arrangement. 
Apparently there was no response to these letters. Meanwhile, Minister of Estates Seda, 
with whom the companies had been desperately trying to meet, in an interview with an 
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 US Department of State telegrams (Klippert of Goodyear and McGrath and Lundstedt of USR) dated 5 
March 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1964-66, Inco Rubber Indon, Box 1215).  After the takeovers, 
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State Department in Washington; it is thanks to this that such a detailed record of the negotiations is 
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 US Embassy telegram (Galbraith) dated 11 March 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1964-66, Inco 
Rubber Indon, Box 1215). 
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Indonesian reporter from McGraw-Hill indicated that the GOI was offering some kind of 
production sharing arrangement (although this was news to USR and Goodyear).
130
 
On 19 March USR and Goodyear representatives were finally able to meet jointly 
with Minister Seda.  The discussions were inconclusive, but Seda did make several 
points. First, he indicated that there would probably be no change in the marketing 
arrangements and that existing contracts would be honored, certainly good news for the 
companies. He also indicated that each company should reduce the number of its 
personnel, though he agreed in principal to allow the companies to leave 5-6 people: a 
few engineers and a few quality control people on the estates, and one marketing person 
to operate from Medan.  He also indicated that although there was no possibility of an 
outright purchase of the estates, there was the possibility of the GOI making installment 
payments to the companies over time. He also suggested that Belgian and French estates 
would shortly be treated in the same way (even though nothing had yet happened to 
them).
131
 He asked for further proposals from both companies. 
On 26 March, Minister Seda met with the Goodyear representatives (there 
apparently was no similar meeting with USR representatives) and made what amounted 
to the GOI‘s first concrete proposal. Seda offered a choice: the first alternative was for 
Goodyear to keep its estates, but the GOI would manage them using the current team. 
The second option, which Goodyear clearly favored, was that it would sell to the GOI the 
estates, which would henceforth be managed by the Perusahaan Perkebunan Negara (the 
PPN, the GOI-owned estate companies) but with Goodyear continuing to provide 
advisory and marketing services. Payment for the estates would be equivalent to book 
value; installment payments would be made over a ten year period, and would be in the 
form of sales of latex with price reductions from the normal market prices (in effect, the 
discounts would be the payment). Goodyear, as part of the marketing and advisory 
arrangements, would be allowed to keep a marketing supervisor, two chemists (for 
quality control), two engineers, and one doctor on the estates. If the second option were 
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 US Embassy telegram (Galbraith) dated 12 March 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1964-66, Inco 
Rubber Indon, Box 1215). 
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 See US Embassy telegram (Lundberg of Goodyear to Klippert) dated 20 March 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 
Central Files 1964-66, Inco Rubber Indon, Box 1215); US Embassy telegram (Ellis) dated 11 June 1965 
(USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1964-66, Inco Rubber Indon, Box 1215). 
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agreed to, Minister Seda emphasized, it would have to be presented to the Indonesian 
public as a complete nationalization (presumably Seda was not worried about the stigma 
of nationalization under this alternative because the GOI was paying for the assets). 
Goodyear favored the second proposal in part because it had excellent relations with the 
PPN – at the time, Goodyear was marketing about 80% of the latex produced by the PPN 
estates in North Sumatra.
132
 Clearly another major benefit of this arrangement was that 
Goodyear would get some compensation for the estates. Perhaps most importantly, the 
arrangement would allow Goodyear to continue with the all important latex business. The 
two obvious initial obstacles were agreeing to a fair price for the estates and then figuring 
out how to determine the pricing of the latex to be used as payment. Toward the former, 
Goodyear‘s head office cabled its negotiator in Jakarta that the estimated fair market 
value of the estates was USD $21 million, but that it would settle for $15 million.
133
        
Over the next several months, various proposals were made, but nothing was 
agreed to. On 13 April and 15 April, Minister Seda met with Goodyear representatives 
and USR representatives, respectively, both of whom made similar verbal proposals 
along the lines of the second alternative presented to Goodyear on 26 March.  Each 
company was to be compensated for its estates over several years via pricing 
arrangements on produce purchased by the companies. Goodyear asked for $15 million 
for its estates, USR asked for $14 million. Both would be allowed to keep foreign 
advisors on the estates.  The Goodyear foreign presence would be whittled down from 15 
to six (two engineers to assist in installing a new latex processing machine, two people 
for quality control, and one medical doctor on the estates, with one marketing person in 
Medan). Similarly, USR foreign personnel would be reduced from 13 to seven (one 
doctor, three scientists (for quality control and USR‘s food crop program) and one other 
person on the estates, with two marketing people in Medan). However, in the following 
weeks the GOI seemed to favor a production sharing arrangement. Minister Seda in early 
May told USR that Minister Subandrio had approved the concept of compensation 
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 US Embassy telegram (Jones) dated 26 March 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1964-66, Inco 
Rubber Indon, Box 1215); US Embassy telegram (Ellis) dated 11 June 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central 
Files 1964-66, Inco Rubber Indon, Box 1215). 
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 US State Department telegram (Klippert of Goodyear to Lundberg) dated 29 March 1965 (USNACP, 
RG 59 Central Files 1964-66, Inco Rubber Indon, Box 1215). 
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through a percentage of production, with a repayment period of seven years because 
USR‘s concessions were scheduled to expire in seven years; the ministry would make a 
detailed evaluation of the estate and propose other details. Similarly, in mid-May the 
Ministry of Estates asked Goodyear to agree in principle to a production-sharing 
arrangement. A commission would be formed to appraise the Goodyear investment, and 
once a value was agreed upon Goodyear would be paid off over 10 years at 10% per year 
by giving Goodyear a percentage of the production from its ex estates.  The remainder of 
the ex-estates production would then be marketed jointly by Goodyear and the GOI under 
an agreement between the two, although the GOI would not be bound to this. The 
ministry required that Goodyear sign over its property rights before agreeing to any 
production sharing arrangement, a condition that obviously was unfavorable for 
Goodyear.
134
  In sum, it appeared that there was general agreement that (i) both USR and 
Goodyear would be compensated for their estates over a several year period, (ii) both 
would be allowed to market produce from their own estates as well as GOI estates, and 
(iii) both could keep a small contingent of advisors in country (especially for quality 
control, marketing, and medical services). What was not agreed was how much 
compensation the companies would be paid, and how (the method of payment: pricing or 
production sharing) the companies would be paid. 
Final agreement was not reached over the next six months. In fact, the 
negotiations seemed to have died down by mid-June, as neither side appeared to be in a 
great hurry.  In part this surely reflects that the meat of the bargain – the sticky details 
regarding compensation and payment terms – were extremely difficult to agree to. In 
addition, from the Ministry of Estate‘s side, a reason for the slowdown may have been 
the takeover of all foreign estates pursuant to President Sukarno‘s Decree of 26 April.  As 
we shall see in the next Chapter, the ministry was extremely busy dealing with the 
implementation of that decree and probably had little time to iron out details with two 
companies that were already under ministry control. Similarly, from early October 
onward the ministry was certainly preoccupied with the aftermath of the September 30 
Movement. From the companies‘ perspective, they appeared to be in no hurry in large 
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 US Embassy telegram (Ellis) dated 11 June 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1964-66, Inco Rubber 
Indon, Box 1215). 
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part because they continued to market latex from Indonesia, in spite of the lack of a 
formal agreement with the GOI governing the future arrangement. The exact 
arrangements are unclear, but both the companies continued with their marketing of GOI 
PPN estate latex (probably the relationship existing at the time of the takeover continued) 
well as latex from their ex estates. As long as this was continuing profitably, there was 
little reason to complain. In addition, a small number (2-3) of foreign personnel from the 
companies remained on the estates or in Medan dealing with quality control and 
marketing issues and negotiating with the GOI.
135
 However, as we shall see in the next 
Chapter, agreement would soon be forced upon both USR and Goodyear at the end of 
1965.  
With the ending of ownership control over the companies, a contest immediately 
began within Indonesia for control over the estates and the opportunity to exploit the 
perceived wealth, resources and manpower they represented. The US consul in Medan 
reported that the newly-appointed GOI management began to ―line their pockets.‖ A 
favorite method was by the upward revision of local contracts, with the extra going to the 
management. New management also favored increased sales of sheet rubber, rather than 
latex rubber, because the sheet rubber could be sold locally with greater opportunities for 
skimming. The US consul in Medan also reported that at least for the first few months 
there were continuing disputes between the PKI-controlled labor unions and the new 
management. Apparently management was resisting labor union calls to nasakomize the 
management of the estates, which might allow the PKI to access the resources and 
manpower of the estates. In this effort, the SOBSI labor unions were supported by North 
Sumatra Governor Sitepu, and the pressure was particularly strong on Goodyear‘s Dolok 
Merangir estate. Other labor groups were also contesting control over the estates as well. 
There was in addition pressure for the army to have some representation on the board of 
directors, even though General Mokoginta (the All Sumatra Regional Commander) 
claimed he was unaware of such a movement. There were also acts of laborer sabotage in 
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 See, e.g., US Embassy Bi-Weekly Economic Reviews dated 26 July 1965, 1 October 1965 and 19 
November 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1964-66, E2-2 – E8, Indonesia, Boxes 722-3); and US 
Embassy telegrams (Green) dated 2 September 1965 and 25 September 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central 
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 413 
 
retaliation for the illicit sale to the laborers of parcels of land by various takeover 
committees and groups seeking to cash in; when the land was not delivered, workers 
contaminated the latex. These circumstances had all contributed to a decline in 
production, at least in the short term.
136
 
There was perhaps no better symbol of the ensuing contest for resources than the 
events concerning PT Hapinis, the company controlled by high-ranking officials from the 
NU political party.  As we saw earlier, back in June 1964 Coordinating Minister of 
Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs Sadjarwo had promised PT Hapinis a part of 
Goodyear‘s Wingfoot estate once the Wingfoot estate exchange was finalized.  Even 
though the estate exchange had been postponed, Hapinis by late 1964 had indeed begun 
to occupy a large southern portion of the Wingfoot estate, a situation that Goodyear was 
powerless to stop. In late June 1965, almost four months after the GOI takeover of the 
estates, Minister Sadjarwo decreed that Hapinis had the right to exploit all the rubber 
from the Wingfoot estate; the profits were reportedly to pay for the construction of a new 
party headquarters. Minister Sadjarwo, as we saw in the previous Chapter, had great 
differences with Minister of Estates Frans Seda and with respect to the foreign estates had 
not played a very public role since President Sukarno‘s Decree 6/1964, which clearly 
gave Minister Seda authority over the British estates. While it is not clear what the 
Sadjarwo/NU relationship was or what Sadjarwo was getting in return, this latest measure 
was certainly an affirmation of the attitude by many GOI officials that the ex-foreign 
estates were items to be exploited, bargained over, and used as patronage.  According to 
the US embassy, Minister Seda was not consulted regarding Minister Sadjarwo‘s decree 
and was furious when he heard about it, arguing that since Goodyear still owned the 
estate, it was not the GOI‘s to give away. The measure also raised the ire of the Action 
Command to Crush US and Belgian Imperialism, the body that was so active in 
demonstrating against the American estates and apparently was still around. It appears, 
though, that despite the protests the concession was initially granted.
137
  It was finally 
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reversed by Minister Seda in May 1966 after the sale negotiations were concluded and 
the Goodyear and US Rubber estates were merged into the GOI-owned estate system (see 




III. The Oil Companies. 
 
Next up were the big three foreign oil companies, Caltex, Stanvac and Shell, 
which were officially taken over on 19 March 1965, some three weeks after the American 
estates.
139
 Similar to the takeovers of the American estates companies, there is a very 
limited record of the behind-the-scenes activity within the GOI prior to the actual 
takeovers that provides some clues as to the motivations behind the takeovers, but this 
evidence is very confusing. Like the estate companies, the decision to take over the oil 
companies was made at the highest levels of the GOI and came as there appeared to be 
mounting pressure from labor unions, but the actual GOI takeover occurred before there 
was any physical seizure or takeover by third parties. The end result, however, was 
unique among all the foreign companies taken over in Indonesia from 1963-65 and 
exemplified oil company exceptionalism: while the companies were in theory placed 
under GOI control and supervision, in reality GOI control and supervision did not 




                                                                                                                                                 
to Klippert) dated 8 July 1965 and 9 July 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1964-66, Inco Rubber 
Indon, Box 1215); US Medan Consul telegram (Heavner) dated 3 September 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 
Central Files 1964-66, Inco Rubber Indon, Box 1215). Sadjarwo‘s decree apparently designated Wingfoot 
as a ‗pilot project‘ to be managed by PT Hapinis.    
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 For a description of the operations of the big three, see Chapter Three, Part II, Section A. Although 
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pages because its operations were comparatively insignificant. Pan American International Oil Company 
was owned by Standard Oil of Indiana, and the Indonesian subsidiary was named Pan American Indonesian 
Oil Company. As noted in Chapter Three, it signed a CoW in 1962 and commenced exploration activities 
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October 1966 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1964-66, PET 15-2 Indon, Box 1389) and 17 January 1967 
(USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1967-9, PET 6 Indon, Box 1356).  
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 It should be noted, though, that as we shall see in the next Chapter Shell was actually bought out by the 




As we saw in the previous Chapters, the GOI had since the beginning of the 
takeovers in September 1963 maintained a policy that Shell – and in practice, Stanvac 
and Caltex - was not to be interfered with. This policy, of course, was not followed in the 
case of Shell‘s East Kalimantan operations from late September through late December 
1963. There also had been a number of minor worker takeover attempts at various Shell 
facilities in January 1964, though these were never fully carried out, and over the course 
of 1964 there were various worker strikes and demonstrations at Shell‘s facilities and at 
Stanvac‘s operations. Stanvac, in fact, was forced to withdraw its expatriates from the 
Pendopo oil field to the refinery at Sungei Gerong in early 1964 because of PERBUM 
(Persatuan Buruh Minyak, the oil workers labor union, affiliated with SOBSI) pressure. 
The departure of the expatriates did not seem to stop the strikes and demonstrations, 
though none of them involved any significant attempt to takeover the company.
141
  
Caltex‘s operations apparently did not experience nearly as many demonstrations, 
presumably because it had no refinery acting as a central operations area and its fields 
were far from major centers of population. In addition, PERBUM, for a number of 
reasons, also was significantly weaker at Caltex than the other two.
142
   
In late February and early March 1965, at the peak of the anti-American period 
described in Part I above, pressure to take over the oil companies mounted. This pressure 
seemed to come from two sources: the first was within the GOI itself, and the second 
from workers and specifically PERBUM, which was directing the workers.  The reasons 
may have been intertwined in that GOI officials were reacting to PERBUM actions, but 
again the picture is very murky; the GOI decision may have been made before there was 
even a significant worker attempt to grab the companies. On 23 February the general 
manager for Caltex was informed by military sources that a certain group was planning to 
take over US oil companies in the next few days. Apparently Third Deputy Prime 
                                                                                                                                                 
proved exceptional in that it appears to be the only one which both endured and which the GOI actually 
paid for. 
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 Interview with John Karamoy 12 September 2006, and interview with Sudono 26 September 2006. Mr. 
Karamoy was the field manager for Stanvac‘s Pendopo field from early 1964 until late 1966. Mr. Sudono 
also worked for Stanvac at the Pendopo field in the mid-1960s.  
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 Interview with Madjedi Hasan, Wisaksono Noeradi, and Anton Wahjosoedibjo 5 October 2006. Each of 
these men worked for Caltex in the mid-1960s.   
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Minister Chaerul Saleh, who was also the Minister of Basic Industry and Mining (under 
whose jurisdiction the oil companies fell) was involved in the plan, because ―for political 
reasons [he] wants to assert his revolutionary character.‖
143
  The veracity of this claim is 
impossible to verify; similarly, it is unknown who was part of the ‗group,‘ or whether this 
group was actually involved in the takeovers that followed. It was certainly true, though, 
that Minister Chaerul Saleh was under pressure from the PKI beginning early 1965. After 
the shutdown of the ‗Body to Support Sukarno‘ and the Murba party in late December 
and early January (both of which were virulently anti-PKI, see Chapter Five, Part I, 
Section A), the PKI had intensely campaigned against those associated with Murba, and 
Minister Saleh and Trade Minister Adam Malik (who were both linked with the Murba 
party, though Minister Saleh was not officially a member) were particularly targeted. 
Both were demoted in a minor cabinet reshuffle of late March, though both remained in 
the cabinet. It is uncertain if President Sukarno was acting under pressure from the PKI or 
had his own reasons for the demotions, but what is clear is that Chaerul Saleh in 
particular was engaged in a real struggle with the PKI, with both sides trying to gain 
favor with President Sukarno.
144
  
On 3 March, Julius Tahija, an Indonesian who was one of the highest ranking 
managers at Caltex, informed the US embassy that for the first time that morning 
Caltex‘s Jakarta headquarters had been smeared with slogans, reflecting increased PKI 
pressure aimed at forcing a takeover of American oil companies. In addition, Tahija said 
that the army territorial commander in central Sumatra had removed several 
―troublemakers‖ from Caltex‘s oil fields.  No interference with operations had been 
experienced, and the army commander there was fully aware of the importance of the 
continued flow of oil. In fact, Tahija claimed that President Sukarno and key military 
figures were quite aware that the ―moment anything happens indicating interference with 
control of Caltex (even such [an] occurrence as occupation of Caltex Headquarters in 
Jakarta) insurance companies will withdraw insurance on tankers and lift of oil from 
Indonesia will be halted.‖ Tahija also asserted that some takeover plans had been made 
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 US Embassy telegram (Jones) dated 23 February 1965 (LBJL, National Security Files, Country File 
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Indonesia, pp. 66-7.  
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by the GOI already, including the naming of personnel at key positions at Caltex, but that 
implementation of the plan would depend on the ―power interplay between Sukarno, 
Subandrio and the PKI, and the Army.‖ He explained that President Sukarno had given 
First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio much rope, but was beginning to doubt some of 
the things Subandrio had done, and if Sukarno found that Subandrio had hurt Indonesia‘s 
position then Sukarno would get rid of him. Many people, especially in the army, were 
worried about the way Subandrio was handling affairs in Indonesia, and the army was 
―particularly concerned about oil continuity of its fuel supplies without which it would 
soon be immobilized.‖ The army was ―trying to stay neutral in [the] internal political 
struggle.‖ The implication was that Subandrio was in a position to influence the PKI‘s 
attacks on the oil companies: ―if Subandrio pushes his pro-PKI program to the point 
where oil companies are taken over this could well produce serious clash between the 
armed forces and the PKI and elements cooperating with it.‖
145
    
On 13 March, Tahija was told by Minister Chaerul Saleh confidentially that the 
day before (12 March) at a meeting of unnamed top GOI officials in Bogor the decision 
had been made to take over the management of the three oil companies in the next few 
days. Minister Saleh indicated that after the takeover operations would proceed normally 
and the CoWs adhered to. Although specifics of the takeover were vague, Saleh gave a 
sense of the thinking at the meeting. First, Caltex‘s American employees could stay or 
leave, and Caltex could continue to transfer oil in its own tankers. If Caltex elected not to 
do so, Russian tankers were ready to step in, and the USSR was also ready to assist the 
GOI with marketing the oil.  Second, army leaders at the meeting strongly believed that 
the PKI had gone too far (with what exactly is unclear) and were going along with the 
decision in order to ensure continuing domestic supply.
146
 However, a day or two later 
Tahija also met with the ―three military chiefs‖ (presumably this meant the leaders of the 
army, navy and air force) who assured him that they would oppose anything ―which 
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 US Embassy telegram (Jones) dated 3 March 1965 (LBJL, National Security Files, Country File 
Indonesia, Indonesia Cables (1 of 2), Volume IV, 3/65 – 9/65, Box 247).  US Ambassador Jones, for one, 
believed there was ―considerable wishful thinking‖ in Tahija‘s analysis and doubted that the oil situation 
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Suharto and President Sukarno.   
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 US Embassy telegram (Jones) dated 13 March 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1964-66, PET 15-2 
Indon, Box 1389). 
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would affect oil operations in any drastic way.‖
147
  Meanwhile, on 15 March Minister 
Subandrio gave US Ambassador Jones ―categorical assurances that GOI had no present 
intention of disturbing American oil companies or abdicating contracts‖ and also said he 
had told Chaerul Saleh the same day to ―lay off‖ the oil companies.
148
 
In fact, Minister Chaerul Saleh seems not to have ‗laid off‘ at all. According to 
the British embassy, in the week before 19 March Minister Saleh met with the political 
committee of PERBUM and asked them what they wanted to do. The response was ―kick 
out the foreigners,‖ which Saleh explained would lead to many difficulties. When this 
group persisted with the demand, Saleh said he would consult with President Sukarno.  
Apparently he did so and two days later called back the political committee, enunciating 
a three point plan which had the President‘s approval. The first point was that ―maximum 
difficulties‖ should be made for the American oil companies, but not to the point of 
takeover; further instructions would be given depending on how American/Indonesian 
relations developed. Shell was to be left alone for the time being because ―they were 
sincere and had a good record.‖  The second prong was that there should be maximum 
pressure for Indonesianization of top management of the oil companies. The third prong 
was the complete revision of the CoWs.  In fact, later in the week but unbeknownst to 
Minister Saleh, Permigan, the GOI partner to Shell, told Shell that there must be 
complete and immediate Indonesianization of Shell and even provided names of the 
Indonesians they wanted to fill the positions.
149
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On 18 March, there was a worker strike at Shell‘s Pladju refinery as well as a 
demonstration at Stanvac‘s Sungei Gerong refinery. The strike at Pladju was led by 
PERBUM and lasted only one day; it was unclear how much the strike affected 
operations, but by the next day operations had returned to normal.
150
 The demonstration 
at Stanvac‘s Sungei Gerong garnered much attention and was widely reported in the press 
as an attempted takeover of the facility, but despite such reports no takeover occurred or 
was really even close to occurring; in fact, operations apparently were not significantly 
disturbed and things were back to normal the next day as Sungei Gerong was 
immediately put under army and police protection.  The attempt was led by PERBUM 
acting via the ‗Oil Workers Action Unit at Sungei Gerong‘ (Kesatuan Aksi Buruh Minyak 
Sungei Gerong, a group comprised of the seven major oil worker unions), as apparently 
the Muslim unions were opposed to it.
151
 While the takeover attempt was hardly 
threatening, the Kesatuan Aksi Buruh Minyak Sungei Gerong did issue a ‗proclamation,‘ 
signed by representatives from PERBUM, the KBM, and SARBUMUSI (the NU labor 
federation), declaring that Sungei Gerong had been seized. The proclamation referred to 
(i) the attitude of the imperialist USA, the enemy of Indonesia who gave $4.0 million of 
weapons as aid to Malaysia, (ii) the attitude of President Sukarno, who said all foreign 
capital should be taken over, (iii) the necessity to take concrete steps to support President 
Sukarno regarding the foreign capitalist imperialist Americans in Indonesia, and (iv) the 
attitude of the Kommando Aksi Buruh Minyak that was displayed on 11 March (this may 
have been a reference to the meeting between Minister Chaerul Saleh and PERBUM 
representatives). The proclamation then declared that by the actions of the workers on 18 
March the American company at Sungei Gerong and the Pendopo oil field had become 
the property of the Republic of Indonesia in accordance with Article 33 of the Indonesian 
constitution. The proclamation further asked that President Sukarno take over Stanvac‘s 
property and make it the property of Indonesia, and also instructed the workers to 
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continue working and that the oil workers and the armed forces should work together to 
safeguard oil production and distribution.
152
    
The next day, 19 March, events reached a climax. Early in the morning, there 
were incidents at the Jakarta headquarters of Stanvac and Caltex. At Stanvac, a crowd of 
about 200 gathered outside as 15 representatives from PERBUM, SARBUMUSI, and 
Buruh Marhaenis (another labor group) met inside with Stanvac‘s general manager. At 
this meeting the labor representatives said they were taking over the company and asked 
the general manager to leave. The general manager refused both demands, saying that 
Stanvac was only a contractor under the CoW and any takeover orders could come only 
from the GOI.  The crowd then left and went to Caltex headquarters, where eight 
representatives met with Caltex management and declared that Caltex operations were 
being taken over. Similar to Stanvac‘s response, Caltex management refused to accept the 
takeover on the grounds that Caltex ―could not take any orders from anyone except the 
GOI‖ under the CoW. The crowd then left, saying they had an appointment with Minister 
Chaerul Saleh. Neither of these incidents was violent, and neither interfered with the 
companies‘ operations or amounted to anything close to a takeover of the companies. 
Nevertheless, police advised that Caltex expatriate managers be sent home, and most 
Indonesian and expatriate staff were accordingly sent home for the day.
153
  Apparently 
the worker delegations did meet later that morning with Minister Chaerul Saleh. The New 
York Times reported that ―[a] thousand Communist-led workers had presented a petition 
to Dr. Saleh this morning, asking him to seize the oil companies,‖ to which Saleh 
reportedly answered that the decision would be made by President Sukarno.
154
 Shortly 
thereafter, Minister Saleh met with President Sukarno and Minister Subandrio.
155
  
B. The Takeovers. 
Emerging from the meeting with First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio and 
Third Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul Saleh on the afternoon of 19 March, President 
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Sukarno told reporters that the GOI was taking over management of the foreign oil 
companies. Minister Saleh elaborated on Sukarno‘s statement, saying that the President 
had already telegraphed military authorities in Sumatra to place the companies under 
temporary GOI authority and supervision.
156
 He further said that the decision was made 
―to stem oil worker‘s and people‘s enthusiasm to take over foreign oil companies on 
account of US support for Malaysia and to safeguard security and proprietary rights of 
the foreign oil companies.‖ He indicated that management and supervisory teams would 
be appointed, but the companies would remain responsible for operations and were 
obligated to support the GOI teams.
157
  Separately, he also arranged for the companies to 
meet with him the morning of the next day, 20 March. 
Surprisingly, Minister Saleh was unable to make this 20 March meeting, having 
been called away to Bogor for very urgent KOTI meetings. Instead, the short meeting 
took place between representatives of Caltex, Shell, Stanvac and Pan American and three 
officials from the Ministry of Basic Industry and Mining, including one of Saleh‘s 
deputies.
158
  The companies were given three documents: a letter from Minister Saleh 
himself and two decrees implementing the takeover. The letter from Saleh, which was in 
English and was read aloud at the meeting, is worth quoting at length for its reasoning 
behind the GOI‘s decision to take over the companies. It noted that recent events ―are the 
logical consequences of our revolution which is part of the revolution of mankind for a 
better world to live in.‖ There have been ―rising demands which in essence is the 
breaking off of the rules, norms and conditions which arise from and have been pushed 
along by the imperialistic mind in all its manifestations in the political, economical as 
well as the social and cultural field.‖ These events include the 
contradictory and even conflicting political relations between the 
Indonesian and the US and British governments concerning the ‗Malaysia‘ 
issue, the strengthening of solidarity between the Afro-Asian nations 
striving for their common goals, and the march of the New Emerging 
Forces, all are unbreakable and interrelated and constitute a part of the 
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recent developments which took place, namely demands made by the 
workers-unions concerning the oil companies. 
 
The GOI was ―aware of its responsibilities and recognizes the vitality and role of the oil 
industry in the development as well as in the defense of the state,‖ and especially now at 
the current stage of Konfrontasi the GOI ―has to safeguard its interest but simultaneously 
has to meet to a certain extent the aspiration and potentialities of the people. Therefore in 
light of recent events the Government is determined to take [measures] to safeguard the 
continuation and smooth functioning of the oil operations.‖ The letter seemed to be 
suggesting that Konfrontasi and other events had stimulated the people/workers to action, 
and the GOI, because of the importance of oil production to the country, was stepping in 
to safeguard its interests. The letter continued: ―The oil industry will be placed and 
custody [sic] under direct government control temporarily while recognizing and 
maintaining the proprietary rights of the foreign partners.‖ The cooperation of the 
companies was requested in order to ―avoid any possible stagnation in functioning of the 
industry,‖ and the smoothness of the GOI measures would be the ―measuring staff‖ for 




Two decrees implementing GOI supervision were also given to the companies at 
the 20 March meeting. The first decree, issued by Third Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul 
Saleh in the name of the Presidium Kabinet, placed Caltex, Shell and Stanvac under the 
temporary control/supervision (penguasaan/pengawasan) of the GOI without 
diminishing the proprietary rights of the companies.
160
  The decree indicated that the 
Minister of Basic Industry and Mining (Chaerul Saleh) would appoint supervisory teams 
to assist in implementing the supervision. The management of the oil companies was 
obligated to continue to share responsibility over the efficient operations of the 
companies, and was also obliged to assist the supervisory teams.  The three elements of 
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(i) assumption of management, but not ownership, (ii) the appointment of supervisory 
teams, and (iii) the obligation of owner-appointed management to continue to assist the 
teams, were almost identical to the terms of the GOI takeover of the American estate 
companies the previous month.  The decree cited the following reasons for the measures: 
(a) the increasing intensity of Konfrontasi against the puppet Malaysia, and the interests 
of security and safety of the entire oil industry for the benefit of the revolutionary 
struggle in facing increasing revolutionary enthusiasm, (b) that the political attitude of the 
USA and Great Britain had caused the anger of the oil workers and laborers to emerge 
and who therefore took the step of proclaiming the takeover of the companies, and (c) the 
framework of the commemoration of the 10 year anniversary of the first Afro-Asian 
conference (i.e., Bandung in 1955). The second decree was issued by Minister Saleh in 
his capacity as Minister of Basic Industry and Mining (the Ministry which oversaw the 
oil companies) and appointed the supervisory teams for each of Caltex, Stanvac and 
Shell.
161
   
Oil company representatives were finally able to meet separately with Minister 
Chaerul Saleh and his assistants on 22 March. Minister Saleh seemed to make different 
points with each company, or at least each company seemed to come away with different 
impressions. In the meeting with Caltex, Saleh said the companies would soon be 
receiving written statements regarding the functions of the teams. Saleh indicated that 
―political pressures‖ had forced him to take these steps, but that he hoped they would be 
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temporary and that everything at Caltex could continue on a relatively normal basis. 
However, should the team find Indonesians ―capable of fulfilling higher grade positions,‖ 
then the expatriates in those positions likely would be asked to leave. When Caltex 
complained about the actions of some union members, Saleh indicated he would send the 




In the meeting with Stanvac representatives, Minister Saleh indicated that the GOI 
had acted under an article of the CoW which allowed the GOI to take measures based on 
the GOI‘s defense needs. In addition to defense, the GOI had acted in the interests of the 
security of the company. He indicated the measures were temporary and that the length 
would depend upon the internal and external political situation, in particular the Malaysia 
issue, but that he hoped operations would continue normally. Saleh also suggested that 
the team would work within the terms of the CoW except in the special cases of defense 
and national revolution; otherwise, normal management functions would continue as 
usual, and Stanvac could appeal decisions of the team to him. He further indicated that 
there would be sub-teams at Stanvac‘s installations and that they might occasionally 
―take over management prerogatives.‖ Finally, the Stanvac manager also reported what 
had been heard about Minister Saleh‘s meeting earlier that day with the supervisory 
teams. Saleh apparently instructed the teams to be ―passive‖ if the companies cooperated, 
but ―active‖ if the companies did not cooperate and pursued policies ―contrary to the 
Indonesian revolution.‖ The CoWs would continue for now, though in four months time 




In the meeting with Shell representatives, Minister Saleh indicated several reasons 
for the imposition of GOI supervision over Shell, despite its not being an American 
company. First, although recent labor activities had been directed against the American 
companies, it was only a matter of time before Shell began experiencing such labor 
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activities. Second, the GOI did not want to give the impression that ―American 
companies were being discriminated against.‖ Regarding the function of the supervisory 
team, Minister Saleh gave some unclear answers. He indicated that the team would 
supervise the activities and decisions of the Shell board of directors, but that the team 
would do so without disturbing the company‘s operations under the CoW.  When 
queried, Saleh said the company would be managed half by the team and half by the 
Shell board, though how this would be done apparently was not said. Further, on matters 
such as defense and ―sovereign rights‖ (which were cited as other reasons for GOI 
supervision), the team would assume management authority. When Shell pointed out the 
difficulties of division of management responsibility, Saleh responded by expressing the 
―hope that reasonable cooperation could be developed in the spirit of mutual 
consultation.‖ In addition, Saleh noted that the duration of supervision would depend on 
the company‘s cooperation as well as the Malaysia issue. Finally, he admitted that the 
GOI was worried about recent labor union activities and that these measures were 
intended to ―curb such activities.‖
164
 
In addition to the meetings with the companies on 22 March, Minister Saleh also 
issued a third decree concerning the organization, duties, authority and working 
procedures of the supervisory teams.
165
 This decree essentially expanded the duties set 
forth in Saleh‘s decree of 19 March; presumably the extra three days allowed the 
Ministry of Basic Industry and Mining to reflect more about what it wanted the 
supervisory teams to do. The decree kept the structure of the teams intact, although it did 
formalize the composition of the five man teams as one representative from the GOI 
partner company, one representative from MIGAS, two representatives from the foreign 
oil company, and one labor representative, each of whom were to be appointed by the 
Minister of Basic Industry and Mining. The teams were given authority over the 
following: (i) to implement and safeguard the instructions of the minister, (ii) to stipulate 
and direct each action by management to adjust the operations of the company to the 
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regulations and guidelines and policies of the government, (iii) to exercise actively day to 
day supervision of all activities and actions of management in the areas of exploration, 
production, processing, transportation, storage and administrative matters, (iv) to bring in 
line all actions of management contrary to the regulations, guidelines or policies of the 
government, (v) to request all information and explanations deemed necessary pertaining 
to the oil company, and management was obliged to assist the team in carrying out its 
tasks, (vi) to supervise all activities within the orbit of the oil company in order to prevent 
anything that may hamper production, and (vii) to handle all issues from inside or out of 
the company and to settle them in line with laws, regulations and guidelines of the 
government. In carrying out their tasks, the teams were expected to make contacts and 
cooperate closely with agencies and organizations within and without the Ministry of 
Basic Industry and Mining, at the capital city as well as in the provinces. The Deputy 
Minister of Mining Affairs was designated as the minister‘s representative with day to 
day authority, including the power to suspend members of the teams. Finally, the teams 
were expected to provide monthly reports to the minister on their work. The powers 
contained in the decree were obviously extremely broad and could easily result in the 
effective displacement of owner-appointed management; the trick for the oil companies 
would be to see how much these broad powers were actually exercised. 
On 24 March, just five days after GOI supervision was announced on 19 March, 
the supervisory teams were formerly installed at separate ceremonies at the Jakarta 
headquarters of each company. The ceremonies were ―quiet, with no large crowds or 
demonstrations,‖ but the one at Stanvac was filmed by local TV. At each ceremony, 
Minister Chaerul Saleh made both a short speech and a later ―longer speech for political 
consumption,‖ in which he instructed the teams to act in accordance with the Revolution, 
the defense of Indonesia, the struggle to crush Malaysia, and for the welfare of the 
people. He also said that future cooperation between the GOI and the oil companies 
would depend on the ―assistance, cooperation and understanding‖ the companies gave to 
the supervisory teams.
166
 The swiftness of events left the oil companies reeling, with 
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hardly any time to react, and the big unresolved question was just how much the 
supervisory teams would interfere with their operations. 
It should also be noted that Third Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul Saleh issued yet 
another decree concerning oil just as all of these events were unfolding, but its exact 
purpose and relationship to the foreign oil companies is unclear.
167
  The decree formed a 
team to ―Upgrade National Defense in the Field of Oil,‖ which was headed by the 
Minister of Basic Industry and Mining (Saleh himself) and included the Minister of 
Labor, the Minister/Secretary General of the National Front, the Commanders of the 
army, navy, air force and police, the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, the Deputy 
Attorney General, the Chairman of KOTI‘s Oil Affairs team, the three President 
Directors of the SOE oil companies, and an unstated number of representatives from oil 
labor organizations. The team was charged with following, investigating, and evaluating 
all developments and problems in oil affairs and formulating proposals in order to 
increase national defense. The team was also allowed to establish sub-teams at the 
regional level to assist the team (the composition of these regional teams was also 
specified and consisted of the regional Pantja Tunggal, as well as single representatives 
from each of the Ministry of Basic Industry and Mining, the Ministry of Labor, the three 
GOI oil companies, and an oil labor organization). What motivated this decree is unclear; 
the formation of the group may have been Minister Saleh‘s response to the army‘s 
concerns over the country‘s oil supply and its obvious impact on the army‘s operational 
capabilities. One observer suggested it was intended to check the influence of labor 
unions.
168
 It is unclear if the team ever actually met or whether it caried out any of its 
assigned activities, and it does not appear to have been a factor in the supervision of the 
oil companies.   
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C. Company Reaction and Impact of GOI Control and 
Supervision. 
Although the oil companies were clearly somewhat shell-shocked by the dizzying 
pace of events, in reality there was initially very little they could do but to comply with 
the GOI measures and wait and see what developed. The speed of events, and the great 
uncertainty they portended, also were suggestive that the proper approach would be to 
wait until the dust settled before taking any action. Certainly the oil companies (and 
obviously Shell) were aware of the takeovers of the British firms in 1963-64 as well as 
the takeover of the American rubber estates in February. However, they probably 
correctly sensed that the oil industry was simply too important and too complicated for 
the GOI to make any immediate and radical changes. As early as 13 March, when Tahija 
of Caltex was told by Minister Chaerul Saleh that plans were afoot to take over the 
companies, the general manager of Caltex acknowledged that Caltex was faced with 
really only two choices: either accept the GOI intervention or get out.
169
  A similar choice 
faced Shell and Stanvac, and each of the three companies adopted the ‗accept, wait and 
see‘ alternative. None apparently requested the formal intervention of the American 
government or the British government, instead electing to deal with the matter on their 
own. 
Indeed, the great uncertainty of the situation had both encouraging and 
discouraging elements for the companies. On the one hand, there were several 
considerations indicating that the situation was not so bad. The Caltex general manager, 
for one, thought that the GOI measures were the minimum steps politically that the GOI 
could have taken to placate labor; the real question was whether the GOI teams would 
actually interfere in the companies‘ operations.
170
 Similarly, the general manager of 
Stanvac felt if the GOI ―had kept hands off, Perbum would be able to shut down the 
companies and that perhaps [the] present set up is the only way to bring peace with the 
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  Second, the companies could derive some satisfaction from the 
composition of the supervisory teams: of the five members, two were from the companies 
themselves, one was a professional from the companies‘ SOE partner, one was a 
professional bureaucratic who knew the industry well, and only one represented labor 
organizations and therefore may be more radical in his demands. Stanvac, at least, felt 
that such a composition signaled the GOI‘s intent that ―the company and the team will be 
able [to] operate together smoothly.‖
172
  In fact, all three companies thought the 
composition satisfactory, with the exception of the labor representatives.
173
 Thirdly, the 
companies certainly believed the GOI recognized that it was unable to step into the 
companies‘ shoes if they did leave. Thus Shell‘s managing director thought it unlikely 
that the GOI would allow the companies to pull out of Indonesia because it would throw 
the entire Indonesian oil industry into ―utter confusion.‖
174
 Stanvac‘s general manager 
also thought that the GOI was trying to satisfy union pressure without actually abrogating 
the CoWs (which would have led to arbitration).
175
  Over the next few months, the 
companies apparently did make it clear to GOI officials – if the latter did not already 
know – the possible impact on the domestic oil situation as well as on overseas sales of 
crude oil if the companies suspended operations in Indonesia.
176
  
Fourth, the minor reorganization and reshuffling of the Indonesian cabinet at the 
end of March seemed to strengthen the companies‘ position. In the reshuffle, the Ministry 
of Basic Industry and Mining was broken up into three separate ministries, the Ministry 
of Oil and Natural Gas, the Ministry of Mining, and the Ministry of Basic Industry, all 
under the Development Compartment. Minister Chaerul Saleh held on to the position of 
Minister of Oil and Natural Gas (he also remained the Coordinating Minister of the 
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Development Compartment), but other individuals were appointed to the other two 
ministries. However, Ibnu Sutowo, the medical doctor/army officer who was president-
director of the GOI oil company Permina and had become one of the most influential 
Indonesians in the oil industry (see Chapter Three, Part II, Section A for a brief 
description of Sutowo), was appointed as Minister of State for Oil Affairs, a brand new 
position. This minister was seconded to the Presidium Kabinet and thus potentially very 
influential.
177
 Given, though, that there was already a Minister for Oil and Gas – Chaerul 
Saleh - the position seemed superfluous, and it was unclear what the responsibilities of 
the two posts were and the relationship between them. There were of course, different 
interpretations about this move.
178
 Stanvac‘s general manager was inclined to think that it 
was the result of pressure from the army, afraid that Chaerul Saleh would ―succumb to 
communist pressure… and will wreck oil policy beyond retrievement [sic].‖
179
 After a 
few months, the US embassy reported there was 
reasonable agreement among the foreign companies that …Sutowo was 
appointed to prevent the PKI and the labor unions backed by it from 
gaining too strong a foothold in the oil companies. The reason is that both 
Saleh and Ibnu Sutowo are ambitious, but for different reasons. Saleh 
wants to be President, and so is subject to all sorts of political pressure.  
Ibnu Sutowo just wants to make a lot of money and to run a good oil 
industry. Both his ambitions and his status as an Army officer insulate him 




These fears about Minister Saleh‘s ability to resist political pressure certainly gained 
credence when in early April Saleh indicated to US Ambassador Jones that the CoWs 
would have to be renegotiated because things were moving so quickly; he claimed to be 
seeking a balanced approach to keep the oil companies interested, but the treatment of 
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 US Embassy telegram (Howard of Stanvac to Esso) dated 2 April 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 
1964-66, PET 15-2 Indon, Box 1389). 
180
 US Embassy telegram (Ellis) dated 6 July 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1964-66, PET 15-2 
Indon, Box 1389); see also US Embassy telegram (Ellis) dated 28 May 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central 
Files 1964-66, PET 15-2 Indon, Box 1389).  
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foreign enterprises was outmoded and needed to be revised ―in keeping with the 
revolution.‖
181
   
However, on the negative side, there were also some very evident reasons for the 
companies to be pessimistic. First was the general overall attitude toward foreign 
investment, which as we have seen continued to be increasingly negative. One Shell 
official in London, echoing the interpretation of the British embassy after the takeovers of 
British companies in 1963-64, thought the GOI‘s measures amounted to an attempt to 
expropriate the company without paying compensation and indicated Shell would not 
pump any more cash into Indonesia and would keep the supervisory team too busy to 
interfere.
182
 Indeed, the past 18 months had shown that a GOI ‗supervision‘ and 
‗management takeover‘ were the first steps to a full takeover. A second negative factor 
was the appointment of the labor representatives on the supervisory teams; none of the 
companies were happy with these members. In addition, Stanvac was very concerned 
over the composition of the team appointed in late March for the Sungei Gerong refinery. 
This team was comprised of one army officer, one representative from Permina (the GOI 
oil company), one representative from MIGAS, and 8 representatives from labor unions 
(one from each union at the refinery), and thus appeared to be top heavy with labor 
representatives. Apparently other local teams would have a similar composition.
183
 Third, 
as noted above, the companies had no real alternative other than to accept initially the 
GOI measures. Theoretically they could pursue arbitration under the CoWs, but this 
would be a long drawn out process, and there was no certainty that the GOI would even 
agree to participate, despite its obligation under the CoWs to do so. In fact, somewhat 
surprisingly, Stanvac‘s shareholders initially concluded that the three decrees effecting 
the takeover (Minister Saleh‘s Presidium decree of 19 March, and his two decrees of 19 
and 22 March issued as Minister of Basic Industry and Mining) were so vague that they 
were unable to conclude that there was a violation of the CoW, even though the decrees 
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 US Embassy telegram (Stanvac Jakarta to Esso) dated 6 April 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 
1964-66, PET 15-2 Indon, Box 1389). However, CoW renegotiations never materialized but instead were 
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 US Embassy telegram (Howard of Stanvac to Esso) dated 31 March 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central 
Files 1964-66, PET 15-2 Indon, Box 1389). 
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certainly authorized actions that would violate the CoW. However, there was nothing to 
gain now by making a general protest about breach of the CoW.
184
  The other alternative 
was to pull out, thereby losing everything, and retaliate against the GOI by boycotting its 
crude oil exports, but the companies were not ready to take this drastic, last irrevocable 
step while any hope remained.   
The companies‘ wait-and-see approach proved fruitful, as the supervisory teams 
in fact interfered very little in either the companies‘ management or their operations.
185
 
The non-interference by the supervisory teams at the oil companies was unique among all 
the foreign companies taken over from 1963-65; only in the case of the oil companies did 
the GOI not ultimately exercise management control. Except for greatly pressuring the 
companies to implement Indonesianization, which will be discussed below, the teams 
proved to be more of an irritant than anything else.  In addition to the teams at Jakarta 
headquarters of each company, teams were also sent to Stanvac‘s Sungei Gerong refinery 
and the Pendopo and Lirik fields (thus covering most of Stanvac‘s major assets),  and to 
Shell‘s Pladju refinery and one field in that area (but apparently not to Shell‘s operations 
in East Kalimantan). In addition, ‗regional‘ teams were appointed in Riau, where Caltex 
operations were located, and in South Sumatra, where Stanvac and Shell had operations; 
the function of these regional teams is not exactly clear, however, but presumably they 
were meant to involve regional authorities. Yet none of these teams appeared to interfere 
significantly in operations or management; initially, the teams were even more concerned 
with obtaining the perks of office (cars, office space, etc.) than with other matters.
186
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The teams occasionally flexed their muscle, such as the time when Stanvac‘s team 
at company headquarters in Jakarta sent a letter to Stanvac‘s Indonesian employees 
notifying them that the team could fire them if the employees did not cooperate.
188
  In 
addition, the teams implemented forced indoctrination sessions for Indonesian 
employees. Julius Tahija, the high-ranking Caltex executive, recalled 
‗control/supervision‘ meant coordinated efforts to wear us down. The 
government began to demand elaborate – and meaningless – studies. It 
also devised humiliations designed to prompt our open opposition. New 
regulations, for example, required all Caltex employees to attend anti-
capitalism indoctrination meetings. The philosophy behind these meetings 





Caltex also reported in early September that its regional team was requesting reports 
within an impossible time period; however, Caltex did not think this and other minor 
measures were coming from the top level, but instead that local demands were made ―to 
show [the] activity necessary to justify team membership.‖
190
   
From the companies‘ perspective, perhaps the greatest irritant the teams brought 
was greatly increased pressure to Indonesianize the companies‘ high level staff.
191
 The 
problem for the companies was the lack of well-trained Indonesian managers, a problem 
not unique to the oil industry. Indeed, the oil companies had made substantial efforts in 
the past decade to Indonesianize their staff, and they had agreed in the CoWs to continue 
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with this, yet progress was naturally slow, certainly in part because of supply issues.
192
  
For example, the new Indonesian manager at Shell‘s Balikpapan refinery was a public 
relations person with little experience in production and refining.
193
  It was clear to the 
companies from the beginning of the supervisory period that one of the main roles of the 
supervisory teams would be to press for more Indonesianization; Minister Chaerul Saleh 
told US Ambassador Howard Jones in early April that the rate of Indonesianisasi would 
have to be stepped up, and another GOI official even told one of Stanvac‘s employees 
that the main purpose of the supervisory teams was to increase this.
194
 Hence in early 
June the supervisory team at Caltex put great pressure on Caltex to Indonesianize its 
finance and medical staff, pressure Caltex thought was coming from the unions and the 
union representative on the supervisory team. The problem was potentially serious, as 
there was a shortage of Indonesian medical doctors (Caltex generally brought in foreign 
doctors) and its Indonesian finance staff was simply not ready.
195
 In late June, both Shell 
and Caltex were informed by their teams in writing that the companies should achieve 
75% Indonesianization at all levels (including the board of directors) by the end of the 
year, and the companies were to begin implementing this program by 1 October.
196
 Shell 
was also told around the same time that ―pending a satisfactory solution of the 
Indonesianization problem no personnel either expatriate or Indonesian should be 
transferred between the various areas of operation.‖
197
 In mid-August, Caltex‘s 
supervisory team sent it a letter outlining a crash program of Indonesianization, and in 
early September, the team instructed Caltex to appoint an Indonesian to the post of 
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superintendent of transport within one week.
198
  These direct pressures, however, were all 
generally successfully resisted by the companies, and after the September 30 Movement 
these demands died down, at least for several months.       
If the teams did not interfere in operations and only interfered with management 
to the extent of pressuring the companies to implement greater Indonesianization of staff 
members, what then was the function and role of the teams?  From the viewpoint of 
several Indonesians who were on the supervisory teams, the primary role was to protect 
the oil companies from the workers and labor unions. One member of the Stanvac 
supervisory team at the Sungei Gerong refinery stated that the purpose of the team was to 
act as a bumper between Stanvac and the workers, to act as liaison between the two, with 
the real goal of protecting the company from the workers led by the PKI, which was very 
strong and wanted to take over the company. As a result, the team did not try to get 
involved in the management or the business of the company, but tried to restrict and 
control the workers. There were 12 soldiers on site to assist with the effort.
199
 Similarly, 
one member of the supervisory team at Stanvac‘s headquarters indicated that the mission 
of the team was two-fold: first, to learn as much as possible about the business and 
operations of Stanvac, and second to protect Stanvac from the workers and the PKI so 
that its operations would not be disturbed. According to him, the supervisory team rarely 
met with Stanvac‘s management, but rather communicated through letters or via the 
Stanvac representatives on the team. Protecting the company from the workers in practice 
generally meant having a sense of what was going on, and if there were problems to tell 
the police or the army, but nothing ever happened at the Jakarta headquarters. The 
supervisory team had to write monthly reports to the Minister of Oil and Gas which 
highlighted what occurred each month in the business, such as production, exports, 
operations, etc. He also recalled that training sessions of about two weeks were held with 
Indonesian employees in which matters such as nationalism, Pantja Sila, the constitution 
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 Interview with A Qoyum Tjandranegara, 11 September 2006. Mr. Tjandranegara worked at the Ministry 




and NASAKOM were discussed. Team members also received an honorarium/salary 
from Stanvac as well as cars and offices.
200
 The chairman of the supervisory team at Shell 
echoed these sentiments. He indicated that the team‘s main job was to safeguard and 
maintain production, especially from the workers, and to dampen labor disputes so 
production would not be interfered with, to keep the labor unions under control. Before 
the team was installed at Shell, this man met with Minister Chaerul Saleh, who told him 
to safeguard the operations of the company. His team visited Shell‘s various facilities, 
met and discussed the GOI‘s intentions with staff and labor, and did not interfere with the 
company‘s operations.  Shell even involved the team in the business to a certain extent. 
He also indicated that the team was only active for a few months because it became 
heavily involved in the buyout negotiations.
201
 Conversations with several Indonesian 
employees of the oil companies also indicate that the main role the supervisory teams 
played was to keep the workers and unions in check.
202
  
Overall, it appears that labor union/worker agitation did decrease significantly 
after the supervisory teams were imposed. Whether this inactivity was the result of efforts 
                                                 
200
 Interview with Sjarif Lubis, 19 September 2006. Mr. Lubis worked for Stanvac from 1958 to 1961, 
when he began working at the Ministry of Basic Industry and Mining. In 1965 he was assigned to the 
supervisory team at Stanvac‘s headquarters.  
201
 Interview with Sutan Assin, 28 September 2006. Mr. Assin worked for Shell from 1958-63, then for 
Permigan, the state-owned oil company partnered with Shell under Shell‘s CoW. He was appointed the 
head of Shell‘s supervisory team in March 1965. 
202
 John Karamoy, the field manager of Stanvac‘s Pendopo oil field from early 1964 until late 1966, 
described how the GOI did not really intend to take over the oil companies, but rather the supervisory 
teams were meant to counter PERBUM and its demands that the companies be taken over. The GOI could 
not refuse the PKI, it was too strong, so the GOI had to do something to respond to the PKI‘s takeover 
demands. The message behind the installation of supervisory teams was that the company was now under 
the control of the GOI, so there was no need for PERBUM to take the company over, a message that the 
supervisory team often repeated to the workers. (PERBUM was very strong at Pendopo. In fact, before the 
supervisory team arrived, Karamoy had once been ‗kidnapped‘ for about eight hours by PERBUM 
members, who told him they were taking over Pendopo and then asked him to join them, which he refused.) 
The team, comprised of two men from the army, a captain and a lieutenant, knew that their mission was to 
protect the company, to be in the middle between the company and the workers/PKI. The team did not 
interfere in the operations at Pendopo, but instead let Karamoy do his job. The team was provided with 
housing (already built), cars, and some expenses (e.g., gas and water) which were very cheap. (Interview 
with John Karamoy 12 September 2006) Another Indonesian employee of Stanvac at Pendopo confirmed 
that the role of the supervisory team was to safeguard production.  He also indicated that the team did not 
interfere with operations and that the team was very successful in controlling the activities of PERBUM 
and other affiliates of the PKI. (Interview with Sudono 26 September 2006) Similarly, an employee of 
Caltex at the time also confirmed that the main purpose of the regional supervisory team in Rumbai (Riau) 
was to counter the PKI/PERBUM in the region, and that the supervisory team did not interfere in Caltex‘s 
operations and sometimes even facilitated them. One way the team neutralized the PKI/PERBUM was by 
imposing a requirement that all strikes and demonstrations had to be approved in advance by the team. 
(Interview with Madjedi Hasan 5 October 2006) 
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by the supervisory teams, or just a natural consequence of the GOI ―takeover‖ satisfying 
labor union demands, is unknown. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that, reflecting oil 
company exceptionalism, the GOI ―management takeover‖ of the oil companies was in 
name only and did not interfere in any significant way with the companies‘ management 
or operations.  
 
IV. Other American Companies. 
 
Somewhat overshadowed by the GOI takeover of American estates and the big 
three oil companies was the seizure and takeover of other American businesses, each of 
which had a significantly smaller presence in the country than either the estates or the oil 
companies. The GOI takeover of these companies came quickly in succession after the 
‗takeover‘ of the big three oil companies on 19 March: Goodyear‘s tire factory on 22 
March, followed by Union Carbide‘s battery plant on 3 April, AIFA insurance company 
around 4 April, National Cash Register on 10 April, and American film companies in 
mid-April. This period, as we saw in Part I, was exactly when US-Indonesian relations 
were reaching their low point. However, a major difference between these takeovers and 
those of the American estates and oil companies was that labor groups and other 
organizations actually physically seized these companies and thus triggered GOI 
intervention, unlike the estates and oil companies where the GOI ostensibly acted 
preemptively to prevent such a seizure. The failure of the GOI to act preemptively in the 
case of these other companies, I suggest, was a clear reflection of the lesser economic 
value of these companies as compared to the estates and oil companies, most notably as 
generators of foreign exchange revenues. As a result, the GOI takeover of these firms was 
a generally messy and seemingly uncoordinated affair. I start in Section A with the 
Goodyear tire factory, which was seized by labor groups on 20 March, one day after the 
GOI placed the big three oil companies under its control, and then taken over by the GOI 
on 22 March. Section B then analyzes the takeover of three other American companies 
that were first seized in late March and early April by the KBM labor federation in an 
obviously coordinated fashion that occurred just as US emissary Ellsworth Bunker was 
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arriving in Jakarta to assess the US-Indonesia bilateral relationship. Finally, Section C 
examines the takeover of American film companies, whose experience in 1964-65 
seemed to track precisely the US-Indonesian relationship.  
A. Goodyear Tire Factory. 
The Goodyear tire factory in Bogor (near Jakarta), the largest remaining 
American company in Indonesia, was the next company to be taken over by the GOI.
203
 
The GOI takeover occurred on 22 March, just three days after the GOI takeover of the oil 
companies. The takeover of Goodyear‘s tire factory has a number of interesting elements, 
including a takeover first by the city government of Bogor, followed by a workers 
takeover that precipitated the central government takeover.  
On 20 February, Mr. Corbin, Goodyear‘s general manager, was informed by the 
Pantja Tunggal of the city of Bogor that the Pantja Tunggal was temporarily taking over 
the factory in order to protect the factory from sabotage.
204
 This announcement came 
suddenly and was not preceded by any worker or labor union activity or any indications 
of sabotage. Corbin was told that a team was to be appointed to supervise the company, 
but he was assured that the team would not interfere at all in management or operations, 
that the supervision was to be nominal.
205
 The mayor of Bogor, as chairman of the Pantja 
Tunggal, then issued two decrees implementing the takeover.
206
 The first decree, No. 
554, placed the company under the Pantja Tunggal’s supervision, appointed an executive 
supervisory team (comprised of the members of the Pantja Tunggal other than the 
mayor), instructed the workers and management to work as usual, and also ordered the 
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local National Front branch to explain what was happening to the local community and 
mass organizations in order to prevent any actions which contradicted the decree.  The 
second decree, No. 555, appointed a second supervisory team, which presumably took 
direction from the executive team.  The decree instructed the supervisory team not to 
interfere in the internal affairs of the company, especially in the marketing and 
distribution areas, and also specifically stated that the team had no executive operational 
authority except as decided by the Pantja Tunggal.  This team was also directed to report 
immediately to the Pantja Tunggal any instances of sabotage or malfeasance. There were 
seven members appointed to the team; one representative from each of the prosecutor‘s 
office, the police and the local military command, one member from the National Front, 
and three labor federation representatives (Usman from KBM, A. Zaidan from 
SARBUMUSI (the NU affiliated labor federation), and Sumardjo from SOBSI).  In 
response to a written protest from Goodyear, the mayor of Bogor sent Goodyear a letter 
dated 24 February stating that the intent was to control security and provide physical 
protection (to prevent sabotage or subversive actions that ―may come from parties 
opposing smoothness‖ in the course of the Indonesian Revolution) and not to interfere 
with management or production.  
It appears that these measures genuinely were intended to safeguard the Goodyear 
factory.  Most importantly, the team did not interfere at all in management or operations 
of Goodyear.  Goodyear did make available office space to one or two police officials 
(representing the supervisory team), who interrogated some Indonesian employees, but 
otherwise management and operations were left undisturbed.
207
  Presumably the presence 
of the team was intended to dissuade union activity, and it is quite possible that the team 
did implement measures to control the workers.  Certainly the supervisory team was 
structured in a way both to appease the unions and to keep workers and unions under 
control; as we saw above, despite the presence of one member of the National Front and 
three representatives from labor organizations on the supervisory team, the defined duties 
of the team were quite limited, and there were other members of the team, as well as the 
executive team and the Pantja Tunggal itself, to rein in unwanted activity by the union 
                                                 
207
 US Embassy telegram (Ellis) dated 25 June 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1964-66, Inco 15-2 
Indon, Boxes 1072-3). 
 440 
 
members. Indeed, there appeared to be little union activity for about a month, with the 
notable exception of a 14 March meeting among mass organizations and labor groups in 
Bogor which called for the takeover of the company with labor representation in 
management.
208
 The question then arises as to whether the Bogor municipality acted on 
its own in implementing these measures, independent of the central GOI; there is no 
evidence either way on this point, though one of the decrees and the 24 February letter 
did refer to an instruction from the Minister of Basic Industry and Mining dated 
September 1964. In fact Corbin, the Goodyear general manager, did protest the Pantja 
Tunggal‘s actions to the Ministry of Basic Industry and Mining, but the ministry refused 
to take any action.
209
        
However, what measures, if any, the supervisory team took against the unions 
proved ineffective, as on 20 March labor groups successfully seized the tire factory. This 
action occurred just one day after the big three oil companies were placed under GOI 
supervision on 19 March. The labor action was led by the Goodyear Workers Action Unit 
(Kesatuan Aksi Buruh Goodyear), a group comprised of at least five labor groups: Serikat 
Buruh Goodyear (Goodyear Workers Organization), SOBSI, KBM, SARBUMUSI and 
SEPESGO. The US embassy, as well as foreign news reports, certainly believed that the 
PKI/SOBSI was the real leader of the group and the takeover effort.  The groups arrived 
early in the day, called two expatriate managers to the factory, and at a meeting around 
9:15 am with the expatriate managers and all the Bogor Pantja Tunggal (whose 
supervision the company was already theoretically under) announced the takeover. The 
Goodyear managers were told to await a written decree, and then expatriate managers 
were barred from entering the factory.
210
 As the mayor of Bogor subsequently explained 
to Corbin, the Pantja Tunggal then peacefully 
turned over control of the factory to insurgent labor group due [to] 
political pressures and to avoid possible property damage [to] plant [and] 
to ensure safety [of] Americans.  After meeting with EC members, labor 
returned control to [the] Pantja Tunggal which immediately organized 
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temporary committee representing outside labor officials, Pantja Tunggal 




This temporary committee then approached the Ministry of Basic Industry and Mining to 
set up a central GOI team.  It appeared that this temporary committee formed by the 
Pantja Tunggal remained in charge until the GOI team arrived, as the American 
expatriate managers were not allowed to return to the factory. However, it is not clear 
who the members were. 
A Takeover Statement dated 20 March was also issued by the Goodyear Workers 
Action Unit and signed by representatives from five labor groups (Serikat Buruh 
Goodyear, SOBSI, KBM, SARBUMUSI and SEPESGO).
212
 The signors for KBM, 
SARBUMUSI and SOBSI were none other than Usman, A. Zaidan, and Sumardjo, 
respectively, the same three who were on the supervisory team appointed by the Bogor 
Pantja Tunggal back on 20 February.  The takeover statement cited Ganyang Malaysia, 
various actions taken by the imperialist United States (including support for Malaysia and 
aggression in Vietnam), and President Sukarno‘s statements in MANIPOL regarding 
imperialists, as reasons for ejecting the Americans (who were enemies of the Indonesian 
Revolution) from Indonesia. It also cited the following as reasons for the takeover: to 
prevent sabotage from business elements, the great demands of national responsibility, 
the idea that the factory can benefit the Indonesian Revolution and strengthen the 
endurance of the Revolution, and the takeover demands of the 14 March meeting. The 
declaration stated that the factory would be immediately turned over to the GOI to 
become Indonesian property and appointed a three-member temporary team (Pimpinan 
Perusahaan Sementara) to lead the factory. This three-man team was comprised of 
Usman, A. Zaidan, and Sumardjo, the same labor union leaders.  As the composition of 
the team the Pantja Tunggal appointed on 20 March is unknown, it is unclear if these 
three men stayed in their new posts for long.   
The central government, which was already preoccupied with the takeovers of the 
oil companies on 19 March, very quickly stepped in. On 22 March, just two days after the 
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 US Embassy telegram (Corbin to Goodyear Akron) dated 23 March 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central 
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 Piagram Ambil Alih Perusahaan Ban Goodyear dated 20 March 1965 (ANRI, R-22 240). 
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20 March labor union seizure, Third Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul Saleh issued on 
behalf of the Presidium Kabinet a short decree placing the Goodyear tire factory under 
the temporary control and supervision (penguasaan/pengawasan) of the GOI.
213
 The 
decree noted that because car tires were vital commodities for transport and the flow of 
goods, and because of the intensification of the Indonesian Revolution and the 
enthusiasm and ability of the Indonesian nation, it was necessary to have control over the 
tire factory and to form a supervisory team. DEKON and TAVIP (the acronym for the 
Tahun Vivere Pericoloso, President Sukarno‘s 17 August 1964 independence day speech) 
were also cited. The decree then placed the tire factory and its units operating in 
Indonesia under the temporary control/supervision of the GOI, without diminishing the 
property rights of the owners. In other words, it was to be a temporary takeover of 
management, not ownership. The Ministry of Basic Industry and Mining would appoint 
and prescribe the duties of a control/supervisory team (Badan Penguasa/Pengawas), and 
the American employees were required to assist the team as long as required. At a 
meeting with representatives of Ministry of Basic Industry and Mining the next day, 23 
March, Goodyear representatives were handed a letter from Sardju Ismunandar (who had 
the title of Assistant to Minister for State Enterprise Affairs within the Ministry of Basic 
Industry and Mining), who was an assistant to Minister Chaerul Saleh.
214
 The letter stated 
that the reason the tire factory and its enterprises in Indonesia were placed under the 
temporary control/supervision of the GOI was to safeguard the company in light of 
several events, including demonstrations by local mass organizations, the takeover by the 
workers, and the placing of the company under a temporary management team. However, 
such control/supervision, which would be implemented by the Ministry of Basic Industry 
and Mining, would not diminish the rights of ownership in the company. 
By 24 March, just two days after the GOI placed the company under its 
control/supervision, a six man control/supervisory team (Badan Penguasa/Pengawas 
Goodyear) was appointed. Its chairman was Soehardi Reksowardojo, the director of the 
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 Keputusan Presidium Kabinet (Wakil Perdana Menteri III Chaerul Saleh) No. Aa/D/28/65 Tentang 
Penempatan Pabrik Ban ―The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Coy Ltd‖ Dibawah Penguasaan/Pengawasan 
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 US Embassy telegram (Corbin to Goodyear Akron) dated 23 March 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central 
Files 1964-66, Inco Rubber Indon, Box 1215); for a copy of the letter, see US Embassy telegram (Ellis) 
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Chemical Industries Department (BPU Kimia) of the Ministry of Basic Industry and 
Mining. Other members included Nos (who was on the Dunlop Tire supervisory team), 
Sjahfiri Alim from Goodyear, and Major Sukotjo from the army. The other two members 
had not yet been appointed, but were to be from the Bogor Pantja Tunggal and the 
Ministry of Labor.
215
 The choice of Sjahfiri Alim, whom we met at the very beginning of 
Chapter One, is instructive. Alim, who at some point became chairman of the 
control/supervisory team and in effect the number one man at the factory, not only was 
sales manager and one of the highest ranking Indonesian employees at Goodyear, but also 
was close to Minister Chaerul Saleh.
216
  Apparently Alim also already knew Sardju 
Ismunandar (Minister Saleh‘s assistant with the title of assistant to Minister for State 
Enterprise Affairs) and Soehardi Reksowardojo (the director of the Chemical Industries 
Department (BPU Kimia) and chairman of the supervisory team), presumably through his 
friendship with Minister Saleh; it was Soehardi who appointed him to the supervisory 
team. Each of these four men - Minister Chaerul Saleh, Sardju Ismunandar, Soehardi 
Reksowardojo and Sjahfiri Alim - were strongly anti-PKI. Thus, by appointing Alim to 
the GOI control/supervisory team, the Ministry of Basic Industry and Mining not only 
had someone who had years of experience working at Goodyear, but also someone 
known to and trusted by the high level officials in the ministry and someone who would 
oppose any PKI interference in the company.  
The GOI control/supervisory team rapidly asserted its authority, and the owner-
appointed management never regained control over the factory. Initially, there appeared 
to be a power struggle between the GOI team and the temporary team appointed by the 
Pantja Tunggal; Corbin, the Goodyear general manager, without providing specifics, told 
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 US Embassy telegram (Corbin to Goodyear Akron) dated 24 March 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central 
Files 1964-66, Inco Rubber Indon, Box 1215).   
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 Alim was a Minangkabau born in 1927 to well-educated parents who were inspectors for the 
Department of Education during the Dutch colonial rule. Alim himself grew up in Jakarta and Bandung and 
had received a Dutch education until World War II started. He fought in the war against the Dutch and then 
in 1951 joined Goodyear in the sales department. He gradually rose in the sales department, and by the time 
of the takeover he was the sales manager and one of the highest ranking Indonesian employees at 
Goodyear. Alim met Chaerul Saleh, also a Minangkabau, in the late 1950s or early 1960s through their 
wives, and the two families became very close. Background material on Alim and his relationships with 
Minister Saleh and the other officials comes from interviews with Alim family members and interview with 
Mohammad Mansur dated 11 July 2006. (Mr. Mansur joined the Ministry of Basic Industry and Mining in 
1963 and initially worked for Sardju Ismunandar.) 
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the head office that there were ―many signs of internal conflict and power struggle 
involved in turnover to working team.‖ In addition, the ministry was ―seemingly finding 
difficulty appointing remaining two members [of the] supervisory team who are 
acceptable to labor.‖
217
 It is unclear how long these problems persisted, though, and there 
is no further mention of them in the available material. With respect to the role of owner-
appointed management, however, there was little doubt that this group no longer had any 
control or authority. After 20 March, foreign managers were allowed back in the factory 
only one time on 13 April to collect their passports and accept the GOI team-prepared 
inventory; thus, 20 March marks a clear date after which owner-appointed managers had 
little power or influence, and certainly no control.
218
      
The company‘s initial reaction to these events was to try to stand firm and lodge 
protests with the relevant authorities. Hence, Corbin had protested the initial takeover by 
the Pantja Tunggal on 20 February with both the Pantja Tunggal and the Ministry of 
Basic Industry and Mining on the grounds that existing police protection was adequate 
and there was no need for additional protection, but this had no effect. Goodyear also 
requested the US embassy to lodge an official protest, which was done. Given that the 
Bogor Pantja Tunggal team did not interfere with operations, it appeared, at least until 
the GOI takeover, as though Goodyear thought the situation was still salvageable.
219
 In 
fact, on 19 March, the day before the labor union takeover, Goodyear decided to suspend 
the overseas travel of key expatriates so as not to give the image of abandonment (which 
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 US Embassy telegram (Corbin to Goodyear Akron) dated 26 March 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central 
Files 1964-66, Inco Rubber Indon, Box 1215).   
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 In the ensuing weeks, there were obvious signs that control and authority would not be returned to 
owner-appointed management. For example, Indonesian technicians from the GOI-owned tire plant were 
brought in to assist, presumably to fill the void left by the expatriate managers. Various announcements and 
speeches by officials indicated that Americans would not be returning. On 31 March, control over three 
Goodyear bank accounts was transferred to the Ministry of Basic Industry and Mining.  By the end April, 
Goodyear was told that at least six of its 11 American managers were already ‗redundant,‘ and on 14 May 
Goodyear was told that the ministry had decided that four expatriate managers would be allowed to stay in 
assist/advisory capacities, in particular with respect to maintaining production and in relations with 
Goodyear Akron (the home office). A few weeks later, the name of the factory was actually changed to 
‗Gelora Yuda,‘ meaning ‗spirited war,‘ although the tires still had the Goodyear name. See US Embassy 
telegram (Ellis) dated 25 June 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1964-66, Inco 15-2 Indon, Boxes 
1072-3).   
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 US Embassy telegram (Jones) dated 23 February 1965 (LBJL, National Security Files, Country File 
Indonesia, Indonesia Cables (2 of 2), Volume III, 9/64 - 3/65, Box 246); US State Department telegram 
(Goodyear to Corbin) dated 23 February 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1964-66, Inco Rubber 
Indon, Box 1215); US Embassy telegram (Ellis) dated 25 June 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1964-
66, Inco 15-2 Indon, Boxes 1072-3).    
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could precipitate a takeover).
220
 As we saw above, on 21 March Corbin met with the 
Bogor mayor to demand the return of the factory, but this also had no impact. After the 
GOI takeover, the home office instructions were to 
issue no ultimatum but continue [to] maintain firm stand by insisting in 
writing [on] our full management and ownership rights.  Do not negotiate 
away company rights. For your information but not for disclosure or 
action no negotiations appropriate unless on basis [of] full nationalization 
with appropriate compensation.  Make no agreement to any management 
or assistance agreement but if required to sign anything note protest on 





Goodyear also took a few proactive measures. At a meeting with Sardju 
Ismunandar (Minister Chaerul Saleh‘s assistant with the title of assistant to Minister for 
State Enterprise Affairs) on 29 March, Corbin took the major step of actually proposing 
that the GOI take an equity stake in the company (it is not clear how big a stake this 
was).
222
 Apparently no response was received. Smaller measures included the withdrawal 
of about Rp. 45 million in cash before the ministry assumed control over the bank 
accounts, as well as an unsuccessful attempt to reenter the factory.
223
 Corbin also 
considered destroying development manuals and correspondence, but was told by the 
head office not to destroy the manuals and not to take measures that might antagonize the 
supervisory team or jeopardize the safety of personnel.
224
 Goodyear even consulted with 
an Indonesian lawyer, who rather understatedly advised that the ―supervision and 
management of your company by the government is definitely an infringement of your 
articles of incorporation. Since political, social and economical considerations are of 
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As with the case of most of the foreign companies in Indonesia other than the oil 
companies, Goodyear had little leverage to counter the takeovers and ultimately had little 
choice other than to accept developments as they unfolded. By the end of April, 
Goodyear, seeing the proverbial writing on the wall, realized its position was hopeless 
and had already decided to withdraw its foreign personnel. Certainly the clear signs from 
late March throughout April that managerial authority and control would not be regained 
(see footnote 218) were major factors in the decision.  On 7 April, the GOI supervisory 
team chairman, Soehardi Reksowardojo, unofficially proposed that Goodyear enter into a 
licensing and raw material purchase agreement ―as the only way to salvage any American 
presence, since the Goodyear investment was no longer recognized in actual practice.‖  
Goodyear refused to consider this option; it only would fulfill outstanding raw material 
orders that were backed by letters of credit, and this was done simply to gain some 
leverage. After the 7 April meeting, Goodyear also instructed its managers to cooperate 
with the takeover team only ―under duress to ensure the safety of American property and 
personnel.‖ Increasingly concerned over the safety of its remaining expatriates, Goodyear 
began to send them home in the second half of May.
226
 In addition, in June Goodyear 
sought another legal opinion from Indonesian counsel that it had exhausted its remedies 
under Indonesian law. The response was that President Sukarno‘s decree of 24 April (see 
next Chapter) had legalized the supervision/management of the company by the GOI, that 
no legal steps could be taken in Indonesian courts, and there were no grounds for 
compensation as only management rights, not ownership rights, were transferred. 
Goodyear also enquired if the departure of expatriate management (as representatives of 
the owner) could be construed as abandonment or voluntary relinquishment that might 
jeopardize future compensation claims. The Indonesian lawyer opined that ―no useful 
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purpose can be served by remaining.‖
227
  On 8 July, Corbin, the Goodyear general 




B. The KBM-led Takeovers of Union Carbide, AIFA, and NCR. 
In the last week of March, the KBM labor federation, in an obviously coordinated 
fashion reminiscent of the DPS-KBKI takeovers of British firms in Jakarta in September 
1963, seized three American firms in Jakarta, Union Carbide‘s Indonesian subsidiary (25 
March), the Indonesian branch of the American and Foreign Insurance Association (29 
March) and National Cash Register Company‘s Indonesian subsidiary (1 April).  The 
three companies‘ businesses were very different, and the only thing linking the seizures 
was that they were targeted exclusively at small American firms by a single labor 
federation at a time when US-Indonesian relations were reaching their nadir and US 
President Johnson was sending special envoy Ellsworth Bunker to Indonesia to evaluate 
the situation. Announced on 22 March, Bunker‘s trip was from 30 March through 14 
April.
229
 An interesting aspect of the takeovers was the very different GOI response to 
each takeover. I suggest that the different responses reflected both the government‘s 
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surprise and confusion at the KBM-led seizures (thus suggesting that there was no 
collusion between the GOI and KBM) and to a lesser extent competition within the GOI 
for control over the companies that were perceived to be possible sources of wealth and 
patronage, even though in fact they were not.
230
   
The businesses of these three companies were quite different, but all were 
relatively small operations. Union Carbide operated a battery factory in Jakarta that was 
established in 1934 and by 1964/5 employed about 300 workers.
231
 However, the 
company was in dire straits by this time, as production was running at about 5% of 
capacity, and the plant only operated about one day a week.
232
  NCR, on the other hand, 
had no factory in Indonesia but rather imported and distributed accounting machines. Its 
head office was in Jakarta, and it had branch offices in Bandung, Surabaya, Semarang 
and Medan (the head office in Jakarta was seized first, followed by the branch offices 
within the week). Its primary physical assets were an inventory of accounting machines 
as well as several houses and cars.
233
 It is unclear how many employees there were, but it 
probably did not exceed 20. AIFA, in contrast, was an insurance firm. Its only office was 
in Jakarta, and its main assets were insurance policies and bank accounts.
234
 It probably 
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had fewer employees than NCR. Interestingly, none of the three companies had any 
expatriate managers; all their managers and workers were Indonesian.  
The KBM seizure of each company appeared to be quite similar. Representatives 
from the KBM, from both the KBM unit at the respective company and also outside 
KBM members in the case of UCC and AIFA, occupied the factory or office.  In the case 
of UCC and AIFA takeover declarations were read aloud and the Indonesian managers 
were forced to sign takeover statements. The AIFA takeover statement cited (i) 
deteriorating US-Indonesia relations, (ii) the fact that AIFA was an American company 
not in conformity with the Indonesian Revolution, and (iii) the laying off of workers, as 
reasons for the takeover and indicated that the company was going to be handed over 
immediately to the GOI. The top-level Indonesian managers of UCC and AIFA were then 
evicted from the premises and not allowed back in; the top manager of NCR, who lived 
above the office, was allowed to stay on and assist, though it was clear he had no 
authority.
235
 A takeover team apparently was also established at NCR. None of the three 
parent companies was able to regain control over their respective Indonesia operations 
after the KBM seizures. 
1. GOI Response: Union Carbide. 
The GOI response to the seizures was very different for each company. In the 
case of UCC, Third Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul Saleh issued no less than three 
decrees regarding the company, which likely reflect both the confusion and competition 
within the GOI for control over the company. On 3 April 1965, nine days after the KBM 
seizure, Minister Saleh, in the name of the Presidium Kabinet, issued a decree formally 
placing the company under GOI management (pengurusan), without, however, harming 
the proprietary rights of parent Union Carbide.
236
 The decree cited the attitude of the 
USA towards Indonesia (which caused all the workers of the company to be angry and 
resulted in their taking over the company), the intensification of the Indonesian 
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April 1965.  
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Revolution and the desire and ability of the people to stand on their own feet 
(BERDIKARI), and the interests of safety and security of production, as reasons for the 
takeover.  The Governor of Jakarta was appointed on behalf of the GOI to take 
responsibility and control over the company and safeguard its assets, and the relationship 
and responsibilities between the owners and the GOI were to be stipulated in a separate 
agreement. 
Confusingly, the 3 April decree was not announced publicly until 14 April, by 
which time another decree had been issued by Minister Saleh on 9 April that superseded 
the 3 April decree by taking responsibility for the company out of the hands of the 
Governor of Jakarta and into the hands of the Ministry of Peoples Industry.
237
 Without 
referring to the 3 April decree at all, the 9 April decree took over the management 
(pengurusan) of both the UCC battery plant as well as PT Filma in Surabaya, again 
―without diminishing the proprietary rights of the owners‖.
238
 This decree cited the 
necessity to ―guarantee the continuance and increase of production, as well as the safety‖ 
of both the battery factory and the Filma plant, both of which had been taken over by 
workers in connection with both BERDIKARI and the ―intensification of the Indonesian 
people‘s revolution which was now confronting the neo-colonialist Malaysia project,‖ as 
the reason for the takeover.  The GOI body responsible for the companies was now the 
Ministry of Peoples Industry, and the owners of both companies were obliged to provide 
the necessary assistance to the new management of the company. No reason was given 
for the shift of responsibility from the Governor of Jakarta to the Ministry of Peoples 
Industry; in fact, none of the Governor of Jakarta, his original responsibility for the 
company, or the 3 April decree was even mentioned. This failure to revoke the 3 April 
decree was finally corrected by the issuance by Minister Chaerul Saleh of a third 
Presidium Kabinet decree on 6 May 1965 that specifically revoked the 3 April decree.
239
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The sequence of these three decisions indicates there were divisions, or at least 
uncertainty and confusion, within the GOI over the fate of the company and the battery 
plant. It took the GOI nine days to react to the union takeover of 25 March, and this 
decision, though dated 3 April, was not actually made public until 14 April, and even 
then the public announcement had already been superseded by events. The company was 
first placed under the care of the Governor of Jakarta (3 April), but less than a week later 
(9 April) was given to the Ministry of Peoples Industry (headed by Major General Azis 
Saleh). The issuance of the third decree (6 May) indicates that someone had not received 
the message of the switch in responsibility, compelling Minister Chaerul Saleh to make it 
clear again. It is unclear what roles the Governor of Jakarta and the Minister of Peoples 
Industry played in the decision making process, but it seems likely that that they were 
both eager to be in control of the company and lobbied for such a result, one based on the 
location of the company (the Governor of Jakarta) and the other based on the type of 
business the company engaged in (the Ministry of Peoples Industry). Like most of the 
foreign owned manufacturing interests that were taken over, Union Carbide‘s Indonesian 
subsidiary ended up under the Ministry of Peoples Industry.  
2. GOI Response: National Cash Register. 
The struggle within the GOI over the fate of National Cash Register was even 
more apparent than that of Union Carbide. In this case the catfight was between Third 
Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul Saleh on one side and Proxy Minister of Foreign Trade 
Brigadier General Achmad Jusuf on the other. In early February 1965, cabinet 
responsibility for foreign trade had been transferred from the Minister of Trade (Adam 
Malik) to the renamed Kompartment of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Economic Relations, 
and Foreign Trade, headed by First Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister 
Subandrio. On 23 March Jusuf assumed the new position of Proxy Minister for Foreign 
Trade (under the Kompartment of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Economic Relations, and 
Foreign Trade), and in addition on 31 March Jusuf  replaced Adam Malik as Minister of 
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Trade (the post was renamed Minister of Internal Trade).
240
 Thus, Minister Jusuf was 
very new to the cabinet when the KBM takeover of NCR took place on 1 April.   
On 10 April, Proxy Minister for Foreign Trade Jusuf issued a decree that 
effectively took control of NCR away from KBM and placed it under himself.
241
 Citing 
the necessity to ―give order to‖ and ―to control the takeover‖ of the company by the labor 
organizations in order to ensure the smoothness of daily operations, the decree appointed 
the three man takeover team (presumably this was the team established by KBM) to be 
temporary members of a board of supervisors (Dewan Pengawas). This board of 
supervisors was led by an official from the Directorate of Trade and was directly 
responsible to Proxy Minister of Foreign Trade Jusuf. However, the composition of this 
board and its actual role were not stated; it may have been that the three takeover team 
members and the official from the Directorate of Trade were its only members. Workers 
of the company were directed to work as usual. In contrast to takeover decrees issued in 
other cases, this decree did not actually say that the GOI was taking over management of 
the company, nor did it mention the usual phrase of ―without diminishing ownership 
rights‖ or that the relations between the GOI and the owner would be set forth in a 
separate contract. This probably reflected that Proxy Minister Jusuf was unaware of how 
the GOI takeovers of foreign companies had been implemented. Clearly, however, by 
putting his own man in charge of the ambiguous board of advisors, the decree did self-
establish Minister Jusuf as the one in ultimate control of NCR. 
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However, on 24 April Third Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul Saleh on behalf of 
the Presidium Kabinet issued a short decree that placed the company under his control.
242
 
This decree contained the now standard language of placing the company under GOI 
management (pengurusan) without diminishing the proprietary rights of the owners. 
Minister Saleh‘s Special Assistant was appointed to control and safeguard the assets of 
the company, and the governors of the regions where the company had branch offices 
were appointed to control and safeguard the respective branches; thus, control of the 
company was taken away from Minister Jusuf. These officials were to nominate 
managers at the head office and branches, and the relationship between the GOI and the 
owner of the company was to be set forth in a separate agreement. The reasons cited for 
the measures included the attitude of the USA (which caused the employees of the 
company to become angry and takeover the company), the intensification of the 
Indonesian Revolution, BERDIKARI, and the security of production. The decree did not 
mention Minister Jusuf‘s decree of 10 April. Curiously, the decree also did not refer at all 
to President Sukarno‘s Decree 6/1965 issued the same day (see next Chapter) under 
which the GOI assumed control over all foreign companies.   
On 6 May, some 12 days later, Minister Chaerul Saleh reversed course and issued 
a second decree which placed NCR back under the control/management 
(penguasaan/pengurusan) of the Department of Foreign Trade.
243
  This decree stated that 
Minister Saleh‘s decree of 24 April was mistaken and it was necessary to conform it to 
Minister Jusuf‘s 10 April decree. As a result, Minister Saleh‘s 24 April decree was 
officially revoked, and NCR was placed under the control/management of the 
Department of Foreign Trade, without diminishing the proprietary rights of the owners. 
The implementation of GOI control/management was specifically assigned to the Proxy 
Minister for Foreign Trade (i.e., Jusuf).  
Similar to Union Carbide, these decisions indicate there were divisions, or at a 
minimum uncertainty and confusion, within the GOI over the control of NCR. Minister 
                                                 
242
 Keputusan Presidium Kabinet (Wakil Perdana Menteri III Chaerul Saleh) No. Aa/D/54/1965 Tentang 
Penempatan Perusahaan The National Cash Register Company Didalam Pengurusan Pemerintah Republik 
Indonesia, dated 24 April 1965. 
243
 Keputusan Presidium Kabinet (Wakil Perdana Menteri III Chaerul Saleh) No. Aa/D/61/1965 Tentang 
Pentjabutan Keputusan Presidium Kabinet No. Aa/D/54/1965, dated 6 May 1965. 
 454 
 
Jusuf initially wrested control of the company away from KBM, but then Minister 
Chaerul Saleh stepped in and assigned the company to someone under him, only to 
reverse himself a few weeks later and put the company back under Minister Jusuf. A US 
embassy report on the situation suggested that because Minister Jusuf reported to First 
Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio, the struggle really may have been between Ministers 
Saleh and Subandrio, with Jusuf a proxy for Subandrio.
244
 Interestingly, as we shall see in 
the next Chapter, Yusuf was also involved in a jurisdictional conflict over another 
company, the American Singer Sewing Company. Another interesting feature of this 
story is that Minister Chaerul Saleh‘s decree of 6 May returning the company to Minister 
Jusuf‘s control and resolving the question of who had control over the company was 
issued on the same day that Minister Saleh issued the decree regarding Union Carbide 
that (by revoking a prior decree) finally resolved which GOI body had jurisdiction over 
that company. That these two cases were resolved the same time is certainly not 
coincidental, though it is hard to know why Minister Saleh backed off on both; perhaps 
Saleh was aware that these two companies generated little in the way of revenues.  
3. GOI Response: AIFA.    
In contrast to both the case of UCC and NCR, the GOI did not issue a decree 
regarding AIFA and there appeared to be no GOI infighting over the company. The lack 
of a decree, however, did not stop the GOI from taking control of the company away 
from the KBM. Instead, within 4-5 days after the KBM seizure, the company was handed 
over to the Ministry of Finance.  The AIFA representative who flew in from Bangkok 
was told by Ministry of Finance officials that a supervisor would be appointed to 
administer the company‘s assets, and that a GOI-owned insurance company would take 
custody of the physical assets.  In addition, the company‘s insurance policies (fire and 
accident, and marine) would be assigned to separate GOI insurance companies. Claims 
incurred on the policies prior to 29 March, the date of the KBM takeover, would be paid 
from AIFA‘s Rupiah assets, and claims incurred after 29 March would be paid by the 
GOI companies. This entire scheme was explained as not infringing upon the ownership 
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rights of AFIA, though obviously that was exactly what was happening.
245
  Interestingly, 
this case, along with the takeover of the film companies (see Section C below), were the 
only takeovers of the period which did not result in the issuance of a GOI decree. In the 
case of AIFA, it was probably because the company had such a small presence.   
C. Film Companies. 
More than any other American company, the experience of the American film 
companies closely paralleled the deteriorating bilateral US-Indonesia relationship. Unlike 
other US companies, there was a very active and long campaign against the film 
companies beginning in May 1964 that culminated a year later in March and April 1965, 
the same time as the other American companies were taken over. This campaign was led 
by the PKI and was another element of the PKI‘s political offensive begun in early 1964 
(see Chapter Five, Part I, Section A). Another difference was, as the US embassy noted, 
that the ―matter was handled by the GOI more as a cultural and political problem than as 
an economic one. The PKI certainly saw it in this light and its attacks were almost 
entirely on the cultural and political level with little emphasis on movies as a branch of 
American business.‖
246
 In addition, unlike the other companies, it was not labor 
federations that initially seized the film companies‘ assets (which were just films, as the 
companies had no operations or production facilities in Indonesia and hence no workers) 
but instead by a PKI-led group known as PAPFIAS, described below. Moreover, unlike 
the case of most of the US companies (except AIFA), the GOI never issued a takeover 
decree; in fact, GOI intervention here does not appear to be coordinated in any respect, 
but rather very haphazard. Finally, unlike the other US companies, there was some 
limited early partial resolution of the takeover. 
The American film companies were represented in Indonesia by an organization 
called Motion Picture Export Association of America (MPEAA). Its main office in 
Jakarta represented at least eight film companies (Allied Artists, Columbia Films, MGM, 
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 Century Fox, United Artists, Universal Pictures, and Warner 
Brothers), and it also had an office in Surabaya. Some of these individual film companies 
also had local offices in Jakarta acting as distributors of films. The MPEAA also 
distributed films, in addition to its main function of acting as representative.  The main 
assets of the film companies in Indonesia were films; there were apparently around 3,000 
thirty-five and sixteen millimeter films in storage or in circulation.
247
  
The campaign against American films was led by the ‗Action Committee to 
Boycott American Imperialist Films‘ (PAPFIAS), a group established by the PKI and 
other organizations in early May 1964.
248
  As noted in Part I, Section B, this was right 
around the time that US official William Bundy publicly suggested that an expansion of 
Konfrontasi might result in a drop in US aid and both President Sukarno and Minister 
Subandrio were expressing their concern over the deterioration of the relationship to US 
Ambassador Jones. The chairman of PAPFIAS was Mrs. Utami Suryadarma, identified 
by the US embassy as an ―extreme leftist‖; she was also the head of the GOI Board of 
Censors as well as the wife of Air Force Marshall Surjadi Suryadama.
249
 Even before this 
group was established there had been threats of a boycott, but none ever materialized; 
however, immediately after its establishment PAPFIAS began a very effective boycott 
against American films.
250
 At the request of US Ambassador Jones, President Sukarno 
instructed First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio to stop the boycott, but Minister 
Subandrio‘s efforts were not effective. For example, by mid-June 1964 over 100 theaters 
were reportedly shut down, and no films were being shown in the main cities of Java 
(except for those in the homes of GOI officials, including the Presidential Palace in 
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Jakarta).  In July 1964, the National Front joined the campaign. President Sukarno, who 
initially had assured US Ambassador Jones that the matter would be taken care of, now 
appeared to favor the boycott. 
Over the next two months, the matter of foreign films rose to the highest levels of 
the Indonesian government.
251
 The Ministry of Trade and the GOI Board of Censors 
jointly announced the abolition of the MPEAA on August 19, but specifically provided 
that foreign films could still be shown, though they would come completely under GOI 
control and import quotas would be established. The announcement also called for an end 
to the boycott.  (As we saw in Part I, Section B, this came during a pivotal period in the 
US-Indonesia relationship, after US President Johnson met with the Malaysian Prime 
Minister and just two days after President Sukarno‘s 17 August speech castigating the 
US.) The boycott continued, however, and on 30 August, less than two weeks later, 
Minister of Trade Malik publicly called for an end to the boycott and even suggested that 
there was no further need for PAPFIAS. This prompted harsh attacks on Minister Malik 
by the communist press, and the boycott continued, despite some opposition to it. Then, 
in what the US embassy considered an attempt to outmaneuver the boycott and its 
supporters, in late September and October 1964 the Presidium Kabinet stepped in, 
appointing a three man ministerial committee, including Minister Malik, Minister without 
Portfolio Oei Tjoe Tat, and Information Minister Achmadi, to make recommendations 
regarding foreign films. The basic recommendation was that all foreign films would be 
re-censored, with the two main considerations being whether the film promoted the 
Indonesian Revolution and protected the negligible Indonesian film industry. On 20 
October, a presidential decree gave the Presidium Kabinet general authority over 
Indonesian film policy.  Thus, demonstrative of the polarizations in Indonesian society 
and government, what had been a fairly simple matter of deciding film policy had 
reached an absurd result with the matter kicked up to one of the highest GOI executive 
bodies, the Presidium Kabinet; in addition to deciding upon matters of national 
importance such as foreign policy, economic growth and the like, this body was also 
ostensibly charged with deciding what films the Indonesian public would see. It is 
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unclear if the Presidium Kabinet ever issued any decrees or policy guidelines regarding 
films, but in any case the GOI was either unwilling or unable to stop the boycott, which 
continued throughout the end of 1964 and into 1965. 
The situation culminated in March and April 1965, just as the US-Indonesia 
relationship reached its nadir.
252
 By mid-February 1965 the MPEAA was ―seriously 
contemplating a complete withdrawal from the Indonesian scene,‖ as there had been 
almost no revenues for nine months due to the almost complete lack of commercial 
showings of US films. In addition, there had developed a large backlog of films awaiting 
Board of Censor (still chaired by Mrs. Utami Suryadarma, chairwoman of PAPFIAS) 
approval before distribution. Before the MPEAA could reach a decision, however, events 
moved beyond its control, and over the course of one month, from mid-March to mid-
April, the film companies lost control of their most valuable assets, films. On 16 March 
there were widely publicized demonstrations by PAPFIAS in Jakarta against the MPEAA 
office (it apparently was still functioning, despite the August 1964 order to shut down); 
within the same building were also the offices of some of the foreign film companies and 
their local distributors (where the films were kept). The demonstrators, one of whose 
leaders was Mrs. Utami Suryadama, seized the MPEAA office and the offices of the 
distributors of 20
th
 Century Fox, Universal, and United Artists. The police were present 
but did not stop these seizures, though they did block the demonstrators from entering the 
Warner Brothers distributor, which along with the offices of MGM, Columbia and 
Paramount closed voluntarily. On 19 March there were further demonstrations against 
Columbia and Paramount. Meanwhile, the Jakarta Attorney General had sealed off some 
of the film company buildings and placed them under GOI custody to preempt PAPFIAS. 
However, PAPFIAS continued to occupy some of the offices. Around this time the film 
companies began unsuccessful efforts to remove some of the films from the offices. 
Then, on 10-11 April the Jakarta military authorities evicted the demonstrators from one 
of the buildings and sealed off all the distributors offices. A few days later on 15 April, 
all the distributors‘ offices in Surabaya were seized by PAPFIAS during a demonstration. 
At some point later the National Front acquired control over the offices in Surabaya. On 9 
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May a representative of the MPEAA came to Jakarta to dissolve the distribution 
organization of each American company and acquire the films. He was able to dissolve 
the companies, but the military authorities did not allow him access to the distributors‘ 
offices, claiming that teams were taking inventories of the films. Nor would the Board of 
Censors allow the MPEAA to take possession of the many films awaiting the Board‘s 
approval. The representative finally left on 20 May without retaking possession of any of 
the films. 
However, the MPEAA was eventually able to recover a small portion of the films. 
At the end of May, the Board of Censors was revamped and a new chairman appointed in 
place of Mrs. Utami Suryadarma. In late July and early August, the Board of Censors 
turned over about 185 feature length 35 millimeter films to the US embassy; it still had 
another 65 sixteen millimeter films which were never returned.
253
 Moreover, most of the 







The takeovers of foreign companies in Indonesia in the first several months of 
1965 clearly represented an American phase of takeovers, as 11 of 13 companies placed 
under government control/supervision/management in the roughly six week period from 
late February to early April were all American-owned and almost the entire American 
business presence in Indonesia was taken over by the GOI.
255
 GOI intervention was 
ostensibly precipitated by labor union takeovers or the threat thereof, most of which were 
led by either SOBSI, KBM, or both. Neither the labor union seizures nor the takeovers by 
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the GOI were violent, although warning shots were fired by police in one of the labor 
demonstrations against the estates. In each case, with the exception of the big three oil 
companies, the GOI moved swiftly to assume complete control of the company by 
ejecting owner-appointed management, installing GOI appointed managers, and severing 
relations between the company and parent. In an obvious attempt to avoid the 
repercussions of nationalization, the GOI insisted that the takeover was limited to 
management, not ownership, and that the rights of the owners were unaffected. Such a 
characterization was nonsensical, as these takeovers clearly were unacknowledged 
confiscations of foreign businesses. Moreover, in a major difference with the SOBSI-led 
takeovers of British companies in January 1964, the takeovers of American estate 
companies, which acted as a trigger for the seizure of other American business interests, 
were actively encouraged by President Sukarno, who in early December 1964 gave labor 
unions the green light to demonstrate against the companies and take other actions to the 
point where the GOI could claim its takeover actions were protective in nature. In 
contrast, the SOBSI-led attempted seizures of British enterprises in January 1964 were in 
effect a challenge by the PKI to President Sukarno and the GOI over the direction of 
Konfrontasi. Consequently, the hesitation, uncertainty and confusion on the part of the 
GOI with respect to the British companies that resulted in the gradual, creeping 
confiscations of British enterprises over the course of 1964 was much less evident in the 
case of the American companies.   
The takeovers of American businesses directly reflected the deterioration of the 
bilateral relationship between the United States and Indonesia. Indeed, in his 
independence day speech on 17 August 1965 entitled ‗Reach to the Stars: A Year of Self 
Reliance,‘ President Sukarno cited the relationship between the United States and 
Indonesia as a principal reason for the takeover of US businesses. It was not just the 
attitude of Indonesia, Sukarno challenged: 
On the contrary, much more depends in the present situation on the 
attitude of the United States. Whether they will stop supporting ‗Malaysia‘ 
and be friendly again with Indonesia, or whether, on the contrary, they 
persist in supporting ‗Malaysia‘ and thus in being hostile to the Republic 
of Indonesia – this is the most important issue at present in the relationship 
between the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia. It 
would be well for the US government to weigh all this up because, in the 
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final analysis, we have the full right – as a sovereign republic – to 
nationalize or even confiscate any foreign capital at all which is 




In thus explicitly linking the takeovers to foreign policy generally and to the relationship 
between the GOI and the USA specifically, a relationship that was in decline due to US 
support for Malaysia in Konfrontasi, President Sukarno also made clear that American 
companies were essentially pawns in, or hostages of, the relationship. 
Nevertheless, the differing course of the takeovers and the subsequent treatment 
of the American companies reflected to a great extent the economic importance of the 
respective companies. In a nod to oil company exceptionalism, the big three foreign oil 
companies were placed under nominal GOI supervision, with owner-appointed 
management continuing to manage the companies and the GOI rarely interfering in 
management and operations. Indeed, the primary purpose of the GOI‘s supervisory teams 
was to ensure continued production and keep the labor unions in check. (However, as we 
shall see in the next Chapter, the GOI‘s attitude would chang over the course of 1965, 
and by the end of the year there was great pressure on the oil companies to sell all their 
operations to the GOI.) In the case of the American estate companies, whose rubber 
estates produced valuable foreign exchange, while the GOI quickly displaced owner-
appointed management, it was also initially content to allow the companies to continue 
marketing internationally the latex produced from those estates and government-owned 
estates, and the GOI also entered into negotiations to compensate the owners. As long as 
the revenues continued to flow, the arrangement was tolerable enough for both sides. In 
the case of the other American companies taken over, most of which were in the 
manufacturing and services sectors and did not generate significant amounts of foreign 
exchange, owner-appointed management was displaced fairly quickly by the GOI.  
There were a number of different convergences of trends or events with the 
takeovers of American companies in the early part of 1965. In the first place, President 
Sukarno‘s involvement in the takeovers represented a clear convergence of his ideas with 
those of the PKI, which had for several years regarded the United States as its greatest 
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enemy and advocated the takeover of US enterprises. However, while Sukarno supported 
and encouraged the takeovers, he also seemed to want to keep the companies out of the 
PKI‘s hands. Secondly, it should also be noted that President Sukarno‘s 8 December 
1964 decision to proceed with the takeovers of US companies came on the heels of his 26 
November 1964 decree to formalize GOI control over the British enterprises (see Chapter 
Five, Part V). It thus appears that President Sukarno came to some conclusive decisions 
regarding British and American companies in the two week period spanning the last week 
of November and the first week of December 1964. Finally, these moves also occurred 
precisely around the time – late 1964 and early 1965 - when many observers thought 
President Sukarno and Indonesia had ‗turned to the left,‘ both domestically and 
internationally. Domestically, this direction was signaled by, among other events, the 
President‘s decision to ban the BPS and suspend the Murba party (see previous Chapter), 
while internationally the increasingly strident anti-imperialist direction of foreign policy 
was marked by President Sukarno‘s decision to leave the UN in early January 1965 and 
the apparently sudden acceleration of the formation of an anti-imperialist alliance with 
the PRC.   
In his independence day speech of 17 August 1965, President Sukarno cited 
another benefit from the takeovers of American companies in that it contributed to 
Indonesia‘s implementation of the principle of BERDIKARI, or self-reliance. Sukarno 
claimed that GOI supervision of US companies was 
an important step for the Republic of Indonesia, which, on the principle of 
Self-Reliance [BERDIKARI], is engaged in building its own national 
economy, entirely free from both imperialism and feudalism…What is 
obvious, even a child can understand this, is that with imperialist capital it 
is impossible for us to build socialism. Let alone socialism, even a national 
economy is impossible. For that reason, the principle of building an 
economy without foreign capital has become a principle which, for us, is 




Insofar as the takeovers of US companies contributed to this vision of self-reliance, 
Sukarno‘s assertion is certainly true; however, as I have argued in this Chapter, the 
declining US-Indonesia relationship was the predominant causal factor behind the 
takeovers of US enterprises. Instead, as we shall see in the next Chapter, it was in mid-
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April 1965, after the takeovers of most all the US companies, that President Sukarno 
elevated the concept of BERDIKARI to official national policy, the major manifestation 
of which was the takeover of all remaining foreign businesses in Indonesia. This 
represented a completely new twist in the saga of takeovers of foreign enterprises in 
Indonesia; no longer would takeovers be clearly linked to foreign relations with specific, 
individual countries (as was the case with the takeovers of Malaysian and American 
companies), and no longer would domestic political instability in the form of labor union 
challenges play a large, meaningful role (as was the case with the seizure of British firms 
in September 1963 and January 1964). In contrast, national economic policy would be the 
governing rationale, and this new guiding policy would result in the virtual elimination of 
foreign investment in Indonesia by the end of 1965, with the two major exceptions of 









Chapter Seven:  1965: BERDIKARI and the Nadir of 
Foreign Investment in Indonesia 
 
 
The final wave of takeovers of foreign companies from 1963-65 in Indonesia was 
analytically very different from the previous waves.  The previous Chapters have argued 
that the earlier waves were linked directly to domestic political instability (the seizures of 
British companies in September 1963 and in early 1964) and to foreign relations (the 
seizure of Malaysian companies in the fall of 1963 and the seizure of American 
companies in early 1965) and that the earlier waves involved only companies from the 
specific countries of Great Britain, Malaysia and the United States.  However, the 
takeovers of this final phase, which perhaps not coincidentally began almost immediately 
after the American phase, were triggered by an official change in GOI policy in which all 
remaining foreign companies with any significant operations in the country, no matter the 
nationality of the owners, were taken over by the GOI, with the important exceptions of 
two of the big three oil companies, Caltex and Stanvac.  In total, six foreign 
manufacturing facilities and at least 10 foreign estate companies (owning at least 44 
estates) plus Shell Oil were taken over in this wave.  In addition, the 1958 foreign 
investment law was repealed, closing the country off to future foreign investment, a 
largely symbolic gesture as little, if any, new foreign investment had entered the country 
since the law was passed. Nevertheless, it complemented the first step of seizing foreign 
companies already in the country by technically shutting the door to any new foreign 
investment coming in. By the end of 1965, foreign investment in Indonesia, with the two 
exceptions of Caltex and Stanvac, had been eliminated. 
The new official policy was BERDIKARI (the Indonesian acronym for berdiri di 
atas kaki sendiri, or ‗standing on one‘s own feet‘), meaning economic self-reliance. 
President Sukarno was its primary proponent, and it was at his urging that the rubber 
stamp MPRS adopted the principle in mid-April 1965 as a foundation for a major change 
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in national economic policy.  It was also the first major economic policy initiative since 
DEKON of 1963 and the last economic policy initiative of the Guided Democracy era. 
Once adopted, it took its place along with DEKON and other slogans in the ideological 
pantheon of Guided Democracy; indeed, the entire year was designated as the ‗Year of 
Self-Reliance‘ by President Sukarno in his annual independence day speech on 17 August 
1965, similar to the declaration of the previous year as the ‗Year of Living Dangerously‘ 
in the President‘s 17 August 1964 address (and the naming of other years in previous 
independence day addresses). As we shall see, the BERDIKARI policy for the most part 
lacked specific measures and was by no means wholly implemented by the GOI. Its 
greatest impact was with respect to foreign investment. 
The adoption of the BERDIKARI policy in April 1965 reflected a pinnacle with 
respect to economic affairs in Indonesia in several ways. I suggested in Chapter One that 
1965-66 in Indonesia was a culmination of sorts in Indonesia in the three areas of 
domestic political conflict, economic affairs, and foreign relations, and the previous 
Chapter described in detail how 1965 was the pinnacle of Indonesia‘s anti-imperialist 
foreign policy. In economic affairs, the adoption of BERDIKARI was firstly an 
acknowledgement of the horrible condition of the Indonesian economy. 1965-66 was a 
climax of economic chaos in Indonesia, the product of years of economic neglect that 
resulted in a virtual collapse of the economy, a primary feature of which was staggering 
inflation. As we shall see, one of the key points of the BERDIKARI program was its 
rejection of the Eight Year Development Plan, one of the lynchpins of economic policy 
under Guided Democracy, in what was deemed a banting stir, or ‗drastic turning of the 
steering wheel.‘ The adoption of BERDIKARI and the banting stir recognized the Eight 
Year Development Plan was not working and the economy was heading for, if not 
already in, a disastrous state.  Secondly, in the broader scope of Indonesia‘s brief 15 year 
history, the adoption of BERDIKARI was an apogee of sorts with respect to economic 
policy-making, as it represented the culmination of efforts to construct a national 
economy in the aftermath of Indonesia‘s political independence. As we saw in Chapter 
Two, the transformation of a colonial economy into a national economy was a central 
preoccupation of economic policy-makers, though there was hardly consensus on what 
this economy should look like. In particular, the role of Indonesians in the economy – the 
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other side of the coin of the role of foreigners in the economy – and control over the 
economy and its key assets (the Indonesianization of the economy) were major issues. 
Hence various plans and strategies such as the Economic Urgency Plan, the Five Year 
Plan, Guided Economy and the Eight Year Development Plan, were all devised in part to 
address this issue. The adoption of BERDIKARI can thus be seen as the culmination of 
these efforts: standing on Indonesia‘s own two feet, or self-reliance, was now the official 
goal of economic development.  
With respect to existing foreign investment, BERDIKARI was effected via 
President Sukarno‘s Decree 6 of 1965, which authorized the takeovers of remaining 
foreign businesses but left actual implementation of the policy up to the Presidium 
Kabinet, which in turn delegated implementation to the individual ministries under whose 
competence the companies fell. Thus the actual takeover of the foreign firms appeared to 
vary from company to company, much like the situation in which British firms found 
themselves in 1964. Of these takeovers, only American Singer Sewing involved a 
physical takeover by labor unions before the GOI intervened, reflecting the drastic 
diminution of labor union takeover activity after the introduction of Presidential Decree 
6/1965. In another interesting twist, the GOI initially continued to insist that, like the 
takeovers of American firms in the previous wave, it was merely taking over 
management of the firms, that ownership rights in the companies would not be affected, a 
position obviously designed to avoid payment of compensation for nationalizations. 
However, as described in the next paragraph this position was modified with respect to 
the non-British estate companies and Shell Oil.  
Although with the implementation of Presidential Decree 6/1965 all foreign 
companies were technically under GOI control, there was a major GOI push at the end of 
the year to eliminate finally the lingering presence of foreign investment in the country. 
This effort had two key components: an attempt to buyout or take over the management 
of the big three oil companies, and the final management takeover and buyout of the non-
British foreign estate companies.  These were the only groups of foreign companies with 
which the GOI engaged in serious compensation negotiations. In a nod to the power of oil 
company exceptionalism, Shell Oil was bought out at the end of December 1965 for a 
price of $110 million, but Caltex and Stanvac both successfully resisted strong GOI 
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takeover pressure. In the case of the non-British estates, I suggest the decision to 
compensate the owners was attributable both to the attitude of Minister of Estates Frans 
Seda as well the ability of those very estates to generate foreign exchange to pay for 
themselves, thus creating a minimal burden for the GOI. Hence, though most of the 
designated values of the estates were very low, most of the compensation payments were 
never made, and the estate companies in reality had little choice but to agree, at the end 
of 1965 altogether 16 estate companies owning at least 58 estates agreed to compensation 
terms with the GOI totaling $29 million plus Rp. 1.85 billion, generally payable over 
seven to 10 years.  
This final GOI push at the end of 1965 coincided with the culmination of the 
domestic political power struggle under Guided Democracy in what was the most 
tumultuous period in the history of independent Indonesia. This was the third and best-
known climax of 1965, along with ones in economic affairs and foreign relations. As is 
well known to even the most casual observer of Indonesian history, the September 30 
Movement (known as G30S, short for Gerakan Tiga Puluh September, or the Movement 
of 30 September, so named for the evening on which it started) in which six senior army 
generals were killed triggered a chain of events that led to the destruction of the PKI as 
well as an open political power struggle between President Sukarno and his opponents 
and ultimately to the downfall of Sukarno and Guided Democracy. The September 30 
Movement remains controversial and mysterious even today. Given the uneasy 
partnership between President Sukarno and the army, a relationship compounded by the 
PKI‘s political offensive begun in early 1964, it was clear before the events of 30 
September that Indonesia had been building toward an internal confrontation for several 
years,  and some form of showdown between the army and the PKI was certainly not 
unanticipated in 1965. The September 30 Movement was very quickly squashed by 
General Suharto, and thereafter the army turned its attention toward the PKI, whose 
members, along with many non-members, were liquidated by a coalition of forces in one 
of the largest massacres in the 20
th
 century.  Second, at the same time, General Suharto 
along with various army leaders and civilian supporters was engaged in a power struggle 
with President Sukarno that peaked from December 1965 to early March 1966, with the 
balance of power tipping away from President Sukarno in favor of his opponents in early 
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March. Moreover, at the same time as the political conflict was unfolding the Indonesian 
economy also reached unprecedented levels of inflation and decay. It was amidst this 
political, social, and economic turmoil  that the GOI made its final year end push to 
eradicate foreign companies from Indonesia, and in at least one case – not surprisingly, 
that of the oil companies, again reflecting oil company exceptionalism -  this final push 
became intertwined in the domestic power struggle. 
This Chapter is divided into three main Parts. Part I analyzes the BERDIKARI 
doctrine generally, while Part II focuses on the impact of BERDIKARI on foreign 
investment. Part III analyzes the final push to eliminate foreign investment at the end of 
1965, beginning with a short analysis of the domestic political conflict. The Chapter ends 
with a brief conclusion in Part IV.  
 
I. BERDIKARI as National Economic Policy. 
 
The term BERDIKARI began to emerge prominently in national discourse in 
1963. Its primary proponent in official GOI circles was President Sukarno, who in the 
general context of opposition to imperialism and neo-colonialism increasingly began to 
link economic independence with political sovereignty, arguing that the latter could not 
exist without the former.  However, initially BERDIKARI was little more than one of 
Guided Democracy‘s many slogans, without substance or specifics, until at President 
Sukarno‘s urging it was adopted by the MPRS as national economic policy in mid-April 
1965. It then became so pervasive that the year 1965-66 was deemed the ‗Year of Self-
Reliance‘ by President Sukarno in his 17 August 1965 independence day address. Despite 
its newfound prominence, though, the policy was formulated primarily in terms of broad 
objectives and lacked specific measures, and except with respect to foreign investment 
seems not to have been implemented to any great degree, which is undoubtedly a major 
reason why is has received so little attention in academic literature on Indonesia.
1
 In an 
                                                 
1
 For example, the excellent Emergence of a National Economy, the best recent account of Indonesian 
economic history, only mentions this doctrine in passing (pp. 186, 189). Other accounts also devote little 
attention to it; see, e.g., Robison‘s Indonesia: Rise of Capital, pp. 75-6, and pp. 36-7 and 40-1 of  T.K. Tan, 
"Sukarnian Economics," in Sukarno's Guided Indonesia, ed. T.K. Tan (Brisbane: Jacaranda Press, 1967). 
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effort to redress this situation, this Part I will delve in some detail into the BERDIKARI 
policy.  
A. From Slogan to Policy. 
While the term BERDIKARI certainly existed before 1963, it was only during the 
course of that year that the term began to gain prominence as an economic slogan both 
publicly and within GOI circles.
2
  The primary proponent of BERDIKARI was certainly 
President Sukarno, who as we saw in Chapter Two was the formateur of ideology during 
Guided Democracy, though as we shall see in Section B below the President was likely 
influenced by the PKI and the examples of North Korea and the PRC. President Sukarno 
claimed that for him the goal of economic independence (if that can be seen as the 
primary objective of self-reliance) as a principle component of national independence can 
be easily traced back to the early 1930s, if not before.
3
 Nevertheless, the term 
BERDIKARI itself only gained traction beginning in 1963 and increasingly in 1964-65. 
For example, the term was not mentioned at all in DEKON, which was announced in 
March 1963 and was, until the adoption of BERDIKARI in 1965, the ideological basis of 
Guided Economy. In his 17 August 1963 independence day speech (entitled ‗The 
Resounding Voice of the Indonesian Revolution‘), the President did not use the 
BERDIKARI acronym but instead the full expression, noting his pleasure that the desire 
to build a self-reliant national economy was increasingly evident and that it was a sign of 
economic patriotism.
4
 In 1964, as the term increasingly was sprinkled in his speeches, the 
President in his famous ‗Year of Living Dangerously‘ speech on 17 August 1964 
                                                                                                                                                 
Other sources incorrectly attribute the year BERDIKARI was implemented to 1964. One of the few 
publications that did follow the emergence of the policy was the Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies – 
see its first two volumes in 1965. Insofar as I am aware, there is no study of BERDIKARI, and in fact there 
are very few references to it in scholarly literature other than those cited in this Chapter.   
2
 Mangkusuwondo, Industrialization Efforts in Indonesia, pp. 2-3.  Indeed, Mangkusuwondo notes that it 
was the adoption of BERDIKARI that led him to his dissertation topic.  
3
 In the undelivered portion of his 11 April BERDIKARI speech discussed below, Sukarno stated that the 
principle of ―standing on our own two feet‖ had been an idea of his ―since the beginning,‖ citing a 1932 
speech in which he explained the concept of ‗self help,‘ as well as his ‗self help‘ slogan during the Japanese 
occupation. Conceptually, however, these terms seem very different, even if they share the same goal.  See 
also Hauswedell, The Anti-Imperialist United Front, p. 436.   
4
 An English translation of the speech can be found in ―Indonesia 1963: Looking Back over the Year‖; see 
p. 33 for the above reference.  For the Indonesian version, see p. 28 of Sukarno, "Genta Suara Revolusi 
Indonesia: Pidato Presiden Republik Indonesia pada Tanggal 17 Agustus 1963," ed. Departemen 
Penerangan RI (Jajasan Nasional Djakarta, 1963).   
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identified BERDIKARI, political independence, and separate cultural identity as the three 
key principles of independence, a formulation that later became known as Trisakti.
5
 In 
this speech he also approved of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung‘s formulation of 
establishing an independent economy as the foundation of independence, as well as North 
Korea‘s achievements in this regard.
6
 Yet throughout this period 1963-64, there was no 
elaboration of what BERDIKARI actually meant and how Indonesia would achieve it, 
and the term remained a slogan only. 
In 1965 the slogan was adopted as national policy in at least several areas. In the 
first place, it was adopted by the MPRS as official national economic policy in mid-April 
at the urging of President Sukarno. President Sukarno‘s 11 April speech to the MPRS and 
the ensuing MPRS decisions, which we will examine below, were the primary official 
explanations of the policy, and in fact the rubber stamp MPRS was apparently convened 
primarily for the purpose of adopting BERDIKARI as national economic policy.
7
 This 
measure was the last major economic policy initiative of Guided Democracy, and the first 
since DEKON of 1963. Secondly, to a lesser extent, as discussed in Chapter Six the 
slogan of BERDIKARI in 1965 also became a corollary of the anti-imperialist policy in 
Indonesian foreign relations, a result of Indonesia‘s increasing isolation in the 
international community due to its strong anti-imperialist emphasis. These two notions of 
self-reliance in international relations and self-reliance in economic matters clearly 
gained strength from each other. So imbued had the term become by the summer of 1965 
that it was easy for President Sukarno to declare the upcoming year the ‗Year of Self 
Reliance‘ in his 17 August independence day speech.  
President Sukarno‘s 11 April 1965 speech at the opening of the third MPRS 
session, entitled ‗Berdiri Diatas Kaki Sendiri,‘ provided the ideological basis for the 
adoption of BERDIKARI.
8
 While the purpose of the speech was to announce a new 
                                                 
5
 See Weatherbee, Ideology in Indonesia, pp. 26-7. 
6
 See pp. 57-8 of Sukarno: Address by the President of the Republic of Indonesia on 17 August 1964. 
7
 MPRS meetings were important under Guided Democracy for the adoption of economic policies. The first 
meeting of the MPRS in 1960 approved the Eight Year Development Plan, the second MPRS session in 
1963 approved DEKON, and this third session approved BERDIKARI.   
8
 A copy of the speech, including a portion that was not delivered orally but in written form, can be found 
in Sukarno, "Berdiri Diatas Kaki Sendiri (Amanat Politik Presiden pada Pembukaan Sidang Umum ke III 
MPRS, 11 April 1965),"  (MPRS dan Departemen Penerangan RI, 1965). An official English language 
version can be found in Sukarno, "Self Reliance: Policy Address by the President at the Opening of the 
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economic policy that was termed a ‗banting stir,‘ or sharp turn of the wheel, based on a 
foundation of BERDIKARI, the first two thirds of the speech focused on political affairs. 
A continued emphasis of the political portion was on the ongoing struggle of the 
Indonesian Revolution and its implementation, in particular the confrontation against 
NEKOLIM (imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism). The President argued that a 
basic principle of the Indonesian Revolution was to stamp out colonialism, especially 
pointing to Malaysia (which was established to encircle and contain the Indonesian 
revolution, thereby furthering the imperial interests of the British), and he declared that 
the struggle against NEKOLIM was succeeding and that the OLDEFOS were in decline. 
Sukarno also claimed that the Indonesian Revolution was comprised of two stages, the 
national democratic stage in which feudalism, capitalism and NEKOLIM were uprooted, 
and a second phase of Indonesian socialism, and that Indonesia had almost completed the 
first phase and was on the verge of transitioning into the second. He also described three 
urgent political tasks facing the country: to make a success of Konfrontasi, to bring about 
cooperation among NEFO countries in holding the CONEFO conference, and to continue 
the struggle resulting from Indonesia‘s withdrawal from the UN. Hence, the Indonesian 
people should be prepared to create a new political and economic climate, based on 
MANIPOL, TAVIP (the acronym for ‗Year of Living Dangerously‘) and DEKON, aimed 
at making a success out of the Dwikora struggle (Konfrontasi), ensuring the Indonesian 
Revolution was a beacon in building a new world with NEFO as its nucleus, and 
preparing the people to implement the third objective of the Revolution. Thus, the 
discussion of the economic measures that followed was cloaked in and framed by 
Indonesia‘s continuing revolutionary struggle. 
Turning to economic affairs, President Sukarno called for a banting stir with the 
goal of achieving BERDIKARI. The reason such a banting stir was necessary constituted 
perhaps the clearest, most concrete measure of the speech:  a clear rejection of the Eight 
Year Development Plan. The plan no longer accorded with reality and had been ―left 
behind by the development and stepped-up progress of the Revolution.‖ Hence, it was 
now necessary to make a decisive change in policy – banting stir – in order to meet the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Third General Session of the Madjelis, Bandung, 11 April 1965,"  (Department of Information, Republic of 
Indonesia, 1965). Citations in the text are to the English language version.    
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needs of Indonesia‘s revolutionary development. Such a change, however, did not mean 
that Indonesia should change its identity - a just and prosperous society was still the goal, 
and Pantja Sila remained the national identity. To implement this great change, the 
President suggested that what was needed was self-reliance. Quoting North Korean 
Leader Kim Il Sung, who was present at the speech, Sukarno said, in English, ―In order to 
build a democratic state, the foundation of an independent economy of the nation must be 
established. Without the foundation of an independent economy, we can neither attain 
independence, nor found the state, nor subsist.‖ This notion of economic independence as 
a key component of Indonesia‘s independence was the ideological foundation and 
rationale for the BERDIKARI principle, and the President would continue to emphasize 
the concept of economic independence in other speeches.
9
  Pointing toward North Korea 
as a model of achieving self-reliance, Sukarno put forth five basic economic tasks that 
Indonesia had to fulfill in the context of BERDIKARI: (i) successfully completing nation 
and character building projects, (ii) solving as soon as possible the problem of 
insufficient food and clothing, (iii) finishing the projects in the Eight Year Development 
Plan that were either already under construction or economically important for 
Indonesia‘s strategy for struggle, (iv) overcoming the obstacles to development by using 
the strength of the Indonesian people and its natural resources to produce more goods, 
and (v) resolving the problem of foreign capital in Indonesia so that the country could 
reach full freedom in the economic sphere. In this regard, he also noted that at the present 
stage of the Indonesian Revolution ―we have subjected the economic interests of foreign 
countries in Indonesia to our policy and national laws so that they are more and more 
pushed out of their position towards total liquidation which may result in additional 
contribution to Indonesia‘s own material possessions.‖ Finally, the President emphasized 
                                                 
9
 See, e.g., Sukarno‘s speech ‗After Ten Years, Still Onward, Never Retreat,‘ delivered on 18 April 1965, 
one week after the BERDIKARI speech, at a conference in Jakarta to celebrate the 10
th
 anniversary of the 
Bandung conference: ―For us, economic independence is the prerequisite for real independence in political 
and cultural affairs. It is indeed so that we seized our political independence as a weapon with which to 
establish economic independence. Without economic independence, in fact, we are not politically 
independent; we do not have cultural independence; we do not have independence in diplomacy; we do not 
have independence in military affairs; yes, without economic independence in fact we do not have any 
independence at all.‖ (Cited in Feith and Castles, Indonesian Political Thinking, p. 469) We saw above that 
President Sukarno in his TAVIP speech on 17 August 1964 first identified BERDIKARI, political 
independence, and separate cultural identity as the three key principles of national independence.  
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several times that ―the really existing economic funds and forces‖ should be the main 
foundation for realizing BERDIKARI. 
The President highlighted that numerous adjustments were necessary so that 
Indonesia could implement its new ‗Program for Economic Struggle.‘ Again charging 
that the Eight Year Development Program was not working, Sukarno noted that most of 
the B projects of the plan, which were designed to provide the majority of financing for 
the plan, were not in accordance with the concept of BERDIKARI because they mostly 
depended on cooperation with foreign capital along conventional lines.
10
 Other 
adjustments included the integration of all development planning, as well as a priority on 
finishing infrastructure projects (a fundamental one of which was the project of ―mental 
upgrading of our people within the framework of Nation and Character building 
including the Indoctrination Program‖). There was also to be an emphasis on using 
Indonesia‘s natural resources to make products, with North Korea again providing an 
example. In the international trade sector, exports must be increased and imports limited 
only to goods which could not be made in Indonesia. Thus, the President declared he had 
decided that 
import shall only be carried out by the Government. Private entrepreneurs 
are forbidden to do any import unless they do so on behalf of the 
Government. To these private entrepreneurs license will only be given to 
try and become producer-exporters whose export will be done under 
Governmental guidance. That then is the task which the Revolution puts 
on the shoulders of private entrepreneurs…. 
 
In this connection, imports should help spur production of exports sufficient to finance 
the imports. With respect to cooperatives, there could only be two kinds: those for 
production, and those for distribution. In the all important area of financing, Sukarno 
noted that Indonesia would have to rely on its own strengths and abilities, including the 
state-owned enterprises, cooperatives and private businesses, and the strength of the 
people, workers, farmers and the armed forces. The main sources of financing were to be 
farming, estates, and mining of natural resources, but new sources of income would have 
to be found. In addition, state-owned enterprises must make a greater contribution to 
                                                 
10
 As we saw in Chapter Two (Part III, Section D), this charge was true; in particular, the oil industry, 
which was dominated by the big three foreign oil companies, was meant to provide over 75% of the 
required foreign exchange.  
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financing development, and more authority should be given to the regions to create their 
own financing sources. Finally, in order to fight inflation, the GOI budget should be 
under the control of the President himself. Similarly, to ensure effective implementation 
of development, the Indonesian Development Bank needed to be restructured, and a 
centralized planning, implementation and control apparatus at the central and regional 
government levels needed to be put in place; this was to be led by the President, who 
would be assisted by a new National Economic Directing Board.
11
  
The MPRS responded to Sukarno‘s speech by formally endorsing banting stir and 
BERDIKARI as national economic policy.
12
 The MPRS decree echoed Sukarno‘s 
statement that the national democratic phase of the Indonesian Revolution in which the 
remnants of imperialism and feudalism were to be eliminated was almost completed, that 
the next stage of Indonesian socialism was beckoning, and that the Eight Year 
Development Program needed to conform to the current state of development and 
revolution with a program based on economic struggle. Such a program involved a 
banting stir based on a policy of BERDIKARI, and the remaining three years of the Eight 
Year Development Plan (1966-68) were to be based on the foundation of BERDIKARI. 
The decree noted that for the Indonesian people, the principle of BERDIKIRI meant 
belief in their own ability to fulfill their material, spiritual and religious needs using their 
own strengths as the foundation. Thus BERDIKARI meant utilizing real economic 
strengths and forces, which meant that farming and plantations would be the base and 
industrial development would become the ―spinal cord‖ of economic development. In 
order to expand existing economic forces it was necessary to exploit the country‘s natural 
                                                 
11
 There was also a written portion to Sukarno‘s speech which was not delivered orally but was instead 
distributed.  The general content was the same, though the President took particular care in urging the 
MPRS to adopt banting stir and BERDIKARI and describing why it was necessary to do so. He also noted 
that self-reliance did not mean isolation from other nations behind a Chinese wall.   
12
 Ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara Republik Indonesia No. VI/MPRS/1965 tentang 
Banting Stir Untuk Berdiri Di Atas Kaki Sendiri di Bidang Ekonomi dan Pembangunan, dated 16 April 
1965. The following discussion is based on this decree. In addition, there was another very short MPRS 
decree which affirmed Sukarno‘s 11 April speech as the basis of the current stage of the Indonesian 
Revolution and of a new program of struggle for the Indonesian people in the fields of politics, economic, 
society, culture, and security, and also gave the President the full power and authority to implement it 
(Ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara Republik Indonesia No. V/MPRS/1965 tentang 
Amanat Politik Presiden/Pemimpin Besar Revolusi/Mandataris MPRS Yang Berjudul ‗BERDIKARI‘ 
Sebagai Penegasan Revolusi Indonesia Dalam Bidang Politik, Pedoman Pelaksanaan MANIPOL dan 
Landasan Program Perdjuangan Rakyat Indonesia, dated 16 April 1965).  
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resources and raw materials. It further identified six strengths of the economy: (i) nation 
and character building projects of President Sukarno, especially those involving 
mental/religious development, (ii) the manpower of the Indonesian people, including 
workers, farmers, fishermen and the armed forces, (iii) state-owned enterprises, (iv) 
projects of the Eight Year Development Plan which were almost completed, (v) 
cooperatives, and (vi) progressive private entrepreneurs (Article 1).  
Much of the rest of the MPRS decree was devoted to adding more substance to 
the above broad outlines, though most of this substance was in the form of broad goals 
and objectives rather than specific policies. Without listing any by name, the MPRS 
identified 12 general, basic types of projects that should have priority of implementation, 
which in order were those relating to nation and character building, production of food 
and clothing, security/defense projects, farming/estates, forestry, mining and industrial 
projects, projects processing raw materials, infrastructure projects in communications, 
transmigration projects, research and development projects, worker education projects, 
and projects from the Eight Year Development Plan that had already begun (Article 2). 
These residual projects of the Eight Year Development Plan should be integrated and 
synchronized with local and regional projects (Article 4). It was also necessary to strike a 
balance between political and economic duties in allocating manpower, financial 
resources, and supply of goods, and also disseminating projects to the local areas (Article 
3). Creating an economic climate in accordance with current needs meant rehabilitating 
the means of production, stabilizing prices using price controls, fighting inflation by 
having a stable base of production based on concrete planning, fighting the black market, 
and increasing the purchasing power of the people (Articles 5 and 11). Progressive 
private capital should be directed toward the area of production (presumably instead of 
importing), and in order to create a better climate for production obstacles in the 
licensing/permitting process should be eliminated (Article 13). In addition, there should 
be a broad retrenchment in non-productive fields (Article 15). In the important area of 
financing development, funding should be based on the strengths of the country itself. 
Specifically, (a) the B projects of the Eight Year Development Plan that depended on 
foreign capital were eliminated, (b) funds were to come from SOEs, the working people 
(workers, farmers, fisherman and armed forces), cooperatives, and progressive private 
 476 
 
elements, and (c) efficient management must be emphasized and wasteful practices 
eliminated (Article 6). The first source of development funds should be those obtained 
from processing natural resources from farms, estates, forestry and fisheries, though 
continuing efforts would have to be made in ―digging for‖ new sources (Article 7), 
including granting more authority to the regions to develop their own sources (Article 8). 
Two areas of the MPRS decree that were, to varying degrees, subsequently 
implemented were foreign trade and foreign investment. In the area of imports and 
exports, the decree confirmed Sukarno‘s vision of forbidding private firms from 
importing goods except on behalf of the GOI (essentially placing importing under the 
GOI‘s control); insofar as exporting, private firms would only be given licenses to do so 
if they endeavored to become ―producer-exporters,‖ and even then exports were 
permitted only under the leadership of the GOI (Article 9). Moreover, in order to protect 
domestic industry, purchases (and thus imports) of foreign goods were only allowed if 
such goods could not be made in Indonesia, and foreign exchange derived from exports 
should be aimed at strengthening domestic production (Article 14). With respect to 
foreign companies, the MPRS decided to ―implement nationalization and if necessary 
seize all foreign companies that were enemies so as to achieve complete freedom in the 
economic and distribution fields‖ (Article 10). 
The remainder of the MPRS decree was mostly concerned with administrative 
aspects of this new policy. All development projects should be paid for by the national 
budget, which in turn should be directly controlled by the President (Article 12). Various 
GOI apparati were to be involved; for example, to provide leadership and guidance and 
ensure the success of these and other development measures, a National Economic 
Council (Dewan Ekonomi Nasional, or DEPENAS) would be established; its membership 
was to include groups that were part of NASAKOM, and its specific composition and 
duties were to be determined by the President (Article 19). There was also emphasis on 
coordinating the development process between the center and the regions (Article 20). 
The MPRS further gave President Sukarno, who was to be assisted by two existing 
planning agencies, MUPPENAS and BAPPENAS, the task of devising by the end of 
1965 a detailed plan for implementing this banting stir (Article 21). These efforts were 
not free from political concerns; capitalist bureaucrats (kabir) and other counter-
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revolutionaries would have to be eliminated from the bureaucracy (Article 22), and the 
team assisting the President should have elements from Pantja Sila, MANIPOL, and 
NASAKOM (Article 23). The Indonesian armed forces were also specifically targeted, as 
Article 23 called for the continued mental and spiritual development, including 
indoctrination, of the armed forces, and noted that its development as both an instrument 
of the Indonesian Revolution and an instrument of security should be in rhythm with the 
intensification of the Indonesian Revolution. Finally, lest there be any remaining doubt 
that President Sukarno was in charge of executing this new policy of BERDIKARI, the 
last article of the decree explicitly vested the President with full power and authority to 
implement it (Article 25). 
 As is evident, President Sukarno and the MPRS only provided a broad outline of 
banting stir and the BERDIKARI policy, leaving most of the details to be worked out and 
implemented later. Much of the content was limited to broader objectives without 
specific policy prescriptions. (In this respect, BERDIKARI was quite similar to DEKON, 
which as we saw in Chapter Four contained broad statements of economic principles that 
could be interpreted and implemented in various ways.) For example, it was one thing to 
identify the strengths of the Indonesian economy, but in practice how could these 
strengths be translated into self-reliance?  Likewise, how exactly did one rehabilitate the 
instruments of production, rein in inflation, eliminate the black market, and increase the 
purchasing power of the people? How, precisely, was more development financing 
supposed to be generated from internal sources? There were certainly some specific 
policy measures, such as the rejection of the Eight Year Development Plan, which was 
cited as the main reason for the drastic turn of the wheel.  Other specific measures were 
the placing of control over imports and exports into the hands of the GOI, the 
nationalization of foreign investment, and to a lesser extent the prioritization of 
development projects (which remained unnamed). Nevertheless, the tasking by the MPRS 
of President Sukarno with devising a plan to implement the new policy – and effectively 
leaving the entire implementation of BERDIKARI in the President‘s hands - indicated an 
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awareness that most of these broader objectives would have to be worked out in detail in 
the future.
13
    
B. Influences, Rationale and Implementation of BERDIKARI. 
Having outlined generally the BERDIKARI policy as proclaimed by President 
Sukarno and the MPRS, I now turn to examining the rationale for, and implementation 
of, the policy. I start with potential influences on President Sukarno as he devised the 
policy, in particular the PKI, North Korea and the PRC. Each of these three entities was 
promoting self-reliance when President Sukarno proposed BERDIKARI as Indonesia‘s 
national economic policy, and President Sukarno seemed to draw upon the ideas of each 
in formulating BERDIKARI, though it is impossible to state with certainty the degree of 
influence these three had on Sukarno‘s thinking. Of course each of the PKI, the PRC and 
North Korea was certainly influencing the others to some degree in promoting and 
implementing self-reliance, making the concept a big mixing pot of ideas. I also examine 
BERDIKARI in the broader context of Indonesian economic policy since independence. I 
then turn to what I believe were the principal reasons for the adoption of the policy: the 
chaotic condition of the Indonesian economy in 1965 and the lack of outside assistance, 
in effect leaving the President with little alternative. The section closes with a discussion 
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of the implementation of BERDIKARI, finding that except with respect to foreign 
investment little of the policy was put into practice.  
 President Sukarno‘s promotion of BERDIKARI as national economic policy 
closely tracked the policy of the PKI, which had advocated a policy of BERDIKARI 
since 1963, not coincidentally around the same time that the term gained increasing 
prominence. In his report to the PKI central committee of February 1963, PKI Chairman 
Aidit suggested that ―the real way out of Indonesia‘s economic difficulties is not by 
begging for loans from abroad or making the Indonesian people the servants of foreign 
capital invested in Indonesia, but by the development of a national economy that can 
stand on its own two feet,‖ a suggestion that Aidit repeated in late May 1963 with the 
implementation of the economic stabilization package.
14
  In late September, upon his 
return from a world tour that included visits to the USSR, the PRC and North Korea, 
Aidit praised the North Korean economic model of standing on one‘s own two legs.
15
 
Indeed, one close observer of the PKI posits that after the outbreak of Konfrontasi the 
PKI rejected the Soviet style developmental model and, ―drawing once again on Chinese 
views, proposed a strategy of self-reliance for Indonesia giving primary emphasis to the 
agricultural sector.‖
16
 The decisive moment for PKI support for a policy of BERDIKARI 
appeared to be the December 1963 central committee meeting, which as we saw in 
Chapter Five was also the moment the PKI decided to embark on a major political 
offensive. In his report to the meeting, Aidit, recognizing that US aid to Indonesia would 
dry up after the outbreak of Konfrontasi and that the PRC was probably not in a position 
to help, again advocated a policy of BERDIKARI, and in 1964 BERDIKARI became the 
PKI‘s economic ―catchword.‖
17
 In advocating this policy, the PKI was apparently 
influenced most strongly by the Chinese model, but as we have seen North Korea also 
provided an example.
18
  What then, was the PKI‘s influence on President Sukarno‘s 
adoption of BERDIKARI? Mortimer suggests that the militantly nationalistic atmosphere 
                                                 
14
 Cited in Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno, p. 264; Chetwynd, Indonesian Stabilization 
Attempt, pp. 51-2, citing Aidit‘s speech of 26 May 1963. 
15
 Donald Hindley, "The Indonesian Communist Party and the Conflict in the International Communist 
Movement," The China Quarterly 19 (1964), pp. 107-8, citing Aidit‘s speech of 30 September 1963.  See 
also Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno, pp. 356-7.  
16
 Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno, pp. 248-9.  
17
 Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno, pp. 236-7, 245.  
18
 Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno, pp. 270-1, 248-9.  
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of Konfrontasi led to the adoption by President Sukarno (aided by the loss of the 
technocratic and economically pragmatic First Minister Djuanda) of many of the PKI‘s 
economic slogans, including BERDIKARI.
19
  It is difficult to assess the validity of this 
assertion that Sukarno simply borrowed BERDIKARI from the PKI, but clearly at a 
minimum there was a convergence of ideas and undoubtedly the PKI‘s promotion of the 
concept did influence Sukarno to some extent.  
Another possible influence on President Sukarno with respect to BERDIKARI 
was the Peoples Republic of China.  Chinese leader Mao Zedong first formulated the 
concept of self-reliance (known in Chinese as zili gengsheng) with respect to the PRC in 
the late 1950s.
20
 The use of the term, however, dates back to the Yenan era (1937-45) of 
the Chinese Communist Party, when the CCP was forced during the Japanese occupation 
and civil war to fend for itself in the remote northwestern area of Yenan. The term re-
emerged as the PRC implemented its Great Leap Forward in 1958 and relations with the 
USSR began to sour, and the periods when self-reliance was most strictly applied were 
1958-62 and 1966-70. While the withdrawal of Soviet economic and military aid to the 
PRC in 1960 was a major reason for the more severe application of the doctrine, 
indigenous factors, such as a long experience with western imperialism, the Yenan era, 
and Mao‘s own vision of socialist development, were also very influential. The policy‘s 
basic goals were internally-generated development (using human resources, especially 
mass mobilization, using local resources, allowing foreign trade but not as the prime 
catalyst of growth, and rejecting adoption of foreign ideas and knowledge without first 
adopting them to Chinese conditions) and the avoidance of external dependency 
(meaning primarily to ensure Chinese autonomy with respect to other nations, and also 
struggling against the imperialist world economy by creating a broad united front 
emphasizing collective self-reliance), though there was clearly internal disagreement over 
how to reach these goals. Foreign trade in particular was to be strictly controlled by the 
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 Another feature of Chinese self-reliance was its application below the national 
level to regional and local units of government and businesses, each of which was 
expected to become self-reliant.
22
 
President Sukarno was certainly aware of the Chinese concept of self-reliance 
because the concept was an integral part of the Indonesian-Chinese anti-imperialist united 
front campaign. One observer has argued that the three concepts of political sovereignty, 
economic self-reliance and independent cultural identity were jointly developed by the 
PRC and Indonesia as key concepts of their anti-imperialist position, with the PRC in 
particular focusing on enunciating economic self-reliance, while Indonesia concentrated 
on the other two.  This position of self-reliance was in part designed to address the 
problems associated with foreign economic aid, which often came with attached political 
strings and was thus seen as a measure to continue western control and domination. 
Moreover, the Chinese also advocated the nationalization of all foreign capital in Afro-
Asian countries as a means toward achieving true self-reliance.
23
 Self-reliance was one of 
the eight guiding principles of the PRC‘s own foreign aid program in the 1960s, which 
the PRC also claimed was free of political strings.
24
    
It was North Korea, however, that seemed to provide much of the inspiration for 
President Sukarno‘s BERDIKARI concept.  In the mid-1960s, North Korea had one of 
the most self-reliant economies in the world.
25
 Self-reliance was embodied in the North 
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Korean concept of Juche, a comprehensive term that applied not just to the economy but 
also to politics and society.
26
 First enunciated by North Korean leader Kim Il Sung in late 
1955, the concept was applied most stringently in the 1960s, triggered in part by the 
withdrawal of Soviet aid by the end of the 1950s that forced North Korea to wean itself 
off Soviet support.
27
 North Korea was a strong proponent of economic independence as a 
prerequisite for political independence, and the primary objectives of economic Juche 
were ―to reduce the possibility of political pressure from unreliable large allies by 
economic means and to mobilize the domestic resources and human energy of North 
Korea‘s own people in order to minimize dependence on outside counties.‖
28
 There were 
three basic strategies followed under Juche: (i) a priority on the development of heavy 
industry, using the country‘s own raw materials and resources, (ii) using mass 
mobilization techniques and campaigns that emphasized and encouraged the 
revolutionary enthusiasm of the people, and (iii) allowing foreign economic trade and 
interaction but only in a supplementary capacity.
29
 Insofar as the influence of the North 
Korean Juche on President Sukarno, it is fairly evident that Sukarno viewed North Korea 
as a model of self-reliance, often citing it as an example (as we saw in Sukarno‘s 11 April 
1965 speech to the MPRS). One observer even suggests that the BERDIKARI concept 
was ―derived from an appreciation of North Korea‘s efforts toward an ‗independent and 
self reliant‘ economy,‖ while another commentator argues that North Korea was ―chosen 
by both the PKI and Sukarno as a model for Indonesia‘s economic development.‖
30
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Diplomatic relations between the two countries were only established in April 1964, and 
Sukarno visited North Korea the first time for a few days in early November 1964 at the 
end of his long overseas tour. The President came away suitably impressed by the 
country‘s economic achievements, particularly its self-sufficiency in food and clothing, 
which not coincidentally were, as we have seen, two stated objectives of Guided 
Economy. Kim Il Sung reciprocated with a visit to Indonesia in mid-April 1965, during 
which he attended Sukarno‘s 11 April BERDIKARI speech to the MPRS, and the North 
Korean leader was supportive of Sukarno‘s anti-imperialist policies to the point where 
Sukarno included Pyongyang in his anti-imperialist axis declared in his 17 August 1965 
independence day address.
31
     
In addition to these external factors, there were also some internal factors at work 
pushing Sukarno in this direction, in particular if we broaden our lens from the immediate 
focus of 1965 and view economic policy-making for the period 1950-65 as a whole.  As 
we saw in Chapter Two, the construction of a national economy controlled by Indonesia 
was the overriding concern of economic policymakers since independence in late 1949, 
even if there was significant disagreement over what this meant in practice and how 
Indonesia should get there.  Thus the various economic plans implemented over the next 
decade and a half - the Economic Urgency Plan, the Five Year Plan, the Eight Year 
Development Plan - all were formulated in part to address this issue. The nationalization 
of Dutch companies was a significant step in this direction, and under Sukarno‘s 
increasingly nationalistic and revolutionary Guided Democracy, there was a greater push. 
For example, two new laws passed in 1960, the Oil and Gas law and the Basic Agrarian 
law, further cemented Indonesia‘s control over her own resources, at least in theory. A 
related aspect of these efforts to construct a national economy was the drive to be self-
sufficient in food and clothing. Indonesia in the late 1950s began to make a number of 
concerted attempts to achieve self-sufficiency in rice, none of which were successful. 
Self-sufficiency in food and clothing were also declared goals of Guided Democracy and 
the Eight Year Development Plan, though neither was achieved.
32
 If the BERDIKARI 
program is viewed from the perspective of a desire to construct an independent national 
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economy (without which there could be no political independence), then its adoption in 
1965 was in a sense the culmination of these various policies and drives over the previous 
15 years. BERDIKARI thus simultaneously represented a pinnacle in economic policy-
making and the goal of economic development.  
Nevertheless, there was also a very practical reason for launching the 
BERDIKARI policy, one that President Sukarno himself explicitly recognized in his 11 
April speech to the MPRS. This was the condition of the Indonesian economy, which 
reached its own nadir of chaos in 1965-66, expressed by the President as the failure of the 
Eight Year Development Plan that necessitated the new direction. Here again I emphasize 
that for Indonesia the year 1965-66 was a culmination in three interrelated areas: the 
domestic political struggle, foreign relations, and the disastrous condition of the 
economy. As we saw in Chapter Four, the last meaningful attempt to reform the economy 
in 1963 was derailed by the September 1963 outbreak of Konfrontasi, which, as was the 
case with the domestic political struggle and the anti-imperialist direction of Indonesia‘s 
foreign policy, seemed to intensify economic deterioration. In the first place, 
Konfrontasi‘s outbreak ended any chance of foreign aid, a critical component of the 
stabilization package, which effectively killed the reform attempt. Secondly, the warlike 
situation and the trade embargo of Malaysia (including Singapore, through which many 
of Indonesia‘s exports passed) resulted in a major decline in exports and thus in precious 
foreign exchange, which meant there was a concurrent decline in imports; this had the 
twin effect of contributing to domestic price increases as well decreasing GOI revenues 
(foreign trade taxes, as we have seen, contributed a sizable portion to GOI revenues).
33
 In 
addition, the increased expenditures associated with Konfrontasi consumed an increasing 
portion of the GOI budget – by one estimate, Konfrontasi expenditures constituted 19% 
of the GOI 1965 budget, in addition to the defense budget of 21%.
34
  
In 1965-66, the Indonesian economy was in a state of near collapse. One 
commentator described the situation as follows: a ―decade of ever-increasing economic 
mismanagement had brought a degree of economic breakdown with few parallels in 
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 A principal problem was inflation, which had been a persistent thorn 
since independence but under Guided Democracy became a major issue, easily 
surpassing 100% in 1963 and 1964. However, from late 1964 inflation began devolving 
into spiraling hyperinflation, reaching almost 600% in 1965 and almost 640% in 1966.
36
  
The primary cause of this devastating inflation was the ever-expanding GOI budget 
deficits, as GOI revenues simply could not keep pace with ever-increasing expenditures, 
and the resulting deficits were made up by the simple expedient of printing more money 
(see Chapter Two, Part IV, for some figures). These budget deficits acted as a safety 
valve for a whole host of unresolved political issues and especially reflected the political 
weakness of the central government.
37
 One consequence of this inflation was the inability 
of the GOI to direct the economy; indeed, as one observer noted, by 1964 ―there was little 
the government could do to re-establish control over the economy,‖ and by 1966 the only 
ways inflation could be checked were ―through a dramatic inflow of foreign aid, or 
through a revolutionary political change to a strong economizing government capable of 
greatly increasing revenue and slashing expenditure simultaneously.‖
38
 Adding to these 
inflationary woes was overall stagnation in domestic production, with declining per-
capita income and deterioration of the ‗social overhead capital‘ in the form of 
infrastructure.
39
  In addition, Indonesia‘s huge accumulated foreign debt of $2.4 billion 
had become problematic, and by the end of 1965 Indonesia began defaulting on some of 
this debt, as Indonesia‘s declining export earnings and foreign exchange reserves were 
not nearly sufficient to cover debt service and projected import needs.
40
 In sum, by April 
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1965 the Indonesian economy was in serious trouble, and in an attempt to prevent the 
foundering Indonesian economic ship from sinking altogether President Sukarno‘s 
response was BERDIKARI. 
While BERDIKARI thus may be seen as a response to Indonesia‘s economic 
situation, we can still ask why BERDIKARI was chosen and not some other economic 
program. In addition to the ideological factors and external influences described above, I 
believe there was a very compelling, pragmatic answer to this key question: the lack of 
feasible alternatives, what some observers have referred to as making virtue out of 
necessity.
41
  As noted previously, there was a significant drop-off in foreign aid after 
1963 when Konfrontasi broke out, and even the USSR was disinclined to provide new 
funds. Moreover, with its aggressive anti-imperialist foreign policy Indonesia had 
successfully isolated itself from most of the world, leaving the PRC as its principal 
international ally. The resulting situation was one in which Indonesia could expect little 
foreign assistance (and if it did receive loans, there was the question of how the loans 
could be repaid, given the country‘s dwindling foreign exchange reserves), and thus 
Indonesia had no choice but to rely on herself.
42
  The real difficulty was in figuring out 
how to do this.  
In fact, except with respect to foreign investment, very little of the BERDIKARI 
program seems to have been implemented in practice. There are a number of possible 
reasons for this. In the first place, there was the political turmoil and general 
governmental paralysis following the September 30 Movement in which the culmination 
of the domestic political conflict took center stage (see Part III, Section A). A second 
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related reason may have been more basic: that except in a few areas such as foreign 
investment and foreign trade, BERDIKARI as enunciated by President Sukarno and 
adopted by the MPRS lacked any specific guidelines or policy prescriptions and was 
instead a statement of broad policy objectives. President Sukarno – really his advisors - 
was charged with translating these broader objectives into reality, a very tough task that 
was compounded by the ramifications of the September 30 Movement. A third reason 
may have been strong domestic resistance by various groups within Indonesia whose 
interests were threatened by the program, though this is difficult to prove.
43
 In the 
following paragraphs I discuss the two areas where there seem to have been some limited 
movement toward implementation of BERDIKARI: first with respect to government 
administration and planning, and second with respect to foreign trade.    
With respect to government administration and planning, the GOI took a number 
of steps toward implementing BERDIKARI, though none of these ultimately had much 
impact.  In early September 1965, a governmental body known as KOTARI (an acronym 
for Kommando Tertinggi Economi Berdikari, or ‗High Command for Economic Self-
Reliance‘) was formed. Its primary function was to assume most of the tasks of KOTOE 
(the ‗Supreme Command for Economic Operations,‘ the economic equivalent to KOTI, 
formed a few years earlier to provide direction in economic affairs which was now 
confined to economic aspects of Konfrontasi), and at some point it was to be replaced by 
DEPENAS, the National Economic Council authorized by the MPRS in its 16 April 
decree on BERDIKARI. Thus KOTARI had broad power over economic matters and was 
meant to provide economic policy direction and to coordinate the same within the various 
government departments, presumably with an emphasis on BERDIKARI. It reported 
directly to President Sukarno and was headed by Minister of Internal Trade A. Jusuf, 
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whom as we saw in Chapter Six had only been appointed to this new post in March 1965, 
replacing Adam Malik. Its other members were all ministers and included Minister of 
Central Bank Affairs Jusuf Muda Dalam, Minister of Light Industry M. Jusuf, Minister of 
Information Achmadi, and Minister of State Sukendro. In mid-September, President 
Sukarno instructed KOTARI to increase state revenues, review the tax system, end 
unnecessary subsidies, and halt the import of consumer goods (which included revising 
the foreign exchange system). However, except with respect to imports (which we shall 
examine below), it appears that KOTARI did not implement any regulations in these 




   Some individual GOI ministries also adjusted their plans to fit banting stir and 
BERDIKARI, in particular with respect to the adjustments to the Eight Year 
Development Plan. For example, the Ministry of Basic Industry revamped its planning of 
projects under the Eight Year Development Plan, continuing some but cancelling others. 
The underlying concept behind the continued projects was to focus on import 
substitution, reducing dependence on imported goods such as fertilizer, cement, 
chemicals, metals and machinery. These new plans, though, appear to not have been 
implemented to any great extent, as the September 30 Movement effectively put an end 
to whatever remained of the Eight Year Development Plan.
45
 In addition, Minister for 
Central Bank Affairs Jusuf Muda Dalam claimed to have implemented BERDIKARI in 
banking by granting new credit only for expansion of production on estates, farms and in 
key industries, though its impact was most likely limited.
46
  Some ministries even created 
special positions associated with BERDIKARI, such as the Assistant to the Coordinating 
Minister of Light Industry in charge of BERDIKARI, a position created in June 1965 
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when the Ministry of Light Industry was elevated to its own Compartment with a 
coordinating minister and four ministers.
47
     
In the area of foreign trade, however, there was a significant but failed effort to 
implement BERDIKARI. As we saw above, at President Sukarno‘s urging the MPRS had 
agreed that private firms should be prohibited from importing goods except on behalf of 
the GOI (essentially placing importing under the GOI‘s control) and would be permitted 
to export only under the leadership of the GOI and only as ―producer-exporters‖ (this was 
intended to foster production of goods, instead of merely trading for goods made by 
others and then exporting them). In late November 1965, two decrees were issued that 
beginning in 1966 would limit importing to the GOI and private firms acting on behalf of 
the GOI. However, these regulations were never implemented in practice, and in April 
1966 the new government announced it was abolishing them.
48
  Nevertheless, except for 
foreign investment, this effort appears to be the strongest attempt to devise specific 
measures to implement BERDIKARI policies.  
  
II. BERDIKARI and Foreign Investment. 
 
In contrast to its general lack of implementation in other areas, BERDIKARI was 
applied to foreign investment. The result was a final wave of takeovers in 1965 in which 
all remaining foreign investment in Indonesia, with the exceptions of Caltex and Stanvac, 
was taken over by the GOI. Altogether, six foreign-owned manufacturing facilities and at 
least 10 foreign estate companies (owning at least 44 estates) were taken over by the GOI 
on the basis of BERDIKARI.  BERDIKARI‘s implementation with respect to foreign 
investment marked a dramatic shift in the takeovers of foreign firms in Indonesia in the 
mid-1960s because it signaled that the position of foreign firms in the Indonesian 
economy had changed as a matter of national economic policy, not as a result of foreign 
relations (such as the takeover of Malaysian companies in the fall of 1963 and the 
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takeover of American companies in early 1965) or domestic political instability (the 
takeover of British firms in 1963 and 1964). Now, all foreign investment, not just British, 
Malaysian and American, was taken over pursuant to a readily identifiable, universally 
applicable, economic policy. 
While President Sukarno spearheaded the drive to eliminate foreign investment 
under the BERDIKARI doctrine, its actual implementation was generally left to the 
ministers under whose competence the companies fell. As noted in Part I, in his April 11 
BERDIKARI speech to the MPRS, President Sukarno had challenged the MPRS to find a 
solution to the problem of foreign capital in Indonesia so that the country could achieve 
complete freedom in the economic field. The MPRS, obviously reflecting Sukarno‘s 
wishes, responded by agreeing to proceed with nationalization and if necessary the 
seizure of all enemy foreign companies, and President Sukarno was given the full 
authority to implement this provision. About one week later, President Sukarno, citing 
the principle of BERDIKARI, issued Presidential Decree 6/1965 under which all foreign 
companies in Indonesia, regardless of nationality, were placed under GOI control.
49
 
About one month later, President Sukarno issued another decree revoking the 1958 
foreign investment law in the name of BERDIKARI, thus officially slamming the door on 
the possibility of any new foreign investment.
50
 Nevertheless, as implementation of 
Presidential Decree 6/1965 was left to the various ministries, the takeovers varied from 
company to company, somewhat similar to the situation of British firms in 1964, and in 
the case of the foreign estates the final assumption of managerial control came only in 
December. However, one major difference between this wave of takeovers and the 
previous waves is the sharp diminution of labor union involvement; of the takeovers after 
Presidential Decree 6/1965 was issued (24 April 1965), only the case of American-owned 
Singer Sewing involved a physical takeover by a labor union before GOI intervention. 
Although BERDIKARI was the justifying rationale for the takeovers, there were 
some hints that a change of policy with respect to foreign investment was in the works for 
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other reasons. Shortly before Sukarno‘s 11 April BERDIKARI speech, Third Deputy 
Prime Minister Chaerul Saleh on 5 April told US special envoy Ellsworth Bunker that 
―‗old style investments‘ have no future in Indonesia and [the] GOI [is] now considering 
broad ‗new economic policy‘ to govern foreign firms, including US oil interests.‖ 
Minister Saleh provided three rationales for this new policy.  First, 
agitators in Indonesia are picking off foreign investors one by one – first 
Dutch, then Brits, now Americans. Attention will probably soon center on 
Belgians and French. This piecemeal approach causes both political and 
economic problems and makes it difficult for the GOI to have longrun 
consistent policies. In the second place, some foreign firms have 
‗outdated‘ attitudes and follow unhelpful policies, these must be ended. 
Finally, present system makes it difficult for GOI to control wages and 
fringe benefits for foreign firms, in contrast with firm control over 





Moreover, a CIA memo of early 1965 described how a 19 February 1965 high level 
meeting of KOTI officials recommended that all western business interests, including the 
oil companies, be taken over. The primary reason for the recommendation was the 
internal security situation; Brigadier General Sugandi was quoted as saying that ―it is 
clear…that western capital aims at squeezing Indonesia economically, while at the same 
time serving to cloak subversive activities. The United States is the major offender. 
However, all western business interests, including US, British and Belgian interests, 
should be taken over by the government.‖
52
  
This Part II is divided into two sections. Section A examines Presidential Decree 
6/1965, the decree by which the remaining foreign investment in Indonesia was taken 
over, and its initial implementation by the Presidium Kabinet and the various ministries, 
in particular the Ministry of Estates.  Section B then investigates the revocation of the 
1958 foreign investment law, which ensured that no new foreign investment could enter 
the country.  
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A. Presidential Decree 6/1965 and Initial Implementation.     
President Sukarno‘s Decree 6/1965 of 24 April 1965, using the rationale of 
BERDIKARI, established the basis for GOI control over every foreign enterprise in 
Indonesia, regardless of nationality. Signifying its importance, Presidential Decree 
6/1965 was the only major decree of all the takeover decrees issued by the various 
departments and ministries of the GOI from 1963-65 that came with an accompanying 
explanation. This provides some useful insights into the rationale behind the decree as 
well as clarification of some issues. A key feature of the decree was that although it 
established GOI control over all foreign companies generally, it left the implementation 
of government control, including the power to designate specifically which companies 
should be placed under government control, in the hands of the Presidium Kabinet, which 
as we shall see passed on some of the responsibility to individual ministries. The decree 
also continued to maintain the GOI fiction that it was assuming control over, but not 
ownership of, the companies, such that the proprietary rights of the owners were not 
affected and thus no compensation would have to be paid. This assertion, though, was in 
practice challenged by Minister of Estates Frans Seda, whose implementation of the 
decree clearly anticipated that compensation would be paid to owners of the estates.  
1. Presidential Decree 6/1965. 
The opening paragraphs of President Sukarno‘s Decree 6/1965 and the 
accompanying explanation make clear that BERDIKARI was the primary rationale 
behind the decree.
53
 The preamble of the decree noted that the ―Indonesian Revolution 
had now reached a stage inspired by the people who wished to implement the principle of 
‗standing on one‘s own feet‘ in the economic field.‖ In connection therewith, the position 
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of foreign companies with a non-domestic character needed to be adapted to fit the new 
conditions, and pending the results of such ―adaptation,‖ it was first necessary to place 
the companies under the control (penguasaan) of the GOI in order to safeguard the 
Indonesian economy generally and those enterprises in particular. The preamble also 
referred to various GOI decrees and measures, including MANIPOL, DEKON, TAVIP, 
as well as both MPRS decrees of 16 April 1965 on banting stir and BERDIKARI. The 
accompanying explanation referred to the objectives of the Indonesian Revolution as set 
forth in MANIPOL (establishing a unitary and democratic state, establishing a just and 
prosperous state, and establishing friendships with other countries in establishing a new 
world free from imperialism and colonialism), as well as DEKON. It also highlighted 
Sukarno‘s TAVIP speech and noted that the three stages of the Indonesian Revolution 
cited in the TAVIP speech had been reached: freedom in politics, standing on one‘s own 
feet in the economy, and having one‘s own identity in the cultural field. The explanation 
continued that in order to achieve the people‘s objective of BERDIKARI it was necessary 
to reconsider GOI policy toward foreign capital, and in light of the two MPRS decrees of 
16 April it was now time to place all foreign enterprises in Indonesia with a non-domestic 
character under GOI control. The explanation noted, however, that the GOI was willing 
to listen to the concerns of the entrepreneurs involved, and that there were still ways for 
foreign capital to participate in the Indonesian economy in the future, namely on the basis 
of production sharing. 
In terms of its implementing provisions, Decree 6/1965 placed all foreign 
enterprises with a non-domestic character under the control (penguasaan) of the GOI, 
without diminishing the proprietary rights of the owners (Article One). Rather 
confusingly, the Presidium Kabinet was charged with issuing further decrees to determine 
which foreign companies were actually to be placed under GOI control (Article Two). 
The Presidium Kabinet was also charged with the general implementation of the 
takeovers, and it was to be assisted by the ministers and coordinating ministers in the 
respective areas. Priority was to be given to securing (i) the continuation of smooth 
operations within the companies, (ii) the safety and security of the inventory of the 
companies, and (iii) the proprietary rights of both the owners and the workers of the 
companies. If necessary, the Presidium Kabinet and the relevant ministers should also 
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listen to the owners of the companies. (Articles Three, Four and Five) It was not clear 
what ―listening to the owners‖ meant; the explanation to the decree suggested that this 
last provision referred to listening to the owners in the context of the settlement by the 
GOI of the owner‘s proprietary rights. Finally, the decree specifically provided that it 
applied to all foreign companies already placed under GOI supervision/control before the 
decree was issued (Article Six), making clear that all British and American companies 
already taken over fell under its ambit. Presumably this was to ensure that the distinction 
between takeover of management and takeover of ownership applied to all companies. 
Several provisions of the decree were confusing and contradictory and deserve 
further comment.  First, while the decree made plain that only foreign companies with a 
―non-domestic character‖ were to be taken over, it did not clearly define what was meant 
by a ―non-domestic character.‖ The explanation to the decree defined foreign enterprises 
as those meeting one or both of the following criteria: those enterprises (i) whose capital 
was owned partially or wholly by foreign individuals or bodies, and/or (ii) which aim to 
transfer abroad some or all their profits. Yet, the explanation then went on to state that 
―foreign domestic companies which in their business did not intend to transfer profits 
outside the country‖ did not fall within the definition of foreign enterprises, suggesting 
that repatriation of profits, and not actual ownership of the company, was the determining 
factor.  This was almost certainly in part an un-artful attempt to insulate Chinese-
Indonesians (and foreign Chinese and other foreign Asian residents of Indonesia) who 
played such a key role in the economy from the effects of Decree 6/1965; President 
Sukarno may have feared that the decree could be interpreted to apply to them, despite 
the fact that most of them were now Indonesian citizens. Such a carve-out based on profit 
repatriation was also a relatively easy way to distinguish between European and 
American firms, which generally tried to repatriate profits when conditions allowed, and 
other firms, and as a practical matter kept all funds within Indonesia, something that was 
clearly beneficial to the Indonesia economy. In any case, as late as early June the GOI 
was still searching for a definition of a foreign enterprise with a ―non-domestic 
character.‖ Minister Chaerul Saleh himself admitted as much in a meeting with 
representatives of various political parties in which he suggested that there could be a 





 Of course, companies with ties to OLDEFOs would be taken over, 
while those with ties to NEFOs would not.    
In addition to the definition of ―non-domestic character,‖ there was a second 
ambiguous issue in the decree related to which foreign companies would be taken over 
and the timing thereof. The decree clearly stated that all foreign enterprises with a non-
domestic character were placed under the control of the GOI; however, simultaneously 
and contradictorily, the Presidium Kabinet was charged with determining which foreign 
companies were to be placed under GOI control. The explanation to the decree was again 
helpful in answering this ambiguity; it stated that GOI control over the companies would 
not be automatic, but rather to avoid confusion the Presidium Kabinet would have the 
power to determine which companies would be placed under government control. Thus, it 
appeared that potentially not all ―foreign companies with a non-domestic character‖ 
would be taken over; it would be up to the Presidium Kabinet to decide. The explanation 
further noted that the relations between the GOI and the country of origin of the foreign 
company should be taken into account when determining which companies to take over. 
What President Sukarno appears to have intended was to establish a general policy of 
taking over all foreign companies and then to institutionalize control of the takeover 
process within the Presidium Kabinet and provide the Presidium Kabinet with discretion 
over what companies were to be taken over in practice.
55
 This was almost certainly 
intended to prevent individual ministers and other GOI authorities (at both the central and 
provincial/local levels) from taking matters into their own hands and to ensure that the 
GOI takeover policy would be better coordinated at the top level. Moreover, in exercising 
its discretion the Presidium Kabinet was clearly meant to take into account foreign 
relations, implying that companies from friendly nations (perhaps other NEFOs) may be 
treated differently.  
In sum, Presidential Decree 6/1965 appeared to include two possible carve-outs 
from the general rule of a takeover of all foreign companies. The first was the ambiguous 
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definition of a ―foreign company with non-domestic character,‖ and the second was 
vesting the Presidium Kabinet with discretion in choosing which companies were to be 
taken over. Both of these carve-outs, of course, diluted the purity of the BERDIKARI 
concept. If Indonesia was indeed to stand on its own two feet, it should theoretically not 
distinguish between the companies of friendly countries and non-friendly countries. In 
any case, as far as I have been able to determine, the vast majority of remaining foreign 
companies which actually produced goods (as opposed to small trading operations or 
retail stores) were almost all from either European or North American countries, and 
these were all taken over pursuant to Decree 6/1965.     
2. Initial Implementation of Decree 6/1965. 
(a) Decrees of the Presidium Kabinet. 
As the Presidium Kabinet was responsible for implementing Presidential Decree 
6/1965, we first examine what measures the Presidium Kabinet took. Unfortunately, the 
record is not completely clear. It appears that the Presidium Kabinet issued two kinds of 
decrees: the first involved the registration of foreign companies in general, and the 
second specifically designated which foreign companies were under GOI control. Third 
Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul Saleh appeared to be the member of the Presidium 
Kabinet primarily responsible for implementing Decree 6/1965.  
First, the Presidium Kabinet issued a series of instructions to the various GOI 
ministers directing them to arrange for the registration of foreign companies under their 
jurisdiction. One of these instructions, issued by Third Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul 
Saleh on behalf of the Presidium Kabinet, refers to two previous instructions regarding 
registration of foreign companies of a non-domestic character and requests that the results 
of the registration be forwarded immediately by the ministers to the Presidium Kabinet.
56
 
It further requests the ministers to take an inventory of all property, debt, and wealth of 
each of the companies and also to prepare an initial balance sheet for each of the 
companies, in each case at the time the company was taken over by the GOI. The 
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ministers were also requested to do the same thing with respect to foreign companies 
taken over before Presidential Decree 6/1965 (i.e., the British and American companies).  
Thus, from this instruction we can surmise that as early as 30 April, about a week after 
Decree 6/1965 was issued, the Presidium Kabinet took the initial step of organizing the 
registration of all foreign companies remaining in Indonesia. This suggests that the 
purpose was more information gathering than anything else; presumably the Presidium 
Kabinet wanted to get an idea of how many foreign companies there were, and the best 
way was to have the companies register. The instruction also suggests that orders had 
probably already been issued instructing ministers to proceed with the takeovers – as 
noted above, the inventory was to be taken at the time of takeover. 
The second type of implementing decree the Presidium Kabinet issued were those 
specifically designating which foreign companies were placed under GOI control 
pursuant to Presidential Decree 6/1965. As described above, this was one of the functions 
Decree 6/1965 charged the Presidium Kabinet with performing. I have found one 
example of this type of decree, which relates only to foreign estate companies; hence the 
assumption that there are more decrees of this nature, as it would be odd indeed if the 
Presidium Kabinet issued a single decree limited to estate companies. The decree, dated 4 
May 1965 and issued by Third Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul Saleh in the name of the 
Presidium Kabinet, placed all foreign estate companies that were not already under GOI 
control or management pursuant to Presidential Decree 6/1964 (the one issued by 
President Sukarno in November 1964 regarding British companies) or the Presidium 
Kabinet decree of 26 February 1965 (the one issued by Minister Subandrio regarding 
American estate companies) under government control (penguasaan).
57
 The reasons cited 
were the intensification of the Indonesian Revolution, the determination of the people to 
implement BERDIKARI, and the safety and security of production. The decree had 
provisions similar to other takeover decrees from both 1964 and 1965. The decree stated 
that Indonesian managers would be appointed to the estate companies; these Indonesian 
managers would be assisted by an advisory council (Dewan Pertimbangan) of unknown 
                                                 
57
 Keputusan Presidium Kabinet (Wakil Perdana Menteri III Chairul Saleh) No. Aa/D/58/65 Tentang 




composition.  To ―safeguard and assist with the continuation of work of the company and 
the raising of production,‖ the decree also appointed boards of supervisors (Badan 
Pengawas) consisting of elements from the local Pantja Tunggal, workers, farmers, and 
experts.  The owners of the companies were required to provide the necessary assistance 
in the interests of production and the continuation of management, and the relationship 
between the owners and the GOI was to be set forth in a written contract.  The GOI took 
full responsibility for the continuation of the companies‘ work. However, in language 
slightly different from other decrees issued in 1965, the decree said attention should be 
paid to the proprietary rights of the owners (as opposed to saying these rights would not 
be diminished). Surprisingly, the decree did not appoint any GOI official or ministry to 
implement the takeovers, though as we shall see below Minister of Estates Frans Seda 
took charge.       
(b) Implementation of Presidential Decree 6/1965 at the Ministerial Level. 
Pursuant to the Presidium Kabinet‘s instructions, various GOI ministries began 
the process of registering and taking over the foreign companies falling within their 
purview. These actions involved (i) at least 10 foreign estate companies owning at least 
44 estates, including the large SOCFIN group of companies (see Chapter Three, Part II, 
Section B), (ii) five foreign manufacturing companies taken over by the Ministry of 
Peoples Industry, and (iii) the NASPRO aspirin plant in Jakarta (the largest 
pharmaceutical operation in Indonesia), taken over by the Ministry of Health. In this 
subsection I shall first focus on the takeovers by the Ministry of Peoples Industry, 
including Singer Sewing, and then examine the takeover of the foreign estates, a process 
that was much longer and more involved. It bears repeating at this point that, with the 
exception of Singer Sewing Company, the takeover of these companies did not involve 
labor union or worker activity.  
(i) Implementation by the Ministry of Peoples Industry.  
  On 5 May, the Control Board for British Companies from the Ministry of 





 The announcement went further than information gathering: citing 
Presidential Decree 6/1965, it stated that pending further instructions from the Presidium 
Kabinet all foreign companies with a non-domestic character within the ministry‘s 
purview were now under its control (penguasaan). Thus, by asserting its control over the 
companies without specific prior authorization from the Presidium Kabinet, the Ministry 
of Peoples Industry actually appeared to go beyond the scope of Presidential Decree 
6/1965. Such legal niceties were quite immaterial, however. The announcement required 
that all affected companies (which were not specifically named) must register within 
three days with the ministry by providing the following information: the name, address 
and type of company, the names and functions of the leaders of the company, and the 
residence of the shareholders and directors of the company who were overseas. It is 
unclear how this announcement was transmitted to the various companies, but 
presumably the ministry already had a pretty good idea of which companies under its 
purview were foreign.     
Following this, in the space of several days in mid-May the Ministry of Peoples 
Industry (headed, as we have seen, by Minister Azis Saleh) swiftly placed five foreign 
manufacturing companies under its control. The first was the Bata Shoe factory in Jakarta 
on 17 May. This company, Canadian-owned, was part of the world famous Bata Shoe 
company, originally from Czechoslovakia, and according to the US embassy was the 
largest industrial employer in Indonesia at the time. The ministry installed a one man 
supervisory team, but did not eject the foreign head manager, who was allowed to remain 
and manage until the end of the year.
59
 Then, the next day on 18 May, the ministry placed 
four foreign businesses in East Java under its control. These were the Belgian-owned 
Interbra beer factory (ex-Heineken managed) in Surabaya, the Singer Sewing assembly 
plant in Surabaya (see following paragraphs for more on this), the West German-owned 
Prodenta toothpaste factory in Surabaya, and the Belgian-owned Faroka cigarette plant in 
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Malang.  A formal transfer ceremony for these four companies, made notable by the beer 
factory manager‘s refusal to sign the transfer document, was held on 21 May. It is unclear 
how long the foreign managers of the beer, cigarette and toothpaste factories were 
allowed to remain.
60
 Apparently the Ministry of Peoples Industry did not issue a formal 
takeover decree in any of these cases.  
The Ministry of Peoples Industry control over the Singer Sewing assembly plant 
in Surabaya did not last long, however, and was actually one of many interesting features 
of the takeover of American-owned Singer Sewing Company.
61
  On 28 April, a group of 
KBM members who were not employed by Singer announced in Singer‘s Jakarta office 
that Singer was now unionized and that the KBM was taking the company over.
62
 
Manager Leslie Wearmouth refused to sign the takeover declaration and was prevented 
from leaving the office until the police, who were called in by the US embassy, 
intervened. The next day, Wearmouth returned to the office, where he again was told that 
the KBM was taking over and he again was prevented from leaving until the police 
rescued him a second time. The police apparently wanted to install their own supervisory 
team, but Wearmouth, with the assistance of the US embassy, was able to enlist the help 
of Proxy Minister of Foreign Trade Jusuf (whom we encountered in Chapter Six in 
connection with the takeover of National Cash Register in April-May) to prevent the 
company from falling under the control of either the union or the police. There was some 
hesitation on the part of the Department of Foreign Trade (the US embassy reported there 
was a week‘s worth of ―intensive‖ negotiation), which may have been overcome by 
highlighting the importance of Singer sewing machines in making army uniforms, but 
Minister Jusuf finally agreed to help. 
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In a decree issued on 10 May, Minister Jusuf effectively placed the company 
under the control of the Department of Foreign Trade by establishing a three man team, 
responsible to him, to regulate, supervise and manage the company so that its operations 
could return to normal.
63
  The team was chaired by Lt. Col. Soentoro from the Ministry 
of Trade.  The decree specifically appointed Wearmouth as a technical advisor to assist 
the team, and it also instructed the workers of the company to work as normal. The 
decree was similar to the one Minister Jusuf issued regarding National Cash Register; it 
did not actually say that the company was placed under GOI supervision/control, nor did 
it mention the usual phrase of ―without diminishing ownership rights,‖ or that the 
relationship between the owners and the GOI would be set forth in a separate contract.  
Nevertheless, the decree left no doubt that the Department of Foreign Trade and not the 
KBM would be in control of the company, and the appointment of Wearmouth as 
technical advisor clearly suggested that Wearmouth would retain a great degree of 
influence over the company. 
However, the Wearmouth/Jusuf plan hit a slight snag when the Ministry of 
Peoples Industry placed Singer‘s Surabaya assembly plant under its control on 18 May. 
To this point, the Surabaya assembly plant had not been interfered with by either the GOI 
or labor unions, as all the action had been in the smaller Jakarta office.
64
 It is unclear if 
the Ministry of Peoples Industry was aware of Minister Jusuf‘s prior actions regarding 
Singer; presumably it was aware, but believed that because the facility was an assembly 
plant it belonged under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Peoples Industry and not the 
Department of Foreign Trade.  An official from the Ministry of Peoples Industry was 
installed as the acting manager of the assembly plant, but he was recalled after a few days 
because Minister Chaerul Saleh had apparently instructed the Ministry of Peoples 
Industry, which fell within Minister Saleh‘s jurisdiction as Coordinating Minister for 
Development in the cabinet, to back off.
65
 To reinforce this decision, on 24 May Minister 
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Saleh on behalf of the Presidium Kabinet issued a decree placing Singer under the 
control/management (penguasaan/pengurusaan) of the GOI, without diminishing the 
proprietary rights of the owner.
66
 The decree named the Department of Foreign Trade as 
the GOI entity in charge of the company. Moreover the decree specifically affirmed 
Minister Jusuf‘s decree of 10 May, indicating that the appointment of new Indonesian 
managers by the Proxy Minister of Foreign Trade and their duties should be on the basis 
of the 10 May decree. 
Once the intra-GOI territorial dispute was resolved, the Department of Foreign 
Trade wasted little time in asserting its control over the company, despite the 
arrangement that Wearmouth had made. The US embassy reported that by early June 
Soentoro, the supervisory team chairman, was actively excluding Wearmouth from his 
management duties. By late June, all orders were signed by Soentoro, and Wearmouth‘s 
advice and assistance were not sought.
67
  Wearmouth continued to go to the office 
through the beginning of August, but he did not participate in the business at all.
68
 
While it was clear by this point that its Indonesian operations were lost, Singer 
faced a dilemma unique with respect to the takeovers in that it was negotiating with a 
private Indonesian businessman to take over the business in Indonesia. These 
negotiations had begun in early May with the knowledge and approval of the Department 
of Foreign Trade. By early August, the thrust of these negotiations had changed from a 
possible buyout to the appointment of the businessman as Singer‘s sole distributor in 
Indonesia. However, the negotiations had stalled over various points. Meanwhile, in late 
July supervisory team chairman Soentoro was also ratcheting up the pressure on 
Wearmouth. In a letter dated 21 July, Soentoro indicated that the supervisory team would 
continue to market imported Singer products, but there should be direct communication 
between the supervisory team and Singer USA; there was no longer a need for a liaison in 
the person of Wearmouth, and if Singer were unwilling to pursue this kind of direct 
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relationship, the team would obtain supplies from other sources.
69
 This suggests that the 
only reason the supervisory team allowed Wearmouth to stay behind was the leverage 
Singer USA held in the form of its exported products - presumably either the Singer 
brand name or the quality of the products (including the component Singer parts used in 
the assembly plant) was very high and hard to replace or duplicate. That Singer had some 
leverage was also indicated by the interest of the Indonesian businessman in becoming 
Singer‘s sole distributor in Indonesia. Whether it agreed to the GOI plan or to the plan of 
the businessman, Singer would achieve its main objective of continuing the sale of its 
products in Indonesia. According to the US embassy analysis, acceding to the GOI 
request was the better alternative in that Singer was doing what the GOI wanted and did 
not voluntarily dispose of its assets (if it sold out to a private party), thereby possibly 
preserving claims that Singer was involuntarily taken over and thus eligible for 
compensation.
70
 Whether this accurately reflected Singer‘s thinking is unclear, but Singer 
eventually opted for the GOI plan and continued to supply the taken-over plant with 
Singer products during the period of GOI control.
71
  
(ii) Implementation by the Ministry of Estates. 
There were at least 10 foreign estate companies with at least 44 estates, ranging 
from the large SOCFIN group (which owned 18 estates totaling just over 51,000 hectares 
in North Sumatra and Aceh) to several companies with only one or two estates, taken 
over by the Ministry of Estates under the BERDIKARI policy. However, the 
implementation of GOI control pursuant to Presidential Decree 6/1965 by the Ministry of 
Estates was in sharp contrast to implementation of Decree 6/1965 by other GOI 
ministries. In the first place, it appears that the Ministry of Estates did not begin to take 
measures to assert control over the estates until late June or early July, some seven weeks 
after the Presidium Kabinet‘s 4 May decree placing foreign estates under GOI control. 
The reasons for this delay are unclear; it may have been because the ministry was still 
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assembling information about the foreign estates, but it also appears that the ministry was 
awaiting further clarifying instructions from the Presidium Kabinet. Second, in terms of 
management it appears that the owner-appointed managers were allowed to remain active 
in the management of the estates until the end of the year (when the companies were 
bought out, see Part III, Section C) in a situation very similar to the ambiguous and 
anomalous position many owner-appointed managers of British enterprises found 
themselves in after early February 1964 (see Chapter Five).
72
 Most importantly, from the 
beginning the Ministry of Estates appeared to be genuinely interested in buying out – 
effectively compensating - the owners of the estates. In fact, with the exception of the oil 
companies, the non-British foreign estates (including Goodyear and US Rubber) were the 
only foreign companies taken over by the GOI with whom the GOI engaged in serious 
buyout negotiations. As we shall see in Part III, these negotiations culminated at the end 
of 1965. Thus, the treatment of the non-British foreign plantations by the Ministry of 
Estates is exceptional in the history of the takeovers of foreign businesses in the 1960s. 
In tracing what happened to these companies, we are fortunate to have a report 
from Minister of Estates Frans Seda to the Presidium Kabinet in June 1966 that sets forth 
in broad scope the measures the Ministry of Estates took to implement Presidential 
Decree 6/1965 (the ―Seda Report‖).
73
 The first few measures the ministry took were 
similar to steps taken by other ministries. First, the ministry undertook to register all 
foreign estate companies. This was done by issuing an instruction on 6 May to all 
directors of foreign estate companies to report to the Ministry of Estates within one 
month on matters regarding their companies, including information regarding the status 
of the company‘s capital, the organizational scheme of the company, the company‘s 
staff/personnel, and the company‘s shareholders.
74
 Interestingly, the instruction indicated 
that estate companies that had the status of foreign estate companies as of 1 January 1964 
(16 months before Presidential Decree 6/1965 was issued) would be taken over, even if 
they no longer had foreign status. However, the instruction did not attempt to define what 
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was meant by ―non-domestic character,‖ the ambiguous phrase referred to in Presidential 
Decree 6/1965. The second step the ministry took was to form an ‗Implementing Team‘ 
which was charged with dealing with all matters and issues that arose regarding the 
implementation of Presidential Decree 6/1965.
75
 This team of nine people was led by 
Minister of Estates Frans Seda and included four assistants to him (including Danardjojo 
Hadisasono, whom we previously encountered in connection with the takeover of 
Harrisons & Crosfield‘s Jakarta office in September 1963 and who was the Ministry of 
Estates official negotiating buyouts with Goodyear and US Rubber), the principal 
directors from three of the GOI management boards for various agricultural products 
(BPU-PPN Rubber, BPU-PPN Tobacco, and BPU-PPN Other Plants), and the head of the 
Dwikora structure (the body established to control British estates – see Chapter Five) 
Mirza Mustakim.  
According to the Seda Report, the ministry then took the unusual step of calling in 
the foreign estate managers and explaining to them the meaning of Presidential Decree 
6/1965 and how it would be implemented. Minister Seda explained that for reasons of 
―social justice‖ foreign capital would no longer be allowed to operate in the estate sector. 
Even more unusual, Minister Seda explained to the owners that in the future there would 
be discussions between the GOI and the owners regarding the compensation to be paid; 
compensation would be on the basis of neither the GOI nor the owners being unduly 
burdened. ―We suggested that compensation value be seen as if the owners were giving 
the Government long-term credit.‖ Finally, the minister asked each of the owners to 
submit in writing their opinion about how Presidential Decree 6/1965 should be 
implemented. This was done in order to counter the news reports from outside Indonesia 
that the GOI was violating the rights of foreigners; presumably by asking for their 
opinion, the GOI could argue that the foreign companies had been consulted (even 
though in reality they had little choice). Apparently within a week most of the owners 
submitted their opinions, and the majority wanted the GOI to buy them out.
76
 As far as I 
can determine, with the exception of Goodyear Plantations and US Rubber (both of 
which were already controlled by the Ministry of Estates under Frans Seda) this was the 
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first time a GOI ministry had suggested that compensation might be paid for the 
confiscated foreign companies. There was certainly nothing in Presidential Decree 
6/1965 or the Presidium Kabinet decree of 4 May which seemed to authorize directly this 
action, though Decree 6/1965 did provide that the Presidium Kabinet and the relevant 
Ministers should also listen to the owners if necessary and the Decree‘s explanation 
vaguely referred to the government‘s settlement of proprietary rights. 
One foreign estate manager vividly remembered that May meeting with Minister 
Seda and the other foreign estate managers. Karl Schneider, at the time the general 
manager of SIPEF, recalled that Minister Seda told the foreign managers that they had 
two choices: either they could sell the estates to the GOI and receive compensation, or the 
estates would simply be taken over without compensation. If the foreign owners selected 
the sale/compensation alternative, they had to make an appraisal of their estates within 
three months and submit it to Minister Seda. The appraisal was to be based on the planted 
acreage of each estate. Acreage in palm oil trees was to be valued at US$1,500 per 
hectare per year for the remaining lifespan of the trees, while acreage in rubber trees was 
to be valued at US$2,500 per hectare per year for the remaining lifespan of the trees; 
palm oil trees were given a lifespan of 25 years, and rubber trees were given one of 30 
years. The companies were supposed to provide the calculations for determining values. 
Buildings and machinery were to be appraised at acquisition value. According to 
Schneider, SIPEF duly provided its appraisal around the end of August, but there was no 
response from the Ministry until very late in the year.
77
       
It was not until late June or early July, some two months after the issuance of 
Presidential Decree 6/1965, that the Ministry of Estates commenced taking actual 
measures to implement control over the companies. Presumably this delay was in part 
due to the ministry‘s waiting for the foreign estate companies to register before taking 
action, though the ministry may also have been waiting for further instructions from 
higher authorities. On 28 June, Minister Seda issued a decree placing the foreign estate 
companies that had already registered with the ministry (these companies were 
specifically named) under the ministry‘s supervision (pengawasan) while the ministry 
awaited further instruction (thus implying that the supervision was a temporary measure 
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until further clarification regarding the estates was received).
78
 Seda‘s use of the term 
supervision (pengawasan) was in sharp contrast to the use of the stronger term control 
(penguasaan) in Presidential Decree 6/1965 and the Presidium Decree of 4 May, which 
almost certainly was indicative of Seda‘s more moderate approach in dealing with foreign 
companies. This decree stated that supervision would be undertaken by officials with the 
title of ‗Officials Supervising Foreign Estates‘ (Petugas Pengawas Perkebunan Asing, or 
PPPAs). Supervision was to be aimed at (i) continuation of production and marketing of 
the goods, (ii) safeguarding management and instruments of production, and (iii) 
implementing the duties assigned by the Minister of Estates. A few days later on 30 June, 
Minister Seda issued another decree appointing five individuals, most of whom appeared 
to be industry professionals, to be the PPPAs of specified estates that were grouped into 
geographical units.
79
 These five PPPAs, who were allowed to have staffs of up to five 
people, were directly responsible to the Minister of Estates.   
Minister Seda also issued several instructions to the owners of the foreign estates 
around this time which further tightened ministry supervision over the companies. First, 
on 28 June Seda issued an instruction that (a) prohibited the owners from entering into 
new contracts, from taking unspecified steps which rendered difficult the implementation 
of Presidential Decree 6/1965, and from transferring ownership of their companies, and 
(b) required contracts that had ended be reported to the Ministry of Estates within one 
week of their end date. An explanation to the instruction issued a few days later indicated 
that the prohibited ―new contracts‖ meant long term sales contracts or other contracts that 
would make it difficult to implement Presidential Decree 6/1965; it further indicated that 
new sales contracts could be entered into as long as both prior notification was given to 
the ministry and the contracts did not commit estate produce after the end of July.
80
 It is 
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unclear if this instruction was aimed at specific actions of owners that had come to light 
or was simply a preemptive measure. Second, on 14 July Minister Seda issued an 
instruction that directed the owners to provide the PPPAs with lists of their companies‘ 
assets and wealth, reports on the companies‘ operations and production, and copies of all 
existing contracts (presumably to understand what the companies‘ contractual obligations 
were).
81
 In addition, the owners were instructed to provide the PPPAs and their staffs 
with all facilities necessary to implement their duties. As with the prior instruction, it is 
unclear if this was aimed at uncooperative owners resisting the PPPAs or was more of a 
preemptive measure designed to smooth the way once the PPPA‘s actually began their 
assignments.     
The last major step Minister Seda took was the formation in late July of an 
‗Appraisal Team‘ (Team Taksasi) that was charged with evaluating the assets, wealth and 
value of the foreign estate companies.
82
 The Appraisal Team was instructed to complete 
its work as soon as possible and report the results directly to the Minister of Estates. This 
measure was certainly taken in anticipation that some type of compensation would be 
paid to the owners of the foreign estate companies. This team was comprised of a variety 
of individuals from GOI bodies and was chaired by Cosmas Hartojo, the vice-chairman 
of the Ministry of Estates‘ Bureau to Safeguard Production (Wakil Kepala Biro 
Pengamanan Produksi Departamen Perkebunan).
83
 This team or its sub-teams apparently 
did visit and appraise the estates. Karl Schneider, the SIPEF manager, reported that a 
GOI team visited SIPEF‘s Perlabian estate; an Indonesian staffer at SOCFIN who later 
rose to the position of general manager also indicated that he accompanied the evaluation 
team for SOCFIN around the company‘s estates, and the entire process (SOCFIN had 18 
estates) took as long as six months.
84
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In terms of management of the foreign estates, the Ministry of Estates allowed the 
owner-appointed managers to remain on the estates, but the extent to which the owner-
appointed management retained control over the companies is unclear. These managers 
certainly occupied anomalous positions, as the estates were in theory at least under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Estates (according to Minister Seda‘s decree of 28 June) if 
not control (according to the Presidium Kabinet‘s decree of 4 May). Perhaps the best 
comparison is the position of owner-appointed managers of British companies after early 
February 1964; a gradual creeping takeover of management that probably varied 
according to individual PPPA preferences. For example, the US embassy reported that as 
late as mid-November the foreign estates were still under their own management.
85
 
Similarly, in early November Minister Seda issued an instruction to both the PPPAs and 
the owner-appointed directors prohibiting the owner-appointed directors from (i) making 
any staff changes, (ii) making any transfers of property, or (iii) using income derived 
from estates under their control for estates not under their control.
86
 The implication 
seemed to be that these directors still retained a great deal of influence and authority. In 
contrast, the experience of SIPEF‘s general manager, Karl Schneider, suggests that the 
PPPAs were in complete control from the time they arrived. The man appointed to 
SIPEF‘s Perlabian estate, A. Siregar, had almost all authority over the estate; he had to 
approve almost everything, he supervised all finances, and nothing was paid without his 
signature. Siregar grew to rely on and trust Schneider, who was under instructions from 
the head office not to burn bridges in case SIPEF ever came back.
87
 This suggests that 
while PPPA Siregar was clearly in charge with overall authority, owner-appointed 
Schneider was also very much involved in the operations of the estate. This arrangement 
perhaps was an ideal version of the formulation so common in the GOI takeover decrees 
that owner-appointed managers should assist the takeover teams to the extent necessary 
in managing the companies. In any case, as we shall see, in early December 1965 
Minister Seda effectively resolved the anomalous position of the owner-appointed 
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managers by officially replacing the owner-appointed managers and taking complete 
control over the estates.  
B. The Revocation of the 1958 Foreign Investment Law. 
A second manifestation of the BERDIKARI principle with respect to foreign 
investment was the revocation of the foreign investment law of 1958. As we saw in 
Chapter Three, in practice very little, if any, new foreign investment entered the country 
under the rubric of this law, but it was still on the books in 1965, though it has often been 
reported by foreign commentators that the law was revoked long before this.
88
 Thus, the 
ultimate repeal of the law in 1965 was largely symbolic, but nevertheless important in the 
implementation of BERDIKARI because it closed the door to new foreign investment, 
thereby complementing the first step of seizing the remaining existing foreign 
investment.  Without any laws or supporting regulations, new foreign investment had no 
legal means by which to enter the country, even if it wished to.   
While President Sukarno was clearly the main impetus behind the revocation of 
the 1958 foreign investment law, Third Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul Saleh in early 
1965 was also increasingly critical of foreign investment. For example, in late March 
Minister Saleh claimed that he had asked the Presidium Kabinet to revoke the foreign 
investment law, saying it was already dead. The US embassy interpreted this statement as 
in part reflecting Minister Saleh‘s ―efforts to shore up his faltering political position.‖
89
 
Minister Saleh, as we have seen, was a fierce nationalist, but he was also generally 
supportive of foreign investment; he was also under severe attack by the PKI, and his 
close alignment with and support from President Sukarno seemed to be slipping, as 
evidenced by the breakup of the Ministry of Basic Industry and Mining at the end of 
March (see Chapter Six, Part III). Hence, the US embassy surmised he could gain favor 
with President Sukarno, and perhaps weaken the PKI attacks on him, by calling for an 
end to foreign investment. Following this incident, as we saw above on 5 April Minister 
Saleh also told US special envoy Bunker that ―old style investments‖ had no future in 
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Indonesia and changes were likely forthcoming. Then, on 16 May, after Presidential 
Decree 6/1965 had been issued, Minister Saleh publicly announced that Indonesia would 
no longer permit investment of foreign capital. This announcement was made at a 
congress of KBM labor federation workers; at the same time, Minister Saleh noted that 
President Sukarno would decide whether to nationalize the companies already in 
Indonesia, and also that the takeovers of foreign oil companies should be handled by the 
GOI, not the unions. Given the setting of the remarks, this was likely both another effort 
by Minister Saleh to shore up his effort to appear more revolutionary by saying no more 
foreign investment would be allowed (which was simply reflecting reality in the sense 
that no foreign investors would want to come in given the prevailing conditions) and a 
warning to the KBM and others to let the GOI decide on the status of companies already 
present in Indonesia.
90
   
Shortly thereafter, President Sukarno issued the first of two decrees revoking the 
1958 foreign investment law, each of which highlighted BERDIKARI as the rationale for 
the law‘s revocation. The first short decree, issued on 27 May 1965, cited the 
consideration that the development of the economy and the growth of national production 
had raised the standard of living of the people so that it was necessary to continue based 
on the principle of berdiri diatas kaki sendiri, and therefore that the time had now come 
for the revocation of the 1958 law.
91
 With that, the 1958 foreign investment law was 
formally repealed. The circle was now complete: all foreign companies already in 
Indonesia had technically been placed under GOI control, and no more were allowed to 
enter. 
This decree was further codified by President Sukarno‘s issuance of a formal law 
at the end of August.
92
 In classic Sukarno discourse, the law noted that foreign capital in 
Indonesia had the characteristic of taking as many profits as possible away from 
Indonesia and continually exploiting the Indonesian people as well as obstructing the 
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road of the Indonesian Revolution in finishing the national democratic stage and entering 
into Indonesian socialism based on Pantja Sila. Moreover, in order to implement the 
principle of berdiri diatas kaki sendiri in the economic field as well as the principles of 
DEKON to build a national economy free from the remains of imperialism and 
feudalism, it was necessary to eliminate the establishment and operation of foreign 
capital in Indonesia so as to increase national production and raise the people‘s standard 
of living. It further added that with the stoppage of foreign investment in Indonesia, it 
was necessary both to have a regulation to implement Article 10 of MPRS Decree VI of 
16 April (the provision calling for the nationalization of foreign companies) and to work 
together with foreign economies, especially the NEFO countries. It then revoked the 1958 
law and further indicated that a new law would be forthcoming regarding the 
implementation of Article 10 of the MPRS decision and the working together with other 
countries without allowing new foreign investment.
93
    
 
III. The Final Push: The End of 1965. 
 
On 21 December 1965, Minister of Light Industry Brigadier General M. Jusuf 
issued a decree that provided the ministry would select new Indonesian management for 
Bata Shoe, which operated a shoe factory in Jakarta.
94
 Bata Shoe had been placed under 
GOI control/supervision on 17 May but in late December was still managed by E. 
Reimann, a Swiss expatriate who had originally been appointed by the owners of Bata. 
According to the US embassy, Bata Shoe was the last surviving foreign-owned industrial 
enterprise in Indonesia, apart from the oil companies. The status of Reimann is an 
excellent example of the different pace of assumption of control by the GOI of the 
companies placed under GOI control pursuant to Presidential Decree 6/1965. Why 
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Reimann had lasted so long is unknown, though it may have been due in part to the 
factory‘s operating at 70% of capacity, a remarkably efficient number given the tough 
economic times. However, Reimann‘s work permit had suddenly not been extended and 
he was given three days to leave the country; Minister Jusuf‘s decree was apparently 
issued to thwart Reimann‘s attempts to select which Indonesian would replace him as 
manager. The decree further provided that the GOI would decide upon the ownership 
status of the company, no doubt reflecting the general GOI position that the ownership of 
the foreign companies taken over under President Decree 6/1965 had not changed. 
Reimann did leave the country and a new Indonesian manager was appointed, which for 
Bata Shoe was a clear signal that the status of the factory was no longer in doubt and it 
had indeed been taken over by the GOI.
95
     
Bata Shoe was by no means alone, however. In the last two months of 1965 the 
GOI embarked upon a major push to eliminate the last vestiges of foreign investment 
with the apparent deadline of the end of the year. This in effect meant resolving the status 
of those companies that, although technically under GOI control/supervision (which 
every foreign company was by this point), were still were managed by foreign owner-
appointed personnel. As we have seen, the only companies that had this status were the 
big three foreign oil companies, a number of non-British foreign estates placed under 
GOI control pursuant to Presidential Decree 6/1965, and perhaps a few manufacturing 
firms like Bata Shoe. In the case of the oil companies, the GOI successfully negotiated 
the buyout of Shell Oil for $110 million, but was unsuccessful, despite the application of 
tremendous pressure, in taking over Caltex and Stanvac. In the case of the non-British 
estates, the GOI under Minister Seda‘s direction not only finally squeezed out owner-
appointed management but also agreed to buyout terms with the various owners in what 
was essentially compensation for formal nationalization (altogether 16 estate companies 
owning at least 58 estates agreed to compensation terms with the GOI totaling $29 
million plus Rp. 1.85 billion, generally payable over seven to 10 years). In contrast, none 
of the manufacturing firms that were seized, either pursuant to Presidential Decree 
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6/1965 or otherwise, were offered compensation. Thus, the oil companies and the non-
British estates were treated very differently from all the other companies the GOI took 
over from 1963-65. While the treatment of the oil companies is another example of oil 
company exceptionalism, the reasons behind the different treatment of the non-British 
foreign estates were not as evident. I shall argue that the answer relates both to the 
outlook of Minister of Estates Frans Seda and to the ability of these foreign estates to 
generate foreign exchange revenues to pay for themselves.  
This final push occurred amidst a chaotic and gruesome period in modern 
Indonesian history that witnessed the climax of the domestic political conflict in 
Indonesia and the eventual downfall of President Sukarno and his Guided Democracy. As 
I have suggested, this was the third great culmination of 1965-66, the first being the one 
in Indonesia‘s foreign relations and the second the one in economic affairs, especially the 
deterioration of the economy. In the tense atmosphere of 1965 in which the continuing 
PKI political offensive alarmed not just the army leaders but many civilians as well, the 
September 30 Movement, although it was quickly stopped by General Suharto, provided 
the excuse for the army to seize the initiative and oversee the destruction of the PKI, 
which by December was all but liquidated. The September 30 Movement also resulted in 
a struggle for power between President Sukarno and his opponents, led by General 
Suharto. This competition was already bubbling under the surface but sprang into the 
open in December 1965 (as the PKI was being finished off) and peaked from December 
to March 1966, with the balance of power tipping away from President Sukarno in favor 
of his opponents. In at least one case – the oil companies – in an episode that one 
historian has described as a critical moment in the transition of power,
96
 the final GOI 
push to eliminate foreign investment intersected with this political power struggle, and 
again oil company exceptionalism proved to be the rule. 
President Sukarno was certainly the main driving force behind this year-end push 
to eliminate foreign investment, though his motivations remain obscure. It is 
inconceivable that such a major push, with the possible elimination of the big three 
foreign oil companies and the payment of almost $30 million in compensation to non-
British foreign estate holders, could occur without both his full support and urging; in the 
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chaos of the final months of 1965, no one else had the authority and influence to make 
this happen. Why, then, push for the end of the year? One reason may have been that the 
end of the calendar year would make a nice clean date by which the President could boast 
that all foreign investment had been eliminated as part of the process he had already set in 
motion and was well underway - the nominal takeovers of the oil companies in March, 
the summer negotiations with the oil companies (described below in this Section B), the 
establishment of the BERDIKARI policy, and the issuance of Decree 6/1965 and its 
initial stages of implementation. That is, President Sukarno wanted to ensure that 
BERDIKARI was fully implemented, and having a calendar year deadline provided 
chronological cleanliness so that the second stage of the Indonesian Revolution 
(Indonesian socialism), in which all vestiges of imperialism were eliminated, could be 
ushered in. Yet, given the unfolding political power struggle in the last three months of 
1965, one is tempted to look for a connection between the political conflict and the drive 
to eliminate foreign companies – why bother with foreign companies when there was a 
major power struggle developing? One observer has suggested that in the case of the oil 
companies the President may have been motivated by ―repairing the political damage 
done [to] him by the attempted coup [the September 30 Movement] and restoring his 
personal political position…a public bridling of the oil companies would spotlight 
Soekarno as Leader of the New Emerging Forces striking a blow against the neo-colonial 
multinational corporations.‖
97
 Hence, Sukarno may have felt that beating the drum of 
anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism in the form of eliminating foreign capitalists was a 
rallying cry around which he could gain support in the political struggle. This is certainly 
plausible and would account for the acceleration of events in November and December, 
even if the groundwork for the final push was already in place before September 30. If so, 
however, the President badly miscalculated, at least with respect to the oil companies.  In 
short, President Sukarno‘s motivations remain unclear.     
This Part III is divided into three sections. Section A traces the culmination of the 
domestic political struggle. Because these events have been so well documented in the 
existing secondary literature, this analysis is in summary form only. Section B then 
                                                 
97
 Aden, Oil and Politics in Indonesia, pp. 279-80. 
 516 
 
examines the GOI push to take over the big three foreign oil companies, while Section C 
investigates the management takeover and buyout of the non-British foreign estates.  
A. The Culmination of the Domestic Political Struggle. 
As argued in Chapter Two, under Guided Democracy political power was shared 
primarily between President Sukarno and the Indonesian army in an uneasy partnership 
of convenience, each with their own areas of influence.  The political parties, in particular 
the PKI and the PNI (along with NU the three largest remaining parties), were effectively 
―domesticated‖ on the political sidelines but were used by President Sukarno as a balance 
to check the power of the army. The PKI depended upon the protection afforded by 
President Sukarno to fend off the army, as both the army and the PKI increasingly viewed 
the other as a major threat. As we saw in Chapter Five, however, at the end of 1963 the 
leadership of the PKI decided to go on the political offensive, a decision shaped in large 
part by the opportunities presented by outbreak of Konfrontasi and allowed by the lifting 
of martial law in May 1963. This political offensive was launched in early 1964 with the 
seizure of British companies, the encouragement of aksi sepihak, the launch of a 
campaign against American films, actions against American installations, calls for 
retooling and nasakomization, and a host of other measures. Thus over the course of 1964 
domestic politics appeared increasingly polarized, and indeed the PKI‘s increasing 
visibility and volubility resulted in several counter push-backs by non-PKI forces, the 
most notable of which was the BPS. In an apparent victory for the PKI, the BPS was 
banned by President Sukarno in mid-December 1964, and in early January 1965 the 
Murba party, many of whose members led the BPS, was suspended. 
 The PKI continued its political offensive into 1965, setting the stage for the 
climax of the domestic political struggle.
98
 As we have already seen, the PKI through its 
mass organizations played a central role in the takeover of American estates and oil 
companies, and it also embarked upon a campaign against Ministers Chaerul Saleh and 
Adam Malik, both of whom were demoted (Malik more so) in cabinet reshuffles in the 
first three months of 1965. Moreover, over the course of 1965 the PKI increasingly 
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attacked the army publicly. Perhaps the best known of these challenges was PKI leader 
Aidit‘s call in mid-January to arm workers and peasants, a suggestion that was then taken 
up in late May by President Sukarno under the moniker of a ‗Fifth Force‘ (the first four 
forces being the existing army, navy, air force and police).
99
 President Sukarno actually 
claimed the idea was PRC Premier Zhou Enlai‘s, and indeed the PRC offered to supply 
100,000 light weapons to arm the people. The army, however, while in principle 
endorsing the concept, in practice blocked its implementation, and finally in late 
September army commander General Yani publicly announced the army‘s opposition to 
it.
100
 A second PKI challenge to the army was its continuing push for the nasakomization 
of the armed forces, the main goal of which was the formation of advisory teams (whose 
members came from NASAKOM elements) to work with the commanders of the army, 
navy, air force and police.
101
 The army, of course, vigorously opposed such a measure 
and successfully blocked it.  The PKI also intensified its campaign against kabir (the 
acronym for kapitalis birokrat or ‗capitalist bureaucrats‘), a term mainly used to identify 
army officers, especially those who worked in SOEs.
102
 The PKI further encouraged 




The PKI‘s political offensive in 1964-65 led many observers to conclude, 
incorrectly as events turned out, that the PKI was coming close to seizing power.  This 
misperception was most likely rooted in the PKI‘s ability to generate mass support, which 
in fact was the party‘s primary strength and was evidenced primarily by mass 
demonstrations and actions, including the takeovers of foreign companies. The PKI‘s 
ability to mobilize the masses was perhaps best displayed in May 1965, when the party 
held two mass rallies in Jakarta, one on 1 May (May Day) and the other on 23 May, the 
45
th
 anniversary of the founding of the party. In both, huge crowds – on 23 May, the size 
                                                 
99
 On the fifth force, see, e.g., Crouch, Army and Politics in Indonesia, pp. 89-94; Mortimer, Indonesian 
Communism under Sukarno, pp. 381-85; Sundhausen, Road to Power, pp. 190-4, Legge, Sukarno, pp. 424-
5.  
100
 Crouch, Army and Politics in Indonesia, p. 90; Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno, pp. 
384-5.  
101
 On nasakomization of the armed forces, see Crouch, Army and Politics in Indonesia, pp. 86-9; 
Sundhausen, Road to Power, pp. 190-4.   
102
 On kabir, see especially Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno, pp. 379-80.  
103
 See Crouch, Army and Politics in Indonesia, pp. 82-6.   
 518 
 
was estimated to be over 100,000 – turned out to support the PKI, with President Sukarno 
also speaking at the second rally, leaving little doubt in the minds of many – Indonesian 
and foreign alike - that the PKI was the ―largest and best organized political party in the 
country,‖ enjoying ―a rare combination of money, mass membership and presidential 
favor.‖
104
  Indeed, by August 1965, the party estimated that it had 3.5 million members 
and that membership in its mass organizations totaled some 23.5 million.
105
 How deep 
this mass support actually ran, however, is unclear; there are, for example, no opinion 
polls from the period, and as events would later suggest support for the PKI at rallies did 
not translate into support for armed conflict.
106
 Moreover, the PKI had only very limited 
representation in the government, with only three cabinet positions (none with significant 
resources or authority) and no provincial governorships.
107
 In addition, the PKI did not 
have the support of any significant portion of the elite.
108
 Perhaps most importantly, the 
PKI had no arms with which to defend itself, should a major conflict break out. 
 In addition to its perceived mass support, the second great asset of the PKI was 
the protection afforded by President Sukarno, whose stature was thought to be 
unchallengeable.  From the end of 1964 with the banning of the BPS President Sukarno 
increasingly seemed to favor the PKI, and as I have noted before there was also appeared 
to be an increasing convergence of ideas between the President and the party. This was 
especially notable in foreign affairs, with the emphasis on anti-imperialism, Konfrontasi, 
the alliance with the PRC, the negative relationship with the United States, etc. On the 
domestic side, the President also appeared to borrow more and more from the PKI‘s 
political discourse (e.g., BERDIKARI, and the notion of entering into a second socialist 
stage in the Indonesian Revolution after the first national democratic phase). Sukarno 
also continued to jostle with the army for position, encouraging divisions within and 
among the branches of the armed forces, sometimes supporting the PKI‘s positions (in 
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the case of the ‗fifth force‘) and sometimes opposing them (not pushing the armed forces 
to nasakomize). Even outside the PKI-army–Sukarno relationship, the President over the 
summer of 1965 seemed to be favoring a more radical course when he pushed the PNI to 
purge its right wing elements, which in fact the PNI did in August and September in the 
first major purge in PNI history.
109
 (On the other hand, with respect to the taken-over 
foreign companies Sukarno was clearly unwilling to turn them over to PKI, a feeling 
shared by all the ministers under whose jurisdiction the companies fell.) What the 
President‘s ultimate intentions for the PKI were is the subject of debate; some argue that 
Sukarno was simply using the PKI to counter the army, and that he had no intention of 
putting the PKI in power or following the PKI‘s program of restructuring the social order, 
while others argue just the opposite.
110
 Nevertheless, it was clear that the PKI was highly 
dependent on the President‘s protection and support, and the party of course tried to 
maximize fully this support. 
By August and September 1965, the political tension was thick. The 
precariousness of the PKI‘s position of dependency on President Sukarno was 
undoubtedly placed in sharp relief when President Sukarno collapsed on 4 August and 
had to rest for a number of days because of kidney problems. While these health issues 
were already known and the President seemed to bounce back, the seriousness of the 
problem was far from clear. Hence, the episode raised the immediate question of who 
would lead the country should Sukarno be unable to.  The army was almost certainly also 
rethinking its position as well, and indeed rumors had already been circulating for months 
about the possibility of an army coup. Contributing to the tension was another surge in 
inflation in September, yet another reminder of the precariousness of the Indonesian 
economy. In the words of one observer, 
With the president‘s health in doubt and various rumors of coups in the 
air, the armed forces were preparing for a massive celebration of Armed 
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Forces Day on 5 October to match the PKI‘s huge anniversary 
celebrations of the previous May. As some twenty thousand troops 





While some sort of showdown was certainly not unanticipated, the way events developed 
was probably not foreseen by many people.   
The immediate catalyst for the showdown was the September 30 Movement 
(Gerakan Tigapuluh September, or G30S for short), which to this day remains the most 
mysterious and controversial event in modern Indonesian history.
112
 On the night of 30 
September in Jakarta, a group calling itself the September 30 Movement kidnapped and 
killed six senior generals (three of whom were actually killed in their homes) of the army 
high command, including army chief General Yani.  A failed attempt was made on 
General Nasution. The apparent goal of the movement was to prevent a so-called 
‗Council of Generals‘ from seizing power from President Sukarno. Oddly, the movement 
also announced the formation of a 45 member central revolutionary council that did not 
include President Sukarno as the chief decision-making body of the government. The 
operation was ill-conceived and poorly executed; one of its early objectives was probably 
to gain the support of President Sukarno by simply arresting the generals and then turning 
them over to him to deal with (it is not clear exactly what Sukarno would have done with 
them in the face of certain army resistance), but securing the President‘s endorsement 
was severely jeopardized by the killing of the senior generals. The only military actions 
of the movement were in Jakarta and in Central Java, but these modest measures were 
squashed in Jakarta in less than two days by the relatively unknown General Suharto and 
in Central Java in a few weeks, in each case fairly effortlessly and with surprisingly little 
bloodshed. While the movement‘s broader actions and participants are generally known, 
the great mystery remains who, if anyone, was acting as the dalang or grand puppeteer 
behind the movement. On the surface, the movement appeared to be led by a handful of 
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officers from the army and air force, but PKI chairman Aidit (and the party‘s Special 
Bureau headed by Sjam) was also clearly involved, and there were questions about the 
complicity of President Sukarno himself and even General Suharto (who was one of the 
highest ranking generals not targeted for kidnapping).
113
 
What is clear, however, is that the September 30 Movement provided the trigger 
for the culmination of the domestic political struggle in Indonesia, first by the destruction 
of the PKI and second by the eventual displacement of President Sukarno. In the first 
place, as one observer has rightly noted, the army, insisting that the PKI was the 
mastermind behind the September 30 Movement, used the movement as a pretext to 
eliminate the PKI.
114
  In one of the worst massacres in the 20
th
 century, some 250,000 to 
1,000,000 people – the precise number will probably never be known – were killed.
115
 
Thousands more were arrested and detained a decade or more. The killings began within 
days after the September 30 Movement and continued well into the first few months of 
1966, though most occurred in 1965. The main areas of the killings were East Java, 
Central Java and Bali, but other areas of the archipelago, such as Aceh and North 
Sumatra, also witnessed a significant number of deaths. In some cases, the army directly 
participated in the killings, while in others it supplied weapons, training and strong 
encouragement to various groups,
116
 and in any case the army did little to prevent them. 
Many people killed or arrested were not even PKI members, and local factors, including 
resentment from the aksi sepihak actions, religious hostility and even local grudges which 
had nothing to do with national politics, played a significant role in determining the scale 
of the killings.
117
 Hence, while the army certainly created the conditions for the 
massacres, a variety of civilian groups, perhaps most notably the youth wing of the NU 
political party (Pemuda Ansor), supported and participated in them. The scope of the 
slaughter was vastly broader than the triggering incident of killing six high-ranking 
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generals, and by mid-December 1965 the PKI, which put up no resistance, had effectively 
been eliminated as a political force.
118
 
The September 30 Movement was also the catalyst for the ending of the Sukarno-
army political partnership and the eventual downfall of President Sukarno and the end of 
Guided Democracy.
119
 Some observers have suggested that the displacement of President 
Sukarno was the goal of upper-ranking army officers all along, and that the September 30 
Movement was immediately seized as the pretext for the army to take power.
120
  
However, it is more likely that this objective was only really considered some months 
later.
121
 The main reason is that while the army was united in its loathing of the PKI, it 
was very factionalized in other matters and was especially divided in its attitude toward 
President Sukarno, who as the founding father of the country still commanded great 
loyalty and respect from many officers.
122
 While there were clearly army officers who 
wished to be rid of Sukarno, there were also many who admired him. Hence, while the 
army almost certainly had plans for a post-Sukarno world – what army does not have 
plans for every imaginable contingency? – it is difficult to believe that there was unity of 
opinion regarding seizing power from Sukarno. Army leaders were doubtless aware of 
the great stature Sukarno continued to maintain in the public eye, and if there were any 
sort of intra-army consensus it was more likely along the less drastic lines of a shifting of, 
or adjustment in, the power sharing arrangement between the President and the army. 
Moreover, after the deaths of the high-ranking generals there was a clear void in army 
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leadership, with numerous parties jostling for power; General Suharto in the initial 
months after 1 October was at best first among equals within the army. 
From October through mid to late December 1965 the army was, at least on the 
surface, more focused on eliminating the PKI than on the Sukarno-army political 
struggle. In fact, in retrospect it appears that the PKI, even as it was being destroyed by 
the army-organized campaign, was the primary wedge driving the split between the army 
and President Sukarno, for in the months after 1 October the President continued to 
support the PKI and steadfastly refused to denounce or ban it, a stance that encouraged 
army leaders to take a harder line against him.
123
 In the first few months after G30S there 
were clear signs of conflict between Sukarno and General Suharto and other officers; 
these conflicts probably reflected a mixture of both (i) the army‘s insistence that the PKI 
be destroyed (and reluctance to trust President Sukarno with the task) and (ii) Suharto and 
others‘ desire both to limit Sukarno‘s influence and meddling in army affairs and to gain 
a greater share of the power pie. For example, on 1-2 October, in the midst of the 
September 30 Movement, General Suharto flatly rejected President Sukarno‘s proposal of 
General Pranoto as army commander and insisted that he (Suharto) be put in charge 
restoring security and order. On 10 October, General Suharto established the 
KOPKAMTIB, or Operations Command to Restore Order and Security. Then, on 16 
October Suharto essentially forced Sukarno to appoint him army commander and chief of 
staff of KOTI, which Suharto re-staffed and reorganized in late November.
124
 In addition, 
in mid-November the army initiated a general purge within the GOI of all PKI elements.  
Meanwhile, President Sukarno, who clearly realized the possible ramifications of the 
September 30 Movement, did his best to downplay its significance and protect its 
participants from army wrath. The President also refused to yield to army pressure to ban 
and denounce the PKI, a refusal that as noted was unacceptable to army leaders 
determined to destroy the party.  
In late December, after the PKI was all but eliminated as a political force, the 
underlying conflict between President Sukarno and his political opponents, led by 
General Suharto, appeared to sharpen and bubble to the surface. General Suharto and his 
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allied army officers were not alone; there was a fluid, ever changing alliance of forces 
unhappy with President Sukarno, in particular over his continued refusal to condemn the 
PKI. These allies included, among others, leaders of the other political parties, other 
civilian elites, and an organization of university students known as KAMI (Kesatuan Aksi 
Mahasiswa Indonesia, formed in late October and heavily supported by the military), 
altogether an amorphous group later named the ‗Generation of 1966.‘ At this point the 
state of the economy interjected itself into the political struggle. With inflation soaring at 
the end of 1965 and the GOI budget deficit out of control, the GOI in late November and 
mid-December introduced a number of measures to stabilize the economy.
125
 On 22 
November, the GOI officially raised the domestic price of petrol and other oil products, 
in the case of petrol from Rp. 4 per liter to Rp. 250 per liter. In mid-December, the GOI 
announced that beginning in January the price of petrol would rise further to Rp. 1000 per 
liter and that prices for bus and rail tickets, postage, and other utilities would be 
substantially increased in an effort to make these public enterprises pay their own way. 
At the same time, the GOI announced that it was reforming the currency by exchanging 
new Rupiah notes at the rate of new Rp. 1 for old Rp. 1000 (a 1000 time devaluation), the 
abolishing of old Rp. 5,000 and 10,000 notes after 30 days, plus a 10% tax on exchanges 
of these notes and bank deposits. Another measure was substantial year-end bonuses and 
wage increases to keep up with inflation. The effect was an immediate and painful 
general price increase; despite a government freeze on price hikes, the price of a liter of 
rice (Indonesia‘s staple food) in Jakarta shot up temporarily to Rp. 5000 (in May it was 
Rp. 250, in mid-September Rp. 640, early October Rp. 1,250) in a round of panic buying 
before settling around Rp. 3000.  
The resulting inflation, as well as the overall economic situation, expanded public 
attention from the narrower issue of the PKI to the broader issue of the effectiveness of 
the Sukarno government and had a galvanizing effect as widespread protests, led by the 
student group KAMI (which was supported by the army), erupted. Indeed, for the next 
few months KAMI occupied a central place in the political struggle. On 10 January 1966, 
several thousand students at a rally in Jakarta issued the ‗Three People‘s Demands‘ 
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(TRITURA, or Tri Tuntutan Rakyat), which were to bring down prices, dissolve the PKI, 
and purge the cabinet of the PKI. Related demonstrations continued over the next few 
days.
126
 Around the same time, KAMI sponsored a seminar on the economy at the 
University of Indonesia (the most prestigious university in the country) that featured 
several respected economics professors from the university‘s Faculty of Economics and a 
few other well-known public figures who were highly critical of the state of the 
economy.
127
 A few days later on 15 January, thousands of students tried to disrupt a 
cabinet meeting in the Bogor Presidential Palace by entering the grounds, forcing the 
presidential guard to fire warning shots and prompting President Sukarno to criticize 
them sharply.
128
 KAMI, temporarily cowed, would again assert itself at the end of 
February. 
Meanwhile, beginning in late December, President Sukarno went on the political 
offensive, a push that culminated in late February with a major cabinet reshuffle. One 
example of this offensive was the call to form a front to defend the President, known as 
Barisan Sukarno, issued by First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio on 16 January, one 
day after the cabinet meeting in Bogor. Numerous groups then issued statements of 
support for the President, and even 92 cabinet members presented Sukarno with a 
statement professing their loyalty. The whole affair was obviously politically charged as 
there was a struggle behind the scenes to gain control of the movement, and eventually 
General Suharto was able to neutralize it somewhat by requiring all organizations 
supporting the President to register with KOTI, which Suharto now headed.
129
 
Throughout January and February 1966 the President continued to rebuff increasingly 
strident demands that he denounce the PKI and reorganize the cabinet. Sukarno‘s most 
forceful assertion of his authority and challenge to his opponents came on 21 February 
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when he reshuffled the cabinet in a way that left little doubt that he would continue to 
resist any encroachments on his power. In this reshuffle, some 10 strongly anti-
communist ministers, including Coordinating Minister for Defense and Security General 
Nasution and other defense-related ministers, were dismissed and replaced by ministers 
strongly loyal to Sukarno. In addition, most of the ministers who were targeted by KAMI 
and supposedly linked to the PKI were kept.
130
   At the same time, KOTI was renamed 
KOGAM and limited to matters dealing with Konfrontasi only.  
The cabinet reshuffle again galvanized the anti-Sukarno forces, and after a chaotic 
period of a little under three weeks the advantage swung to the side of General Suharto 
and his allies.  Here again KAMI, and the group of anti-Sukarno army officers who 
supported and encouraged it, played a central role; the main tactic of the Suharto group 
appears to have been to foment an atmosphere of crisis so that the army would be forced 
to step in and restore order. On 24 February large KAMI-led demonstrations blocked 
roads in Jakarta in an attempt to prevent the installation of the new cabinet, and two 
students were killed by the palace guard. President Sukarno banned KAMI the next day, 
but its members were reconstituted under a different name a few days later and organized 
new demonstrations. Meanwhile General Suharto and his allies continued to press 
President Sukarno to reshuffle the new cabinet. On 8 March there were attacks on the US 
embassy as well as Indonesia‘s own foreign ministry, and then on 9-10 March there were 
attacks on the PRC‘s news agency, consulate and cultural affairs building. On 11 March, 
as the cabinet was about to convene in the Presidential Palace in Jakarta, unidentified 
troops appeared outside, apparently preparing to take action, which caused President 
Sukarno, accompanied by Ministers Subandrio and Chaerul Saleh, to flee by helicopter to 
the Presidential Palace in Bogor. Later in the day General Suharto sent three other 
generals to Bogor to meet with President Sukarno, and the result was a letter (known as 
Supersemar, an acronym for Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret, or ‗Instruction Letter of 11 
March‘), almost certainly coerced, in which President Sukarno ordered General Suharto 
to take all necessary measures to guarantee the security and stability of the government 
and the Revolution and to guarantee the safety and authority of the President.  General 
Suharto exploited this opening to the fullest, the next day (12 March) officially banning 
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the PKI and then ordering the arrest of some 15 ministers, including Ministers Subandrio 
and Chaerul Saleh, on 18 March.  President Sukarno tried to resist these and other 
measures, but with Supersemar the political balance had tilted away from him in favor of 
Suharto and his allies. 
While the issuance of Supersemar was a major milestone in the struggle between 
President Sukarno and his opponents, it by no means eliminated Sukarno as a political 
threat, as Sukarno continually challenged the new government until he was finally forced 
out of office in early March 1967, almost a year later.
131
 The Suharto-led forces, aware of 
the great respect and loyalty President Sukarno still commanded both publicly and within 
the armed forces and not wishing to see the country erupt in civil war, repeatedly tried to 
get the President to agree to a new power sharing arrangement in which the President‘s 
sphere and influence were greatly diminished, but Sukarno, unhappy with the different 
direction the new government was going in, refused to compromise. In the first few 
months, this new administration, later termed the ‗New Order,‘ appeared to be led by a 
triumvirate of General Suharto, Sultan Hamengkubuwono of Yogyakarta in economic 
affairs and Adam Malik in foreign affairs, though eventually of course General Suharto 
and the army emerged as the dominant figure and institution. An MPRS session was held 
in late June 1966 to solidify the new group‘s position, and following this a totally 
revamped cabinet consisting of only 29 ministers (the 21 February cabinet had over 110) 
was installed in late July over President Sukarno‘s objections. Other high government 
officials who were considered loyal to Sukarno, especially military officers, were 
reassigned, and a number of ministers were put on trial. Eternally defiant, President 
Sukarno continued to lash out over the next few months, and there were a number of 
tense moments that could have resulted in open military conflict. Finally, after allegations 
of Sukarno‘s involvement in the September 30 Movement at the trial of Air Force 
commander Omar Dhani led to increased public pressure against the President, General 
Suharto in February 1967 made what amounted to a final offer to Sukarno. Negotiations 
stalled, however, and in a very tense atmosphere on 8 March 1967 the MPRS in 
beautifully obscure language dismissed Sukarno from the presidency and replaced him 
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with General Suharto.  In a sad ending to a remarkable life, the man who led Indonesia to 
independence spent the next three years, until his death in 1970, under effective house 
arrest, completely sidelined from Indonesian politics.   
B. The Oil Companies. 
Chapter Six argued that GOI control/supervision imposed over the big three oil 
companies March 1965 was in the first few months thereafter only nominal, and that 
neither the companies‘ management nor operations were interfered with to any 
significant degree. The biggest irritant the companies experienced was increasing 
pressure for further Indonesianization of staff. However, in the last five months of 1965, 
the big three came under intense GOI pressure to be taken over. The pressure started to 
build in August, really began to boil in late November, and finally culminated in 
December when the oil companies‘ situation became intertwined with the political 
struggle between President Sukarno and General Suharto. The chain of events is 
extremely confusing and hard to unwind, and certainly not all the facts are out on the 
table. 
Confusingly, pressure came in two basic forms from two different sources. The 
first source was Minister of State for Oil Affairs Ibnu Sutowo, who pushed for a buyout 
of the companies, especially Shell and Stanvac, in negotiated transactions. These 
discussions initially were for the buyout of the two companies‘ refineries, something that 
had already been agreed to under the CoWs but within a 10-15 year window. Both these 
companies actually were not unhappy with the prospect, and in fact Stanvac initiated the 
early discussions. The option of a negotiated buyout was very clean – it was 
nationalization in the classic sense - but the problem for the funds-strapped GOI was that 
it would involve a payment of some sort. The second type of pressure came from 
Minister Chaerul Saleh and was in the form of management takeover, something 
threatened by the March imposition of GOI control/supervision but never implemented. 
This option, of course, was quite different from a buyout and had been the favored 
approach of the GOI over the previous two years, as it did not involve a payout but rather 
the effective substitution of owner-appointed management by GOI-appointed managers. 
(Related to this, but theoretically separate, was Indonesianisasi of management, a 
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possible third alternative that was also pushed to a lesser extent.
132
)  Unlike Minister 
Sutowo‘s buyout approach, the management takeover approach did not involve written 
communications to the companies suggesting that the parties work something out; the 
pressure came via oral threats. 
 Why did the GOI take these two different approaches, and were they somehow 
coordinated? President Sukarno was clearly the impetus behind the management takeover 
approach, although it was Chaerul Saleh who executed it, at least on the surface. A 
management takeover was certainly the preferred style of both Sukarno and Chaerul 
Saleh, as previous Chapters have demonstrated. However, President Sukarno must have 
also supported the buyout approach; it is unconceivable that so much pressure could have 
been exerted without his approval. Nevertheless, the two approaches did not appear to be 
greatly coordinated, as Ibnu Sutowo pursued the buyout approach and Chaerul Saleh 
pursued the management takeover approach, and they were rarely presented together as 
an either/or choice. I think there are two explanations for these two approaches. First was 
the very nature of oil company exceptionalism; because of the position of the big three oil 
companies, the GOI could not act unilaterally as it did with other foreign companies, but 
had to come to some agreed settlement. Having two different options provided some 
flexibility. A second related reason is that the two separate approaches reflected the 
general attitudes, interests and positions of their two proponents, Ministers Chaerul Saleh 
and Ibnu Sutowo, and they also reflected the divisions within the GOI about how to 
handle the companies. Politics certainly played a role; Minister Chaerul Saleh, though he 
had apparently lost some influence with President Sukarno earlier in the year, clearly 
sided with Sukarno in the political power struggle from late 1965 through early 1966 and 
as we have seen was politically without a base of support and totally reliant on the 
President. Minister Sutowo, on the other hand, was not such a highly visible political 
figure, nor was he as reliant on President Sukarno, and seemed more interested in the 
business of the oil industry than in politics.  In the midst of all this, of course, was the 
issue of Sutowo‘s rivalry with Chaerul Saleh for dominance of the oil sector; in the 
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cabinet reshuffle of late March 1965, Chaerul Saleh was appointed Minister of Oil and 
Gas (he was already Third Deputy Prime Minister and Coordinating Minister for the 
Development Compartment), while Sutowo was appointed to the new and rather 




Complicating this GOI push as well as the oil companies‘ reactions were the 
different interests and stakes of each of the three companies in Indonesia. As early as the 
beginning of July 1965, both Shell and Stanvac began to reconsider their respective 
positions in Indonesia, and Shell was even considering withdrawing entirely from 
Indonesia. The main reason was financial, as Shell was losing so much money that it 
would be forced to pump dollars into Indonesia by the end of the year, a prospect that 
was very worrisome, especially when the GOI was already delinquent in its payments to 
Shell.
134
 As discussed in Chapter Three (Part II, Section A), the main cause of Shell‘s 
financial woes was that it was almost completely tied to the Indonesian domestic market. 
It exported little, if any, crude oil, and most of its refined products were sold in Indonesia, 
which imposed severe price controls and thus limited revenues.  Stanvac, on the other 
hand, did not want to withdraw completely, but rather wished to accelerate the sale of its 
refinery to the GOI and in early July put out several feelers to the GOI concerning 
advancing the refinery sale.
135
 Like Shell, Stanvac‘s domestic Indonesian sales, which 
were the bulk of its operations, were not very profitable, and by selling its refinery (most 
of the output of which remained in Indonesia), it could concentrate on expanding its 
small crude oil exports (an option Shell did not have), which was where the most profits 
were to be made. Under the CoW‘s signed in 1963, both Stanvac and Shell already 
agreed to sell their refineries to the GOI within 10-15 years (1973 to 1978), and thus 
Stanvac was simply seeking to accelerate that transaction. In fact, there was precedent for 
this acceleration; the CoWs had also specified that Shell and Stanvac would sell their 
Indonesian distribution and marketing facilities to the GOI within five years, but these 
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sales were completed in July 1965 (with the companies‘ full consent and cooperation), 
just as the companies began thinking about these new options.
136
  Another reason to sell 
the refineries was the possibility of takeover without compensation, as, after all, unlike 
the relatively isolated and undeveloped oil fields, the refineries were a very visible and 
symbolic target.
137
 There was also, of course, the possibility that the GOI would increase 
its interference to the point where the companies would be forced to leave Indonesia 
anyway, something that all three companies felt would set bad precedents for their 
operations in other areas.
138
 In marked contrast to the positions of Shell and Stanvac, 
Caltex was only minimally tied to the Indonesian domestic market. It had no refinery and 
exported the vast majority of its crude oil, and its crude exports were enormous, dwarfing 
the exports of the other two (see Chapter Three, Part II, Section A). Thus, Caltex had 
every incentive to remain in Indonesia and keep its exports of crude oil flowing.  
1. The GOI Push.    
On 9 August 1965, Minister Ibnu Sutowo announced publicly that Indonesia 
would take over both Stanvac‘s Sungei Gerong refinery and Shell‘s Pladju and 
Balikpapan refineries by the end of the year, and that negotiations with the two 
companies would commence by 20 August.
139
  Although Shell and the GOI had clearly 
been in contact by the time of Minister Sutowo‘s announcement, Shell apparently was 
still considering the sale and had not agreed to begin negotiations. Shell was evidently 
hoping that it and Stanvac could present a united front to the GOI regarding the sale, but 
was beginning to realize that Stanvac had different interests and was not so amenable. 
Shell officials were under ―no illusions that their assets would eventually go to 
Indonesia,‖ but were hoping to get a fair price while they could.
140
 In any case, Shell and 
Stanvac representatives both met with Minister Sutowo on 19 August to begin 
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 What was discussed at the meeting is unknown, but within a few weeks 
both Shell and Stanvac submitted to Sutowo valuations of their respective refineries 
based on the formula specified in the CoWs. Stanvac estimated the value of its refinery at 




Except for a few developments, very little information is available regarding the 
course of the negotiations over the next ten weeks. How many times the parties met, what 
the primary issues were, are all unknown. The first development was a major one; 
sometime at the end of August or the very beginning of September, Shell decided that it 
wanted to withdraw from Indonesia entirely.  It authorized its representatives to approach 
the GOI about a sale of all its assets, which it hoped the GOI could finance by payment in 
kind (i.e., oil), and it expected to be out of Indonesia by the end of the year. The basic 
reasons were the ones we have seen: (i) first, GOI pressure on the oil industry since 1963, 
which culminated in its ‗request‘ to buy the refineries, and (ii) perhaps more importantly, 
as Shell did not export crude oil, continued exploration and production without refinery 
capacity was simply unprofitable and would result in Shell injecting money into 
Indonesia.
143
  Along similar lines, Stanvac was now thinking about selling to the GOI its 
oil fields in South Sumatra which fed its refinery, which would leave Stanvac with only 
its fields in Riau (central Sumatra) that were used to export crude oil. The difference 
illustrates the different positions of Shell and Stanvac; Shell had no significant crude oil 
export sales to fall back on, so it wanted to get out entirely, whereas Stanvac, like Shell, 
would be happy to sell off its domestic Indonesia business, but unlike Shell would 
continue on in a purely export business (similar to Caltex).
144
 The second development in 
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the negotiations was Stanvac‘s receipt of a letter from Minister Ibnu Sutowo dated 4 
October. The letter proposed that compensation for the refinery be based on the book 
value of the refinery, a number which was way below Stanvac‘s offer of $30 million and 
was contrary to the formula specified in the CoWs.
145
 This may have been Sutowo‘s first 
counteroffer, and the low figure and Sutowo‘s willingness to deviate from the terms 
agreed to in the CoW portended that difficult negotiations lay ahead. Presumably Shell 
received a similar letter.         
Meanwhile, in mid-September Caltex was told by reliable sources that President 
Sukarno had instructed Minister Chaerul Saleh to proceed with the management takeover 
of the oil companies by the end of the year.
146
  Sukarno‘s instruction to Minister Saleh 
was probably ‗Directive 6,‘ an elusive decree which has been referred to a number of 
times by commentators, but a copy of which, insofar as I am aware, has yet to surface.
147
 
According to one observer, Directive 6 required the ―transfer of management of the oil 
companies to Indonesian control no later than 31 December 1965.‖
148
  In any case, the 
rumor certainly would have alarmed Caltex more than Shell and Stanvac. Caltex‘s 
operations, thanks to its crude oil exports, were far more profitable than those of the other 
two, and Shell and Stanvac were already engaged in negotiations to divest all (Shell) and 
part (Stanvac) of their assets. 
The September 30 Movement and its immediate aftermath probably initially 
slowed down both the buyout negotiations and the pressure for management takeover, but 
it did not halt them.
149
 If anything, after an apparent quiet period of six weeks or so after 
1 October the pressure swiftly built up, culminating in the last week of November and the 
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first three weeks of December. On the management takeover front, on 3 November 
Minister Chaerul Saleh informally transmitted a statement to Caltex that the events of 1 
October (the September 30 Movement) had not altered the GOI‘s position toward the oil 
industry and that the GOI would take over the management of Caltex by the end of the 
year. The GOI would act unilaterally if necessary, as the general unpopularity of the USA 
in the world meant that unilateral action would not have ―serious consequences‖ for the 
GOI. Caltex was welcome to maintain a representative office if it wanted.
150
  Caltex was 
very concerned by this development, as this and other indications suggested that the GOI 
was increasingly interested in Caltex. Caltex did not know what precisely was meant by 
management takeover; the possibilities, none of which were palatable, were many, and 
there was even a rumor of a possible buyout, though there had been no discussions with 
Minister Sutowo about it.
151
 It is unknown if Stanvac and Shell received a similar 
message. Given that neither was nearly as profitable as Caltex, and that Shell was 
negotiating to withdraw from Indonesia entirely and Stanvac was hoping to sell all of its 
assets related to domestic production, it is unlikely they would have felt the threat as 
keenly anyway. Characteristic of future pressure regarding management takeover, there 
was not any formal, written message to Caltex on the matter, as communication was all 
done orally. 
As it turns out, Minister Chaerul Saleh was not targeting Caltex only. On 23 
November Minister Saleh, in his capacity as Minister of Oil and Natural Gas, issued 
Decree 179, which was given only to GOI officials and was not to be released to the 
general public.
152
 As we shall see, Stanvac only found out about this decree two weeks 
later when the companies were under intense pressure. Intended for the guidance of GOI 
officials in state enterprises and on the oil company supervisory teams, and probably for 
officials within the Ministry of Oil and Natural Gas, the decree stated that the ministry 
would coordinate all oil operations within Indonesia, ranging from planning to production 
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to refining to distribution and to marketing. (One wonders if this language was also 
directed at Minister Sutowo in an attempt to assert Saleh‘s authority over Sutowo.) The 
decree continued to say that all oil operations in Indonesia would ultimately be owned 
and operated by state-owned enterprises, and such change would be implemented by the 
transfer of ownership of all private/foreign refineries to the GOI. In addition, the 
management of all private or foreign oil companies would be in the hands of the GOI by 
the end of the year, without changing the ownership status of the companies, and the 
CoWs would be adjusted accordingly to reflect the new form of cooperation. In addition, 
the decree indicated that foreign sales (without prejudicing the needs of the domestic 
market) would seek to maximize foreign exchange revenues; priorities for overseas 
marketing would be given to Pakistan, Burma, Cambodia, and the Peoples Republic of 
China, and efforts to develop markets in African countries and NEFO countries would be 
made.  It thus appeared as though the GOI, in one form or another, was finally going to 
take over the oil companies. However, the GOI still did not communicate formally to the 
companies its desire to take over management.   
 On the buyout front, in late November and early December there was a sudden 
shift in the buyout negotiations to include all the assets of each of the three companies. 
Buyout negotiations for Shell and Stanvac, though they certainly were continuing from 
mid-September to early November, appeared to pick up steam in the second half of 
November. On 18 November, Stanvac presented to Minister Sutowo a buyout offer for its 
refinery and the oil fields in South Sumatra that supplied the refinery; apparently Stanvac 
was seeking $32.5 million for these assets.
153
 A few days later on 20 November, Shell 
also submitted a comprehensive proposal to Sutowo for all Shell‘s assets.
154
 Then, in the 
last few days of November, Sutowo met separately with both Caltex and Stanvac 
representatives and asked if they would be willing to sell all their assets to the GOI. For 
Stanvac, this meant that it would also sell its oil fields in Riau, which were used to export 
crude oil directly and thus a source of profits (these fields were not included in Stanvac‘s 
18 November offer). In the Stanvac meeting, Minister Sutowo confirmed that the refinery 
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negotiations had to be completed by 1 January, and that it was still the policy of the GOI 
to take over 100% of the management of the companies even if this meant 
nationalization. The Stanvac representative told Sutowo that Stanvac was not interested 
in selling the Riau fields, to which Sutowo appeared agreeable and indicated the sale 
would proceed on the basis of the refinery and South Sumatra fields only. In the case of 
Caltex, this was the first time Caltex had received any formal inquiry from the GOI into 
the sale of its assets. Minister Sutowo explained that payment for the assets would be 
made on a production sharing basis, with Caltex taking its existing share of the profits 
over an undetermined period of years. The Caltex representative merely told Sutowo that 
he would communicate the offer to Caltex‘s shareholders (which were of course not 
interested, though it is unclear if this was communicated to Sutowo).  Despite the 
negative response of Stanvac and the indifferent response of Caltex, on 2 December 
Minister Sutowo sent letters to both companies asking if they would be willing to transfer 
all their assets to the GOI.
155
  
Over the next 10 days, pressure on Caltex and Stanvac – on all three fronts of 
management takeover, buyout, and Indonesianization of management - continued to 
mount. First, on 3 December, Stanvac discovered that its GOI supervisory team had 
written to the Ministry of Labor recommending that the work permits of 14 expatriates 
not be renewed.  The supervisory team had informed Stanvac on 30 November that all 
Stanvac‘s expatriate work permits might not be renewed after 31 December, and it 
appeared that the team was now taking steps to ensure the forced 100% Indonesianisasi 
of Stanvac.
156
  Second, on 2 December, one of the negotiators on the GOI buyout team 
told the Stanvac representative that because Shell was selling everything, Stanvac also 
had to sell everything. This point was reinforced by Minister Sutowo himself on 4 
December when he told the Stanvac representative that the GOI would not proceed with 
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the buyout negotiations unless all Stanvac‘s oil fields were included in the package.
157
 
This appeared to be quite a reversal from Sutowo‘s position just a week earlier. Third, 
pressure was ratcheted up again on 7 December, when Stanvac received a copy - 
unofficially - of Minister Chaerul Saleh‘s Decree 179 calling for the management 
takeover of the oil companies by year end. Presumably Caltex quickly found out about 
this as well. Fourth, as early as 7 December rumors began to circulate that Shell had 
agreed to a GOI buyout for $110 million, and both Stanvac and Caltex were certainly 
aware of this by 10 December.
158
 As it turned out, the buyout agreement was not signed 
until the end of the month, but hearing that Shell had agreed to basic terms certainly 
increased the pressure on Caltex and Stanvac to come to some resolution. Fifth, on 9 
December Minister Sutowo sent a formal written buyout proposal to Caltex that 
apparently had the blessing of the high army command.
159
  
In the face of all this pressure, both Caltex and Stanvac‘s response was to play for 
time in hopes that the situation might change, as neither wanted a showdown with the 
GOI. As far as a buyout was concerned, neither was prepared to give up its crude oil 
export facilities. Profits from exports were excellent, and neither company believed that 
the GOI was in a position to make prompt and adequate compensation for the assets. 
Similarly, a management takeover was out of the question, as it would set an awful 
precedent in other parts of the world where the companies, especially Caltex, had 
operations. There was also great uncertainty regarding the form of a management 
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takeover, as the GOI had not even discussed the matter with the companies yet. Caltex 
even thought the GOI may have been trying to provoke it to make a move that the GOI 
could then use as an excuse to move in. According to company sources, by early 
December Minister Chaerul Saleh was holding daily internal meetings to figure out how 
to implement a takeover.  Saleh apparently wanted to avoid a situation similar to Iran in 
which the GOI would be unable to market crude oil overseas, and one way to do this 
would be to invoke the defense clause in the CoWs (basically allowing the GOI to take 
over the companies for reasons of national defense) on the grounds that the companies 
were agents of the US government that was opposed to the GOI in Konfrontasi. In any 
case, if a management takeover did occur, both companies were prepared to go to 
arbitration, and Caltex would also consider halting the oil shipments, which of course 
would directly and immediately impact the GOI‘s foreign exchange reserves.  Stalling for 
time seemed the best way to avoid certain conflict with the GOI, and given the great 
political turmoil at the time there was a chance that the GOI position might change. 
Moreover, delaying would allow the companies to educate GOI officials, particularly in 
the army, of the potential consequences if the companies were forced out.
160
  
The US embassy in Jakarta was also a forceful advocate of the ‗delay and warn‘ 
approach. The US embassy had, of course, been monitoring the oil companies‘ situation 
(especially Caltex and Stanvac, as they were US companies) for some time, but for about 
a six week period from early November to mid-December the US embassy actively 
inserted itself into the situation, principally by warning various GOI officials about the 
possible consequences of a forced sale or management takeover. As US Ambassador 
Green noted in his memoir, ―the most immediate problem we faced was trying to help 
save the two large US oil companies in Sumatra, Caltex and Stanvac, from imminent 
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 On 29 October, Dean Rusk, the US Secretary of State, upon hearing 
of Stanvac‘s problems, cabled Green to do ―anything which can be done to get into heads 
of new Indo leadership‖ the consequences of forcing the oil companies out. Rusk was 
concerned that an expropriation would bring into effect a US law known as the 
Hickenlooper Amendment, which prohibited the US government from providing aid to 
countries that expropriated US assets without compensation, and if invoked meant the US 
government could not provide aid to the Indonesian army.
162
  On 6 November, 
Ambassador Green wrote back to say that the embassy was ―not sanguine about [the] 
chances [of] oil companies remaining here,‖ but in general concurred ―with the 
desirability of obtaining deferral of any unilateral takeovers.‖  He agreed that ―now is the 
time to question [the] army as to its intentions and depending on [the] answers to point 
out …advantages of deferring [the] solution…‖ Finally Green noted that the topic had 
been briefly broached with a ―nascent channel,‖ but it ―may take us some time to develop 
useful dialogue with army on oil and other matters…because the army has its hands full 
with domestic security and political problems, and those in the army who could talk 
meaningfully on oil and related political matters are relatively few.‖
163
 
Ambassador Green indeed believed that there were several reasons why the army 
may not have been willing to step in. First, there was the matter of the political struggle 
between President Sukarno and those who opposed the path down which he was leading 
Indonesia; in the uncertain political climate of the time, even with the ongoing 
neutralization of the PKI, the army could not be seen as catering to US interests, 
something that Sukarno would certainly pounce upon. A second reason was that even 
―most of [the] anti-communist army leadership are strongly imbued with [the] conviction 
that Indonesians must control their own national resources and that there [was] no room 
for foreign ownership or management control.‖ While the army was interested in 
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maintaining oil production and in good relations with the USA, it was not ―sympathetic 
to long-term retention of foreign oil interests.‖ A third reason Green cited was the army‘s 
role as a primary defender of Indonesia‘s continuing revolution. Given the bankruptcy 
and failure of the ―continuing revolution‖ in so many aspects (internationally, 
economically), many were searching for a rationale for revolution. One achievable aim 
seemed to be the control by Indonesia over its own resources, in tune with the 
BERDIKARI concept.
164
     
Nevertheless, the US embassy followed up with various measures. Its message 
was reportedly communicated through a variety of channels: between Ambassador Green 
and General Suharto via military attaches, between Green and Frank Galbraith (the 
second ranking US embassy official) and Minister Adam Malik, and between Galbraith 
and an aide to General Nasution.
165
  On 22 November, Ambassador Green met with 
Minister Sutowo himself. Green ―expressed the hope that no radical step would be taken 
by Indonesia which would endanger either continued production (especially in view of 
the obvious army need for petroleum products), foreign exchange earnings, or relations 
with the US.‖ Green also pointed out that the US government did not want to be involved 
in the negotiations between the GOI and the companies, but that it was ―especially 
interested in avoiding any incident which might stand in [the] way of improvement of 
relations.‖ Minister Sutowo apparently expressed general agreement, saying that 
especially with respect to Caltex he hoped some sort of agreement on Indonesianization 
could be reached. Sutowo also said that Minister Chaerul Saleh was very busy and had 
left the oil industry to Sutowo to take care of.  Sutowo as well clearly identified himself 
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In the first two weeks of December, the US government became increasingly 
involved as the pressure on the companies mounted.  In Jakarta, Ambassador Green and 
other officials were meeting with oil company officials regularly, advising them to stall 
for time.  Green was convinced that the embassy should 
not get involved in any specifics, but try to get the message across, 
especially to top level military, that it would be decidedly against their 
own best interests to take any peremptory move which would hazard 
foreign exchange earnings, interrupt production [of] oil and oil products 
(so essential to military) and make it very difficult to achieve mutually 
beneficial US-Indo relations. What we are looking for is some mutually 
acceptable arrangement, but that is something to be worked out between 




On 8 December, Green reported that Minister Adam Malik had passed on US concerns to 
General Nasution, who ―had the situation very much in mind,‖ though it was uncertain 
how far Nasution would push the issue against Saleh and Sukarno.
168
 Meanwhile, back in 
the United States representatives of Caltex and Stanvac met with US State Department 
officials to inform them of the situation. As a result of these meetings, US Secretary of 
State Rusk fired off a telegram to Green in Jakarta, instructing him to make the following 
points to the appropriate Indonesian officials: (i) first, the companies ―do not desire to 
sell [the] export crude facilities, and do not see [a] reasonable possibility for prompt, 
adequate and effective compensations,‖ (ii) second, that ―effective interference in 
company management of properties is totally unacceptable to [the] companies,‖ who 
would proceed to arbitrate, and (iii) the GOI should consider whether its own interests 
would be served by a showdown, which ―would almost certainly deepen GOI economic 
difficulties by reducing foreign exchange earnings from oil exports‖ and might ―bring 
into effect Hickenlooper-Adair Amendment and other relevant US laws, thereby making 
it legally impossible for USG to engage in future aid programs…‖ Moreover, would not 
the GOI be better off delaying until a ―more tranquil climate‖ existed, or at least 
proceeding only with the sale of Stanvac‘s refinery operations and the related oil fields, 
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as that (along with the Shell purchase) would result in ―total ownership and control of all 
properties which supply Indonesian market and defense needs.‖
169
 It is unclear if Green 
followed through with this message, as by the time he received it the situation seemed to 
be changing. 
From 10 to 15 December there were some indications that the GOI position was 
perhaps changing, but there were also signs that it was holding fast. On the night of 10 
December, Julius Tahija, the highest ranking Caltex executive of Indonesian nationality, 
met with Minister Sutowo. Sutowo was about to leave for Tokyo and asked that Caltex‘s 
manager meet him there to discuss Sutowo‘s buyout proposal of 9 December. Minister 
Sutowo told Tahija that he had just spoken with Minister Chaerul Saleh and explained to 
him ―the many complications he saw in the situation.‖ Minister Saleh indicated to 
Sutowo that since the Shell buyout agreement was being signed and the takeover would 
impose ―heavy administrative burdens‖ on the GOI, action with respect to Caltex and 
Stanvac may be postponed. The next day Tahija, continuing his ‗diplomacy,‘ met with 
Minister Chaerul Saleh for discussions.  From these discussions, Tahija reported that 
Minister Saleh was ―now convinced that Caltex [was] firmly opposed [to] any unilateral 
takeover of management‖ and would go for arbitration, and that Caltex could not ―be 
pressured into a forced takeover.‖ Minister Saleh, would, however, send Sutowo to New 
York to explain GOI intentions to the Caltex shareholders. Finally, Minister Saleh 
contradictorily added that once changes were made to the CoWs, he would step away 
from the oil industry, which was interpreted by Tahija as meaning that Saleh would 
proceed with nationalization!
170
  It appeared that Minister Saleh had not changed his 
mind after all; on 15 December a Stanvac representative was informed by a senior GOI 
official who had just spoken to Minister Saleh that Saleh was waiting until Minister 
Sutowo returned a few days later before making what appeared to be a final decision 
about the oil companies. The decision, though, was whether to proceed with the buyout 
or to implement a plan of 100% Indonesianization, with ownership remaining 
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 Meanwhile, in Tokyo on 15 December, the Caltex general manager told 
Minister Sutowo that Caltex would not accept a management takeover, to which Sutowo 
replied that the same was required under the GOI constitution, that he would advise 
President Sukarno of this, and that the GOI would takeover unilaterally.
172
   
  The apparent steadfastness Minister Chaerul Saleh exhibited, as well as the 
uncertainty over the position of the foreign oil companies in Indonesia, changed abruptly 
on that same day of 15 December in an episode that one historian has described as a 
crucial moment in the transition of power from President Sukarno to General Suharto.
173
 
The US embassy reported that at a ―high level meeting‖ in Tjipanas (south of Jakarta), 
Minister Saleh 
tabled a proposal to proceed with takeover of all foreign oil companies‘ 
management. KOTI economic section chief Gen. Achmad immediately 
called up Gen. Suharto who arrived at meeting by helicopter and there 
Gen. Suharto made it crystal clear to all assembled that military would not 
stand for precipitous moves against oil companies. He stressed that this 
would result in loss of production which would jeopardize interests of 




General Suharto had intervened forcefully and dramatically. Perhaps unaware of this 
event (or, if he was aware, possibly trying to ensure that Minister Saleh received the 
message), Adam Malik spoke with Minister Saleh the next day, 16 December. As Malik 
relayed the contents of the conversation to Ambassador Green, Malik 
told Saleh that, speaking on behalf of [the] army, this is not [the] time to 
push [the] US on oil properties question; [at] minimum, Saleh should 
postpone discussions until more urgent basic questions [were] resolved. 
Saleh responded that all he was doing was trying to take over management 
of ‗companies in our own country.‘ Malik warned Saleh that we would be 
killing the goose that lays the golden egg.
175
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Ministers Chaerul Saleh and Sutowo both backed down with respect to Caltex and 
Stanvac. Tahija of Caltex reported on 18 December that Minister Saleh was looking for a 
face saving formula and would ask Sutowo (who was arriving later that day from Tokyo) 
to come up with a plan ―which recognizes that any 100% takeover of management 
impossible but which envisages accelerated Indonesianization looking to negotiations 
sometime hence when things have settled down.‖
176
  On 23 December Caltex was told 
unofficially by the head of its GOI supervisory team that the decision to take over the 
company was off, that there would be no takeover. At the same meeting, the head of the 
supervisory team asked the Caltex manager if Caltex would make an advance to 
Indonesia based on projected 1966 profits; in essence, Caltex was being asked for a loan. 
Though the request was unofficial, Caltex believed it had come on instructions from a 
higher authority. Later that day, Tahija reported that KOTI, along with several ministers, 
was attempting to formulate a ―no nonsense‖ economic policy and that KOTI was trying 
to elevate economic problems to the same level of importance as political problems. In 
this connection, Minister for Private Banking Jan Massie had asked Tahija to help secure 
loans from the oil companies to the GOI.
177
 The sudden switch from the threat of forced 
management takeover or buyout to the polite request for a loan was indeed remarkable.  
On the same day, Minister Sutowo again asked the Stanvac manager if Stanvac was 
willing to sell its Riau oil fields; when told no, Sutowo answered that in such case 
negotiations over the refinery and its related fields in South Sumatra should recommence, 
thereby dropping the matter of the Riau fields and signaling that Stanvac would be 
allowed to stay for the time being.
178
 Thus, by late December the GOI had dropped its 
push to take over Stanvac and Caltex.            
In stark contrast to Caltex and Stanvac, the Shell buyout proceeded and a ‗Heads 
of Agreement‘ was signed on 30 December by Minister Sutowo and Shell 
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 The heart of the arrangement was payment in kind (oil) over an 
extended period of time, which made the deal affordable and acceptable to the GOI and 
in reality was the only way payment could be made. The entirety of Shell‘s business in 
Indonesia was sold to the GOI for a price of $110 million. Ten percent of the price ($11 
million) was payable in cash up front, while the remaining $99 million was to be paid in 
annual installments of about $19.5 million over a five year period and guaranteed by a 
letter of credit issued by Bank Negara Indonesia. However, it was agreed that the parties 
would immediately negotiate an oil purchase agreement whereby the GOI would sell 
refined oil from the Pladju and Balikpapan refineries, in amounts and at prices to be 
agreed upon, to a company within the Royal Dutch Shell group; once this agreement was 
reached, the annual installment payments would become monthly payments, and the 
monthly purchases of refined oil under the new oil purchase agreement would count 
toward the GOI‘s monthly payment obligations to Shell under the asset sale. In effect, the 
GOI would be paying for Shell‘s assets in kind – in refined oil. In addition, the Bank 
Negara Indonesia letter of credit would be replaced by letters of credit from other 
institutions. The parties also agreed to negotiate a services agreement whereby Royal 
Dutch Shell would provide technical assistance and guidance, including foreign advisors 
if agreed to. The GOI also freed Shell from any obligations/responsibilities towards its 
Indonesian employees, and the parties mutually released each other from all claims each 
had on the other, with the GOI assuming all Shell‘s Rupiah debts. The sale date was to be 
1 January 1966, whereupon the GOI would assume control and management over the 
business. A side letter signed the same date changed the terms of the first payment of $11 
million to $2 million in cash, with the remaining $9 million to be paid in nine monthly 
installments by again offsetting the purchase price under the oil purchase agreement – in 
effect payment in kind in refined oil. Thus, under the final arrangement, the GOI only 
paid $2 million in hard cash to Shell, with the remaining $109 million coming in kind. A 
Presidium Kabinet decree issued on 31 December by Third Deputy Prime Minister 
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Chaerul Saleh approved the Heads of Agreement and the side letter, and the sale went 
forward on 1 January as scheduled.
180
  
2. Assessment and Aftermath. 
How do we explain this outcome whereby both Caltex and Stanvac were able to 
resist a GOI takeover but Shell sold out? The answer is found in oil company 
exceptionalism and the unique position of the big three oil companies in Indonesia. The 
position of the oil companies was such that they could not be forced into a buy-out or 
management takeover; the implications for the Indonesian economy in the form of lost 
foreign exchange revenues for the GOI and economic dislocation from a highly likely 
slowdown of oil production were simply too great.
181
 Why, then, did Shell agree to 
continue with the sale in late December even as pressure on Caltex and Stanvac waned? 
Put simply, it appears to have been because Shell did not think it could make any money 
in Indonesia as long as its operations were tied so closely to the Indonesian domestic 
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market. This was the very same rationale that had motivated Shell to offer all its assets to 
the GOI in late August; neither the potential ramifications of the September 30 
Movement, nor the easing of pressure on Stanvac and Caltex in late December, changed 
this calculus. Unlike Caltex (whose operations were mostly exports of crude oil) and 
Stanvac (whose profits came primarily from its limited exports), Shell had little in the 
way of crude oil exports to fall back on, and the strict domestic pricing environment, 
combined with the artificially low exchange rate, made it very difficult to be profitable. 
In addition, it was already owed some $10 million by the GOI, a number that was likely 
to grow and unlikely to be repaid.
182
  As an indication of how badly off Shell was, it 
reported in mid-November that it only had several weeks‘ worth of Rupiah left before it 
would have to remit foreign currency to Indonesia at unrealistically low rates.
183
 Thus, 
Shell‘s profit outlook was the key reason for the sale, not GOI pressure. 
Indeed, Shell‘s sell-out did not appear to be a forced sell-off by any means, but 
rather a negotiated, arms-length transaction. The purchase agreement itself was 
reasonably balanced; certainly by far the most important issue contested was the sale 
price. On this question, the British Foreign Office reported that ―Shell were reasonably 
satisfied with the negotiated price, considering the declining influence of their Indonesian 
investment.  On the other hand, Shell probably regret that they have now surrendered 
their rights to benefit in the future from substantial deposits of crude awaiting 
exploitation in Indonesia.‖
184
 Similarly, the Wall Street Journal reported that Shell 
officials were satisfied with the negotiations and that a Shell spokesman had described 
the negotiations as ―based on what is regarded as an adequate present day evaluation of 
the business concerned.‖
185
  Moreover, despite the GOI‘s shortage of cash, Shell could be 
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reasonably assured of future payment because it was made in refined oil.  In fact, this 
new arrangement put Shell in a position somewhat similar to Caltex‘s in the sense that it 
no longer had to be involved in the Indonesian domestic market, but would now be 
‗purchasing‘ refined oil for the international markets, without the costs of exploration and 
production, and without the restrictions of the Indonesian domestic market.  The new 
arrangement would obviously not be as profitable as Caltex‘s, but it was probably much 
better than Shell‘s existing position. Shell‘s calculation regarding payment proved 
correct, as the purchase price was fully paid by December 1971.
186
   
Let us also return briefly to the question of motivations of Ministers Chaerul 
Saleh and Ibnu Sutowo in attempting to force a resolution of the position of the oil 
companies. Assessing Minister Saleh‘s motivations appears to be simpler. Without his 
own power base and reliant on President Sukarno, he was allied with the President in the 
emerging political power struggle; trapped by his dependence on Sukarno, there was little 
room for him to maneuver and thus he had little choice but to go along with Sukarno‘s 
push for a GOI takeover in the form of the familiar management takeover. Minister Saleh 
may have believed that ultimately the oil industry should be under the control of the GOI, 
but his actions in March and April with respect to the oil companies (and in the years 
before with respect to Shell) clearly suggest that he was very aware of the dangers of 
forcing out the oil companies. Something had changed since then, resulting in a 
hardening of his position towards the oil companies, and the explanation appears to be his 
dependence on Sukarno that in a time of an all-out power struggle made him even more 
vulnerable to and reliant on the President. 
Minister Sutowo‘s position was quite different. As Aden has noted, while Sutowo 
owed much to President Sukarno, one of Sutowo‘s major personal strengths was the key 
position he occupied as a bridge or mediator between the GOI and foreign oil companies. 
Elimination of the foreign companies would threaten this base of power, erasing his 
political independence and the access to economic advantages his position provided. In 
addition, Sutowo apparently felt that the departure of Caltex would create a dangerously 
large gap in the domestic oil industry that neither the GOI oil companies nor other 
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foreign companies could immediately fill.
187
 Sutowo, ever the pragmatist and more 
concerned with stability in the oil industry, was thus hesitant to move against Caltex. In 
contrast, as Aden has suggested a buyout of Shell could be used to build up the assets of 
Permina, the GOI oil company run by Sutowo (see Chapter Three, Part II, Section A for a 
discussion of the GOI oil companies). Indeed, on 28 February 1966 Minister Sutowo 
transferred the assets of Shell to Permina, which was ―instantly transformed from a 
company with assets in northern Sumatra only to an archipelago-wide entity‖ with two 
major refineries in South Sumatra and East Kalimantan. In addition, by purchasing the 
assets of a company that wanted to leave anyway and not forcing the issue with the two 
American companies, Sutowo preserved the possibility of good relations with the United 
States government.
188
     
How critical was General Suharto‘s intervention on 15 December in the context of 
the overall political power struggle between President Sukarno and his opponents? As 
noted above, at least one observer saw the incident as a crucial turning point in the 
conflict. Because the full story of the struggle between President Sukarno and his 
opponents in this six month period from October 1965 through March 1966 is not known, 
it is hard to assess this contention. I am more inclined to think that it was rather one of 
many issues, most notably the role of the PKI and the state of the economy, on which 
Sukarno and his opponents diverged. On the surface at least the power struggle was just 
beginning to boil; the previous two months the focus was more on eliminating the PKI, 
and only from mid-December onward (after President Sukarno via Minister Chaerul 
Saleh backed down from the management takeover of Caltex and Stanvac) did the 
political conflict between Sukarno and his opponents led by General Suharto reach its 
apogee. That is not to suggest that the incident served as the galvanizing trigger for either 
side over the next three months, though it certainly would have confirmed - to those 
aware of it - that Sukarno‘s economic strategy was misguided.  
In the aftermath of the GOI push in late 1965, several points are worthy of 
mention. Although there was no significant GOI pressure for a management takeover or 
full buyout of Caltex or Stanvac after December 1965, both companies were still 
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pressured to Indonesianize their respective managements. Caltex responded in April 1966 
by appointing Julius Tahija as its top ranking executive, making him one of the first 
Indonesians to head a major foreign company in Indonesia.
189
 Tahija was to be advised 
by a representative (an expatriate) appointed by the shareholders of Caltex, but it was 
clear that Tahija was in charge.
190
 After this change, there was little pressure on Caltex to 
Indonesianize. Tahija himself would become one of the most respected businessmen in 
Indonesia. In contrast, Stanvac did not make a similar change at the top but continued 
with its Indonesianasi program established under its CoW and hence was subjected to 
occasional pressure over the next couple of years to promote its Indonesian staff. For 




With respect to the sale of Stanvac‘s refinery and South Sumatran oil fields, 
before the transaction could be finalized it was caught squarely in the middle of the 
transition from the Sukarno administration to the emerging New Order administration. In 
early 1966 Minister Sutowo continued to push to close the transaction, and by 20 April 
the parties had actually agreed to a price of $27.75 million, though the other terms of the 
sale had yet to be worked out.
192
 However, as we saw earlier, by this point General 
Suharto had gained the upper hand in the struggle with Sukarno, and the emerging 
government had begun to hint at a great reversal in economic policy, particularly with 
respect to foreign investment. In late April, Adam Malik, the newly appointed Minister of 
Foreign Affairs (Malik would be appointed to the new Presidium Kabinet in July and be 
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one of the top three officials of the New Order in its first few years), publicly came out 
against the sale. Other GOI officials were also against the sale, and after Minister Sutowo 
was demoted in the July 1966 cabinet shuffle the sale negotiations ground to a halt, as the 
new Minister of Mining Slamet Bratanata (now Sutowo‘s nominal superior) also opposed 
the sale. There were numerous reasons for this opposition. First was the apparent cost of 
the sale; Indonesia had little foreign exchange to spare and could ill afford to be trapped 
into another costly arrangement like the Shell sale. Such an argument was only partially 
true, for as we have seen the Shell sale involved primarily payment in kind, not in cash. A 
second argument was that the new government wanted to promote foreign investment and 
encourage a stable foreign investment climate, neither of which would be helped by the 
sale of assets of one of the two remaining foreign investors in Indonesia. A third reason 
was that the GOI was having a hard time digesting the Shell sale and was simply not 
ready to absorb the Stanvac assets. Lastly, opposition may have stemmed from dislike or 
wariness of Sutowo, who was the primary GOI proponent of the purchase, especially 
from Adam Malik and General Suharto.
193
 Consequently, the Stanvac refinery and South 
Sumatran fields were not sold to the GOI during this time.
194
   
Finally, as a result of the transition from the Sukarno government to the New 
Order government, there were several measures on the domestic political front and within 
the GOI that directly impacted Caltex and Stanvac. First was the exit of Minister Chaerul 
Saleh from the oil industry and the political stage. Caught in the middle of the political 
power struggle, Minister Saleh refused to abandon President Sukarno, declining several 
offers to join the opposition, and from the end of December 1965 appeared to have little 
to do with the oil industry as he came under increasing fire politically. In the short term, 
this allowed Minister Sutowo to become the most powerful GOI official in the oil 
industry, and Sutowo took full advantage.
195
  For example, as we saw above in late 
February 1966 Sutowo transferred all the assets of the recently purchased Shell Oil to 
Permina, the state-owned oil company that Sutowo controlled. In President Sukarno‘s 
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cabinet reshuffle of 21 February, Sutowo replaced Chaerul Saleh as the Minister of Oil 
and Natural Gas.  On 18 March 1966, after Supersemar, Minister Saleh was one of the 
ministers arrested, and he died in jail in February 1967.  Minister Sutowo eventually 
emerged as the king of Indonesian oil, but the initial road was very bumpy as the alliance 
with General Suharto, who was wary of Sutowo and tried to contain his influence, was 
uneasy.  In the cabinet reshuffle of 25 July 1966, the first major one under the new 
government in which the cabinet was completely revamped and stocked almost wholly 
with new appointees, Slamet Bratanata, a director general in the Ministry of Basic 
Industry and Mining in the early 1960s (and a trained engineer) was appointed to the 
renamed position of Minister of Mining. Minister Sutowo was made Director General of 
Oil and Gas, a post within the Ministry of Mining and thus subordinate to Minister 
Bratanata, in what appeared to be a compromise between the army and the economic 
technocrats. Nonplussed, Sutowo continued to contest Bratanata for power and influence, 
until finally General Suharto granted Sutowo effective control over the oil industry late in 
1966.
196
  A few years later in 1968, the two remaining GOI oil companies, Pertamin and 
Permina, were merged to create Pertamina, the GOI oil behemoth headed by Sutowo that 
played a dominant role in the Indonesian oil industry for years when oil revenues were 
the lynchpin of Indonesian economic growth and development.
197
   
C. The Final Takeover and Buyout of Non-British Foreign Estates. 
Complementing the year-end pressure on the oil companies was a concerted effort 
in the last few months of 1965 by the Ministry of Estates both to take control of and to 
buy out all non-British foreign estates. The foreign estates whose owner-appointed 
managers were finally displaced in December 1965 were those taken over under 
Presidential Decree 6/1965 (see Part II). Officially the buyouts were also undertaken 
within the framework of Presidential Decree 6/1965, and the terms of most of the buyouts 
were ‗agreed to‘ by the end of December (except in the case of Goodyear and US 
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Rubber, whose negotiations extended well into 1966). However, the buy-outs included 
six companies whose estates were seized before the implementation of Presidential 
Decree 6/1965: American-owned Goodyear and US Rubber (seized in March 1965), 
Belgian-owned Holding Jabelmat, Samuba and Tjikadu Holding (British-managed, seized 
in 1964), and Indian Bombay Burma (British-managed, seized in 1964). Altogether, the 
Ministry of Estates agreed to buy out 16 foreign estate companies owning at least 58 
estates.  
1. The Buyouts and Final Management Takeover. 
On 10 November 1965, Minister of Estates Frans Seda met with representatives 
of most of the non-British foreign estates whom he had summoned to a meeting in Bogor, 
a small town just outside Jakarta. Minister Seda informed the representatives that the GOI 
intended to complete in short order the nationalization of the companies under 
Presidential Decree 6/1965, and that compensation would be paid on a production sharing 
basis. Valuations and compensations would be negotiated with individual companies and 
all agreements were to be finalized by 1 December, just three weeks away.
198
 
Prior to this point, momentum for final disposition of the non-British foreign 
estates had slowed somewhat since the summer. As we saw previously in Part II, Section 
A2, in late June the Ministry of Estates appointed officials known as PPPAs to supervise 
the estates. The owner-appointed managers of the estates were not displaced, however, 
and in this state of limbo worked with the PPPAs in relationships that were very hard to 
define. The Ministry of Estates had also laid the groundwork for the buyouts as early as 
May, even forming in late July an ‗Appraisal Team‘ to evaluate the assets/estates of the 
various foreign estate companies, and the Appraisal Team did send representatives to at 
least some of the estates. However, it appears that there was little communication 
between the ministry and the companies regarding the buyouts for several months prior to 
the 10 November meeting, which was not surprising considering the political turmoil 
following the September 30 Movement. Certainly the foreign estate holders were aware 
that a buyout was still very much a possibility prior to October 1; for example, in late 
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September the SOCFIN manager told the US consul in Medan that SOCFIN was 
determined to get a big sum for its estates, and if fair compensation was not offered 
SOCFIN would then involve the French and Belgian governments (where most of 
SOCFIN‘s shareholders were from).
199
  
Nevertheless, while there may not have been much outward movement, it seems 
that by early to mid-November the Ministry of Estates finalized internally the basis for its 
calculations of compensation. According to the Seda Report, the initial conclusion the 
‗Implementing Team‘ reached after discussions with officials from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the central bank was that appraisals would be determined by looking 
at the profit producing potential for the company over the remaining concession period of 
its estates. However, after receiving the results of the Ministry‘s ‗Appraisal Team‘ and 
running some calculations, final ―guidelines‖ for the calculating the appraisals were 
established under which the basic value would be the sum of (i) the sales price of one 
year‘s worth of production (an average of the past three to five years‘ annual production), 
(ii) the appraised value of the buildings, and (iii) interest of 5%.  In essence, the 
companies would be paid the estimated value of one year‘s worth of production. 
Presumably the value would be based on world market prices, though this was not clear 
(the guideline mentioned that ―attention should be paid to the total annual export 
production‖). This payment would not be paid all at once, but rather over the life of the 
remaining concession periods of the estates.
200
 
After a period of several weeks during which the Ministry of Estates seemed to be 
in no rush and the 1 December deadline passed, there was a flurry of activity in early 
December, and by the end of the month most of the non-British foreign estate companies 
had ‗agreed to‘ a buyout figure. In the first week of December, the foreign estate 
representatives were called in individually and given letters stating the Ministry of 
Estates offer; in the case of Goodyear and US Rubber (and presumably the other 
companies), the letters did not provide the ministry‘s calculations.
201
 What happened over 
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the next several weeks is unclear, as except in the case of Goodyear and US Rubber (see 
next section) there are few details available regarding the companies‘ reactions to the 
ministry offers and the general course of negotiations.
202
 SIPEF, for one, was quite happy 
with the price the ministry offered and quickly accepted.
203
 The US embassy, though, 
reported that most of the GOI offers were low, but nevertheless were accepted by many 
of the companies by the end of the month.
204
 In any case, after reporting to the Presidium 
Kabinet and President Sukarno on 30 December, Minister Seda announced to the press on 
31 December that the GOI had taken over more than 50 estates of over 150,000 hectares 




Table 7.1 below sets forth the buyout terms for the foreign estate companies as 
stated in the Seda Report. These terms do not represent the actual monies paid; in most 
cases the companies only received the first installment or a portion thereof, and this 
payment was only made in early to mid-1967 when the GOI was trying to lure the 
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companies back to Indonesia.
206
 As the table indicates, most of the payments were to be 
spread out over a period of years in installments, and presumably these payments would 
be sourced from the individual company‘s own ex-estates. Interestingly, many of the 
larger companies agreed to receive payment in kind in the form of produce (usually 
rubber or palm oil). As this concept will be discussed in detail in the next subsection 
regarding Goodyear and US Rubber, it will not be discussed here.  As we shall see, 
Goodyear and US Rubber negotiated the right to keep a small number of advisors on the 
estates to supervise quality control, but as far as I have been able to determine, none of 




Table 7.1: Buyout Terms for Non-British Foreign Estates 




SOCFIN US$13.5 million To be paid over 10 years in 3 annual installments 
of $450,000; payment in kind/production 
Goodyear 
Plantations 
US$4.5 million To be paid over 7 years in 3 annual installments 
of $214,000; payment in kind/production 
US Rubber US$4.1 million To be paid over 7 years in 3 annual installments 
of $195,238; payment in kind/production 
SIPEF US$1.9 million To be paid over 10 years in 3 annual installments 
of $63,333; payment in kind/production 
Tjikadu Holding 
(SIPEF-owned) 
US$137,000 To be paid over 10 years in 3 annual installments 
of $4,566; payment in kind/production 
Plantagen AG US$1.787 
million 
To be paid over 8 years in 1 annual installment 
of $223,000; payment in cash 
Holding Jabelmat US$765,000 To be paid over 10 years in 3 annual installments 
of $25,500; payment in kind/production 
Samuba US$625,000 To be paid over 10 years in 3 annual installments 
of $20,833; payment in kind/production 
PT Kina Monind US$500,000 To be paid over 10 years in 1 annual installment 
of $50,000; payment in cash 
Bombay Burma US$450,000 To be paid over 10 years in 1 annual installment 
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of $45,000; payment in cash 
Societe de Gestion 
et de Participation 
pour L‘Asie et 
L‘Afrique (PT 
Franesia) 
US$521,400 To be paid over 10 years in 1 annual installment 






US$181,700 To be paid over 10 years in 1 annual installment 
of $18,170; payment in cash 
Societe Anonyme 
de Gestion pour 
L‘Indonesie (PT 
Montjolimo) 
US$86,900 To be paid over 10 years in 1 annual installment 
of $8,690; payment in cash 
Glen Falloch Rp. 1 billion One-half in cash; one half in 1966 production of 
coffee 
PPD Kadjaran Rp. 550 million One time payment in cash 
NVCO Kalilanang Rp. 300 million One time payment in cash 
Source: Report of Minister of Estates Frans Seda to Presidium Kabinet dated 29 June 
1966 (ANRI R-17, No. 106) 
 
 
Concurrently with the buyouts the Ministry of Estates moved to assume complete 
control over the estates (which had theoretically already been placed under GOI control 
pursuant to Presidential Decree 6/1965) by finally displacing owner-appointed 
management. On 6 December, Minister Seda issued a decree, apparently retroactive to 1 
December, that made the PPPAs the highest authority on the estates and directed that all 
company employees were responsible to them and not to the owner-appointed 
directors.
208
 Over the next few weeks the owner-appointed managers were replaced, and 
by February 1966 most of the owner-appointed managers or representatives of the foreign 
estate companies had departed Indonesia.  The only exceptions were the small number of 
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personnel retained by Goodyear and US Rubber (see next section), and Mr. Vladimir Dell 




After the buyouts, most of the estates (except for Goodyear‘s and US Rubber‘s, 
and about 10 that were seized in 1964 and already placed in Dwikora) were grouped into 
separate units called PPN Expera, which was short for Ex Perkebunan Asing (‗ex foreign 
estates‘). There were four Expera units (see Appendix B; two in Sumatra, and two in 
Java) that appeared to follow roughly the regional grouping of estates established when 
the PPPAs were appointed back in late June 1965, with Expera II, which was comprised 
of the SOCFIN estates, the largest by far. The prefix PPN – Perusahaan Perkebunan 
Negara (‗State Owned Estate Companies‘) – suggests that the Expera units may have 
been technically incorporated into the GOI estate structure, but the Expera units appear to 
have been administered separately from the other GOI estates. Like many of the taken-
over companies, the very top layer of management was appointed by the GOI, while the 
other management ranks were filled mostly by existing Indonesian employees of the 
estates and perhaps some managers from state-owned estates.  However, in sharp contrast 
to the Dwikora structure for the British estates, no great bureaucratic superstructure was 
formed to oversee the Expera units.
210
  
2. Case Study: Buyout of Goodyear Plantations and US Rubber. 
As we saw in Chapter Six, after the takeover of their estates in February 1965 
both Goodyear and US Rubber were negotiating with the Ministry of Estates regarding 
payment for the estates and future marketing arrangements. There was general agreement 
that US Rubber (USR) and Goodyear would be compensated for their estates over a 
several year period, that both would be allowed to market produce from their own estates 
as well as GOI estates, and that both could keep a small contingent of advisors in country 
(especially for quality control and marketing).   However, there was no agreement as to 
the all important details of how much compensation the companies would be paid, and by 
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 Interview with Karl Schneider on 16 June 2007; interview with Mrs. Vladimir (Beatrice) Dell on 4 
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 Similar to the Dwikora units, though, the Expera units had to file annual and semi-annual reports with 
the Ministry of Estates regarding basic production data such as area planted, area planted but not yet 
producing, output, and number of workers. 
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what means the companies would be paid (a discount in price of produce or production 
sharing).  The negotiations seemed to have died down by June or so, but in spite of the 
lack of agreement both companies continued with their marketing of GOI PPN estate 
latex and latex from their ex estates, and a small number of personnel from the companies 
remained on the estates.      
Goodyear and USR representatives were both present at the 10 November 
meeting with Minister Seda at which he announced the buyouts of the non-British foreign 
estates.
211
 Interestingly, although both USR and Goodyear were taken over in February 
and not under Presidential Decree 6/1965, the Ministry of Estates considered their buyout 
to fall under the ambit of Presidential Decree 6/1965. Both representatives duly reported 
the meeting to their respective head offices in the US, who presumably began to prepare 
their own asset evaluations. At some point over the next few weeks, both companies 
submitted to the ministry separate offer letters that apparently contained the companies‘ 
valuation of their assets, including in the case of USR the method of calculation. Despite 
the 1 December deadline, however, the ministry did not initially seem to be in a hurry. In 
the last week of November both companies met with ministry representatives for the first 
time, but apparently little was discussed, and the ministry even lost the Goodyear 
letter.
212
 The 1 December deadline passed without apparent impact. 
The pace quickened in early December. The lead negotiator for the Ministry of 
Estates was Danardojo Hadisasono, the same ministry official who had been negotiating 
with the companies back in the spring. In the first few days of December, representatives 
from both companies were called in separately by Danardojo and handed letters 
containing the ministry‘s offers.  The ministry‘s offer to Goodyear was $2.5 million and 
to USR $4.0 million. Neither the method of valuation/calculation nor the terms of 
payment was provided (though Danardojo did say that more details would be 
forthcoming).  Danardojo indicated that agreement in principal must be reached by 15 
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 US Embassy Bi-Weekly Economic Review dated 30 November 1965 (USNACP RG, 59 Central Files 
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December, and the details could be worked out over the next year.
213
 On 7 December, 
Lavinder of Goodyear reported the ministry had set the price based on production 
estimates over the next few years, with specific estimates based on acreage and the age of 
the trees, with a ministry explanation to follow the next day.
214
 As we saw above, the 
ministry‘s valuations were generally based on one year‘s production (calculated by the 
projected market price), with the repayment period equal to the remaining period of the 
estate‘s concession. 
Over the next few weeks, the negotiations with both companies centered around 
the valuation of their estates and the timetable and method of repayment. The Ministry of 
Estates did show some flexibility, but its offers were in all cases significantly below the 
offers presented by the companies to the ministry back in April - $15 million for 
Goodyear, $14 million for USR. Both companies believed that the ministry production 
estimates were far too low, and objected to the ministry‘s insistence on roughly one 
year‘s worth of production as the basis for the valuation (instead of replacement value, or 
at least production value over the remaining term of the concession instead of only one 
year). The companies also wanted payment up front as, given the state of the Indonesian 
economy and the GOI‘s foreign currency reserves, future payments in dollars were 
uncertain.  In addition, the companies were perhaps more concerned with what the future 
marketing arrangements would be, as after all this was where the money was to be made, 
but the ministry initially appeared to want to treat these two questions separately, as 
though there were no linkage.
215
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In fact, neither USR nor Goodyear had much leverage over the Ministry of 
Estates. Their only leverage seemed to be the ministry‘s odd desire to make sure the 
companies agreed to a deal and that the deal appeared to be an arms-length transaction; 
the ministry clearly did not want to be seen as forcing a deal down the companies‘ 
throats, though of course it was. Hampering the companies‘ position was the 
development that several of the other foreign estate companies by 20 December or so had 
agreed to the ministry‘s basic terms – one year‘s worth of production payable over the 
remaining term of the concession - with little resistance. Nor did the companies request 
the assistance of the US government, and it is doubtful the US embassy could have 
helped anyway.  Finally, the companies did not present a united front to the ministry; 
although the negotiations paralleled each other and the companies‘ respective interests 
were roughly similar, the negotiations were conducted separately.  Each company was 
quite aware that the other was simultaneously negotiating with the ministry, but clearly 
did not know the exact details or status of the other‘s position. Both wanted to get the 
best deal possible, regardless of the other.     
   By late December, the negotiations seemed to have reached an impasse. Around 
21-22 December, Danardjo presented the companies with yet another deadline of 31 
December (this was the third one; the first was 1 December (given initially by Minister 
Seda), and the second was 15 December (made around the beginning of December)).  
The threat here was that if no agreement were reached, then the ministry would make a 
very one-sided final agreement unfavorable to the companies.
216
 This type of threat was 
used a number of times, not just in the context of a deadline, and was sometimes 
complemented by the warning that if the parties could not finalize the deal, the entire 
transaction would be forcibly taken out of the settlement framework of Presidential 
Decision 6/1965, which meant that the Ministry of Estates would be replaced by a GOI 
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 See, e.g., US Embassy telegram (Lavinder of Goodyear to Klippert) dated 30 December 1965, and US 
Embassy telegram (Aleksa of USR to Gouldin) dated 29 December 1965 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 
1964-66, Inco Rubber Indon, Box 1215). 
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body far less sympathetic and agreeable than it.
217
 Despite a flurry of activity and last 
minute offers, however, the 31 December deadline passed without agreement.  
True to Danardojo‘s word, on 4 January 1966 the ministry gave almost identical 
letters to Goodyear and USR representatives containing the ‗final‘ terms of the deal, 
unilaterally breaking the impasse.  The purchase price for the Goodyear estates was $4.75 
million, payable over 10 years, and the price for USR‘s Kisaran estate was $4.1 million, 
payable over seven years. Payments would be made in three annual installments in kind 
(latex), with the price of the latex determined on a commercial basis between the ministry 
and the company at the time of each delivery; if no price could be agreed, payment would 
be made in US dollars by deposit to the company‘s designated bank account.  Apparently 
the companies were also told that company personnel presently on the estates could 
remain there for the rest of 1966, and the ministry would pay their Rupiah salaries.
218
  
Goodyear, in a last ditch effort to get better terms, immediately made a counteroffer of 
$4.5 million over seven years, which was agreed to by Danardojo on 7 January.
219
 The 
basic payment terms of $4.1 million over seven years for USR and $4.5 million over 
seven years for Goodyear were in fact the basic terms when the agreements were finally 
signed. The ministry also severely pressured the companies to sign an agreement by 11 
January; the US embassy suggested that the reason for the intense ministry pressure was 
Minister Seda‘s public statement of 31 December claiming that 30 companies had turned 
over to the GOI more than 50 estates of over 150,000 hectares, while USR also thought it 
may have been Minister Seda‘s premature report to President Sukarno on 30 December 
that all agreements were finalized.
220
 
                                                 
217
 See, e.g., US Embassy telegrams (Lavinder of Goodyear to Klippert) dated 21 December 1965 and 27 
December 1965, and US Embassy telegram (Aleksa of USR to Gouldin) dated 22 February 1966 
(USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1964-66, Inco Rubber Indon, Box 1215). 
218
 US Embassy telegram (Lavinder of Goodyear to Klippert) dated 4 January 1966 (USNACP, RG 59 
Central Files 1964-66, Inco Rubber Indon, Box 1215); US Embassy telegram (Aleksa of USR to Gouldin) 
dated 4 January 1966 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1964-66, Inco Rubber Indon, Box 1215); US 
Embassy telegram (Green) dated 5 January 1966 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1964-66, Inco Rubber 
Indon, Box 1215). 
219
 US State Department telegram (Klippert of Goodyear to Lavinder) dated 5 January 1966, and US 
Embassy telegram (Lavinder of Goodyear to Klippert) dated 7 January 1966 (USNACP, RG 59 Central 
Files 1964-66, Inco Rubber Indon, Box 1215). 
220
 US Embassy Bi-Weekly Economic Review dated 11 January 1966 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 
1964-66, E2-2 – E8, Indonesia, Boxes 722-3); and US Embassy telegram (Aleksa of USR to Gouldin) 
dated 6 January 1966 (USNACP, RG 59 Central Files 1964-66, Inco Rubber Indon, Box 1215). 
 563 
 
However, despite the ministry‘s ‗final offer‘ and renewed pressure, no agreements 
were signed until late April and early May. While the basic terms were finalized, the 
details remained to be worked out. Over the next four months there would be fits and 
spurts to the negotiations, but overall the Ministry of Estates did not seem to be in a big 
hurry now that the basic terms were ‗agreed to,‘ and another ministry deadline of 3 
March passed without agreement or incident. To summarize briefly, there were five main 
open issues.  The issues were similar for each company, and the companies‘ positions 
were certainly much more closely aligned than previously, which suggests that once the 
basic terms were finalized in early January the companies worked more closely together. 
The first issue was the form of documentation. The ministry wanted the companies to 
sign immediately a very simple transfer document that stated the company had 
surrendered all rights of ownership to the GOI, but that the details of the transaction 
would be based on an unspecified exchange of letters in the future. This was the 
document that the ministry was really pressuring the companies to sign by 11 January. 
Such an arrangement was in essence an agreement by which one side‘s main leverage – 
the property – was given up before the terms most important to it were agreed upon; it 
was an agreement to agree in which the companies could exert no leverage over the GOI 
once it was signed. The ministry was undoubtedly aware of the absurdity behind such an 
arrangement, and it can only be assumed that the reason the ministry insisted on this was 
because it needed to demonstrate to higher authorities that an agreement had been 
reached. The second issue was the determination of the price of the rubber/latex. The 
ministry insisted that this should be determined by negotiations between the parties at the 
time of delivery; the companies, seeing great room for ministry heavy-handedness under 
this arrangement, insisted that the price be determined by averaging the weekly producer 
export prices for the previous month or two prior to delivery. These prices were 
announced publicly, and thus there was no need for negotiation. The third issue was the 
companies‘ insistence on a stock escrow arrangement whereby the shares of their 
Indonesian subsidiary companies would be placed in escrow until the GOI made all 
payments in full. That arrangement was common in commercial transactions, but to the 
ministry it suggested that the transfer was contingent and therefore was unacceptable. 
The fourth issue was the companies‘ insistence that the central bank (Bank of Indonesia) 
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guarantee the deal. Here the companies were obviously looking for the additional comfort 
of a third party guarantee that could pressure the ministry to live up to the deal; however, 
getting the Bank of Indonesia involved was a clear headache for the Ministry of Estates, 
and in any case having the Bank of Indonesia guarantee the deal made the transaction 
part of Indonesia‘s national debt. The fifth issue was related to the fourth; in the absence 
of a Bank of Indonesia guarantee, the companies wanted a default clause in the 
agreement by which all payments would be due and payable immediately if any one 
payment were not made in full. Naturally the ministry was reluctant to agree to an 
acceleration of payment. 
   When the agreements were finally signed with USR on 30 April and Goodyear 
on 12 May, respectively, the Ministry of Estates prevailed on most of the points. The 
final purchase terms, as fixed in early January, were for USR $4.1 million over seven 
years (in three annual installments), and for Goodyear were $4.5 million over seven years 
(in three annual installments). Regarding the open issues, on the form of documentation 
question, as the parties had worked out the details by then, both a document of transfer as 
well as one or two letters of intent containing the terms of the deal were signed.
221
 On 
pricing, the GOI position of a price negotiated at the time of delivery prevailed, though 
the companies could still elect to receive dollars (though this of course was much riskier 
given the GOI‘s foreign exchange problems). Regarding the third, fourth and fifth issues, 
there were no stock escrow arrangement, Bank of Indonesia guarantees, or accelerated 
default clauses.  However, the ministry did agree to a provision that the agreements 
would be ratified by the Presidium Kabinet after signing (a compromise under which the 
Presidium Kabinet would in effect authorize the entering into of the agreements and 
perhaps at least provide a moral guarantee).  Another important provision was the 
ministry agreement not to use the trade name or trademark of either company, and the 
name of the Indonesian subsidiaries would be changed (getting rid of the ‗Goodyear‘ and 
‗United States Rubber‘ names) before the stock was transferred. Each company was 
allowed to keep a small number of personnel on the estates, and their salaries would be 
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document and other letters. 
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paid by the GOI in Rupiah. Each company also received the opportunity to continue to 
receive and sell produce in addition to the produce sold under the agreement, meaning the 
companies could continue to market latex from the GOI estates or additional latex from 
their own ex estates.
222
   
By the time the agreements were signed, the political atmosphere had already 
changed. The confusion and uncertainty of the dramatic political power struggle was 
certainly the main reason the final agreements took so long to arrange; the situation 
paralyzed much of the GOI and probably hindered the ministry from getting whatever 
internal approvals it needed. Indeed, at one point in early April Danardojo told USR that 
the legal department of the ministry was too preoccupied with the cabinet reorganization 
to deal with the agreement.
223
  The details of the Goodyear arrangement were finally 
agreed to by 23 March, but even then the agreement was not signed until 12 May. In 
contrast, the terms of the USR agreement were set on 21 April, and the agreement was 
signed shortly thereafter on 30 April.
224
 In fact, both the Goodyear representative and the 
USR representative cabled their home offices on 11-12 April indicating there were 
rumors that the estates might actually be returned under the new Indonesian government. 
However, it was way too early for such a development, and clearly none of the parties at 
the time had the appetite or strength to continue.
225
  
In mid-May, just after the signing of the purchase agreements, both the Goodyear 
estates and USR‘s Kisaran estate were quietly integrated by Minister Seda into the state-
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owned estate structure (BPU PPN Karet).
226
 This same decree also very diplomatically 
ended PT Hapinis‘ control over Goodyear‘s Wingfoot estate.   
3. Why the Buyouts? 
Aside from negotiations with the oil companies and the non-British foreign estate 
owners, the GOI made no buyout or compensation offers to any other company. While oil 
company exceptionalism explains the different treatment of the oil companies, it is less 
clear why the non-British foreign estates were singled out from all other companies with 
respect to compensation offers.  Moreover, why did the Ministry of Estates make such a 
determined push to eliminate owner-appointed managers and consummate the buyout 
agreements by the end of 1965? The explanation I offer below has three components: (i) 
the Ministry of Estates was being pushed by a higher authority, most likely President 
Sukarno, to resolve the status of foreign estates by the end of the year, and the buyout 
course the ministry followed was conditioned by both (ii) the attitude of Minister of 
Estates Frans Seda and (iii) the method of payment, which imposed comparatively little 
hardship on the GOI as the estates were in effect able to generate themselves the foreign 
exchange necessary for payment.   
First, the entire timing of the buyouts along with the actions of the Ministry of 
Estates suggests that there was great pressure from above to have the status of the 
companies resolved by the end of the year. For example, at the initial meeting of 10 
November Minister Seda ludicrously suggested that the deadline was 1 December, yet 
despite this the ministry itself was unable to move on the matter until early December. 
Thereafter, there was great pressure to have the transactions completed by the end of 
December, with no explanation for such a short deadline with respect to such a 
complicated series of transactions. The forcing of an agreement in principle upon 
Goodyear and USR in very early January, with so many key issues outstanding, and then 
the slowness in consummating the deal once the general terms were announced (though 
this was also certainly due in part to the political power struggle) also suggest that there 
was great outside pressure to have basic agreement reached by the end of 1965; once the 
deadline came, and Minister Seda announced that the deals had been struck, there was no 
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more pressure on him, and hence the Goodyear/USR negotiations could proceed at a 
more relaxed pace. This pressure most likely came from President Sukarno, though I 
have no direct evidence of this; but only Sukarno, and perhaps Minister Chaerul Saleh 
(who would have been acting on Sukarno‘s behalf), could have exerted it. The status 
report Minister Seda delivered to President Sukarno and the Presidium Kabinet at the end 




 If there were outside pressure to resolve the status of the foreign estate companies 
by the end of 1965, though, the direction the Ministry of Estates took – the buyout of the 
estates – was certainly conditioned by the attitude of Minister Seda. As we saw with 
respect to the takeovers of Goodyear and US Rubber in early 1965, while Minister Seda 
was initially very careful to articulate the GOI position of distinguishing between 
takeover of management and takeover of ownership (nationalization), he also, after a 
period of early hesitation (perhaps trying to articulate the GOI position, or waiting for 
permission before proceeding), was willing to try to work out an arrangement with the 
two companies, an arrangement that involved payment of compensation.  Moreover, in 
the case of other non-British foreign estates, from early on he laid the groundwork for the 
payment of some kind of compensation, and even went so far as establishing an appraisal 
team to set the values of the companies. In fact, of all the ministers involved in the 
takeovers of foreign companies, he was by far the most pro-active in attempting to 
resolve the ambiguous status of the companies by effectively formalizing their 
nationalization via agreeing to compensation. Minister Seda was clearly a believer in a 
policy of no nationalization without compensation, as he had explained to PKI chairman 
Aidit and President Sukarno in February (see Chapter Six, Part II, Section C).  Years 
later, Seda explained that his rationale for the buyouts was to show the world that 
Indonesia was an honorable country, that it did not just go around seizing assets, that it 
was not a country of thieves, and that if it did seize assets then it would compensate 
owners, that it would show goodwill and encourage foreigners to come back and provide 
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Indonesia with desperately needed foreign capital.
228
 While the last proposition regarding 
showing goodwill to bring back foreign investment was obviously a stretch in 1965, 
Seda‘s actions in 1965 certainly support his other assertions. Interestingly, somewhere 
along the line Seda himself clearly dropped the pretense that the GOI‘s takeover of the 
estates was one of management only and not ownership.  
This leads to the third and perhaps most important component of the explanation 
for the buyouts and one that Minister Seda could easily sell to his superiors.  This was the 
very practical reason that the arrangements by which the companies were bought out 
involved no great hardship on the GOI and indeed allowed the GOI to continue to reap 
the desperately needed foreign exchange. As described above, most of the payments were 
to be made in produce, in kind, presumably from the companies‘ ex estates, and thus the 
payment would not involve the actual transfer of funds. Hence there was no problem of 
trying to find money to pay the companies, and also no problem of adding to the national 
debt, as the estates in effect would pay for themselves. Moreover, continuing the 
marketing arrangements with the companies would allow the GOI to continue to raise 
much needed foreign exchange; by one estimate, the foreign exchange earnings for the 
GOI in 1965 for Goodyear and US Rubber alone were $11.5 million.
229
 The GOI did not 
have to seek out new ways to market the produce, as it could simply use the existing 
channel of the companies and thus ensure that there was no interruption of marketing and 
the resulting inflow of foreign exchange. Using this scheme also had the additional effect 
of allowing the GOI not to worry about the possibility of one of the companies seizing 
the produce (as AIP tried to do, see Chapter Five, Part III, Section A), since the 
companies were officially paid off. In short, the scheme allowed for the possibility of 
using the estates as earners of profits and foreign exchange with minimal downside to the 
GOI. It was a classic case of the benefits accruing from a production sharing arrangement 
that was based on the foundation of a product that generated foreign exchange revenue 
and in fact was very similar to the Shell Oil buyout arrangement. This ability was a great 
contrast to the foreign manufacturing firms, which for the most part produced and sold 
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for the Indonesian domestic market and were unable to generate foreign exchange 
earnings. We may also consider why Minister Seda did not employ the same arrangement 
with respect to the British estates seized over the course of 1964; the main reason this 




The official introduction in April 1965 of a policy of economic self-reliance 
known as BERDIKARI triggered a final wave of takeovers of foreign companies over the 
remainder of the year. Like the previous waves, GOI control was implemented by the 
displacement of owner-appointed management by GOI-appointed management, and also 
similar to other waves the pace of assumption of control varied widely. However, unlike 
the previous waves during 1963-65 this final wave was not directed against any one 
country but instead to all foreign companies, regardless of nationality, nor was it the 
product of foreign relations or domestic political instability. In total, at least six foreign 
manufacturing facilities and 10 foreign estate companies (owning at least 44 estates) were 
taken over in this wave, and along parallel lines the 1958 foreign investment law was 
repealed, closing the country off to any new foreign investment. At the end of the year, 
there was a major GOI push to eliminate the remaining vestiges of foreign investment, a 
push that featured an attempt to take over the big three foreign oil companies as well as to 
buyout all non-British foreign estates. These were the only two types of foreign 
companies for which the GOI entertained the possibility of a buyout, and this Chapter 
argues the reasons for such distinction were, in the case of the oil companies, oil 
company exceptionalism, and in the case of the non-British foreign estates, the attitude of 
Minister of Estates Frans Seda as well the ability of those very estates to generate foreign 
exchange to pay for their buyout. In making these arrangements, the GOI clearly 
dispelled its own theory that management could be separated from ownership and hence 
no compensation was owed to the various owners. By the end of 1965, foreign 




This final GOI push at the end of 1965 coincided with the culmination of the 
domestic political power struggle under Guided Democracy in what ultimately led to the 
downfall of President Sukarno and his Guided Democracy. This climax of the political 
conflict complemented the other culminations of 1965 in economic affairs and foreign 
relations. In at least one case – the oil companies – the year end drive to eliminate foreign 
capital intersected with the domestic political conflict, and oil company exceptionalism 
won out. President Sukarno was certainly the main driving force behind this final push, 
but his motivations remain obscure. It is possible that he simply wanted to implement 
BERDIKARI in the fullest manner possible by the end of the calendar year so that he 
could proclaim Indonesia self-reliant by 1966. On the other hand, doing so at a time of 
such major political conflict suggests that there may have been some relationship to the 
political struggle, perhaps along the lines of reasserting his authority and garnering 
support after the September 30 Movement. Neither of these explanations, however, is 
fully satisfactory. 
President Sukarno‘s ushering in of the BERDIKARI policy, the last major 
economic policy initiative of Guided Democracy, was in many ways the finest expression 
of Indonesia‘s post-1949 attempts to construct a national economy under the control of 
Indonesians. Self-reliance was a means of achieving economic independence, which in 
effect was the goal of constructing a national economy and an underlying theme of the 
various economic plans put forward. However, the theoretical sweetness of the 
BERDIKARI fruit was not wholly tasted in practice, for the program lacked specific 
measures and was only implemented with respect to foreign investment. Nevertheless, in 
this respect BERDIKARI represented the nadir of foreign investment in Indonesia, for it 
was the culmination of the 15 year trend in which, with the exception of the two oil 
companies, all of the foreign investment in Indonesia - from the early scattered takeovers 
of different Dutch firms in the early 1950s, to the seizure and nationalization of all Dutch 
enterprises in one fell swoop in 1957-58, to the takeover of Chinese businesses associated 
with Taiwan in 1959, to the seizure of British, Malaysian and American companies from 
1963-65 – was appropriated by the Indonesian government. As I shall discuss in the 
following concluding Chapter, put another way BERDIKARI and its implementation thus 
represented the pinnacle of Indonesian economic nationalism.  
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Chapter Eight:  Conclusion and Epilogue: 1965, the 
Pinnacle of Economic Nationalism in Indonesia 
 
 
I. The Pinnacle of Economic Nationalism. 
 
If we follow the definition of economic nationalism in Chapter Two as ―the 
national aspiration to have nationals own and control the productive assets owned by 
foreigners, or residents considered to be aliens, and perform the important economic 
functions hitherto performed by foreigners or resident aliens,‖ then 1965 was the zenith 
of economic nationalism in modern Indonesian history. The promulgation and 
implementation of the BERDIKARI policy over the course of 1965 resulted in the 
extinction of foreign investment in Indonesia, with the very important exceptions of 
Caltex and Stanvac Oil, resulting in Indonesia owning the productive assets previously 
controlled by foreigners and performing important economic functions hitherto 
performed by foreigners. In also revoking the 1958 foreign investment law, Indonesia 
furthermore foreclosed the possibility of new foreign investment, thus ensuring that the 
summit of economic nationalism would be reached.      
As we have seen, Indonesia had been slowly moving in this direction since 
independence in late 1949, though its full expression was by no means preordained. One 
of the principal problems Indonesia faced after independence in the construction of a 
national economy was the degree to which the economy should be ‗Indonesianized,‘ an 
issue that directly questioned the role of foreign investment in the Indonesian economy. 
Ambivalence towards foreign capital resulted in the late promulgation of the foreign 
investment law in 1958, at the same time as Indonesia stunningly seized and nationalized 
all Dutch enterprises and then seized Taiwan-linked enterprises. Under Sukarno‘s Guided 
Democracy, the official government attitude became increasingly hostile towards foreign 
 572 
 
investment. In 1960, two new laws were passed that directly challenged the position of 
the big three foreign oil companies as well as the position of the foreign estates.  
President Sukarno also began pushing for new foreign capital to enter the country in the 
form of production sharing arrangements, a push that was not successful. Then, in a 
series of five separate waves from September 1963 to December 1965 concluding with 
that of BERDIKARI, at least 90 foreign companies of varied nationalities, ranging from 
oil companies to plantations to manufacturing plants to a few other companies and 
accounting for virtually all existing foreign direct investment in Indonesia, were taken 
over. In 1965, the answer to the question, burning since independence, of what role 
foreign investment should play in the new national economy was a resounding ‗none.‘   
However, these five waves from 1963-65 were not, except in the case of the 
BERDIKARI wave, part of an organized plan to eliminate foreign investment from 
Indonesia, though they certainly did not conflict with the general movement in that 
direction. Instead, I have argued that the elimination of foreign investment in Indonesia 
during this period was the result of a complex confluence of the three trajectories of 
Indonesian domestic political instability and conflict, foreign relations, and domestic 
economic matters, trajectories in which existing trends were accelerated by the outbreak 
of Konfrontasi. Each of the five waves of takeovers was linked directly to at least one of 
these trajectories, and in several waves the impact of more than one trajectory was 
evident. Chapters Four and Five argue that it was domestic political conflict and 
instability, first in the form of takeover actions by the DPS-KBKI in September 1963 and 
then in the form of takeover actions by the PKI-controlled SOBSI labor federation, that 
triggered GOI intervention and the placement of the British companies under government 
control. In both cases, the initial seizures by non-government entities were also linked to 
Konfrontasi and clearly contravened GOI policy, and in the case of the PKI it was part of 
a larger political offensive that culminated in 1965. Chapters Four and Six argue that the 
takeover of Malaysian and American companies, respectively, were directly linked to 
President Sukarno‘s increasingly strident anti-imperialist foreign policy. The seizures of 
Malaysian companies in 1963 were obvious measures of retaliation against the formation 
of Malaysia, while the seizures of American companies in 1965, which the President 
supported and encouraged, reflected the deteriorating bilateral US-Indonesian 
 573 
 
relationship and also domestic political instability.  In both cases foreign enterprises were 
thus hostages of Indonesia‘s foreign relations, a means through which the GOI tried to 
exert pressure on foreign governments. In contrast, Chapter Seven argues that the final 
wave of takeovers in 1965 was initiated pursuant to BERDIKARI in a determined change 
of economic policy resulting primarily from the decrepit state of the Indonesian 
economy. Given that foreign aid had dried up and the economy was in shambles, 
Indonesia had little choice but to go it alone under a policy of self-reliance, one in which 
all foreign investment would be deliberately eliminated.  
The takeovers were effected through the displacement of top level owner-
appointed managers and their substitution by GOI-appointed managers in actions that 
were clearly confiscations of foreign businesses.  The companies were usually placed 
under the authority of the relevant GOI minister, who had great discretion over the 
implementation of the takeover. Generally Indonesian employees at all levels were left in 
place, but the GOI-appointed managers were clearly in control, though in the case of the 
British enterprises in 1964 and non-British foreign estates in 1965 the foreign owner-
appointed managers were only gradually squeezed out. The final stroke was the severing 
of communication with the foreign company‘s head office and ownership. However, the 
GOI refused to acknowledge that its actions constituted confiscations of foreign 
businesses. To do so would have obliged the GOI to pay compensation for the 
companies, the common practice of the time and one that GOI officials were well aware 
of after the nationalization of the Dutch companies in 1957-59. Instead, the GOI claimed 
that the companies were under government ‗supervision‘ or ‗control‘ or ‗management,‘ 
all rather vague terms that skirted the question of confiscation or expropriation. By 1965 
the GOI was farcically attempting to separate ownership from management control. 
However, the GOI did agree in late 1965 to pay compensation to the non-British foreign 
estate owners in what was a clear, if unstated, acknowledgement that such arguments 
were untenable. I argue that the primary reason the Minister of Estates was able to agree 
to these buyouts was the foreign exchange generating potential of the estates so that in 
effect they could actually pay for themselves from future earnings. Indeed, I argue that 
the generation of foreign exchange generally was a critical factor in how the GOI treated 
the companies both during the process of takeover and after.     
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In what was the greatest irony of Indonesia‘s pinnacle of economic nationalism, 
nowhere was the importance of the foreign exchange generation more evident than in the 
treatment of the foreign oil companies. Oil company exceptionalism, derived from the 
combination of generation of large foreign exchange revenues for the GOI and the big 
three‘s near monopoly on the production of such a strategic commodity, resulted in Shell 
Oil being compensated for $110 million and both Caltex and Stanvac Oil successfully 
resisting a GOI takeover in late 1965 despite extreme pressure.  If there was ever a 
commodity to which Indonesia could lay nationalist and ownership claims over, oil was 
it. Oil flows from the very soil of a country; it does not have to be planted (like rubber or 
palm oil) or manufactured (like car tires) and furthermore can be sold in crude, unrefined 
form. Hence, the successful resistance of two foreign oil companies, especially Caltex, by 
far the largest producer of crude oil in Indonesia, was a complete perversion of the 
BERDIKARI concept and the desire to eliminate all vestiges of imperialism and 
colonialism. 
While oil company exceptionalism dictated that the oil companies would be 
treated differently, and the ability of the non-British foreign estates to generate foreign 
exchange was a critical factor in reaching a buyout agreement, other foreign companies 
had little leverage to counter the takeovers. The British estates, which presumably could 
have paid for themselves like the non-British estates, were not compensated because the 
British and Malaysians were in an undeclared war with Indonesia, though as we saw in 
Chapter Five AIP (the owner of P&T Lands) was able to exert some leverage in his 
respect. Even in that case, however, it is unclear how successful these efforts were. For 
all other foreign companies taken over by the GOI, which were primarily manufacturing 
companies producing for the domestic Indonesian market, their lack, or limited amount, 
of foreign exchange production (indeed, many manufacturing companies used foreign 
exchange to import goods and did not produce any in return) meant few levers were 
available to them. Nor did these companies produce goods essential to the Indonesian 
economy such as oil, or at least none of them produced something the GOI felt it could 
not live without. Recognizing their lack of leverage, most of these companies were 
pragmatically resigned to their fate and adopted a wait and see attitude, hoping for the 
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The takeovers from 1963-65 exposed the fractious nature of ministerial 
bureaucracy and divisions within the government generally under Indonesia‘s Guided 
Democracy. This ministerial competition and division was by no means limited to the 
area of foreign investment, and reflected in part the limits and weaknesses of the central 
government at large. Divisions and competition at the ministerial level were most evident 
in the various contests for control over the seized foreign companies, especially the 
foreign exchange generating estates, over which a fierce struggle was fought between 
Ministers Sadjarwo and Seda. There were also clearly divisions at the policy level as 
well, including Minister Ahem‘s DPS-KBKI pushing the GOI into the takeovers in 
September 1963 and Minister Seda‘s determined effort to pay compensation for the 
seized non-British estates.  That there was great difference of opinion over foreign 
investment was also evident in the incredible reversals of policy implemented by the New 
Order government in 1966-67 discussed in Part II. 
Insofar as a case study of takeovers of foreign companies, these events highlight a 
number of problems a country faces in confiscating foreign enterprises. First, as 
suggested above there is the issue of how the country‘s actions conform to international 
practices. Specifically, in the case of confiscations of foreign companies there is 
generally an obligation to compensate the companies for their losses. The GOI tried 
wholeheartedly to avoid this obligation by declaring that its actions did not affect the 
                                                 
1
 As we have seen, a variety of measures were tried: appealing to higher authorities such as President 
Sukarno (Unilever), transferring shareholdings to non-British countries (Unilever), replacing British 
expatriates with non-British expatriates (Unilever), complete Indonesianisasi of management (Union 
Carbide), offering some kind of joint venture arrangements (Unilever and P&T Lands), offering the GOI a 
shareholding interest (Goodyear Tire factory and Unilever), focusing on other businesses (Harrisons & 
Crosfield‘s insistence on continuing to operate its trade and shipping interests), jockeying among different 
GOI institutions (Singer), negotiating with private Indonesian businessmen (Singer), and exploring legal 
redress (Goodyear Tire Bogor). None of these courses of action was effective. Thus, many companies, 
especially the large number of British enterprises, were only left with the last-resort measure of claiming 
compensation. However, most were reluctant to do this initially because of the ambiguity of the GOI 
position on the companies‘ status, and to back out of Indonesia without a clear GOI statement might open a 
company up to charges that it abandoned its assets and the GOI only seized the assets thereafter, nullifying 
any claim. Moreover, compensation claims depended upon GOI acknowledgement of an outside, superior 
court of law both to adjudicate the claim and to enforce it, something that Indonesia‘s withdrawal from the 




ownership of the companies and that it was merely placing the companies under its 
supervision or management or control. Notwithstanding this argument, the GOI 
eventually did agree to compensate the non-British estate-owners, though most of this 
was never actually paid, and of course oil company exceptionalism ensured that 
compensation would be paid to Shell Oil. In the case of the non-British estates - and also 
for Shell Oil - a necessary but not sufficient condition for compensation was the ability of 
the estates to pay for themselves over time in the installment payment scheme the GOI 
worked out. In other cases, Indonesia was unable to resolve this compensation issue.   
Second, Indonesia‘s standing the world in the mid-1960s also allowed it to avoid 
the common problem of retaliation for confiscations of foreign companies. Indonesia was 
ardently engaged in an anti-imperialist crusade that left it isolated in the world with few 
friends. In 1965 it withdrew from the UN and other international organizations that 
perhaps could have exercised some leverage over it. Moreover, after the outbreak of 
Konfrontasi in 1963 it received significantly less amounts of foreign aid so that by 1965 
foreign aid was effectively no longer a leverage point. In addition, Indonesia had few 
assets abroad that other countries could seize; Indonesian businesses, whether private or 
public, were rarely a permanent presence in foreign countries. By essentially withdrawing 
from the world, Indonesia could afford to confiscate foreign companies without 
compensation. However, the price for this disengagement and general neglect of 
economic affairs was very high, as the Indonesian economy was essentially dysfunctional 
by 1965-66. As we shall see in Part II, the new GOI administration in 1966 recognized 
these dire straits and reversed many of the Sukarno administration policies in foreign 
affairs and economic matters, in part in order to be eligible to receive the foreign 
assistance desperately needed to reboot the economy.  
Third, the Indonesia case also demonstrates that there are sometimes limits on 
what companies can be taken over. In this case, of course, the limits were the big three oil 
companies. Such was the power of oil company exceptionalism – primarily manifested 
through the great revenues the big three generated for the GOI and the dominant position 
of the big three in the strategic oil sector - that the GOI was forced to compensate Shell 
Oil, which in fact was quite willing to leave Indonesia. The other two, Caltex and 
Stanvac, were not willing to leave and successfully resisted GOI efforts to take them 
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over.  The economic and financial consequences of a forced seizure were simply too 
great, even when the economy was already in an extremely perilous state. 
Finally, this study has also highlighted the general problem of what a government 
should do with a company once it has been confiscated. To what use should the company 
be put? More practically, how will the company be managed, and who will manage it? In 
the case of Indonesia, it appeared as though many of the companies were not used for the 
greater benefit of society but rather as entities to be exploited for personal enrichment and 
patronage opportunities. That is, many of the benefits went to individuals and not for the 
greater good. There was often great ministerial competition and infighting to control the 
seized companies, which reflected not only a fairly weak central government that gave 
great latitude and power to its ministers but also extremely difficult economic conditions. 
Management positions in many of the companies were highly sought after and fought 
over. The opportunities and economic resources the seized companies ostensibly offered 
resulted in great differences in how government control was implemented and the 
companies were subsequently managed, and hence many of the takeovers seemed 
inconsistent and ill-coordinated. On the other hand, given the bloated staffing evident 
when many of the companies were returned in 1967-68, it also appeared as though the 
companies were used in part to provide employment, thus fulfilling a social welfare 
function (though this full employment function was certainly limited by opportunities for 
patronage dispensing). 
Indonesia‘s case also highlights the importance of having competent management 
to lead the companies. While not discussed in this study, it was clear when many of the 
companies were returned to their owners that most of them had been poorly managed and 
essentially run into the ground, forcing the returning owners to inject large sums for 
rehabilitation. The extent to which the poor condition of the companies was the result of 
bad management or terrible economic conditions or lack of funding or some combination 
thereof is hard to say, but certainly bad management was a significant factor. Most of the 
top level management were political appointees, not professional managers, reflecting 
that ―politics was in command.‖ Moreover, at the time Indonesia simply did not have a 





II. Epilogue: Reversal of Policy and Return of the 
Companies. 
 
The year 1965 was the zenith of Indonesian economic nationalism not only 
because most of the foreign investment in the country was taken over but also because 
beginning in late 1966 the emerging New Order government began to reverse a number 
of the previous administration‘s policies, most notably in foreign relations and economic 
affairs and including foreign investment. Indeed, the new administration based its 
legitimacy largely on economic stabilization and development, almost completely 
opposite Guided Democracy‘s emphasis on mobilization and revolution in what was 
obviously a strong reaction to the hardships and uncertainties posed by these previous 
emphases.  Slogans such as MANIPOL, NASAKOM, NEKOLIM, and ‗completing the 
Indonesian Revolution‘ were replaced by the comparatively drab slogans of economic 
development. The startling and dramatic contrast in these areas, of course, came only 
after the political landscape had shifted in early 1966 and began even when President 
Sukarno was still in office.    
In foreign relations, Indonesia‘s strident anti-imperialist policy was almost 
immediately dropped. There was a return to the ‗independent and active‘ approach, with 
a low-key, pragmatic emphasis on foreign policy serving the needs of economic 
development. Despite President Sukarno‘s objections, Konfrontasi with Malaysia was 
effectively ended in August 1966 with the signing of an agreement with Malaysia. In a 
development almost unthinkable two years earlier, in August 1967 Indonesia was also a 
key founding member (along with Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines) of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, an organization for regional cooperation and 
stability that would eventually grow into one of the strongest regional economic bodies in 
the world. The anti-imperialist alliance with the PRC was quickly ended in mid-1966, 
and in October 1967 PRC-Indonesian relations were formally suspended and would only 
be normalized 23 years later in 1990. Indonesia rejoined the United Nations in September 
1966 and other international bodies such as the World Bank and IMF in early 1967. 
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Finally, the relationship with the United States was also repaired, and Indonesia became a 
staunch ally of the Americans, though there were certainly numerous bumps along the 
road. 
In another dramatic break with Sukarno‘s Guided Democracy, there was a new 
strong pragmatic focus on economic growth and development.
2
 Under the guidance of a 
group of economists from the University of Indonesia (many of whom were trained in the 
United States), the new administration made a decisive and successful push toward 
stabilizing and rehabilitating the Indonesian economy. Elements of this new economic 
plan (many of which were similar to the 1963 stabilization attempt) were first put into 
place in October 1966 with the introduction of new regulations. A top priority was tight 
fiscal and monetary policies designed to reign in Indonesia‘s crippling hyperinflation and 
achieve some price stability, a key component of which was the imposition of a balanced 
GOI budget. This entire effort was made possible only by the rescheduling of Indonesia‘s 
$2.4 billion in foreign debt and the influx of large amounts of new aid in a multilateral 
framework provided primarily by Western European nations, the United States and 
Japan. Indonesia‘s new leadership clearly recognized that without this foreign support 
there was little chance for a turnaround.  Measures were also instituted to decontrol the 
economy; multiple exchange rates were gradually phased out in favor of one unified 
exchange rate, foreign trade controls were relaxed and eliminated, and an open capital 
account was also instituted. These stabilization and rehabilitation measures reflected in 
general a re-opening or reconnecting of the Indonesian economy to the world economy in 
what was a clear but unstated rejection of the BERDIKARI principle. There was also a 
new emphasis on the growth of the private sector, although state-owned enterprises 
remained a dominant feature of the Indonesian economy for years. These measures were 
largely successful, and by 1968-69 the Indonesian economy had stabilized (with inflation 
at 10% in 1969
3
) and rehabilitation was in full swing.  
                                                 
2
 These changes have been extensively documented.  For an overview, see chapter seven of Dick et al., 
Emergence of a National Economy; for more detailed descriptions, see chapter three of Bresnan‘s 
Managing Indonesia, and chapters five through seven of Thomas and Panglaykim‘s Indonesia: Effect of 
Past Policies; for a broader look at the economy in the New Order period, see e.g., Hill, Indonesian 
Economy. 
3
 Grenville, ―Monetary Policy,‖ p. 108.   
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Reflecting that the wave of economic nationalism had crested and was receding, 
in a decided reversal of policy foreign investment was now welcomed into Indonesia as 
part of the economic recovery program. Indeed, the new administration, recognizing that 
Indonesia simply did not have the resources to develop fully its economy, particularly in 
the industrial and manufacturing sector, went to great lengths to encourage new foreign 
investment. The cornerstone of this effort was the new foreign investment law of 1967, 
the first law passed by the parliament that year. Designed to attract new foreign 
investment, the law provided numerous incentives such as varying exemptions from 
corporate taxes and dividend taxes, full authority of foreign owners to appoint 
management, including foreign managers and technical personnel, exemption from stamp 
taxes and import duties, as well as favorable terms on grants of land. Significantly, 
foreign companies were also granted the right to repatriate profits and various expenses at 
prevailing exchange rates, rights that were denied prior to then. There were some 
restrictions as well. While most sectors of investment were open, a few such as utilities, 
shipping, aviation, mass media and defense-related areas, were closed. In addition, 
foreign companies were obliged to use and train Indonesian manpower, and perhaps most 
importantly there was a requirement that at some point in the future foreign investors 
divest a portion of ownership to domestic shareholders (the GOI would set general 
guidelines on the timing and amount of the divestment, but investors were encouraged to 
propose their own  plan). Finally, recognizing that foreign investors might be skittish 
about investing in a country that had recently seized virtually all foreign investment, the 
law also contained explicit protections against nationalization. Specifically, Article 21 
provided that the GOI would not nationalize or revoke ownership rights in or take steps 
to restrict the rights of control or management except via an act of parliament, and only in 
the interests of the state. In such a case, Article 22 provided, compensation would be paid 
in accordance with the principles of international law, and the government committed 
itself to binding arbitration in the event no agreement could be reached on compensation.  
The 1967 foreign investment law was complemented by a number of bilateral investment 
guaranty agreements signed between the GOI and foreign countries such as the United 
States that enabled such foreign countries to guarantee certain investments against losses 
from nationalization, revolution, etc. 
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In part to encourage new foreign investment, the GOI undertook a program to 
return the foreign companies seized from 1963-65 in what is another untold story in 
Indonesian economic history. Indonesian officials were well aware that new foreign 
investors would look closely at the treatment of old investors before making a decision 
and thus wanted to give the clearest signal possible regarding their intentions. Indonesian 
officials were also aware that countries providing the much-needed foreign aid would be 
more sympathetic if confiscated companies from their countries were returned to their 
owners. The basic decree providing for the returns was issued by General Suharto in mid-
December 1966, not coincidentally a few days before Indonesia‘s creditor nations met in 
Paris and agreed to reschedule Indonesia‘s foreign debt.
4
 The decree cited the ending of 
Konfrontasi and the desire to increase the production of the companies as the reasons for 
returning control of the companies to their original owners and instructed the various 
ministers to arrange for the return of the companies. There was thus a recognition both 
that GOI supervision/control was no longer necessary because the international situation 
had changed and that private interests were better suited than the government to expand 
production of the companies. Three conditions were established: (i) the returns should 
guarantee the increased production of the company (meaning the owners would have to 
make new investments to rehabilitate and expand the facilities), (ii) the returns should not 
create social tensions (presumably in the form of large lay-offs), and (iii) the returns 
should not be a burden to the GOI (meaning no compensation was to be paid). The GOI 
also formed a committee to oversee the returns and issued various regulations to 
supplement the December 1966 decree.   
Over the course of 1967-68, many of the companies seized in 1963-65 were 
returned to their original owners. Negotiations with owners were often slow and gradual, 
as these investors had to decide whether to invest in Indonesia once again. All 12 
manufacturing enterprises taken over were returned, most in the first eight months of 
1967, though a few owners decided to end operations just after the company was 
returned. The estates were a different matter altogether, in part because vested interests 
eager to maintain the revenues generated by the estates were less willing to forego their 
                                                 
4
 Instruksi Presidium Kabinet (Suharto) No. 28/U/IN/12/66 Tentang Pengembalian Perusahaan-Perusahaan 
Asing ke Dalam Tangan Pemilik Semula, dated 12 December 1966. 
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revenues. Goodyear and US Rubber were the first estate companies to return in late 1967, 
followed by others in the first half of 1968 as the GOI set various deadlines. In total, 
approximately 50% of the estate companies (and about 60% of the number of estates 
taken over) were returned to their owners, though not all their estates were returned. One 
estate company, the large SOCFIN, returned as a joint venture company with the GOI. 
Most of the returnees were the large estate companies; the smaller ones simply did not 
have the resources or enough risk tolerance to come back. The GOI also agreed to pay 
compensation to many of the non-returnees, though these payments were for the most 
part minimal, but did not pay compensation to those who did return (AIP, the owner of 
P&T Lands, received compensation because most of its estates were not returned, but the 
final settlement did not occur until late 1971). Most of the companies returned, whether 
manufacturing facilities or estates, were in very poor physical condition, and virtually all 
the returnees agreed to make significant new investments in their businesses. Even amidst 
the returns, the GOI continued to cling to the notion that it had not confiscated the 
companies but instead had simply taken over their management, and was now only 
returning management (not ownership) back to the owners. In addition, at least 10 of the 
Malaysian enterprises seized in 1963 were returned in 1968. In another effort to close the 
chapter on the takeover of foreign companies, in the summer of 1966 the GOI agreed to 
pay compensation for the seizure and nationalization of Dutch firms in 1957-59 in the 
amount of Fl 600 million (about $165 million), payable in 30 year installments beginning 
in 1971. 
From the late 1960‘s until the present, foreign investment would maintain a 
constant presence in Indonesia, though its role in the economy was fairly minor and 
frequently fluctuated.
5
 The measures taken in 1967-68, including the 1967 foreign 
investment law, ushered in a very liberal five to six year period in which the investment 
door was very open and foreign investment began to trickle into the country, though 
investors were naturally cautious. In 1974, this open door would be closed somewhat as 
economic nationalist sentiment, ever present but not always acted upon, reared its head 
                                                 
5
 Hill estimates that from 1969 until the early 1990s, foreign investment accounted for 1-2% of Indonesia‘s 
GDP and a slightly higher percentage of gross capital formation. Hill, Indonesian Economy, pp. 76-7.  On 




again and led to significant restrictions. Over the next decade and a half there was a 
repeating cycle in which more restrictive measures were followed by more open 
measures, but in no case did the foreign investment regime come anywhere close to the 
first half decade of the 1960s. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the cycle seemed to 
have ended permanently at the open end, as the foreign investment door was as wide 
open as it had been in the late 1960s. Undercurrents of economic nationalism in various 
forms still persist, of course, but the pinnacle of economic nationalism in Indonesia 












APPENDIX A: LIST OF COMPANIES TAKEN OVER, 1963-65 
 
  
EXPLANATION TO APPENDIX A 
 
(i) Column A lists the name of the parent company and the country in which it was 
incorporated/based. 
 
(ii) Column B lists the Indonesian subsidiaries of the parent company and the 
approximate year either the parent (via the listed subsidiary or otherwise) began 
operations in Indonesia. 
 
(iii) Column C describes the business of the subsidiary in Indonesia; where available, I 
have included a description of the assets, location, number of employees, etc. 
 
(iv) Column D lists the date the subsidiary was taken over by the central GOI and which 
ministry took over the subsidiary. The date reflects either (a) the date a specific decree 
was issued for that company or (b) the de facto date on which the GOI ministry assumed 










Name and Nationality 
of Parent Company 
Name of Indonesian 
Subsidiary; Date Parent Began 
Operations  in Indonesia  Description of Business 
Date Taken Over by Central 
GOI and Ministry Involved 
        
Amalgamated Rubber 
and Industrial Products, 
Limited;  British 
(i) NV Cultuur Maatschappij 
Gloensing, (ii) NV Cultuur 
Maatschappij Soember Tengah, 
(iii) NV Cultuur Maatschappij 
Soember Ajoe 
owned three estates in East Java; (i) 
Gloensing/Poerwodjojo estate (rubber, 676 
ha), (ii) Sumber Tengah estate 
(rubber/coffee, 961 ha), (iii) Soember Ajoe 
estate (rubber, 545 ha)  
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (all in Dwikora VII) 
American and Foreign 
Insurance Association;  
American branch office insurance company 
early April 1965 by the 
Ministry of Finance 
Ampat (Sumatra) 
Rubber Estate Limited;  
British 
PT Perusahaan Perkebunan 
Simpang Ampat 
owned Rambung estate in North Sumatra 
(rubber, 1244 ha) 
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Dwikora III) 
Anglo Indonesian 
Plantations, Limited;  
British 
P&T Lands; purchased by AIP in 
1910 
owned 21 estates in West Java totaling 
29,400 ha with approximately 30,500 
employees 
mid-February 1964 by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Agrarian Affairs (all in Dwikora 
IV) 
Anglo Sumatra Estate 
Agency Limited;  50% 
Belgian (SIPEF), 50% 
British (REA) same name 
estate management company based in 
Medan, North Sumatra;  
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs 
Anglo Sumatra Rubber 
Company, Limited;  
British 
PT Perusahaan Perkebunan 
Greahan 
owned Greahan estate in North Sumatra (544 
ha) 
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 







Holdings, Limited;  
British 
two: (i) PT Bandar Sumatra 
Rubber Company, and (ii) PT 
Tambira Rubber Estates 
owned Bandar Pinang estate in North 
Sumatra (rubber, 1510 ha, approximately 380 
employees) and Sungei Burung estate in 
North Sumatra (rubber, 1461 ha, 
approximately 190 employees) 
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (both in Dwikora III) 
Biting Rubber Estates, 
Limited;  British NV Cultuur Maatschappij Biting 
owned two estates in Central Java: (i) Biting 
estate (rubber, 434 ha), and (ii) Kebonroto 
estate (rubber, 71 ha); combined total 
employees approximately 285 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (both in Dwikora V) 
Bombay Burma Trading 
Corporation, Limited; 
India 
PT Indo Java Rubber Planting 
and Trading Company; 1907 
owned Tjiseru/Tjipari estate in Central Java 
(rubber, 2557 ha, approximately 2400 
employees) 
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Dwikora V); in 
December 1965 sold to GOI 
for $450,000  
The Borneo Company, 
Limited;  British PT Haboko Tea Company 
owned two estates in Sumatra: (i) Aek Tarum 
estate, and (ii) Haboko estate 
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (both in Dwikora II) 
British American 
Tobacco Company 
Limited;  British 
British American Tobacco 
Manufacturers (Indonesia) 
Limited;  1925 
3 cigarette manufacturing factories (in each of 
Surabaya, Cirebon, Semarang); 
approximately 4,500 employees in Indonesia;   
8 February 1964 by the 
Ministry of Peoples Industry  
British Rubber Estates 
of Java; British Kali Doeren Estates NV Djakarta 
owned 3 estates: (i) Tugusari estate 
(rubber/coffee, 1092 ha, East Java), (ii) 
Tjimenteng estate (tea/rubber, West Java), 
(iii) Tugu estate (tea/rubber, West Java); 
approximately total 2,000 employees;  
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Tugusari in Dwikora 
VI, Tjimenteng and Tugu in 
Dwikora V) 
Calico Printers 
Association Limited;  
British 
Nebritex, NV; 50% owned by 
Calico, 50% owned by a Dutch 
concern; 1941 
textile factory near Surabaya, East Java; 
estimated value (by company) was £1.0 
million 
8 February 1964 by the 
Ministry of Peoples Industry 
Caltex Oil;  American 
(joint venture between 
Standard Oil of 
California and Texaco) PT Caltex Indonesia; 1936 
oil company; primary fields located in central 
Sumatra 
19 March 1965 by the Ministry 
of Basic Industry and Mining 







Chartered Bank;  British 
same name (branch offices); 
1860s bank; branches in Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan 
26 November 1964 by the 
central bank  
Commercial Union 
Assurance Company, 
Limited;  British 
this company, plus affiliate 
company Ocean Accident & 
Guarantee Corporation, had 
branches in Indonesia   
insurance business; Commercial Union and 
Ocean Accident both had offices in Jakarta 
and Surabaya;  
late September 1963 by the 
Ministry of Finance 
(Department of Insurance and 
Revenue) 
Djember Rubber 
Estates, Limited;  British 
NV Djember Rubber Cultuur en 
Handel Maatschappij 
owned two estates: (i) Doerdjo estate, and (ii) 
Sentoel estate 
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Sentoel in Dwikora VI) 
Dunlop Rubber 
Company Limited;  
British 
Dunlop Rubber Company 
(Indonesia) Limited 
sales office in Jakarta which also oversaw 
production contract with Goodyear (under 
which Goodyear made car tires for Dunlop) 
late September 1963 by the 
Ministry for Basic Industry and 
Mining 
Eastern Sumatra 
Rubber Estates;  British 
PT Eastern Sumatra Rubber 
Estates 
owned Bukit Maradja estate in North Sumatra 
(rubber, 3247 ha, approximately 1300 
employees)  
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Dwikora III)  
Fraser & Neave;  
Singaporean 
NV Handel Maatschappij Fraser 
& Neave  
two soft drink/bottling factories, one in each of 
Jakarta and Surabaya 
8 February 1964 by the 
Ministry of Peoples Industry 
Fuchs GMBH;  West 
German PT Prodenta Indonesia; 1952 toothpaste factory in Surabaya 
18 May 1965 by the Ministry 
of Peoples Industry 
Goodyear Plantations;  
American  
NV Goodyear Sumatra 
Plantations Company; 1917 
owned two rubber estates in North Sumatra 
(Wingfoot (16,000 ha) and Dolok Merangir 
(6,000 ha)); approximately 10,000 employees 
26 February 1965 by the  
Ministry of Estates (Ampera I); 
in May 1966 sold to GOI for 
$4.5 million  
Goodyear Tire Factory;  
American 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Company, Limited; 1935 
tire factory in Bogor, West Java; 
approximately 1,200 employees  
22 March 1965 by Ministry of 
Basic Industry and Mining 
Guthrie & Co, Limited;  
Singaporean/British same name; 1913  
estate management firm; main office in 
Medan  
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 









American   unknown; 1910s 
owned Kwala Gunung estate in North 
Sumatra 
26 February 1965 by the 
Ministry of Estates; (business 
may have been sold to private 
Indonesian investor) 
Holding Jabelmat, SA;  
Belgian 
four subsidiaries: (i) PT 
Perusahaan Perkebunan 
Djember Indonesia, (ii) PT 
Perusahaan Perkebunan Alicia, 
(iii) PT Perusahaan Perkebunan 
Kalitengah Indonesia, (iv) PT 
Perusahaan Perkebunan 
Melania 
owned 5 estates in West Java: (i) Widodaren 
estate, (ii) Alicia estate, (iii) Kalitengah estate, 
(iv) Melania estate, (v) Tjibuni estate (tea); 
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Widodaren and 
Kalitengah in Dwikora VI,  and 
Alicia, Melania, Tjibuni in 
Dwikora V); in December 
1965 sold to GOI for $765,000 
Indeur, SA; 
Swiss/Indonesian 
PT Filma; ex Proctor & Gamble 
(established late 1930s, sold in 
late 1963)  oil/margarine factory in Surabaya 
9 April 1965 by the Ministry of 
Peoples Industry 
Interbra, SA;  Belgian 
PT Perusahaan Bir Bintang; 
brewery established in 1931 
brewery in Surabaya (ex Heineken 
managed/operated) 
18 May 1965 by the Ministry 
of Peoples Industry 
Java Consolidated 
Estates;  British 
6 subsidiaries: (i) NV Kroewoek 
Estates, Limited, (ii) NV Cultuur 
Maatschappij Soember Mas Kali 
Padang, (iii) NV Banjoemas 
Landen, (iv) NV Pasawahan 
Rubber Company Limited, (v) 
NV Goenoengsarie 
Pengoeloeran Estates Limited, 
(vi) NV Cultuur en Mijbouw 
Maatschappij Burix;  
owned 9 estates; (i) Bajah estate in East Java 
(rubber, 1016 ha, approximately 330 
employees), (ii) Soember Mas estate in 
Malang, East Java, (iii) Bandoeardjo estate, 
(iv) Kali Minggir estate in Central Java 
(rubber, 494 ha, approximately 460 
employees),  (v) Pasawahan estate, (vi) 
Goenungsai estate in East Java, (vii) Tjaroei 
estate in East Java, (viii) Redjodadie estate in 
East Java, and (ix) Tjiboeloe estate in East 
Java; 
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Kali Minggir, Bajah, 
Tjaroei, Redjodadie in 
Dwikora V, Soember Mas and 
Goenungsai in Dwikora VI); 
Java Investment, Loan 
and Agency;  British 
two subsidiaries (i) NV 
Landbouw Maatschappij Kali 
Sepandjang, and (ii) NV Cultuur 
Maatschappij Pegundangan; 
1910 
owned two estates in East Java: (i) Kali 
Sepandjang estate (rubber, 804 ha) and (ii) 
Pegundangan estate (coffee/rubber, 1030 ha) 
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 







Plantations;  British 
NV Cultuur Maatschappij Kali 
Selogiri owned Kali Selogiri estate in East Java 
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Dwikora VII) 
Java United Plantations 
Limited;  British 
NV Cultuur Maatschappij Kali 
Klepeoh Gunung Pasang; 1909 
owned two estates in East Java: (i) Tanah 
Manis estate (coffee, 340 ha) and (ii) Gunung 
Gumitir estate (coffee, 613 ha) 
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Dwikora VII) 
Johore Para Rubber 
Company, Limited;  
British NV Tjilmoet Rubber Landen owned Cilaut estate in West Java 
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Dwikora V) 
Kali Glagah Rubber 
Company, Limited;  
British NV Kali Glagah Estate Limited 
owned two estates in East Java: (i) Kaliduren 
estate, and (ii) Kaliglagah estate 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Kaliduren in Dwikora 
VI) 
Laras (Sumatra) Rubber 
Estates, Limited;  British 
PT Perusahaan Perkebunan 
Laras Indonesia 
owned two estates: (i) Kerasan estate 
(rubber), and (ii) Bah Bajoe estate (rubber) 
(combined  3290 ha with  approximately 800 
employees) 
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Dwikora III) 
London Sumatra / 
Harrisons Crosfield  
group;  British various subsidiaries; 1906 
owned 17 estates in North Sumatra, 4 estates 
in Java and 3 estates in Sulawesi totaling 
approximately 52,000 ha (with approximately 
13,000 employees); also managed estates 
and engaged in shipping and trade 
Jakarta office and estates in 
Java and Sulawesi taken over 
in late September 1963, and 
office in Medan and estates in 
Sumatra taken over by June 
1964, in each case by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Agrarian Affairs (mostly 
Dwikora I and II) 
Maclaine Watson; 
incorporated in 
Indonesia but British 
owned Maclaine Watson NV; 1820s 
trading firm, with main office in Jakarta and 
branch offices in Semarang, Surabaya, 
Makassar, Bandjarmasin 








Company;  American NV Lebak Plantations; 1910s 
owned Pasir Koppo estate in West Java 
(rubber) 
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Dwikora V)  
Marawan (Java) Rubber 
Plantations, Limited;  
British 
NV Tjorah Mas Kepoetren 
Estates Limited 
owned two estates in East Java: (i) Tjorah 
Mas estate (rubber/coffee, 220 ha), and (ii) 
Kepoetren estate (rubber/coffee, 355 ha); 
approximately 700 combined employees 
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Dwikora VI); 
Martapoera Rubber 
Estates, Limited;  British Tanah Intan Estate Limited 
ownd Tanah Intan estate in South Kalimantan 
(1350 ha) 
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Dwikora VI) 
Motion Picture Export 
Association of America;  
American branch office 
movie distribution company; this company 
and some of its members (MGM, 20th 
Century Fox, Warner Brothers, Universal 
Pictures, United Artists, Paramount, 
Columbia Pictures) had offices in Jakarta and 
Surabaya and distributorships with inventory 
of approximately 3,000 films;  
April/May 1965 Indonesian 
army seized offices and 
inventory after takeover by 
boycott group; no official GOI 
takeover decree; thereafter 
films controlled by army and 
Censor Board 
National Cash Register 
Company;  American same name 
selling/distributing accounting machines; 
main office in Jakarta, branch offices in 
Bandung, Surabaya, Semarang and Medan 
10 April 1965 by the 
Department of Foreign Trade   
Nicholas PTY, Limited;  
Australian NASPRO 
pharmaceutical company; aspirin factory in 
Jakarta (approximately 150 employees) 
26 April 1965 by the Ministry 
of Health 
Noco Limited;  
Canadian 
PT Perusahaan Sepatu Bata; 
1935 
part of the Bata Shoe Company group; 
operated a large shoe factory in Jakarta  
17 May 1965 by the Ministry 
of Peoples Industry 
Pan American 
International Oil 
Company;  American 
Pan American Indonesian Oil 
Company; 1962 oil exploration 
19 March 1965 by the Ministry 
of Basic Industry and Mining 







Plantagen AG; Swiss 
at least 8 subsidiaries: (i) PT 
Sadang Mas, (ii) PT Maskapai 
Perkebunan Sumcana Padang 
Halaban, (iii) PT Maskapai 
Leidong West Indonesia, (iv) PT 
Maskapai Perkebunan Batu 
Lempit Indonesia, (v) PT 
Maskapai Perkebunan Indorub 
Sumberadung, (vi) PT Indragiri 
Aer Molok, (vii) NV Expl. Mij 
Soengei Lalah, and (viii) NV 
Cultuur Mij Soengei Parit; 
owned at least 11 estates: (i) Padang 
Halaban Sumcana estate in North Sumatra 
(palm oil,  7,292 ha, approximately 820 
workers), (ii) Kanopan Ulu estate in North 
Sumatra (rubber, 1655 ha, approximately 500 
workers), (iii) Malangsari estate in East Java 
(coffee), (iv) Sumberwadung estate in East 
Java (rubber/coffee), (v) Patuahwattee estate 
in West Java (tea), (vi) Gadung estate in Riau 
(rubber), (vii) Aer Molok estate in Riau 
(rubber), (viii) Sungei Sago estate in Riau 
(rubber), (ix) Djapura estate in Riau (rubber), 
(x) Sungei Lalah estate in Riau (rubber), and 
(xi) Sungei Parit estate in Riau (rubber) 
the five non-Riau estates 
taken over sometime from late 
June to December 1965 by 
the Ministry of Estates 
(Padang Halaban Sumcana 
and Kanopan Ulu estates in 
Expera I, Patuahwattee in 
Expera III), except for the 
Malangsari estate which was 
occupied by the Brawijaya 
division of the army; in 
December 1965, five non Riau 
estates sold to GOI for $1.787 
million 
Sampang (Java) Rubber 
Plantations, Limited;  
British 
NV Batam & Preanger Rubber 
Company Limited 
owned two estates in West Java: (i) Sampang 
Peundeuy estate (rubber, 691 ha), and (ii) 
Pasir Budjal estate 
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Sampang Peundeuy 
in Dwikora IV) 
Samuba, SA;  Belgian 
three subsidiaries: (i) PT 
Perusahaan Perkebunan Moesi 
Indonesia, (ii) PT Perusahaan 
Perkebunan Bajabang 
Indonesia, (iii) PT Perusahaan 
Perkebunan Musam Utjing 
owned four estates in West Java: (i) Sannah 
estate, (ii) Bajabang estate, (iii) Sungei 
Musam estate, (iv) Pasir Utjing estate 
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Sannah, Bajabang 
and Pasir Utjing in Dwikora V, 
and Sungei Musam in 
Dwikora III); in December 





 Sea Oil and General 
Corporation;  American PT Baud Indonesia; 1920s 
owned 5 estates in West Java:(i) Pamegatan 
(tea, 2365 ha, lease expired in 1959), (ii) 
Djatinangor (rubber, 962 ha, lease expired in 
1961), (iii) Tjikasungka (rubber), (iv) 
Tjarenang (tea, 1000 ha, lease for 700 
expired in 1958), and (v) Toge (rubber);   
The Tjikasungka estate and 
Toge estate were taken over 
in 1960 by the Ministry of 
Plantations and Agarian 
Affairs and put under state 
owned plantation companies 
because they were mistakenly 
believed to be Dutch; the 
other three estates were 
apparently taken over 7 April 
1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs; the Tjiksanungka and 
Toge estates were placed 
under a state plantation 
company; the Djatinangor and 
Pamegatan estates were run 
by the army on behalf of the 
Governor of West Java, and 
the Tjarenang estate was 
occupied by the public; 
Shell Oil; British PT Shell Indonesia; 1907 
oil company with primary fields located in 
South Sumatra and East Kalimantan and 
refineries in Pladju (near Palembang) and 
Balikpapan 
19 March 1965 by the Ministry 
of Basic Industry and Mining 
(later Ministry of Oil and 
Natural Gas); on 31 
December 1965 sold to GOI 







Company;  American unknown 
sewing machine assembly plant in Surabaya 
(approximately 30 employees); main 
sales/service office in Jakarta  
10 May 1965 Jakarta office 
taken over by Department of 
Foreign Trade; 18 May 1965 
Surabaya plant taken over by 
Ministry of Peoples Industry, 
then on 24 May 1965 




Plantations et de 
Finance);  Belgian 
PT Perusahaan Perkebunan 
Tolan Tiga; 1920s 
owned Perlabian estate in North Sumatra 
(palm oil, 7031 ha) 
sometime from late June to 
December 1965 by the 
Ministry of Estates (Expera I); 
in December 1965 sold to GOI 






various subsidiaries and 
companies; 1911 
owned 18 palm oil and rubber estates in Aceh 
and North Sumatra totaling approximately 
51,700 ha (with approximately 19,000 
employees) 
sometime from late June to 
December 1965 by the 
Ministry of Estates (Expera II); 
in December 1965 sold to GOI 
for $13.5 million  
Societe Anonyme de 
Gestion pour 
L'Indonesie;  French 
PT Perusahaan Perkebunan 
Montjolimo 
owned Montjolimo estate in Central Java 
(rubber, 1089 ha) 
sometime from late June to 
December 1965 by the 
Ministry of Estates (Expera 
IV); in December 1965 sold to 




Participations;  French 
PT Perusahaan Perkebunan 
Sumatra Tapanuli Selatan or PT 
Sumatap 
owned three estates in North Sumatra: (i) 
Batang Toru (rubber, 2242 ha), (ii) Malombu 
(rubber, 937 ha), and (iii) Sangkunur (2505 
ha) 
sometime from late June to 
December 1965 by the 
Ministry of Estates (Expera 
I);in December 1965, sold to 






Societe de Gestion et 
de Participation pour 
L'Asie et L'Afrique;  
French 
PT Perusahaan Perkebunan 
France Indonesia or PT Franesia 
owned six estates: (i) Tjikaso/Tjipangparang 
in West Java (rubber, 1785 ha), (ii)  Pidjor 
Koling in North Sumatra (rubber, 1255 ha), 
(iii) Tjisaga (rubber, 913 ha), (iv)  Lemah 
Neundeat in West Java, (v) Rantja Tapen in 
West Java, and (vi) Matinggeng in West 
Java;  
sometime from late June to 
December 1965 by the 
Ministry of Estates (Tjikaso in 
Expera III, Pidjor  Koling in 
Expera I, Tjisaga in Expera 
III); in December 1965 
Tjikaso, Piidjor Koling and 
Tjisaga estates sold to GOI for 
$521,000  
Stanvac Oil;  American 
(joint venture between 
Standard Oil of New 
Jersey and Socony 
Mobil Oil) PT Stanvac Indonesia; 1920s 
oil company; primary fields located in South 
and Central Sumatra, with refinery at Pladju 
(near Palembang, South Sumatra) 
19 March 1965 by the Ministry 
of Basic Industry and Mining 
(later Ministry of Oil and 
Natural Gas)  
Sumatra Anglo Dutch 
Estates, Limited;  British NV Sumatra Land Syndicate 
owned Sungei Laru estate in South Sumatra 
(rubber, 443 ha) 
sometime between February 
and June 1964 by the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Dwikora IV) 
Sun Insurance Group;  
British branch office insurance company 
sometime in 1964 by the 
Ministry of Finance 




Company, Limited;  
British 
PT Perusahaan Perkebunan 
Panigoran 
owned Panigoran estate in North Sumatra 
(rubber, 1717 ha, approximately 240 
employees) 
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Dwikora III) 
Supara Investments, 
Limited;  British 
PT Perusahaan Perkebunan 
Pangkatan Indonesia 
owned Pangkatan estate in North Sumatra 
(rubber, 3262 ha, approximately 600 
employees) 
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Dwikora III) 
Tabacofina, SA (short 
for Union Financiere 
Belge Des Tabacs);  
Belgian PT Faroka; 1920s cigarette factory in Malang, East Java 







Tanah Datar Rubber 
Estates, Limited;  British 
PT Perusahaan Perkebunan 
Tanah Datar Indonesia owned Tanah Datar estate in North Sumatra 
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Dwikora II) 
Tanah Estates Limited;  
British NV Cultuur Maatschappij Pleihari 
owned various estates in South Kalimantan 
that totalled approximately 3220 ha, including 
Arba estate and Tanah Ambungan estate 
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Dwikora VI) 
Tangoel Rubber Estates 
Limited;  British 
NV Soekokoelon Rubber 
Company Limited owned Soekokoelon estate in Java 
March 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Dwikora VI) 
Tebing Rubber Estates 
(1931) Limited;  British PT Tebing Indonesia 
owned Hevea esate in North Sumatra (703 
ha) 
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Dwikora III)  
Telegoredjo United 
Plantations, Limited;  
British 
two: (i) NV Toeren Estates, 
Limited, and (ii) PT Perusahaan 
Perkebunan Dops (owned by a 
Danish subsidiary of Telegoredjo 
United) 
owned three estates : (i) Tjondong estate in 
Java (4370 ha), (ii) Telegoredjo estate in 
Java, and (iii) Telok Pandjie estate in North 
Sumatra;  
Tjondong estate in June 1964, 
others sometime between 
February and June 1964, in 
each case by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Telegoredjo in 
Dwikora VI, Tjondong in 
Dwikora V, Telok Pandjie in 
Dwikora III) 
Timbang Deli (Sumatra) 
Rubber Company, 
Limited;  British 
PT Perusahaan Perkebunan, 
Industrie & Dagang Timbang 
Deli Indonesia 
owned Timbang Deli Serdang estate in North 
Sumatra (rubber, 1331 ha) 
31 March 1964 by the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Dwikora III) 
Tjikadu Holding Societe 
Anonyme;  Belgian 
(owned by SIPEF) 
PT Perusahaan Perkebunan 
Tjinihnih 
owned Cikadu estate in West Java (rubber, 
1314 ha) 
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Dwikora V); in 
December 1965 sold to GOI 






Tjiwangie Tea Estates, 
Limited;  British 
two: (i) Wangie Wattie Planting 
Co Limited, (ii) De Kali Baroe 
Maatschappij 
owned 3 estates in West Java: (i) Tjiwangie 
estate (tea), (ii) Kali Haroe estate, (iii) 
Tjikawoeng estate;  
sometime in 1964 by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Agrarian Affairs  
Unilever;  British five subsidiaries; 1933 
4 factories (3 (soap, margarine, and coconut 
oil) in Jakarta, and 1 (soap/toothpaste) in 
Surabaya)  
8 February 1964 by the 
Ministry of Peoples Industry 
Union Carbide 
Corporation;  American 
NV National Carbon Company 
Java Limited; 1934 
Eveready battery factory in Jakarta; about 
300 employees 
3 April 1965 by the Ministry of 
Peoples Industries 
Union Insurance Society 
of Canton;  British same name (branch office) insurance company 
unclear; taken over by the 
Ministry of Finance 
(Department of Insurance and 
Revenue) 
United Molasses 
Company Limited;  
British 
PT Java Transport and Trading 
Company 
molasses business; purchases, stores and 
exports molasses, primarily in Java; assets 
included storage tanks and plants for 
molasses in Central and East Java 
(estimated storage capacity of 120 metric 
tons);  
July 1964 by the Ministry of 
Trade 
United Rubber and 
Coffee Plantations 
(1932);  British 
NV Telok Betong Rubber, Tea 
and Coffee Estates Limited 
owned Wai Ratai estate in Lampung, 
Sumatra (10,673 ha) 
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs (Dwikora V)  
United States Rubber 
Company/Uniroyal;  
American 
PT United States Rubber 
Corporation; 1911 
owned Kisaran rubber estate in North 
Sumatra (approximately 17,500 ha with 
approximately 7,300 employees)  
26 February 1965 by the 
Ministry of Estates (Ampera 
II); in April 1966 sold to GOI 
for $4.1 million 
United Sumatra Rubber 
Estates, Limited;  British 
PT Perusahaan Perkebunan 
Tanah Abang Indonesia 
owned Tanah Abang estate in North Sumatra 
(276 ha) 
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 






JA Wattie;  British 
three subsidiaries: (i) NV Handel 
Maatschappij JA Wattie & Co 
Limited, (ii) NV Estate Supplies 
and Trading Co (Indonesia) 
Limited, and (iii) NV Handel 
Maatschappij Caldback 
Macgregor (Java) Limited; Burt 
Taylor/Ross Taylor group was 
also affiliated with this group;  
primarily estate management company with 
head office in Jakarta; also trading company 
head office in Jakarta taken 
over late September 1963, 
and Surabaya office in 
February 1964, by the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs 
        
parent name unknown; 
owned by 1 Chinese 
individual; Chinese 
NV Perusahaan Perkebunan 
Glen Falloch  
owned Glen Falloch estate in East Java 
(coffee/rubber, 911 ha) 
sometime from late June to 
December 1965 by Ministry of 
Estates; in December 1965 
sold to GOI for Rp. 1 billion in 
cash  
parent name unknown; 
owned by 5 Chinese 
individuals; Chinese 
NV Perusahaan Perkebunan dan 
Perdagangan Kadjaran  
owned Kajraran estate in Central Java 
(rubber/coffee, 1063 ha) 
sometime from late June to 
December 1965 by Ministry of 
Estates (Expera IV); in 
December 1965 sold to GOI 
for Rp. 550 million in cash 
parent name unknown;  
Swiss NVCO Kalilanang 
owned Kalilanang estate in Central Java 
(rubber, 1808 ha) 
late from June to December 
1965 by the Ministry of 
Estates (Expera IV, then in 
March 1969 transferred to 
PNP XVIII); in December 
1965, sold to GOI for Rp. 300 
million in cash 
parent name unknown; 
nation unknown NV Koffie Onderneming Tjurug owned Tjurug estate in Central Java 
sometime from February to 
June 1964 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 






parent name unknown; 
Italian PT Kina Monind 
owned Tjibatu estate near Bandung, West 
Java (tea, 1726 ha) 
sometime from late June to 
December 1965 by the 
Ministry of Estates (Expera 
III); in December 1965 sold to 
GOI for $500,000 
parent name unknown; 
Malaysian NV Handel Mij Hok Tong 
rubber remilling business; owned four 
factories, one at each of Palembang, Djambi, 
Pontianak, and Bandjarmasin 
late 1963 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs; Palembang, Pontaniak 
and Bandjarmasin factories 
operated by BPU PPN Karet;  
Djambi factory 'rented to' PT 
Windu, a private company; 
parent name unknown;  
Malaysian NV Hock Lie 
rubber remilling business; owned four 
factories, one at each of Pulau Bjajan Medan, 
Teluk Nibung, Pantauprapat and Sibolga 
late October 1963 by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Agrarian Affairs; Pulau Bjajan 
Medan factory operated by 
BPU PPN Karet; Teluk Nibung 
factory operated by PT Cita, 
Ltd.;  Rantauprapat factory 
'rented to' PT Teluk Harapan 
Baru, a private company;  
Sibolga factory 'rented to' PT 
Piola, a private company; 
parent name unknown;  
Malaysian NV Sunan Rubber 
rubber remilling business; factory in 
Palembang 
late October 1963 by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Agrarian Affairs; factory 
'rented to' NV Metro Trading 






parent name unknown;  
Malaysian Sumatra Rubber Company 
rubber remilling business; factory in 
Palembang 
late October 1963 by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Agrarian Affairs; factory 
operated first by PT Peksin 
and then by GAKKAS rubber 
cooperative 
parent name unknown;  
Malaysian NV Remco 
rubber remilling business; factory in 
Palembang 
late October 1963 by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Agrarian Affairs; factory 
'rented to' the Dasaad Musin 
concern (private) 
parent name unknown;  
Malaysian Fa Ngee Hua & Co rubber remilling business;  factory in Djambi 
late October 1963 by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Agrarian Affairs; factory 
operated by PT Tribina Karya 
parent name unknown;  
Malaysian NV Guan Joo Long rubber remilling business; factory in Djambi 
late October 1963 by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Agrarian Affairs; factory 
'operated by PT Cinpex 
parent name unknown;  
Malaysian NV Setjurai 
rubber remilling business; factory in 
Pangkalan Brandan  
late October 1963 by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Agrarian Affairs; factory 
'rented to' PT Daood Djafar, a 
private company 
parent name unknown;  
Malaysian NV Seng Lie rubber remilling business; factory in Medan 
late October 1963 by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Agrarian Affairs; factory 






parent name unknown;  
Malaysian 
NV Cultuur Handel en Industrie 
Mij Remifa 
rubber remilling business; two factories, one 
in each of Palembang and Djambi; 
late October 1963 by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Agrarian Affairs; Palembang 
factory 'rented to' NV Rahman 
Tamin, a private company; 
Djambi factory operated by PT 














Batu Gingging (London Sumatra/Harrisons & Crosfield) 
Bagerpang/Namu Rambai/Sungei Merah (London Sumatra/Harrisons & Crosfield) 
Rambung Sialang (London Sumatra/Harrisons & Crosfield) 
Sungei Rampah (London Sumatra/Harrisons & Crosfield) 
Turanggie  (London Sumatra/Harrisons & Crosfield) 
Bungara  (London Sumatra/Harrisons & Crosfield) 
Namu Tongan  (London Sumatra/Harrisons & Crosfield) 
Pulau Rambung (London Sumatra/Harrisons & Crosfield) 





Gunung Melayu (London Sumatra/Harrisons & Crosfield) 
Aek Tarum  (Borneo Company Limited) 
Haboko  (Borneo Company Limited) 
Nagodang  (London Sumatra/Harrisons & Crosfield) 
Sungei Rumbija (London Sumatra/Harrisons & Crosfield) 
Bah Lias  (London Sumatra/Harrisons & Crosfield) 
Dolok   (London Sumatra/Harrisons & Crosfield) 
Sungei Bedjankar (London Sumatra/Harrisons & Crosfield) 
Tanah Datar  (Tanah Datar Rubber Estates) 
Si Bulan  (London Sumatra/Harrisons & Crosfield) 





Sungei Birung  (Bandar Property Holdings) 
Bandar Pinang (Bandar Property Holdings) 
Bukit Maradja  (Eastern Sumatra Rubber Estates) 
Pangkatan  (Supara Investments) 
Greahan  (Anglo Sumatra Rubber Company) 
Tanah Abang   (United Sumatra Rubber Estates) 
Kerasan  (Laras (Sumatra) Rubber Estates) 
Bah Baju   (Laras (Sumatra) Rubber Estates) 
Rambung  (Ampat (Sumatra) Rubber Estate) 
Telok Pandji  (Telegoredjo United Plantations) 
Panigoran  (Sungei Buaya (Sumatra) Rubber) 
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Tandjung Pasir/Situngir (unknown) 
Hevea   (Tebing Rubber Estates) 
Timbang Deli Serdang  (Timbang Deli (Sumatra) Rubber Company) 





Bukanegara  (P&T Lands) 
Djalupang  (P&T Lands) 
Kassomalang  (P&T Lands) 
Manjingsal/Tjigarukgak (P&T Lands) 
Pasir Bungur  (P&T Lands) 
Pasir Muntjang (P&T Lands) 
Sariredja  (P&T Lands) 
Serangsari  (P&T Lands) 
Subang  (P&T Lands) 
Sukaredja  (P&T Lands) 
Sumurbarang  (P&T Lands) 
Tambakan  (P&T Lands) 
Tjiater   (P&T Lands)  
Tjipeundeuj  (P&T Lands) 
Wangunredja  (P&T Lands) 
Gunung Tjembaka (P&T Lands) 
Kalimas  (P&T Lands) 
Neglasari  (P&T Lands) 
Tjukul   (P&T Lands) 
Sampang Peundeuj (Sampang Java Rubber Plantations) 





Wai Ratai  (United Rubber and Coffee) 
Alicia   (Holding Jabelmat) 
Melania  (Holding Jabelmat) 
Sanna   (Samuba) 
Tjondong  (Telegoredjo United Plantations) 
Tjilaut   (Johore Para Rubber) 
Bajah   (Java Consolidated Estates) 
Tugu   (British Rubber Estates of Java) 
Tjimenteng  (British Rubber Estates of Java) 
Kertasari  (London Sumatra/Harrisons & Crosfield) 
Djasinga  (London Sumatra/Harrisons & Crosfield) 
Tjisadang  (unknown) 
Pasir Koppo  (Manhattan Securities) 
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Tjikadu  (Tjikadu Holding/SIPEF) 
Bajabang  (Samuba) 
Pasir Utjang  (Samuba) 
Tjibuni  (Holding Jabelmat) 
Tjiseru/Tjipari  (Bombay Burma Trading) 
Tjarui   (Java Consolidated Estates) 
Redjodadi  (Java Consolidated Estates) 
Kali Minggir  (Java Consolidated Estates)   
Biting/Kebonroto (Biting Rubber Estates) 
Tjurug   (NV Koffie Onderneming Tjurug) 
Balagiri  (London Sumatra/Harrisons & Crosfield) 
Balombessi  (London Sumatra/Harrisons & Crosfield) 





Telegoredjo  (Telegoredjo United Plantations) 
Gunungsari  (Java Consolidated Estates) 
Sumber Mas  (Java Consolidated Estates) 
Kaliduren  (Kali Glagah Rubber Company) 
Soekokoelon  (Tangoel Rubber Estates) 
Tugusari  (British Rubber Estates of Java) 
Sentoel  (Djember Rubber Estates) 
Keputren  (Marawan (Java) Rubber Plantations) 
Tjorah Mas  (Marawan (Java) Rubber Plantations) 
Widodaren  (Holding Jabelmat) 
Kalitengah  (Holding Jabelmat) 
Sumberwuni/Anim Sand I-IV  (London Sumatra/Harrisons & Crosfield) 
Treba Sala  (London Sumatra/Harrisons & Crosfield) 
Tanah Intan  (Martapoera Rubber Estates) 





Tanah Manis  (Java United Plantations) 
Gunung Gumitir (Java United Plantations) 
Sumber Tengah (Amalgamated Rubber and Industrial Products) 
Soember Ajoe  (Amalgamated Rubber and Industrial Products) 
Poerwodjojo  (Amalgamated Rubber and Industrial Products) 
Pegundangan  (Java Investment, Loan and Agency) 
Kali Sepandjang (Java Investment, Loan and Agency) 







Perlabian  (SIPEF) 
Pidjor Koling  (Societe de Gestion et de Participation pour L‘Asia et L‘Afrique) 
Batang Toru  (Societe Anonyme Plantations Indonesiannes & Participations) 
Malombu  (Societe Anonyme Plantations Indonesiannes & Participations) 
Sangkunur  (Societe Anonyme Plantations Indonesiannes & Participations) 
Padang Halaban Sumcana (Plantagen AG)   
Kanopan Ulu  (Plantagen AG) 
 
 
Expera II/PPN Ex-SOCFIN. 
 
Medang Ara  (SOCFIN) 
Silabuhan  (SOCFIN) 
Lae Butar  (SOCFIN) 
Seumanjam  (SOCFIN) 
Tripa   (SOCFIN) 
Meureboh  (SOCFIN) 
Seunangan  (SOCFIN) 
Sungei Liput  (SOCFIN) 
Tandjung Maria (SOCFIN) 
Bangun Bandar (SOCFIN) 
Negeri Lama  (SOCFIN) 
Lidah Tanah  (SOCFIN) 
Aek Loba  (SOCFIN) 
Aek Pamiente  (SOCFIN) 
Mata Pao  (SOCFIN) 
Lima Puluh  (SOCFIN) 
Tanah Gambus (SOCFIN) 





Tjibatu   (Kina Monind) 
Tjikaso  (Societe de Gestion et de Participation pour L‘Asia et L‘Afrique) 
Tjisaga  (Societe de Gestion et de Participation pour L‘Asia et L‘Afrique) 





Montjolimo  (Societe Anomyme de Gestion pour L‘Indonnesie) 
Kalilanang  (NVCO Kalilanang) 





Ampera I (later PPN Karet XVII). 
 
Wingfoot  (Goodyear) 
Dolok Merangir (Goodyear) 
 
 
Ampera II (later PPN Karet XVIII). 
 
Kisaran  (US Rubber) 
 
 
Occupied by Brawijaya (East Java) division of army: 
 






List of Archives Consulted: 
 
AEPA  Anglo Eastern Plantation Archives, London, England 
ANRI Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (National Archives of the Republic of 
Indonesia), Jakarta, Indonesia 
BKS-PPS Badan Kerja Sama Perusahaan Perkebunan Sumatra (Sumatra Planters 
Association)(ex AVROS), Medan, Indonesia 
GYA  Goodyear Company Archives, University of Akron, Ohio, USA 
HI  Hoover Institute Archives, Palo Alto, California, USA 
LBJL  Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas, USA 
PDH Pusat Dokumentasi Hukum (Center for Legal Documents), Jakarta, 
Indonesia 
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UKNA United Kingdom National Archives, Kew, London, England 
USNACP United States National Archives, College Park, Maryland, USA 
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